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Abstract 
The restructuring of state-owned utilities in the power sector has been an ongoing trend for 
over three decades, with many countries adopting market-oriented reforms. One of the main 
expectations why developing countries embarked on power sector reform was based on the 
assumption that reforms would improve efficiency and enhance productivity levels within the 
industry. 
This study seeks to verify the impact of market-oriented reform in the power sector, with a 
specific focus on the African experience. The project uses data on 30 selected African 
countries from the World Bank Development Indicators, the African Development Bank, the 
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), the International Energy Agency (IEA), the 
Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Database (AICD), and the Private Participation 
Infrastructure database (PPI), to construct datasets enabling us to complete panel, cross-
sectional data and cross-country analyses for electricity reform spanning the period from 
1989 to 2014.   
In Africa, almost without exception, governments have amended their electricity acts in order 
to allow for greater private sector participation. In many cases the motivation to adopt 
market-oriented reforms have been strengthened by World Bank and other financial donors’ 
recommendations to do so. Historically, Independent Power Producers (IPP’s) were 
introduced as private electricity generators, to increase power generation. The IPPs normally 
signed purchase agreements with the state-owned utilities to buy electricity as a single buyer. 
The most common form of IPPs in the region are Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT) and 
Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) enterprises. Multinational corporations such as Electricite de 
France (Edf), US-based AES Corporation and Germany’s Siemens have played a dominant 
role in many countries in the region.  
The first empirical chapter finds that each individual reform variable (on its own) is not 
sufficient to improve power generation performance. Instead, reform tends to be more 
effective when they are combined. So, for countries to obtain first-best outcomes in terms of 
electricity market reform, it is important to introduce more than one reform at a time in the 
reform process.  
The second empirical chapter measures the electricity distribution efficiency trends of 231 
electricity distribution companies in 16 African countries over a period of fourteen years 
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(2000 -2013).  The analysis is based on a stochastic distance function approach, assuming 
that the number of outages (a quality of service proxy) enters into the company’s production 
function as an underdesirable input, i.e. an imperfect substitute for (the lack of) maintenance 
activities and capital investment. This enables identification of the sources of technical 
inefficiency and the underlying trade-off between quality of service and other inputs/costs 
faced by the operators. Using a multiple output translog input distance technology, we found 
that exogenous factors affect estimated technical efficiency levels significantly. Our result 
also shows that incorporating quality of service is important in helping to benchmark 
performance of the different electricity distribution companies.  
The third empirical chapter explores the notion that institution structures stimulate private 
sector investment. We used cross-sectional data for twenty-eight African countries between 
1990 and 2014 to test empirically the impact of political institutions, market-oriented reforms 
and macroeconomic stability on private sector investment in the electricity market. The 
results generated from our models indicate that political institutions matter, but market-
oriented reform and macroeconomic stability are insignificant. We also found private sector 
investment is greatly influenced by an increase in the real GDP per capita of a country. 
Somewhat surprisingly, our results suggest that African countries with a high corruption 
perception index attract more private sector investment in their electricity market. 
Power sector reform in African countries is characterized by amending the electricity law (so 
as to attract IPPs), the corporatization of service provision, and the creation of new 
institutions (such as regulatory authorities) to support reform activities. There is currently no 
strong commitment to fully embark on privatization and unbundling across the region, as 
governments prefer to engage in public-private partnership. This system promotes a hybrid 
structure where state-owned vertically integrated power companies still dominate, acting as a 
single buyer. Governments and policy makers in this region should therefore adopt reforms 
that acknowledge local conditions, deepening their involvement in market-oriented reforms 
where necessary, in order to achieve first-best outcomes.   
 
 
T a b l e  o f  C o n t e n t s                                                 P a g e  | v 
 
Table of contents 
 
Title page ................................................................................................................................................ ii 
Abstract .................................................................................................................................................. iii 
Table of contents ..................................................................................................................................... v 
Declaration ............................................................................................................................................. x 
List of tables ........................................................................................................................................... xi 
List of figures ........................................................................................................................................ xii 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................... xiii 
Dedication ............................................................................................................................................ xiv 
Chapter 1 ............................................................................................................................................... 1 
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Background and Motivation of study ............................................................................................ 1 
1.2 Scope of study ............................................................................................................................... 6 
1.3 Sources of empirical data .............................................................................................................. 6 
1.4 Structure of the study .................................................................................................................... 7 
1.5 Contribution to the existing literature ........................................................................................... 7 
Chapter 2 ............................................................................................................................................. 11 
Literature Review ............................................................................................................................... 11 
2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 11 
2.2 Why restructure, or change the status quo in the Electricity Market? ........................................ 13 
2.3 Framework for the study of electricity industry reforms ............................................................ 14 
2.4 What does theoretical evidence suggest on the electricity market reform? ................................ 15 
2.4.1 Sector specific market power theories ................................................................................. 15 
2.4.2 The theory of Contestable markets ...................................................................................... 16 
2.4.3 Incentive Regulation theory ................................................................................................. 17 
2.5 Regulatory reforms towards rules-based regulation ................................................................... 19 
2.5.1 The theory of Monopolistic Bottlenecks .............................................................................. 19 
2.5.2 Monopolistic bottlenecks and the concept of essential facilities ......................................... 21 
2.6 Disaggregated monopolistic bottleneck regulation ..................................................................... 21 
2.6.1 The need to regulate third party access ................................................................................ 21 
2.6.2 Monopolistic bottlenecks in the transmission and distribution networks. ............................... 22 
2.7 Reform regulatory scheme and private participation .................................................................. 23 
2.7.1 The need to privatise and regulate third-party access to network markets ......................... 23 
2.7.2 General description of the Principal-Agent Model .............................................................. 24 
T a b l e  o f  C o n t e n t s                                                 P a g e  | vi 
 
2.7.3 Strengths and weaknesses of Principal-Agent Model .......................................................... 25 
2.7.4 Agency theory, Principal-Agent problems and Electricity industry regulation ................... 26 
2.8 What does empirical evidence suggest on the Electricity Market-oriented reform? .................. 27 
2.8.1 The Electricity Market ......................................................................................................... 28 
2.8.2 The Liberalization Process .................................................................................................. 29 
2.8.3 Establishing Regulatory frameworks in the Electricity supply industry .............................. 32 
2.8.4 Creating Competition in Electricity Market reform ............................................................. 33 
2.8.5 Unbundling within the Electricity Market............................................................................ 36 
2.9 The Econometric study of electricity market reforms................................................................. 38 
2.10 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 44 
Chapter 3 ............................................................................................................................................. 46 
The economics of electricity market reform: a cross country analysis .......................................... 46 
3.1. Overview of Electricity market reforms in Latin American countries ....................................... 46 
3.2 Electricity Market reform in European Countries ....................................................................... 56 
3.3 Electricity Market reform in North America .............................................................................. 66 
3.4 Electricity Market reforms in Australia and New Zealand ......................................................... 69 
3.5 Electricity Market reforms in Asian Countries ........................................................................... 71 
3.6 Overview of Electricity Market reforms in African countries .................................................... 76 
3.7 The Power sector in Africa: Country Specifics........................................................................... 77 
3.7.1 Status of the Power Sector in Africa .................................................................................... 82 
3.8 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 113 
Chapter 4 ........................................................................................................................................... 116 
To what extent does liberalisation policy impact on electricity generation? A panel study of 
African countries power sector performance. ................................................................................ 116 
4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 116 
4.2 Overview of Power Generation Challenges in Africa. .............................................................. 119 
4.3 Studies on the restructuring of Power Sector ............................................................................ 121 
4.5 Private participation in the electricity generation sector in Africa............................................ 124 
4.6 Methodology ............................................................................................................................. 127 
4.6.1 The Data Set ....................................................................................................................... 128 
4.6.2. Core Indicators and Variable Derivation .......................................................................... 129 
4.7 Model Specification .................................................................................................................. 130 
4.7.1 A Priori expectations .......................................................................................................... 131 
4.8 Research Hypotheses ................................................................................................................ 132 
4.9 Preliminary evidence ................................................................................................................ 134 
4.10 Empirical Results and Analysis .............................................................................................. 137 
4.10.1 Total net Electricity Generation per capita ...................................................................... 139 
4.10.2 Installed Generation capacity per capita .......................................................................... 141 
T a b l e  o f  C o n t e n t s                                                 P a g e  | vii 
 
4.10.3 Electricity generation per employee................................................................................. 142 
4.10.4 Generation Capacity Utilization ....................................................................................... 144 
4.11 Sensitivity Analyses ................................................................................................................ 145 
4.11.1 The Importance of the Republic of South Africa in the Region ...................................... 146 
4.12. Discussion .............................................................................................................................. 148 
4.13 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 149 
Chapter 5 ........................................................................................................................................... 151 
Measuring technical efficiency in African countries electricity distribution companies: a 
stochastic input distance function approach. ................................................................................. 151 
5.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 151 
5.2 The African Electricity Reform and Distribution Networks ............................................... 154 
5.2.1 Republic of South Africa ................................................................................................... 155 
5.2.2. The Arab Republic of Egypt ............................................................................................. 157 
5.2.3. Nigeria (Federal Republic) ................................................................................................ 157 
5.3. Empirical Literature Review .................................................................................................... 160 
5.4. Statistical Approaches towards Measuring Efficiency ............................................................ 168 
5.4.1. Data Envelopment Analysis .............................................................................................. 169 
5.4.2 Free Disposal Hull (FDH) .................................................................................................. 170 
5.4.3. Corrected Ordinary Least Squares (COLS) ...................................................................... 171 
5.4.4 Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) ................................................................................... 171 
5.5. Technique/Approach selected .................................................................................................. 172 
5.6. Model Specification ................................................................................................................. 173 
5.6.1 Stochastic input distance function ...................................................................................... 175 
5.6.2 Exogenous Factors ............................................................................................................. 173 
5.7. Dataset, choice of variables and Variables Description ........................................................... 176 
5.7.1 Choice of Variables ............................................................................................................ 177 
5.7.2 Input variables .................................................................................................................... 177 
5.7.3 Output Variables ................................................................................................................ 177 
5.7.4 Exogenous Factors ............................................................................................................. 178 
5.7.5. Data Structure and Countries Comparisons ...................................................................... 180 
5.8. Methodology ............................................................................................................................ 183 
5.8.1 Model 1 (General) .............................................................................................................. 184 
5.8.2 Model 2 (Traditional) ........................................................................................................ 184 
5.8.3 Model 3 (Quality of Service) .............................................................................................. 184 
5.8.4 Model 4 (Comprehensive) .................................................................................................. 184 
5.9. Tests of Hypotheses ................................................................................................................. 184 
5.9.1 Correlation Analysis of Input and Output Variables .......................................................... 185 
5.10. Estimation, Results, and Discussion ...................................................................................... 186 
T a b l e  o f  C o n t e n t s                                                 P a g e  | viii 
 
5.10.1 Efficiency Estimates ......................................................................................................... 187 
5.10.2 Robustness Check ............................................................................................................ 190 
5.10.3    Panel Data Models ........................................................................................................ 192 
5.10.4 The Impact of Market-Oriented reform Policies on the EDISCOs Performance ............. 194 
5.11 Discussion ............................................................................................................................... 198 
5.11.1 General Models Analysis and improvement path of inefficient EDISCOs ....................... 198 
5.11.2 Benchmarking of Selected Countries in the Region ........................................................ 199 
5.12 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 201 
Chapter 6 ........................................................................................................................................... 202 
Similar situations, different Outcomes: Explaining the factors influencing PPPs-Investment 
inflow in the African Electricity Market ......................................................................................... 202 
6.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 202 
6.2 Public-Private Partnership in Electricity Market ...................................................................... 204 
6.2.1 Patterns of PPP Activity ..................................................................................................... 206 
6.3 The Africa Electricity Market and Private-Public Partnership Investment Flow trend ............ 210 
6.3.1. Private Sector Investment in the Electricity Market in Africa .......................................... 211 
6.4 Conceptual framework, literature review and Hypothesis ........................................................ 212 
6.5. Factors contributing PPP Investment inflow into the Power Sector ........................................ 213 
6.5.1. Market-Oriented Reform ................................................................................................... 213 
6.5.2 Government Commitment .................................................................................................. 214 
6.5.3 Institutional Capacity ......................................................................................................... 214 
6.5.4 Macroeconomic Stability ................................................................................................... 215 
6.6. Methodology and Model Specification .................................................................................... 216 
6.6.1 Classification of Sample Countries .................................................................................... 217 
6.6.2 Dependent Variable (Y) ..................................................................................................... 217 
6.6.3 Explanatory Variables (𝑋𝑖) ............................................................................................... 218 
6.6.4 Control Variables (𝑍𝑟𝑖) ..................................................................................................... 219 
6.7. Preliminary evidence ............................................................................................................... 221 
6.7.1 Overview of dataset and countries comparisons ................................................................ 221 
6.8 Estimation and Empirical Results ............................................................................................. 225 
6.8.1 Empirical Results ............................................................................................................... 225 
6.8.2 Market-oriented reform ...................................................................................................... 227 
6.8.3 Macroeconomics stability and control variables ............................................................... 228 
6.8.4 Unified Models ..................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 
6.8.5 The Interaction Effect Models ............................................................................................ 228 
6.9. Robustness Check .................................................................................................................... 228 
6.10 Discussion and Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 231 
T a b l e  o f  C o n t e n t s                                                 P a g e  | ix 
 
Chapter 7 ........................................................................................................................................... 232 
Conclusion and policy recommendations for further research .................................................... 232 
7.1 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 232 
7.2 Have the research questions been answered? ........................................................................... 233 
7.3 Policy consequences of our results ........................................................................................... 234 
7.4 Policy recommendation ............................................................................................................ 235 
7.5 Limitation of the research ......................................................................................................... 237 
7.6 Some recommendations for further research ............................................................................ 238 
References .......................................................................................................................................... 240 
 
D e c l a r a t i o n                                                         P a g e  | x 
 
Declaration 
Whilst registered as a candidate for the above degree, I have not been registered for any other 
research award. The results and conclusions embodied in this thesis are the work of myself, 
the named candidate, and have not been submitted for any other academic award  
Thesis word count: 75, 073 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 L i s t  o f  t a b l e s                                                       P a g e  | xi 
 
List of tables 
Table 3.1: Drivers of Electricity market liberalisation …………………………………………………………………47 
Table 3.2: The Production Of Electricity By The Dominant Companies In The Nordic Area (2001). ................. 62 
Table 3.3: Major Legislative Changes In The United States Electricity Supply Industry. ................................... 67 
Table 3.3: Summary Of The Status Of Electricity Restructuring By Different States In The Us. ......................... 68 
Table 3.5: The Structure Of The Canadian Electricity Market ............................................................................ 69 
Table 3.6:  Split Of New Zealand Electricity Corporation (Ecnz) ....................................................................... 70 
Table 3.7: Year Of Restructuring/Policy Change For Asian Electricity Supply Industries ................................. 71 
Table 3.8: Status Of Electricity Market Reform In The India States .................................................................... 74 
Table 3.9: Performance Indicators Of Power Sector Reform In Africa ............................................................... 77 
Table 3.10: Electricity Reform Timeline In 30 African Countries ........................................................................ 78 
Table 3.11: Current Market Conditions In The African Power Sector (2013). .................................................... 79 
Table 4.1: Developing Regions Installed Generation (Million Kilowatts) 1990-2012 ...................................... 121 
Table 4.2: The Variables Description ................................................................................................................ 129 
Table 4.3: Descriptive Summary Of The Power Generation Performance Indicators ....................................... 135 
Table 4.4: Descriptive Statistics Of The Performance Indicators And Reform Variables ................................. 136 
Table 4.5: The Estimation Results Output .......................................................................................................... 138 
Table 4.6: Estimation Results Without Republic Of South Africa ...................................................................... 147 
Table 5.1:  Electricity Distribution Sector In Selected African Countries, (2013) ............................................. 159 
Table 5.2: A Summary Review Of Cross-Country Studies .................................................................................. 165 
Table 5.3: Data And Variables Description ....................................................................................................... 179 
Table 5.4: Descriptive Statistics Of Variables ................................................................................................... 180 
Table 5.5: Geometric Summary Statistics, Average Country Value (2000 – 2013) ........................................... 182 
Table 5.6: Model Specification And Variables Employed For Analysis............................................................. 183 
Table 5.7: Correlation Outcome Between Input And Output Variables ............................................................. 186 
Table 5.8: Estimated Results Of Parameters Of The Input Distance Production Function On Technical 
Efficiency ................................................................................................................................................... 189 
Table 5.9: Estimated Result Of Parameters Of The Input Distance Production Function With South Africa ... 191 
Table 6.1: A Typology Of Ppps Projects In The Power Sector .......................................................................... 207 
Table 6.2: Type Of Ppps Investment In The Power Sector (1991 To 2015) ....................................................... 208 
Table 6.3: Classification Of 28 African Countries According To Income Levels (2014) ................................... 218 
Table 6.4: Dataset Variables Description .......................................................................................................... 220 
Table 6.5: Correlation Of The Explanatory Variables ....................................................................................... 222 
Table 6.6: Average Variables Summary Statistics And Country Ranking (1991 -2014) .................................... 224 
Table 6.7: Factors Determining Private Sector Investment In Africa ................................................................ 226 
Table 6.8: Interaction Effect Model ............................................................... ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. 
Table 6.9: The Estimation Outcome Without South Africa Of The Factors Determining Private Sector 
Investment In Africa ................................................................................................................................... 230 
Table 6.10: Interaction Effect Model With South Africa ................................ ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. 
 
 
 
L i s t  o f  f i g u r e s                                                     P a g e  | xii 
 
List of figures 
Figure 2.1: Electricity Network Of Generation, Transmission, Distribution And Supply ................................... 12 
Figure 2.2: Structure, Conduct And Performance Of Electricity Sector Reform ........... ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT 
DEFINED. 
Figure 3.1: Labour Productivity Of Distribution And Supply Businesses In Brazil (1991 -2000 ........................ 52 
Figure 3.2: Figure 3.2: Private Investment In Electricity Power Sector In Latin America, 1984 -2011(As A 
Percentage Of The Average Gross Fixed Capital Formation). ................................................................... 56 
Figure 3.3: Structure Of Electricity Industry At Restructuring In The United Kingdom ..................................... 60 
Figure 3.4: Share Of Installed Capacity In Africa (2014) ................................................................................... 76 
Figure 4.1: Total Electricity Net Generation (Billion Kilowatt-Hours) In 2012 ............................................... 120 
Figure 4.2: Electricity Installed Capacities (Million Kilowatts)........................................................................ 120 
Figure 4.3: Electricity Generation Projects 1990 -2012 ................................................................................... 125 
Figure 4.4: Sources Of Electricity Generation In Africa 2011 .......................................................................... 126 
Figure 4.5: Time series plots for the key performance indictors …………………….………………… 133 
Figure 4.6: Comparing Africa Region Total Net Electricity Generation To That Of South Africa ................... 145 
Figure 4.7: Comparing Installed Capacity Between Africa Region And South Africa ...................................... 146 
Figure 5.1: Map Of Regional Power Distribution Lines In Africa Region ........................................................ 155 
Figure 5.2: Length Of Distribution Network Lines In 2013 ............................................................................... 156 
Figure 5.3: Efficiency Frontier Measurement Methods ..................................................................................... 169 
Figure 5.4: The Input Distance Function And The Input Combination ............................................................. 173 
Figure 5.5: Distribution Losses As % Of Total Output Sent To Customers (2000 - 2013) ................................ 200 
Figure 6.1: Figure 6.1: World Trends For Ppp Projects And Total Investment From 1991 To 2015. .............. 205 
Figure 6.2: Regional Decomposition Of Projects And Investments In The Power Sector ................................. 206 
Figure 6.3: Type Of Ppps Investment In The Power Sector (1991 To 2015) ..................................................... 211 
 
 
A c k n o w l e d g e m e n t s                                                P a g e  | xiii 
 
Acknowledgements 
I thank God Almighty for his protection, provision, and guidance throughout my stay in this 
institution and in the course of writing this thesis. I am indebted to a number of individuals 
and institutions without whose encouragement, support, and suggestions, this piece of work 
would not have been completed. 
First, I am grateful to my supervisory team led by Professor Andy Thorpe, for their scholarly 
disposition and untiring efforts which lightened my task and facilitated the completion of this 
project. 
My special thanks to my beloved wife (Joy Chinelo) for her love, support, motivation, and 
encouragement in the course of my Ph.D. study, and to my lovely kids (Jessica and 
Christabel) for their patience and wonderful smiles. 
I am most grateful to my beloved mother, brothers (Anthony, Chukwuma, and Ejiuwa), sister 
Rose and sister, in-laws, nieces, and nephews for their prayers, support, and encouragement. 
I will like to extend my sincere gratitude to the Head and Associate Head of the Economics 
and Finance Subject Group, Faculty of Business & Law and also to the Principal and 
Academic Manager of International College Portsmouth (ICP) for the opportunity given to 
me to serve. 
My profound appreciation to friends and colleagues at the Ph.D. office (3.09 Portland 
Building). 
Finally, I will like to express my gratitude to the International Association of Energy 
Economics (IAEE) for sponsoring my conference trip to Perth, Australia. 
 
 
A  t y p i c a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  A f r i c a n  p o w e r  s e c t o r              P a g e  | xiv 
 
Dedication 
I dedicate this piece of work to my late son (Ifeanyichukwu Nworie Junior), who died 
shortly after birth at Princess Anne Hospital, Southampton on 16th March, 2015. This is my 
special tribute to your struggle to live, but it was not to be. You have a special place in my 
heart. 
Rest in peace. 
I n t r o d u c t i o n                                                         P a g e  | 1 
 
Chapter 1 
 Introduction 
The innovation of the incandescent light bulb by Thomas Edison in 1879 has transformed our 
way of life. Electricity is an essential source of energy; has helped consumers to satisfy 
human wants, in powering various machines that help, either directly or indirectly to produce 
consumer goods. We are not aware of any situation where electricity is directly consumed by 
human beings to satisfy their wants. Consequently, the demand for electricity always has to 
be a derived demand, derived from the goods and services, which are directly consumed by 
human beings and produced with its help. 
Electricity is an essential commodity because its generation and consumption have to be 
concurrent and it cannot be economically stored. Another characteristic of electricity is that 
its demand differs in terms of hourly, daily, weekly, monthly and yearly basis. Thus as it is a 
non-durable good, ways to improve its quality of services becomes necessary.  
1.1 Background and Motivation of study 
Thirty years have passed since the first electricity market reform was introduced and there is 
now a need for critical/detailed evaluation and analysis of its economic importance and 
performance, especially in developing countries. It is therefore pertinent to examine the 
challenges, and the evidence in support and against the logic of the market-oriented  reform 
in the electricity market as mentioned by various scholars [Bacon et al. (2002, Besant-Jones 
(2006), Eberhard and Gratwick (2005 & 2013), Eberhard et al. (2008), Jamasb and Pollitt 
(2005), Pollitt (2008, 2009a,b,); Zhang et.al (2008), Kirkpatrick et al. (2006), Felder et 
al(2007), Sioshansi (2006a, 2006b, & 2008); Joskow (2006, 2008); and Kesides (2012)]. The 
existing differences in electricity supply industry models reflect differing views on the 
effectiveness of market-oriented reform in the power sector. In reality, the marginal benefit of 
each reform/restructuring must more than compensate for the marginal cost of such reform if 
it is to be considered effective or successful. 
In the last three decades, we have witnessed an increase in the number of countries adopting 
different power sector reforms (such as regulation, privatisation, access of independent power 
producers to the generation sector and unbundling). Starting from the largest (such as China), 
to the smallest (in the case of Bolivia), many have significantly adopted a type of electricity 
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reform that suits their own needs, conditions and circumstances. Some involve privatization, 
third party access to transmission networks, independent power producers’ access to the 
generation sector, unbundling and the creation of a regulatory body. These market-oriented 
reforms are expected to lead to increase in terms of quality of service, efficiency and 
productivity, and also improve access and lower the price of electricity.  
Chile began a programme of restructuring and privatising her power sector in the early 1980s. 
It is regarded as the pioneer in adopting a market-oriented reform in its power sector, and 
more than half of the countries of the world have followed Chile in reforming their power 
sector. To some countries it is impossible (or undesirable) to embark on any type of 
electricity reform programme that encourages the opening up of their electricity 
production/generation, transmission and distribution or sales to private investors, whereas in 
other countries it is viewed as a welcome way to involve the private sector in the electricity 
supply industry. Thus, replacing government involvement in public enterprises with private 
enterprises in network utilities industries is on the rise in both the developed and developing 
countries.  
Nevertheless, the network utilities industry has proved to be a challenging area for the 
introduction of market-oriented reform as the industries are characterised by high capital 
investment and require long maturity periods in order to earn an acceptable return on 
investment. Moreover, service providers (such as telecommunications, electricity and water) 
that provide essential commodities are often highly visible politically, which increases the 
risk of likely government intervention if market activities become politically inconvenient 
(Victor & Heller. 2008). 
The primary economic arguments in favour of state intervention in the electricity market 
related to the nature of the industry. In the electricity sector, economies of scale and scope are 
important (i.e. horizontal integration leads to cost savings, especially with hydro and coal-
based power plants, and closer coordination reduces wastage).  
The need for embarking on electricity market reform arose from two key factors: firstly, 
dissatisfaction over the poor technical, financial and managerial performance of the state-
owned electricity corporations. Secondly, the inability of the government to finance state-
owned utilities properly. Thus a lack of investment inflow to the system, led to irregular 
maintenance in the power sector, especially among developing countries. So it has been 
difficult to replace public sector enterprises with private enterprises. Nevertheless, despite 
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these obstacles, there are some network industries that have successfully introduced market-
oriented reform (such as telecommunications). 
Scholars such as Joskow; (1997, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2006, 2008), Bacon and Besant-Jones 
(2002); Victor and Heller (2004); Babatunde (2011); Sioshansi (2006a, b); Jamasb, Newbery 
and Pollitt (2007); and Eberhard (2008) have identified: (i) The poor performance of the 
state-owned electricity industries in terms of high costs, wastage, corruption, inadequate 
expansion of access of electricity services to the large population, unreliable supply; (ii) The 
inability of the state-owned utility company to finance its own maintenance costs and 
expansion activities. Thus in general the motivation of reform in the power sector is to 
improve the efficiency of the sector, to offer lower price-cost margins and to offer a better 
quality of service.  
Power sector reform in developed and developing countries is fundamentally different in 
terms of sector conditions and institutional framework. In developed economies, the main 
reason for reform is to improve the efficiency of the sector, by encouraging inter-regional 
(cross- border) trade, sharing investment risks with the private sector and offering customers’ 
choice on their suppliers. Meanwhile, for developing countries where polices of 
industrialisation were encouraged, these have left the power sector with short-term excess 
capacity, so that new capacity was a lower priority than in most developed countries. So the 
main motivation for reform includes; (i) the poor performance of state-owned vertically 
integrated electricity companies (in terms of high costs, inadequate maintenance routes, low 
expansion of access to electricity service and unreliable power supply). (ii) Insufficient funds 
to meet the investment needs of the corporations, (iii) the need to remove subsidies in the 
electricity supply industry and channel the resources to other pressing public needs. (iv) The 
need for the sector to be competitive and contribute to growth of the economy: and lastly (v) 
the desire to raise revenue for the government through the sale of assets from the sector 
(Zhang et al. (2008) and Besant-Jones (2006)). 
Based on the expectation that market-oriented reform in the power sector will lead to higher 
access to electricity connectivity, labour productivity and better use capacity utilisation, 
developing countries embarked on electricity market reform. However, when applying 
theoretical insights into aspects of economic performance in the power sector, there are 
specific features of the sector that need to be considered. The power sector is characterised by 
large sunk cost, minimum economic scale and non-storable and massively consumed outputs. 
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These factors provide governments with the possibility of behaving opportunistically vis-à-
vis the investing companies. Knowing that, under some circumstances, governments may not 
be able to refrain from reneging on explicit or implicit agreements, private investors may 
therefore be cautious about investing in power utilities. As a result, the actual effect of 
liberalization policies on power sector performance and growth is not unambiguously clear.  
Against this background, this study aims to provide answer to the following questions: 
i). Does liberalizing the electricity power generation sector in Africa promote efficiency, 
increase productivity and higher capacity utilisation?  
ii). Do power system size, and market-oriented reforms improve the efficiency level of 
electricity distribution companies in Africa? 
iii) Lastly, do political institutions, liberalization policies and macroeconomic stability matter 
in attracting private sector investment into the electricity market in the African economies?  
Electricity market reforms are often referred to as electricity liberalization1, restructuring2 
and deregulation3. The most common types of electricity market reform are:  
Electricity law amendment: reviewing electricity acts to establish a sound legal basis for 
power sector reforms. 
Corporatization (sometimes refers to as commercialization): is the act of converting (a 
government-controlled industry or enterprise) into a limited liability corporate body often 
with the government as the main shareholder (This type is common among developing 
countries).  
Management contracts: Can be described as a situation where the management of a utility is 
contracted out to a private entity to manage for a specific period of time. The contract is 
subject to renewal or termination by both parties. 
Independent power producers (IPPs): Constitute a key type of electricity market reform. 
With demand for electricity outstripping supply among developing countries, allowing 
                                                          
1 Electricity liberalization means the removal of restrictions on entry and exit into the electricity supply 
industry, making it open to any prospective and interested players (firms) to enter. Sometimes it implies 
reduced state intervention. 
2 Restructuring in electricity utilities is the same as unbundling – which is the process of breaking-up a 
vertically integrated state-owned utility into either different entities or companies. 
3 Deregulation – Can be described simply as the drastic reduction of the government’s participation in the 
electricity sector by opening up the sector to the private investors. 
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independent power producers (IPPs) access to electricity generation is expected to enhance 
power generation capacity in developing countries. 
Privatization: refers to the involvement of private sector investment in utility companies. 
This involvement can be partial ownership or the full sale of the utility by the government to 
a private owner.  
All these types of market reform in the electricity power industry aim to dismantle vertically 
integrated utilities into separate components/segments, creating competitive markets at both 
the wholesale and retail levels, and require changes in a country’s legal, regulatory and 
financial systems in order to enable such reform to work effectively. 
Although there are a number of studies that have examined the impact of electricity market 
reforms on electricity performance indicators, the majority of these studies focus on the 
experience of the developed countries [See – Ehrlich et al. (1994), Pollitt (1995), Martin and 
Parker (1997), Ros (1999), Villalonga (2000), Saal and Parker (2000, 2001), Joskow (1997 a, 
b, 2000, 2001, 2005, 2006 a, b, and 2008)].  While some studies have focused on the 
developing countries [including; Baer (1994), Spiller and Martorell (1996), Lalor and Carcia 
(1996); Chisari et al. (1999), De Oliveira (2003), Williams and Dubush (2004), Kirkpatrick et 
al. (2006), Pollitt (2004, 2006), Zhang et.al (2008), Erdogdu (2011, 2012); Nepal & Jamab 
(2013)], there remains a paucity of studies that use econometric approaches in analysing 
power sector reform. Among the few studies that provides insights into the impact of power 
sector restructuring on performance indicators in developing countries, is Zhang et al. (2008), 
and Erdogbu (2011, 2012 and 2013) which focuses on selected Asian, OECD, South Africa 
and Latin American countries.  
Empirical evidence seems to suggest that assessing the results of electricity market reforms 
(i.e., the effects of privatisation, competition, unbundling and regulation) should not only be 
considered separately, but in some form of combined or interactive effect model. While most 
existing studies of electricity market reform have dealt with one or two of these reforms to 
the best of our knowledge, there are no studies that exclusively analyse electricity market 
reform activities in African countries using an econometric approach (1989 – 2014). This can 
be attributed to fact that reforms in most of the African region are still relatively recent, 
meaning that only now is enough data becoming available to permit econometric analysis. 
This gap in knowledge motivated this study. The rationale behind the selection of these 
countries were based on availability of data and the fact that there represent not only the 
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majority of the African continent’s population (some 1 billion people), but they are also 
provide a representative spectrum of national and electricity sector characteristics. 
1.2 Scope of study 
This study intends to analyse the impacts of market – oriented (liberalisation) policies on 
power utility performance in developing economies with particular focus on the African 
region. By liberalisation we mean the use of market or semi-market mechanisms as part of a 
reform of the power sector. 
By competition we refer to the mechanism of allowing different players to participate in the 
market on a level playing field. We assume this encourages efficiency and promotes quality 
service delivery and performance in the sector.  
The approach we adopted in this study is an econometric one. According to Jamasb et al. 
(2004) they argue that an econometric approach is the best suited approach for analysing and 
testing of hypotheses in a study like this. They also maintain that this approach is the most 
suitable when analysing cross-country study since it involves in-depth investigation or 
qualitative analysis. Thus, this study will develop a cross-country analysis of the economics 
of electricity market reform in Africa. We will focus on estimating, identifying and designing 
a better framework to shed more light on the electricity market reform in African countries.  
Finally, one constraint to this study is data gathering as it is difficult to gather detailed data on 
all aspects of sectorial reforms in power sector in the African region. 
1.3 Sources of empirical data 
This study covers a period of twenty-five years (1989 – 2014). The year 1989 is chosen 
because it was in this year that electricity market reform (EMR) was first initiated in the 
African region. The final year (2014) represents the year for which a reasonable quality of 
data on African countries is available. We intend to include almost all the African countries 
that have adopted (various kinds of) electricity market reform. Due to the fact that not all 
observed countries started reform in the same year, we will employ both balanced panel data 
and aggregated cross-sectional data.  
We will depend on data obtained from the African Development Indicators, the African 
Development Bank database, the World Bank Development Indicators database, Private 
Participation Infrastructures (PPI) Database – World Bank, World Bank/Enterprise Database, 
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the US Energy Information Administration, the International Energy Agency (Non-OECD 
countries database), different country regulatory statistical bulletins, and reports from various 
international and national web sites and papers. 
1.4 Structure of the study 
To carry out this empirical analysis of electricity market reform in developing countries, we 
structure this thesis in the following way: Chapter one provides the introduction, the 
researcher’s motivation for embarking on the research, the scope of the study, sources of 
empirical data and the structure of the study.  
Chapter two focus on the literature review, which consists of a: theoretical foundation, an 
empirical foundation, the econometric modelling approach, the political economy approach, 
the rationale behind power sector reform. Chapter 3 provides in-depth insight to the 
experiences of market-oriented reform among both developed and developing countries and 
power sector reform in African countries. 
We present three independent but inter-related empirical chapters which consists of chapter 4, 
5 and 6. Each of the empirical chapters has its own specific literature review. We are mindful 
to discuss the specific literature of each of the questions that give rise to this research. This 
provides a link between the general theme of the research and the question/objective of the 
study. 
Chapter 4 answers the first research question and objective (to what extent do liberalisation 
policies impact on the power generation performance), Chapter 5 examines the second 
question and objectives – Measuring technical efficiency in African countries electricity 
distribution utilities: A Stochastic Input Distance Function Approach. Chapter 6 investigated 
the third questions & objectives of study – examines the factors influencing PPPs- investment 
in the African electricity market. Chapter 7 deals with the conclusion, policy recommendation 
and suggestion for further studies. 
1.5 Contribution to the existing literature 
This study will benefit policy makers, energy regulators, country specific power utility 
companies, academics and others interested in power sector reforms. The empirical chapters 
have three features in common. First, they all focus on power sector reform and analyse a 
specific feature of it. Second, it is built on a cross-country approach; (i.e., we do not 
concentrate on a specific country later it was based on a particular region – Africa). 
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Third, our results do not just identify shortcomings or weakness, we also suggest the way 
forward in the form of policy recommendations (see chapter 7). Our results shown that the 
standard model in power sector reform involves gradual steps that move state-owned 
vertically-integrated utilities towards the market and is characterised by: 
corporatisation/commercialisation, amendment of electricity Law/Acts, establishment of an 
independent regulator, involvement of the private sector (in the form of IPPs, divestiture of 
generation and distribution assets, concession and Management contracts), unbundling and 
the introduction of competition. But is not sequentially followed by developing countries as 
country situations differ and what works for one will not automatically work for the other 
(Eberhard and Gratwick, 2011). 
There are numerous works in this field, mostly empirical studies that have analysed 
electricity market reforms focused generally on a single/cross -country in OECD, Europe, 
North or Latin America, others concentrate on Asia, Pacific, Middle East, and a few Africa 
countries, although not as a whole. Pollitt (1997) examined the impact of liberalisation policy 
on electricity market performance in OECD countries, and suggested that market-oriented 
reform in the form of privatisation has impacted positively on some countries electricity 
sector, such as Great Britain, Norway, Sweden, Argentina, New Zealand and Chile. However, 
the study maintained that privatisation in these countries does not lead to lower costs in short 
run. 
According to Nagayama (2009) the introduction of liberalisation policies in some selected 
Asian developing countries led to a decline in cross-subsidisation in the electricity market. 
Although in Latin America, the impact of liberalisation on energy prices were mixed. As 
liberalising the industry led to an increase in both wholesale and retail energy prices. 
Other scholars (Joskow, 1998; Briceno-Garmendia et al. 2004) examined the impacts of 
market oriented reform on access to electricity and quality of service.  They maintained that 
reforms were expected to enhance electricity generation, lead to efficient utilisation of 
installed capacities and increase new generation capacities by attracting private investment, 
and to reduce electricity outages. In addition, studies by Cubbin and Stern (2006), Zhang et 
al. (2008) and Erdogdu (2014) find that regulation, capacity utilization and competition have 
promoted service delivery, generation capacity expansion, capacity utilisation and reserve 
margins among some selected developing countries. 
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The essence of restructuring of the market structure in the electricity sector is aimed at 
improving the efficiency and productivity of the industry through introducing market 
competition (Jamasb et al. 2017). Early studies of the Latin American countries electricity 
market showed an improvement in efficiency and productivity in the industry. However, 
there are few cross-country analyses of technical efficiency levels of African countries 
electricity markets. 
On the other hand, one of the main aims of reform in the electricity market, especially among 
developing countries was to increase private investment in the electricity sector. Studies by 
Trebilcock and Rosenstock (2015) examined inefficient and costly energy delivery and 
documented how governments in developing countries have turned to public-private 
partnerships (PPPs) to fund electricity network expansion over the past two decades. Their 
findings shows that institutional capacity is among the key determinants of public-private 
partnership in electricity market. 
There is a research gap in this area of study. Using panel data in all the three empirical 
chapters, this piece of work attempts to fill this gap in the literature;  
 The first empirical chapter examines the extent to which market-oriented policies impact on 
the performance of the electricity generation sector. Thus, market-oriented reforms in the 
form of Structural and institutional reforms are not the end but a means (i.e. there are 
necessary, but not sufficient conditions for improving the performance of power generation 
sector). Our result suggest that individual reform variables on their own is not sufficient to 
improve the performance of the power generation segment, rather they tend to be more 
effective when they co-exist or interact with other reform variables. So for countries to obtain 
first-best outcomes in electricity market reform, it is important to introduce more than one 
reform at a time in the reform process.  
The second empirical chapter assesses technical efficiency of the regulated segment of the 
industry (electricity distribution). We carry out this study using stochastic frontier analysis 
(SFA). Sectorial reforms are not sufficient to raise the quality of service, improve the 
distribution network and reduce the cost levels, comparable to those of developed countries. 
However, as the IDB (1997) argued Latin America could increase its growth rate by between 
1.2 and 1.7 percentage points as result of gains from structural reforms. Then, it is possible 
for African countries to also experience an improvement in electricity distribution. Our 
findings indicates that amount of energy delivered, number of customers and the number of 
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transformers has a significant influence on the technical efficiency levels of the electricity 
distribution companies. Similarly, we find that there is not much difference between the 
(mean) technical efficiency of countries with many distribution companies and/or those with 
one/few companies. 
In the third empirical chapter, our findings shows that institutions matter. For market-oriented 
reform in power sector to yield good success and attract private sector investment it depends 
on the strength of the institution, this to attribute to the reason why African countries 
struggles.  Our result indicates that strong institutional structure is the bedrock for a 
successful reform.  The institutional variables do not individually contribute much in term of 
the proportion in variation in attracting private sector investment, but it matters. Furthermore, 
our findings shown the real GDP per capita is the sole determinant of private sector 
participation. Private sector investors consider the prosperity level of a country in their 
investment decision (i.e. they goes to countries that can afford their service, as return to 
investment is key). 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
For over three decades the pace and the extent of the spread of market reform to nearly every 
aspect of modern economic activity have been remarkable. Network industry supplies 
essential services such as telecommunications, electricity, natural gas and running water.  
  Reformers have sought to replace state control with private enterprise  
  and market  competition in air transportation, telecommunications,  
  banking, ports, railroads, food service, and sundry other activities. Even  
  Russian vodka, for decades a guiding spirit of the planned economy, is  
  today a product of private entrepreneurs rather  than solely state  
  enterprise. (Victor and Heller: 2007). 
 
However, services supplied by network industries have proved to be a challenging area for 
the introduction of market competition because they require significant capital investment 
and the return on investment is slow, as it takes a longer time for the investment to mature. 
These services are also often subject to political intervention for, if left alone, they may 
deliver outcomes that are not in the interest of the government. Indeed, in some countries, 
these essential services are regarded as a central function of government, especially in those 
countries where the government is the largest employer of labour. It has also proved difficult 
to replace state corporations with private enterprises, because of the benefits of economies of 
scale which arise as a result of network interactions, and so these industries are prone to 
natural monopoly (Victor and Heller, 2007). 
However, even if the government decides to open up network industries to private investors, 
they have to set up an institution to monitor the activities of the operators closely, to detect, 
sanction or punish any private firm(s) that seek to use their  monopoly position to exploit the 
consumers – this requires establishing an independent regulator. Despite these challenges, the 
technological progress and the benefits of successful market reform in some countries has 
encouraged other countries to embark on infrastructure reform, for example, the auctioning to 
private enterprise of concessions to manage and operate toll roads, airports, and seaports. 
Also, in the telecommunications sub-sector, privatisation and technological innovations have 
eased the barriers to entry for new competitors in the industry creating a new product (such as 
wireless telephone, internet telephone, etc.) and rendering the old-guard (state-owned 
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enterprises) powerless. These new products provide competition, enhance the quality of 
service, promote efficiency and can reduce prices as well. All these benefits have helped to 
justify the advantages of, and the need for privatisation in, network industries. 
Power sector reform is proving to be difficult for reformers however because of the nature of 
the industry; it is difficult to store electricity, and the network effects of large power grids 
encourage economies of scale in modern central power stations, which creates a barrier for 
new entry, making the sector the hallmark of a natural monopoly (See figure 2.1). Yet, 
despite these barriers (such as high capital costs, political factors, network monopoly effects, 
technological stasis and regulatory insight), private enterprises have found ways to introduce 
market forces into the business of electricity (Victor and Heller 2007). The idea of 
introducing market forces into the power sector started in the early 1980s, with Chile the first 
country to start the restructuring of their electricity industry, followed by Great Britain (under 
the Thatcher government) and then other countries. Their experiences have shown that some 
aspects of the electric power system are best left for the state-owned enterprises to operate, 
such as the transmission and distribution networks as they are prone to monopoly because of 
power poles and high tension lines. Although it is not impossible for these to be managed by 
private firms in the form of concessions or management contracts.  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Electricity network of generation, transmission, distribution and supply 
 
Great Britain under the Conservative government led by Mrs Margaret Thatcher was the first 
to apply this privatization idea on a large scale. They restructured the power sector in 
England and Wales, by unbundling the integrated state-owned enterprises into several 
competitive generators. They also established twelve regional distribution companies, each 
L i t e r a t u r e  R e v i e w                                                 P a g e  | 13 
  
with a specific franchise area of coverage, but maintained the transmission system as a single 
entity managed by the state-owned enterprise (now investor owned).  Following the 
successful market reform of the power sector in Great Britain and other developed and 
developing countries, this encouraged other countries to the extent that, by the end of the 
1990s, most of the OECD countries and over 70 developing countries had taken some steps 
toward reforming their power sector (Bacon, 1999; Steiner 2001). This trend was based on 
dissatisfaction with the performance of state-owned and controlled power sectors, and a 
desire to enhance the performance and the efficiency of the sector.  
  2.2 Why restructure, or change the status quo in the Electricity Market? 
Prior to the introduction of reform programmes or the restructuring of the electricity industry 
in many different countries of the world the power sector was generally structured and 
managed under one, or a combination, of the following: (i) as a government- owned 
enterprise (GOE) or (ii) as privately owned and regulated monopolies (as was the case in 
some US states and Japan).  
Thus, in the case of government-owned enterprises, there was no independent regulator, 
except for a distinct part of the government (i.e. the Ministry of Energy & Power), in charge 
of the regulatory oversight of the industry. The shortcoming of this model is that the 
taxpayers bear the burden and risk of the activities of the industry, while there may also be a 
lack of accountability and proper management of finances since the government agency is not 
directly accountable to the consumer or stakeholders. Also, there is an issue of circularity, 
since different arms of the government tend to get involved either in the building, planning, 
forecasting, investing and the setting of tariffs over the operating of the power sector. This 
may lead to a lack of coordination, poor customer services and reduced technological 
innovation. In the case of emerging economies, governments may not have sufficient funds to 
invest in electricity infrastructure, thus resulting in chronic power shortages and poor service 
delivery. 
Moreover, there is some emerging evidence that, where power utility is privately owned or is 
a regulated monopoly under the supervision of an independent regulator, there tends to be 
higher productivity (Victor and Heller 2007). This model has some merits over the former 
when there is a competent, resourceful, independent and vigilant regulator as a watchdog. 
Some of the potential advantages are; there tends to be stability in prices, adequate supply, 
high performance and efficiency in management and it encourages long-term planning. Some 
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of the demerits of this model are; Price disparities – since different firms provide for 
different states or provinces. Again, there is the problem of No customer choice – the service 
provider gets exclusive areas, so the customers in such areas do not have an option of 
alternative providers. Also, there is the issue of the transfer of risks to the ratepayers as, 
typically, firms tend to transfer all their investment risk to their captive customers, who bear 
it in the long-run.  
2.3 Framework for the study of electricity industry reforms 
Market–oriented reform in the electricity supply industry is a multi – dimensional process, in 
that it differs from country to country.  It is based on a set of specific objectives a country or 
jurisdiction sets out to achieve using a specific model.  At one level, these reforms may be in 
the form of structural or organisational changes, at another, it may require establishing an 
autonomous/independent agency to regulate the activities of the industry. 
In considering reform in the electricity power sector, the following need to be identified: the 
sector endowments, specific characteristics or features such as market size, generation energy 
mix, the historical background of the industry and its market structure. The process of reform 
can be monitored through performance indicators such as operating efficiency and the level 
of increase in investment in the sector. See figure 2.2 for an illustration of the inter-
relationship between the various linkages in electricity sector reform.    
 
                                                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Structure, conduct and performance of electricity sector reform  
Source: Jamasb et al. (2005) 
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                         Fig 2.2   Structure, conduct and performance of electricity sector reform 
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2.4 What does theoretical evidence suggest on the electricity market reform? 
From a theoretical perspective, we assume that a reform should be only embarked upon if, 
and only if, it will improve the efficiency and quality of service of the power sector. This 
does not mean that governments necessarily conduct a social-cost-benefit analysis before 
embarking on a reform programme, but rather they tend to rely on less formal types of 
assessment (UNESCAP, 2001). 
This sub-section focuses on the theoretical framework, with an emphasis on competition, 
regulation and private participation, on which the rest of the study will be built; it will answer 
the question of whether or not electricity is a natural monopoly by examining the theories of 
contestable markets, monopolistic bottlenecks and agent-based models. 
Our theoretical foundation starts with the assumption that firms are willing to enter an 
industry or market if there are incentives to maximise profits. Thus, the following conditions 
must exist; there is no barrier to entry and exit, firms have the ability to set prices and an 
opportunity to invest in new technological innovations at an optimal level. But in reality, 
there exist some obstacles to markets not functioning the way there are designed to be. Such 
problems can be referred to as market failures (i.e. due to asymmetry of information, 
economies of scale through monopoly deadweight loss, and externalities). So regulation 
needs to be introduced for the market to function properly. The government intervenes by 
setting up regulations, but if the situation still does not work as expected, then there is a case 
for deregulation. Deregulation can come in the form of privatization, restructuring, 
corporatization/commercialization and unbundling. In our analysis, we focus on the power 
sector specifically. This sector is characterised by its natural monopoly nature in terms of its 
operation and needs specific regulation. 
In principle, a suitable economic model necessary for establishing a regulatory framework for 
disciplining firms involved in any manipulation of their market power is essential in an open 
network industry such as the power industry.  
2.4.1 Sector specific market power theories 
Economists argue that setting prices and determining the level of output does not solely 
depend on the type of industry or market. In other words, whether the market structure is in 
the form of a monopoly or perfectly competitive industry does not itself constitute a problem. 
The main problem is if there is a barrier to entry (for example if a single firm owns all the 
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strategic resources, sets prices and makes abnormal profits without fear of any form of 
competition). Such a firm may not, therefore, be as efficient as when there are other firms in 
the industry.  
Thus, let as relax our assumption, and consider there is no barrier to entry, the firm does not 
own all the means of production in the industry, and there are other firms competing at the 
same level. This encourages greater competition and the price will be lower, thus making the 
industry more contestable. 
2.4.2 The theory of Contestable markets 
Baumol et al (1982) maintain that a market is considered to be contestable if the entry is 
completely free and exit is completely free as well, and where an entrant firm can displace 
any existing firm in the industry before that firm can respond (Shepherd 1984). They argued 
that such markets provide efficient results not only in principle but also in actuality. As with a 
perfectly competitive market, a contestable market is characterized by zero economic (break-
even) profits in the long run. This theory is based on the condition that for potential 
competition to function properly there must be a perfect close substitute – under the 
assumption that there is:  
Free market entry – there exist a large number of firms engaged in the same business in the 
market. 
 Sunk cost – We mean those costs that cannot be easily recovered if a firm is shut 
down. The firm can only recover some percentage of the cost if there are firms 
willing to buy the business from the initial firm. Network utility industries are 
characterised by this type of cost.  
 Equal level access to innovation – It is assumed that firms have an equal level of 
access to technological innovation.  
Weitzman (1983), Schwartz and Reynolds (1983) and Schwartz (1986) criticized Baumol and 
his associates and argued that in a network/utility market, existing firms do have the 
advantage of greater market information, and a higher level of technology over the entrant. 
Therefore, the incumbent can enjoy high economies of scale in the form of lower average 
cost of production. In contrast, the new firm entering the market does not have sufficient 
knowledge and/or the right set of technologies to use and,  as a result, will end up incurring a 
higher average cost of production.  
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However, it is true the simplified model of this theory does not equate to reality, but that does 
not mean that allowing competition in markets should be rejected. Indeed, this theory is 
regarded as the benchmark for the deregulation of public utilities. Although the influence of 
the contestable market theory in the academic world lasted for a decade, a new theory based 
on regulation reform gained support and became popular in the academic world in the 1990s. 
2.4.3 Incentive Regulation theory 
The incentive regulation theory is based on the idea that governments should establish an 
independent regulator to determine and regulate prices to some extent, as this will lead to 
economic improvement and better performance (Kridel., Sappington and Weisman 1996). 
This theory has been employed in telecommunication industries. In this theory, we can 
identify three kinds of incentive regulation; 
 Rate of Return regulation – This is a type of regulation whereby the firm is allowed to 
make some profit (a fair profit incentive), but the firm also has to improve its 
efficiency and productivity levels. Mathematically: let П represent profit gained, П𝛼 
stand for benchmark profit, П𝛽 represents the realized profit. 
      Thus П =  П𝛼 + β (П𝛽 - П𝛼 ) = (1- β) П𝛼 + βП𝛽.  Where (1- β) П𝛼 stands for 
benchmark and βП𝛽 for actual profit. 
 Price cap regulation – In this type of regulation, the government sets an average price 
the firm should charge. Mathematically; let 𝑃𝑡 stand for a given price at period t, RPI 
is the rate of price index, X represents the rate of growth in productive efficiency, and 
Z is the adjustment rate of other factors.  
Thus 𝑃𝑡 =𝑃𝑡−1 (1 + RPI – X + Z). 
 Yardstick regulation –The third form of the regulation provides a form of 
competition, by comparing different regional (comparable) monopolies to each other. 
For example, the mean of the cost of a comparable group of firms can serve as a 
performance benchmark. Thus, we denote it with the below formula 
Pit  = 𝛼𝑖Cit  + (1 – αi)∑ (𝑓𝑗
𝑛
𝑗 𝑖 𝐶𝑗,𝑡)  
Where: Pit is the overall price cap for firm I, = share(𝛼𝑖) of firm’s own cost information; Cit 
equals the unit cost of the firm, 𝑓𝑗 stands for revenue (or quantity) weights for a group of 
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comparable firms (monopolies), 𝐶𝑗,𝑡 represents the unit cost (or prices) for the group of firms 
and finally n denotes the number of firms in the group (Shleifer, 1997). 
 
 
2.4.3.1 Risk sharing parameter among incentive mechanisms in the electricity market. 
Let consider a static model with asymmetric information, suppose utility firm can reduce its 
cost and improve its efficiency by making increase its efforts4. To illustrate this, let the cost 
to the firm are affected by the effort (e), such as the  𝑐 =  𝜑 − 𝑒, where 𝜑 denote an unknown 
parameter to the utility regulator (i.e. low cost can be as a result of good luck or hard work). 
Therefore, let the cost of effort by the utility firm be in the form of convex function 𝛼(𝑒) >
0. 
We shall focus on the regulation of utility firm which aimed to maximise profit. If the 
regulator set price  ?̅?, then the utility firm is free to choose any price such as  𝑝 ≤  ?̅?. 
Moreover, if the regulator provides for the customers fraction of the profit 𝛽(𝑝) made by the 
utility firm, where  𝛽′(𝑝) > 0, such as the higher the fraction the higher the price charged by 
the firms. The firm’s objective is to maximise profit  𝜋(1 −  𝛽(𝑝)). Therefore, let 𝛽(𝑝) be 
the range of 0 ≤  𝛽 ≤ 1 for  𝑝.  The utility firm’s incentives to increase its effort depend on 
the regulated price p as varies with cost (c). Such as that 𝛽 = 𝑑𝑝/𝑑𝑐. Where 𝛽 represents the 
cost or profit shared. Thus, 𝑖𝑓 𝛼(𝑒) = 1 –𝛽, price-cap regulation has 𝛽 = 0, and return to scale 
regulation has 𝛽 =1. Here the  is the weight on the profits and it satisfies the condition that 0 
<   1. Then the former has a better effort incentive, medium shared risk but with high risk 
than the latter. For the profit sharing regulation has medium risk shared and good incentive, 
while yardstick or benchmarking regulation has strongest incentives but with high risk 
sharing. Therefore, the regulator have to make a compensating adjustment in setting price. 
Among the three-incentive regulation, the issue of cost recovery in rate of return regulation 
proved to be the source of concern. We illustrate with below example. If the regulator permits 
a rate of return which is higher than what the electricity distribution companies actually 
needs, in order to ensure the shareholders, have capital for investment. This could led for the 
distribution companies to increase their return by making unnecessary investment, which is 
assumed to be inefficient. 
                                                          
4 This efforts are assumed to be unobservable as the regulator could not distinguish. 
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Furthermore, as in the case of rate of return leads to inefficient performance, the regulator 
should adopt a better approach that is optimal. To do that, the regulator employs an efficient 
firm (benchmarking firm) with cost level 𝑐?̅? and i indicates the benchmarking firm. Recall 
there are many competitive firms in this industry. With cost level of each frim equal to its 
marginal cost, the regulator will use the benchmarking firm price which is assume to be 
efficient to set the industry price. Assume the regulator commits itself to the price and 
transfer rule, then  
𝑇𝑖 = ?̅?𝑖  and 𝑐?̅? = 𝑝𝑖                                                                                                               (1) 
Where ?̅?𝑖 represent the transfer rule, ?̅?𝑖 stand for cost-reduction expenditure and 𝑝𝑖 is the set 
price. A sample of countries using this methods are Great Britain, Germany, Netherlands, 
Denmark, Finland, and Sweden in their electricity distribution companies. This approach 
intend to promotes best practice has it does not allow inefficient cost choice by any frim 
influence the set price. 
However regulator could employ another approach, a price cap is achievable when firms 
operating in the industry and consumers interest are equally weighted in the regulator’s 
objective function. For example, the case of Californian electricity distribution in 2000 and 
2001. The regulator fix a price cap for the sales of electricity to retail consumers, but when 
the price in the spot (wholesale) market rose above the fixed price (retail price) the regulator 
fails to adjust the price which led to bankrupt of the distributors and result into big black out 
in the state of Californian often refer to Californian electricity crisis (Cowan, 2002).   
Incentive regulation has played an important role in the on-going regulatory reform of 
network industries. However, the weakness of this theory is that it is difficult to measure its 
economic impact and there are no guarantees of its success in the restructuring of network 
industries. This gives rise to another theory that investigated the inherent characteristics of 
the industry. 
2.5 Regulatory reforms towards rules-based regulation 
2.5.1 The theory of Monopolistic Bottlenecks 
Baumol (1982) argued that only industries characterised to require high sunk cost and 
provides essential services (i.e. often referred to having natural monopoly cost functions) 
should be subjected to regulation. So infrastructure facilities based on physical attributes such 
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as natural gas, electricity supply, water supply and sewage treatment or railway networks are 
referred to as having a monopolistic bottleneck.  
However, in terms of electricity supply, only transmission and distribution networks fulfil the 
conditions of a monopolistic bottleneck, while generation (production) and retail 
(consumption) can be regulated (Walz and Schleich 2009). Maxwell, Lyon and Hackett 
(2000) suggested that physical networks, such as pipelines and distribution wires (lines) 
connecting consumers to the system, should continue to be regulated monopolies. But the big 
challenge to policy makers in the industry is how best to govern the vertical relationship with 
the competitive ‘upstream sector’, which consists of markets for natural gas, electricity and 
telecommunication. 
The theory of monopolistic bottlenecks is central to the disaggregated regulatory approach. It 
is based on Stigler’s concept of barriers to entry and identifying network-specific market 
power, which helps in determining the minimum basis for regulation (Knieps, 1997a, b). Its 
main objective is to develop a coherent approach to access regulation, based on the principle 
of network economics. Thus, this method can be used in all network industries, regardless of 
their historical or institutional background (Baumol and Willg, 1999, p.44; Laffont and 
Tirole, 2000, p.98; Kuhlmann and Vogelsang, 2005, p.34). 
However, there are conditions to be fulfilled for a facility to be regard as a monopolistic 
bottleneck. They are as follows: 
i). If a facility provides a service to the end user (customers), and if there are no second and 
third such facilities in existence, we conclude that there is no active substitute available. 
ii). If the facility cannot be duplicated in any economically feasible way, then there is no 
potential substitute. These refer to the costs of the facility as irreversible. 
Furthermore, the whole value chain has to be examined in order to distinguish those network 
aspects that have bottleneck characteristics and those that are non-bottleneck. Non-bottleneck 
chains allow competition, even with or without technological differentiation, product 
differentiation and innovation. For instance, if there exist alternative products that the service 
provider can choose between then there is no monopolistic bottleneck. Nevertheless, if 
economies of scale are relevant and sunk costs are not involved, then the market is 
competitive.  
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Consequently, in network-specific markets natural monopoly can only exist when there are 
no irreversible costs involved (Weitzman 1983). But fixed cost and economies of scale play 
an important role in these areas. Although irreversible cost is no longer relevant during 
decision making for established firms in the industry, it is for a potential competitor who has 
to decide whether to invest (given such irreversible costs).  
2.5.2 Monopolistic bottlenecks and the concept of essential facilities 
 
In network areas, where competition is involved, the concept of essential facilities is of 
crucial importance. This concept was first introduced in US Antitrust Law and was later 
introduced into European competition law as well. For facility or infrastructure to be regarded 
as essential, then the following conditions must be fulfilled: 
 It is not possible for a supplier to a network services market to duplicate this facility. 
 There is no close substitute available. 
 It is difficult for a potential competitor to enter the market. (Areeda and Hovenkamp, 
1988). 
2.6 Disaggregated monopolistic bottleneck regulation 
2.6.1 The need to regulate third party access 
In this section, we differentiate between private bargaining of access conditions among 
competitive networks services and regulated third party access to monopolistic bottlenecks. 
In this theory we expect private bargaining of access conditions between the different 
networks suppliers under competition leads to economically efficient solutions. We assume 
strategic behaviour to be undermined because every bargaining individual/partner can easily 
be replaced by an alternative (potential) network supplier.  
 
Thus, private bargaining solutions on access conditions under competition do not only 
improve the quality of services provided by the suppliers themselves alone, but it enhances 
the overall market performance of the network services provided to the end user (customers) 
(Knieps 2010). However, the problem of inefficiency in terms of access services is becoming 
of great importance to policy makers, as it can cause a decrease in market shares due to the 
strong pressure of alternative (potential) network service providers in the industry.  
In addition, for competition to be effective in the industry there is the need for non-
discriminatory access to monopolistic bottleneck infrastructures. To the level that a 
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monopolistic bottleneck is observable, ex-ante regulation should be in place. Otherwise, the 
evolution of service markets will be ineffective. Also, innovative ways of combatting existing 
bottlenecks should be encouraged and guaranteed in order to allow the evolution of new 
service markets (Knieps 2010).  
Nevertheless, there remain doubts about a concrete solution to the problem of monopolistic 
bottlenecks. We illustrate this in the case of the power system. Assuming a competitive 
network in the form of the power system, where there are potential competitors that need 
access to the power generation and distribution, then these facilities are natural monopolies 
with sunk costs. Let us assume that this cost is not transferable. So if a potential competitor 
plans to enter the market with a parallel line, the existing firm could change its strategy by 
reducing the tariff charge in the short- run. So the short-run variable cost is equal to average 
cost. Thus, if an entrant (a potential competitor) enters the market, it will be difficult to 
compete since the incumbent has the market power advantage. A similar situation is 
observable in other network infrastructures such as railways, airports and gas networks.  
  2.6.2 Monopolistic bottlenecks in the transmission and distribution networks. 
This section examines the fundamental differences similarities in network services –focusing 
on Natural gas and Electricity supply. 
Natural gas is a principal source of energy and power generation. This means that it can only 
be found (and produced) where the resource reservoirs are. The transportation of gas involves 
the use of pipelines (or converting into liquefied natural gas (LNG)) from the place it is 
produced to the region it will be consumed. Pipeline transportation entails a pressure drop 
(that is pressure drops between the gas entry point and exit point, or between two precisely 
defined points - e.g. Compressor stations) (Knieps, 2006).  
We refer to electricity as a secondary source of energy. Unlike natural gas, electricity can be 
produced anywhere subject to regulation/approval. It is mainly generated and consumed in 
the same country, but sometimes can be supplied to other countries. Also, the location of the 
power stations and the transmission networks are selected to meet the need of the consumers 
in either domestic/foreign markets (2006, pp.62). 
In comparison, electricity transmission routes are not the same as other utility services such 
as natural gas pipeline routes or railway routes, in the sense that the existence of other 
railway route does not lead to a congestion problem or involve any form of externality costs 
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on a given route section (Knieps 2006). But when we refer to power transmission the 
situation is different as the scope of the externality costs cannot be restricted to the direct 
transmission line between an entry point and that of the exit points. Rather, it primarily 
depends on the simultaneous generation (feeding into the system) and withdrawal (at the 
various entry and exit points) across the overall system parameters (i.e. Voltage restrictions, 
etc.) in the network system. In other words, it is not possible to transport power directly from 
a particular point of entry to an exit point, as the current may choose another path through the 
grid that has the lowest resistance. Since not all the current will choose to transport through 
the shortest connection (contract path) as the route (or detours), the current does not depend 
on the transmission capacities and resistances of the different line, but it rather depends on 
the feed and withdrawal rates at the entry and exit points. (Hogan, 1992, p.213). 
In addition, power transmission and distribution can be grouped into different voltage levels. 
Thus, power transmission refers to high-voltage networks covering regional areas. The main 
reason to interconnect different power plants is to allow the full utilization of its capacity 
(economics of scale). Also, the extra high- voltage networks can be used to connect power 
generators with the local distributors “supplies”. 
2.7 Reform regulatory scheme and private participation 
The government of both developed & developing countries have long recognized the vital 
role utility network industries play in economic growth and poverty alleviation. For the past 
four decades, most governments entrusted delivery of these services to state-owned 
corporations. But the outcome results were disappointing. Public utility network industries, 
especially the electric power sector, were plagued by inefficiency (Harris 2003). In this next 
sub-section, we examine reform and regulation theories and third party access to the 
electricity sector. 
2.7.1 The need to privatise and regulate third-party access to network markets 
Utility network industries such as electricity, telecommunications, natural gas, and the 
railways have been characterized as either state-owned or private regulated vertically 
integrated monopolies. For the past three decades, the government have engaged in 
privatization, deregulating and restructuring of these sectors. The reform programme 
mainly entails the vertical separation of different segments of the industry, which are 
assumed to have natural monopoly characteristics and continue to be subject to price, 
network access, service quality and entry regulations. The argument that privatizing 
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public utility network industries, especially the electricity sector, is rooted in the 
principle that if the government establishes credible/independent regulatory institutions 
(and ensures prices are moderate), then the sector’s challenges would have been 
reduced, if not totally be solved.  
However, the important question to answer is under which regime will public utility 
network industries be better managed: under private ownership or under the state-
owned enterprise? 
Certainly, if the privatization or regulation framework is poorly designed and/or only 
partially executed it may negate the expected results or benefits of the reform. According to 
Galal et.al (1994) arguments such as those presented by property right theories or public 
choice and bureaucracy theories do not apply to every market structure. But De Fraja (1993) 
showed in his study that under the principal-agent theory, public enterprise performance 
evaluation and optimal contracts explained the network market better than profit incentive 
theories.  
2.7.2 General description of the Principal-Agent Model 
We assume that if two parties decide to come together for the common good or to enter into a 
contract there are (or will emerge) informational asymmetries. In anticipation of the existence 
of informational asymmetries, both parties seek to formulate a contract that will resolve the 
difficulties that these may cause in the near future. Thus, for this reason, this type of contract 
design problem is known as the principal – agent model5. The PA model argues that two 
important conditions are essential for relationships between principals and agents, based on 
anticipation of the informational problems that may arise. First, we assume that agents are 
independent and have the tendency towards maximising their own interests at the expense of 
principals (Sharma, 1997, p. 759). In other words, there is a general assumption of goal 
conflict between the principal and the agent.  
The second condition is based on the relationships between principals and agents as a result 
of a problem of information asymmetry. In economics, information asymmetry exists when 
one party to a transaction holds relevant information but is unable or unwilling to transfer this 
                                                          
5 An arrangement in which one entity legally appoints another to act on its behalf. In a principal-agent 
relationship, the agent acts on behalf of the principal and should not have a conflict of interest in carrying out 
the act. 
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information to the other party. Typically we assumed the agent (employee) who runs the day-
to-day activity of the firm knows more (to some extent) about the firm than the principal 
(employer). Both assumptions have become part of mainstream economic theories. The 
literature illustrates that as a result of these two conditions, two Principal - Agent problems 
arise: hidden action and hidden information (Lipsey, 1983; Mas-Colell et al. 1995; 
Eisenhardt, 1989; Wright et al., 2001; Lange, 2005). In practice, the general arrangement is 
for a principal to pay an agent for his services. Thus, the principal pays the agent for: 
i) the agent to act on the principal’s behalf, or (ii) the agent to provide some service to the 
principal. 
2.7.3 Strengths and weaknesses of Principal-Agent Model 
 
The advocates of this theory identify three important strengths: its inter-disciplinary 
applicability, its explanatory power, and it is result-oriented. First, the theory is applicable to 
a wide range field of studies. Sorrell et al (2004, p.41) stated that Principal - Agent (PA) 
relationships “pervade both markets and organisations”. They are of the opinion that the 
application of a PA theory is important, especially when investigating the problems that exist 
in relationships that have a principal-agent structure (such in the public utility network 
industries context). Likewise, a second strength of the theory is based on its explanatory 
power. For instance, Wright et al. (2001, p. 414) pointed  out that “by narrowly focusing on 
the principal-agent relationship, and with a given set of assumptions, the contribution of this 
theory is that it provides logical predictions about what rational individuals may do if placed 
in such a relationship”. Thus, the theory provides a significant, reliable and empirically 
testable approach on problems of cooperative effort (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 72).  
In addition, PA theory is based on result – oriented solutions. The major rationale behind the 
theory is that Pareto inefficient allocation of resources is inevitable. Thus, the theory 
considers ways in which the relationship between parties (principals and agents) can be made 
more efficient. That is, agency theory is anchored on improving the contracts between the 
parties (IEA 2007, p.28). However, it is clear that there is no single way to design a contract 
that will solve all principal - agent problems. Therefore, when designing contracts, it is 
suggested that the best contract is one that balances the interests of principal and that of the 
agent as much as possible. Again, the theory attempts to identify the first-best contract 
alternatives, and which contract is the most efficient under varying levels of uncertainty, risk 
aversion, and information asymmetry (IEA 2007, p.30). 
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Despite the contribution made by the theory to providing insights into challenges faced by 
Principal - Agents, the theory has some critics (Mitncik, 1992; Lubatkin, 2005; Sorrell, 
2004). Their criticism is based on two foundations: Firstly, its inability to portray real-world 
economic situations, and secondly the incompleteness of the theory itself. Scholars like 
Lubatkin (2005, p.213) argue that the theory is not able to explain the practical complexities 
of real-world institutions, despite using complex, technical and highly formalised 
mathematical models (Sorrell et al., 2004, p. 43). The shortcoming of the theory is due its 
reductionist stand and its acceptance of three key, but inappropriate, assumptions. These are: 
First, that opportunism is pervasive, and that people are motivated by more than just money; 
they also have needs for achievement, responsibility and recognition. People are capable of a 
full range of actions, varying from self-serving to owner-serving, to altruistic. Second, actors 
in the principal-agent relationship are portrayed as simply “dispassionate 
‘Homoeconomicus’” individuals, whereas people are more complex. And third, the theory is 
too straight forward and discounts contingencies that may be more reflective of realities in 
economic relationships.  
2.7.4 Agency theory, Principal-Agent problems and Electricity industry regulation 
For over a decade, economists developed economic model based on agency theory to explain 
the relationship between electricity regulators and operating firms. The theory exposes some 
problems inherent with regulation and investments in the power sector “which may be 
understood through the logic of the Principal-Agent problem” (Howarth et al., 2000, p. 482). 
Indeed, electric power regulation and electricity supply transactions invariably involve the 
core elements inherent in an Agency theory perspective: 
● A principal (in the form of an electricity regulator or shareholder) and an agent (for 
example, a power producer or electricity suppliers); the problem of tariff divergence between 
a principal and agent (for example, an electricity regulator wanting to minimise price charged 
and an energy producer wanting to maximise profit); 
● The problem of asymmetric information whereby the energy producer has vital information 
about the market but does not want to share it with the regulator. For instance, if the producer 
embarks on a general repair of the distribution networks, but does not inform the regulator of 
the extent of the repair, and simply transfers part of the cost of the repairs to the customers in 
the form of utility bills.  
Due to the nature of the electricity market, lack of competition and monopolistic bottlenecks, 
governments subject the sector to regulatory oversight. Some countries do not permit private 
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owned enterprises to participate in the electricity market because they are profit driven, 
resulting in the state-ownership of electricity, especially in the developing countries. The 
rationale is that if the government is managing the key essential sectors (such as the 
electricity sector) this will lead to optimal results, but in many cases this has proved 
unsuccessful, as governments are not the best business managers. This has led to a waste of 
resources. State-owned enterprises (SOE) are inefficient it is claimed, and only tend to satisfy 
the interests of the political elites (Cuervo and Villalonga, 2000 & Newbery, 2004). 
For the last three decades, both developed and developing countries have responded to the 
problem of information asymmetries in the electricity market by introducing market-oriented 
reform.  In a situation where the agent (the utility firms) know more about its efforts invested 
in the operation than the principal (in this case the government or regulator), this gap in 
information is sizable because the regulator are unaware of the technicities involved in the 
enterprises.   
Secondly, regulators in the electricity market tend to behave opportunistically. This happens 
when the agent has committed in the form of investment (sunk cost), but the government 
takes some portion of the value of the investment through nationalisation for its own use. 
However, in developed countries with strong institutional values, regulation promotes 
transparency and best practices in the system. A good example is the UK electricity-gas 
regulation commission (Cuervo and Villalonga, 2000). 
Thus, the application of economic theories to electricity regulation, productivity and 
efficiency require empirical explanation. In the next section, we examine the application of 
theoretical knowledge to the study of electricity market reforms.  
2.8 What does empirical evidence suggest on the Electricity Market-oriented reform? 
This section establishes the empirical foundation to the electricity market reform. It 
highlights the works done so far empirically, in line with our objective, so we only discuss 
those studies that employed data analysis, (i.e. applying a methodological framework and 
employing an empirical model for examining the evidence). There is a numerous literature 
that merely deals with opinion and discussion of electricity industry reform thus that 
literature is not included here as they do not meet our requirements. 
The works reviewed adopted different techniques ranging from cross-country, descriptive and 
qualitative analyses of power sector reform, others focuses on measuring the efficiency and 
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productivity of electricity distribution firms and the overall performance of the industry 
during post and pre reform periods. We also include a brief review of literature from the 
developed countries experience that may be relevant for African countries. The primary aim 
of this section is to review and examine the extent of empirical evidence on electricity market 
reform in both developed and developing countries (Jamasb et.al 2005).  
2.8.1 The Electricity Market 
 “Electricity is an essential commodity, a backbone for almost all economic activity and its 
cost, quality and availability have an impact on the effectiveness of economies, that is  any 
prospects of power shortages, blackout or irregular become major social and economic 
threat” (Bunn, 2003). 
The traditional structure of electricity supply industries almost everywhere on this planet are 
(primarily) vertically integrated monopolies that were either state-owned or dominantly 
privately- owned and subject to price regulation and entry barriers. The major components of 
the electricity sector are generation, transmission, distribution, and retail supply.  
Electricity generation takes the form of converting power from other primary sources of 
energy using a variety of technologies. The underlying principles of electricity generation 
were discovered between the 1820s and early 1830s by a British scientist Michael Faraday. 
His basic method is still used today: electricity is generated by the movement of a loop of 
wire or disc of copper between the poles of a magnet (FEMP 2002). For electric utilities, it is 
the first stage in the delivery of electricity to consumers.  
The second stage is electricity transmission. The transmission network transfers electricity 
from the point of generation to a substation, using the alternating current (AC) system. In this 
process, transformers are used to step up, or increase, the voltage that leaves the power plant. 
This enables electricity to travel over long-distance through wires. When electricity reaches 
its destination, another transformer would then step down, or decrease, the voltage so that 
power could be used in homes and factories. This last phase is called distribution. 
 
Electricity distribution refers to stepping down power from high voltage to lower one to 
delivery to the end users; it involves lowering the transmission high voltage to a medium 
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voltage ranging between 2kv and 35kv with the use of transformers 6(Sallam & Malik 
2011). The process entails the distribution lines transfers the medium voltage power to 
distribution poles close to the customer's premises. Then lower transformers reduce the 
voltage to the usage voltage of appliances and commonly used to supply feed numerous 
customers through lower distribution lines at this point. Commercial and residential 
customers are connected to the secondary distribution lines through service drops. Industrial 
or commercial users whose demand is much higher may be connected directly to the primary 
distribution line or the sub-transmission line. Retail supply is normally organised by 
individual electric utilities. The firms had de facto exclusive franchises to supply electricity to 
residential, industrial and commercial end users within a specific region. 
The performance of these regulated utilities varies among countries. The sector performance 
in developed countries was much better than in their developing counterparts (Joskow 1997; 
World Bank 1994; Besant – Jones 1998 and Bacon and Besant – Jones 2001). The reasons 
have been due to high operating costs, heavy subsidies, a lack of investment (due to poor 
returns), poor maintenance of facilities, a lack of an institutional framework, political 
instability, regular conflicts, a  high level of corruption, and electricity theft.  
Over the past decades electricity supply industry components (generation, transmission and 
distribution) were all regulated and subjected to the control of the government, but in the last  
thirty years or so, ownership and structure in the electricity supply industry have started to 
become more private than public, and the industry has been exposed to structural and 
organizational reform. 
2.8.2 The Liberalization Process 
Change is inevitable, but the transition from state-owned enterprises to competitive oriented 
enterprises has not been a smooth process for the electricity supply industry. There has been 
scepticism and concern over the outcomes of liberalization in the electricity sector in many 
countries. The case of the Californian electricity market crisis of 2000 and 2001 is probably 
the most evident case (Borenstein et al. 2002, Wolak 2003), and the “blackouts in North 
America and Italy have been used to argue that the electricity market reform is based on a try 
and error concept” (Stridbaek, 2006). However, the IEA suggested the reform has recorded 
many successes, such as the case of the UK, Australia, Chile, Norway, Sweden, Demark and 
                                                          
6 Industrial users are connected to distribution line directly mainly 35kv, while residential and commercial 
users utilises 2kv and 5kv as the case may be. 
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Finland (International Energy Agency, 2005). It is pertinent to note that privatising state-
owned enterprises is not a condition for reform, neither is the introduction of competition or 
revising the regulatory framework. However, a combination of economic ideology and an 
anticipation of sale proceeds has meant that privatisation has become a major reform step 
and, to some extent, an objective rather than a means to an end (Jamasb & Pollitt 2008).  
 
Nevertheless, the decision to privatize a state-owned electricity power sector raises a series of 
questions about the optimal approach to adopt in transferring assets to the private sector. 
Should all components (that is; generation plants, high-voltage transmission lines and 
distribution networks) be privatized, or should private ownership be limited to some aspect of 
the sector where competitive markets can be feasibly implemented? A number of studies and 
reports have attempted to answer these questions by suggesting the privatization process as 
the rationale behind electricity sector reform in different countries, especially among the 
developing countries. The New Institutional economic theory provides theoretical support 
and sheds more light on the incentive effects of the privatization process on ownership, 
structure, organisation and regulation in the utility sector (North 1990; Levy and Spiller, 
1996). Other scholars in this school of thought are Niskanen, (1971), Zeckhauser et al. 
(1989), and Boycko et al. (1996).  
Furthermore, most of the advocates of this policy believed that the implementation of market 
– oriented reform in the form of structural or organisational changes in the power sector is the 
ultimate solution. A number of studies have investigated the effects of privatization, 
commercialization and liberalization of the power sector, although most of the empirical 
studies focus on developed countries. Vickers and Yarrow (1988) in their study reported 
mixed results on the effects of privatization. They argued that early studies focused too much 
on the ownership variable. They rightly pointed out there are other variables that influence 
the success of the privatization process, such as the market structure, the nature of the market, 
and the institutional framework. Galal et.al (1994) examined the welfare consequences of 
selling public enterprises, reporting that privatization of network industries in both developed 
and developing economies have a significant impact economically. 
Joskow (1998) suggested that privatisation in the electricity supply industry, especially in the 
power generation sector, promotes competition in the wholesale (bulk) supply segment 
through third party transmission access. This could be accomplished while the distribution 
sector remains a regulated monopoly and a variety of retail options are available to 
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consumers. However, Pollitt (1997) maintained that economic gains from electricity sector 
privatisation across different countries of the world are expected to lead to economic growth, 
citing the success of the UK, Argentina and Chile.  
Bortolotti et.al (1998) suggested that for privatization in the utility industry to be successful, 
caution must be applied. Their empirical study, based on the sales of government-owned- 
utility firms in 38 countries (both developed and developing) over a period of twenty years 
(1977–1997), found that the institutional variable is a crucial factor when considering 
privatization in the utility sector. They emphasised the need for an effective regulatory body 
to assist the government in maximising the sales proceeds to reduce regulatory risk and to 
help in the smoothness of the privatization process. Hawdon (1996) uses the technique of 
data envelopment analysis (DEA) to examine the productive efficiency of the power sector in 
82 countries and finds that the privatising countries exhibit significantly higher efficiency 
than the non-privatising countries. Bergara et al. (1997) examined the impact of privatization 
on electricity supply industry performance. They employed eleven variables and two dummy 
variables (political indices) in their study of the role of the institutional framework in the 
liberalization process. Their results suggested that credible political institutions are highly 
and positively correlated with electricity generation performance. This confirmed the basic 
rationale behind increasing private sector participation, which to a large extent  is based on 
three conditions namely – free entry and exit, third-party access to network facilities, and 
affordable prices to the customers.  
Other scholars have been cautious regarding the economic benefits associated with 
privatization, especially in developing countries. Among these scholars are Birdsall and 
Nellis (2003) who examined the winners and losers in the privatisation of the stated-owned 
power utilities in transitional and developing economies. They employed an orthodox method 
in assessing the equity (or fairness), efficiency gains from privatisation and the trade - off 
between asset ownership, employment, returns to labour, access to (and prices of) 
utility/infrastructure services, and the selling government’s fiscal position. Their results 
indicates that in terms of technical performance, privatisation is considered to be a success in 
many transitional and developing economies. On other hand, privatisation is viewed as 
basically bias (both in conception and execution), and this is the view of many developing 
countries. They are of the view that developing countries are at the loser side, as there are 
worse off in term of distribution of assets and income in the short-run, while privatisation 
favours more the industrial users than the residential users. 
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  2.8.3 Establishing Regulatory frameworks in the Electricity supply industry 
The standard electricity market reform model requires countries embanking on reform to 
establish an independent regulatory body, functioning within a clearly defined legal 
framework7. The regulatory body is planned to provide the “high-quality institution” which 
permits and fosters sustained growth in capacity and efficiency in the electricity supply 
industries, particularly in power transmission and distribution segments.  
For regulatory agencies to be effective and efficient in the electricity industry it has to be 
combined with better governance that emphasises  (a) making fewer mistakes and (b) having 
the mistakes identified and rectified more quickly so that (c) good regulatory practice is more 
readily established and maintained. The difficulties caused by the collapse of some Asian 
independent power producers in the boom of the early 1990s, and many South American 
countries infrastructure reforms and concession contracts in the late 1990s, provide some 
evidence to support the need for a regulatory agency in electricity market reform. This 
perspective has been at the heart of the recent literature on regulatory governance for utility 
service industries, particularly the literature that focuses on developing and transition 
economies. The main advocates of this perspective are Levy and Spiller (1994) and North 
(1990). 
However, the importance of regulation cannot be overemphasised as it is obvious that without 
regulation in the sector, private investors will consider it too risky and will not invest. 
‘Independent’ regulatory bodies are established by the government and provide a well-
defined, clear regulatory framework to reduce ‘regulatory risk’ and provide a platform for 
private investment. The study by Stern and Holder (1999) emphasized the vital role played by 
the regulatory agency in electricity sector performance. According to them, the regulatory 
agency acts as a catalyst for structural reform of public utility network industries like the 
electricity sector. Furthermore, they suggest that for optimal performance in the sector, the 
regulatory agency must be transparent in their transactions. Cubbin and Stern (2005) assess 
                                                          
7 An autonomous regulatory body is not the only indicator necessary for an electricity market, although it is 
essential. But an independent regulator may be combined with other reforms such as unbundling, competition 
and privatization. However, establishing an independent regulatory agency has become a prerequisite to 
attracting private sector investment into the power sector in the same way as an independent central bank has 
become the standard solution to handle commitment and time inconsistency problems in monetary policy 
(Cubbin and Stern 2005). 
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the impacts of a regulatory law and higher quality regulatory governance in electricity 
industry performance. Their analysis covered 28 developing economies between 1980 and 
2001. In their study, they controlled for privatization and competition and allowed for 
country-specific fixed effects. Both regulatory law and higher quality regulatory governance 
are positively and significantly associated with higher per capita generation capacity. Their 
study showed that the positive impact increases in the long-term, as experience develops and 
regulatory reputation grows.  
Using data from the World Bank performance indicators  (which contains detailed annual 
data for 250 private and public electricity companies in Latin America and the Caribbean 
countries) and the electricity regulatory governance database (which contains data on several 
aspects of governance of electricity agencies in Latin America and Caribbean countries), 
Andres, Luis et al. (2008) examined the effectiveness of regulatory governance and its impact 
on electricity sector performance in the region. Their results suggest that the mere existence 
of a regulatory body, regardless of the kind of ownership in the industry, has a significant 
impact on sector performance. In addition, after controlling for the existence of the regulatory 
agency, the ownership dummies variables are still significant and with the expected signs. 
Thus, they propose an experience measure in the model to identify the gradual impact of the 
regulatory agency on sector performance and their results confirm that the existence of a 
regulatory agency has a significant impact on the performance of electricity sector. 
There has been little empirical testing of the hypothesis that effective regulatory governance 
(i) promotes investment and (ii) improves efficiency. So, the task is how to determine, 
measure or model effective regulation as it is difficult to determine the actual effect(s) of 
regulatory impact on electricity prices or allocative efficiency, as different countries adopt 
different regulation policies and obtain divergent results (Jamasb & Pollitt, 2000). In the next 
section, we discuss competition in the electricity market. This includes a review of the recent 
relevant literature and its relevance to our study. 
2.8.4 Creating Competition in Electricity Market reform 
Are people right to think that competition leads to an increase in productivity, enhances 
efficiency and improves sector performance? Our study indicates that there are some 
theoretical reasons for believing this hypothesis to be correct, but they are not overwhelming. 
Furthermore, while the existing empirical evidence in some developed countries supports the 
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theoretical perspective, for the developing and transitional countries there is little or no strong 
evidence.  
In a truly monopolistic competitive market, suppliers (firms) cut costs so that they can 
undercut (rivals') competitors' prices, in so doing they increase their own market share and 
profits. The benefit associated with the competitive paradigm rests on several assumptions, 
some of which are applicable in the electricity supply industry, at least in the short run. The 
first assumption is that there are many similar firms operating in the market, this preventing 
any single firm from manipulating the market to its own advantage. For instance, a dominant 
firm could withhold power supply from some of its plants so as to increase its revenue by 
driving up energy prices, and this could result in a crisis in the industry if not well managed. 
This was the case in California in 2000 – 2001 (Joskow 2001, p.377).  
Similarly, in the early England and Wales electricity reform era, there were only two major 
private generators, and a lack of competition in the sector persisted. So, in 1994, the sector 
regulator had to cap pool prices and order an increase in the number of generation firms in 
order to increase the sector share of competitors/rivals to meet demand. This led the two large 
generators to divest themselves of some capacity. Studies conducted by Green and Newbery 
(1992) and Von der Fehr and Harbord (1993) have suggested that the amount of firms needed 
to achieve effective competition in the UK spot electricity market will be between five to 
seven firms.   
The second assumption is that no single firm can be dominant. Thus, if a single firm controls 
60% of generation, this could lead to market manipulation. Such was the case in Norway 
where the dominant generator temporarily flooded the market with cheap energy, presumably 
to bring other competitors into line with its own pricing precepts (Bacon 1995, p.135).  
The third assumption is that for there to be competition, the operating firms’ cost must be 
structured in a fairly similar manner. For instance, in a system where a firm operates a large 
hydro dam station that has a dominant capacity, this makes it difficult, if not impossible, for 
other small firms to compete. Then in such a circumstance there is no incentive for other 
firms to operate. Therefore, if a single firm has the capacity to operate for a longer period, at 
an affordable price, then there is no need for competition in such a system (Beacon 1995). 
However, in a system with low capacity (i.e. a capacity shortage) as in the case of many 
African countries, because the plants are old and have been used most of the time without 
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regular maintenance, the potential gain in market share as a result of competition will be 
rather small in the short run. But in a system with excess capacity, as is the case with some 
developed countries, competition will be fiercer. Finally, if a country embarks on market 
reform in its electricity supply industry and allows new firms access to the market, then the 
threat of new low-cost suppliers will give incumbent firms an incentive to increase 
productivity, to seek ways to improve efficiencies and to try to reduce costs.  
These assumptions for encouraging competition in the electricity supply industry can be 
incorporated into the design of policy in the electricity market. For example, in Argentina, the 
restructured electricity supply industry was designed so that no single generator would 
control more than 15% of total capacity. However, for some countries grouping generating 
plants into separate companies that would lead to a competitive structure is virtually 
impossible. This is so especially if the country’s total generating capacity is small; so 
dividing the system into three or four units of roughly equal size and cost structure will not be 
profitable. In 1990, for example, 107 countries had an overall generating capacity of 1000 
MW, 90 countries are under 500 MW (Bacon 1995, p.135). So, in any of these countries, it 
will be unwise and unsuitable to introduce a competitive structure. However, opening the 
market to new investment by allowing new generating firms may be good in the sense it will 
increase the number of units.  
Furthermore, if the generating segment of the sector has the structure and the potential for 
competition, then it must develop a framework for selling its electricity in a competitive way 
that transfers this competitive pressure into lower prices. In this case, we assumed that the 
generator firms sells either directly to the transmission company or to the distribution 
companies on long-term contracts. Thus, in this case, competitive pressure will come into 
play only at the time the contract is signed (i.e. one-time competition). After the contracts are 
signed the pressures to be efficient may be reduced unless they can be sustained through 
contract terms. However, one advantage of this approach is that even if the generating firms 
desire to make more profits by raising the energy price, it will not be passed on to consumers 
until the contract expires or a new one is applied for and is renewed. Based on this principle, 
the United Kingdom and the Norwegians designed their power sector wholesale power pools 
in such a way that some power is sold a day before it is supplied, and some time is sold on a 
contract basis (York. 1994). The Norwegian power pool (which appears to have many 
features of true perfect competition) has many sellers, but little power is actually sold through 
the pool (Bacon 1995). 
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However, to operate the UK or Norwegian model requires considerable sophistication as the 
system must coordinate the bids to supply at various prices with the demands on the system 
and the associated settlement plan. To be efficient, the pricing system must be designed in 
such a manner that it rewards the supply of energy and the supply of power in a way that 
generates an optimal amount of investment and permits firms to operate at MC = MR (i.e. 
cover operating costs). Nevertheless, to operate at this level requires knowledge of how to 
market the energy, which is complex, as it requires technical expertise. Experience so date 
suggests that truly competitive power pools will become ever more important in this type of 
system. Unfortunately, at the moment, such systems are only suitable for large and 
technologically advanced countries. 
In addition, studies have shown that many countries have introduced competition at retail 
supply level (Joskow 2006, 2007; Bacon 1995; York 1994; Jamsab et al. 2005). In such a 
system, large consumers are permitted to buy from any distributor at unregulated prices. For 
example, in the UK market, the size threshold was reduced to 100 KW while there were 
approximately over 50,000 customers in this category in 1995. In 1998, the UK regulator 
removal size limit.  
Based on the above perspective, it is clear that when a country introduces market-oriented 
policies in her electricity sector it will create competition, especially in generation and retail 
supply sectors. In general we expect, by allowing independent producers (IPPs) access to 
power generation, this will improve the quantities of electricity generated and will expand the 
installed capacity. Also, it is expected that the production cost will fall, due to enhanced 
technical efficiency, so price falls and the quantity demanded increases. Thus, competition is 
likely to have a positive effect in both electricity generation and capacity expansion. 
  2.8.5 Unbundling within the Electricity Market 
The logic behind unbundling is that it enhance efficiency and attract high number of private 
sector investors when separated into different independent entities (generation, transmission 
and distribution). We will highlight the impacts of unbundling8 based on the available 
examples. 
                                                          
8 There are basically two main types of unbundling in the power sector; vertical unbundling and horizontal 
unbundling. However, horizontal unbundling are not common in developing regions such as in Africa 
continent. 
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First vertical unbundling exposed the inefficient segments of the power sector prior to 
unbundling. It shown that the power sector in developing countries faces high operational 
losses - an index of an inefficient operational system (companies made up for the losses by 
using part of the reserve/plant generation capacity to dispatch higher amounts of electricity 
into the system). However, unbundling implies that the generation, transmission and 
distribution segments now have to minimize electricity and financial losses to meet agreed 
target levels as well as delivering at the in terms of economic performance. In each of these 
cases, the regulatory system and price setting mechanisms must be utilised in driving 
companies involved towards increased energy efficiency in all three segments. Cropper et al. 
(2012) found that vertical unbundling significantly improved average annual electricity 
generation availability by about 4.6 percentage points and reduced outages by about 2.9 
percentage points in Indian states that unbundled before 2003. They also suggested that 
restructuring has not improved thermal efficiency. This may reflect the fact that vertical 
unbundling has not yet attracted sufficient private investment into the Indian electricity 
market compared to that of a developed country like the United States.  
Kwooka (2002) studied the economies of coordination between generation and distribution in 
150 U.S electric utilities. He concludes that the least integrated distributors had significantly 
higher costs on average than the most integrated utilities ($6.27 cents per kWh as against 
$45.35 cent per kWh). This increase is attributed to utility size; that is a small-sized utility 
exhibited diseconomies of coordination. Meyer (2010) employed a frontier analysis to 
examine the economies of scope between the vertical integration of electricity supply 
industry in the U.S. electric industry. His study suggests that the costs of separating the 
electricity segments (as compared to its integration) are again related significantly to the size 
of the utility. That is, for larger utilities the cost is lesser than smaller utilities. So, in effect, if 
unbundling in the electricity market is to be effective and efficient, market size is important.   
However, besides the significant impact of vertical unbundling, there are some shortcoming 
associated with method to be considered. First, it led to the duplication of management duties 
among different segments. Also, separation of segments entails for instance that the 
distribution utility is at liberty to obtain electricity from different sources. Since the observed 
response of distribution companies to increases in electricity demand appears to be to seek 
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additional suppliers to meet demand (rather than embarking on demand-side energy 
efficiency programmes)9. 
2.9 The Econometric study of electricity market reforms 
It is important to note that analysing electricity market reform can be complex, because 
reform in the electricity market can take many different forms, involve a number of 
interrelated procedures and is an ongoing process. While more than half the world’s countries 
have engaged in electricity market reform, even among the leaders, power sector reform 
remains ongoing (Kessides, 2012). In these situations, evaluating the performance of market-
oriented reforms is difficult because what is being analysed is so often incomplete, even on 
the terms set by national governments for their own reforms.  
Which gives rise to the nature of the industry and the fact that in some countries reform are 
on-going, any attempt to carry out an evaluation of the impact of the market-oriented reform 
on electricity market performance based on econometric analysis in some sample of countries 
may not produce good results, even with a country specific study may not allow for a clear 
set of lessons to be identified. For the supporters (advocates) and critics of market-oriented 
reform, this complexity poses different problems. For advocates, it may be hard to produce 
strong evidence that power sector reform is clearly the best option to improve quality of 
service. On the other hand, for the critics, it may be hard to find clear evidence of market-
oriented reform. Thus, the proponents of the reform will always argue that most countries 
engaged in the reform have not properly implemented the full package of the reform and it is 
too early to draw conclusions, especially on the developing countries experience. While the 
antagonists will always make reference to cases where reform has significantly failed, for 
instance, the state of California energy crisis of June 2000 to May 2001 is seen as a classic 
case (Joskow 2001). 
                                                          
9 For instance in the case of Ghana, the distribution company was charged by both generation and 
transmission company for energy delivery (kWh) and not for energy demanded (kW). In such a case, the every 
distribution company are not interested or do not care about power efficiency. Since charging distribution 
companies for energy demanded, as a way to address the low efficiency in the network could be that of fixing 
the amount of electricity allocated to the distributors from available power generating capacity to a certain 
every period of time (e.g. 1-2 years), after which it will be reviewed.  This may enhance the efficiency of the 
distributors as it would be in their interest to deliver effectively so as to maximize energy sales. It would also 
serve as an incentive for improved efficiency if a parameter linked to the efficiency of the distribution was 
incorporated into the tariff calculation formulae (UNIDO & REEEP, 2006) 
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At this point, it is useful to point out what has driven electricity reform in the first place. 
Electricity market reform is as a result of the failure of the state-owned power corporations to 
deliver (Helm, 2004). Thus, by the early 1980s, the power sector in developed countries was 
characterised as having excess capacity, having made expensive technology choices, and was 
productively inefficient. At the same time in developing countries, there was a 
mismanagement of resources, frequent power outages, and the need for massive investment 
in generation and the extension of networks (Bergara et al., 1997). In these circumstances, 
market-oriented reform becomes necessary. The primary purpose of electricity reform was to 
improve efficiency in developed countries and for developing countries it was to improve the 
access and reliability, and to attract private capital to the sector. Modern electricity reform 
began in Chile (1982), the UK (1989) and Norway (1990), and has spread to other regions of 
the world since then (Pollitt 2009). 
Despite the aforementioned difficulties associated with modelling reform performances, there 
are studies that have investigated the impact of electricity market reform. In this subsection, 
we only review selected empirical papers that give insights into how to model and estimate 
the impact of electricity market reform, as each of the empirical chapters of this study has its 
own specific literature review section.  
The study conducted by Steiner (2001) constitutes one of the earliest empirical studies that 
used cross-country and time-series variation to examine the impact of market reform 
indicators (regulation and market structure) on efficiency and electricity retail prices. She 
examined the effect of regulatory reform on the retail prices for large electricity customers by 
comparing the ratio of industrial price to residential price, using panel data for 19 OECD 
countries for a ten-year period (1986-1996). The study used variables such as electricity 
price, the ratio of industrial to residential electricity price, capacity utilization rate and reserve 
margin. She separately estimated the effects of Unbundling, creating a wholesale power pool, 
and offering third party access to transmission and distribution. Her results suggested that 
industrial customers benefitted more in terms of cheap price rate than residential 
counterparts. The study concludes that unbundling does not lead to lower prices in general, 
but is associated with a lower industrial price ratio, a higher capacity utilization rate, and 
lower reserve margins.  
 
The study conducted by Henisz and Zelner (2002) adopted a different approach. They 
investigated the impact of pressure (interest) group competition on the infrastructure 
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investment decision, focusing on the electricity supply industry. Their analysis was anchored 
on two hypotheses: Firstly, that a utility with strong pressure group competition will invest 
more when the political constraint is high. Secondly, if operating in a politically unstable 
environment, a utility will invest less when facing weak pressure group competition. 
Independent variables used were: industrial representation10, Political constraints11 were 
measured by a dummy variable assigned the value 1 or 0 (if the political constraint is high it 
is equal to 1 if the political constraint is low it is equal to 0). Existing penetration level, 
demand growth, financial constraints and availability of foreign supplies are the independent 
variables, while the dependent variable was installed capacity. 
The econometric specification adopted by Henisz and Zelner (2002) in their analysis covered 
78 countries for a period of twenty-four years (1970 – 1994). Panel data on electricity 
investment and policies were used.  The empirical findings suggested that the result was 
robust and consistent with the prior expectations. Specifically, the study concludes that in a 
society with a strong institutional framework where policies are hard to change, then 
lobbying by interest groups is less effective. Also, the degree to which political actors can 
alter policy has a positive and significant impact on investment decision-making.   
Holburn (2001) examined the effects of political risk on an individual firm’s decision to 
access specific markets (electric power industry) using a standard probit model as estimated 
using maximum likelihood techniques.  He argued that the experiences of individual firms 
vary as a result of differences in countries non-market capabilities and political systems. 
Thus, the impact of political risk on firms will not be uniform. Therefore, firms with high 
crisis management skills will be more likely to invest in countries with a higher political risk. 
He constructed hypotheses using firm’s decisions to enter a specific country as the dependent 
variable. Panel data of 122,240 observations was used and the study covered 191 firms in 64 
countries for the period of nine years (1990-1999). The empirical findings identified the 
results were robust, supported the hypotheses, and were consistent with the expected 
economic signs and expectations. Although, a higher level of political (instability) risk 
typically discourages firms to enter, the impact is significantly lower for firms with a greater 
level of international investment experience. In another word firms with experience in 
monopsony generation markets – where firms engaged directly with government bureaucracy 
                                                          
10 Industrial Representation - Measured as the ratio of industrial to total electricity consumption (IR) in a given 
year. Data used to construct this measure were from IEA (1999).  
11 Political Constraints – Measured the extent to which any one institutional actor (e.g. the executive or 
legislature in a given country) is constrained in its choice of policies in a given year. 
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- had a greater propensity to invest in countries with politically unstable environments 
(Holburn, 2001). 
However, the study by Holburn (2001) failed to test whether well-defined and credible 
political institutions are positively correlated with a firm’s investment decision. Our 
assumption is if a country has an independent regulatory institution, it presents a good 
platform for investment inflows, so the fears that the host government will alter policies or 
expropriate an investing firm’s profit or assets are low. However, a similar study was 
conducted by Bergara, Henisz and Spiller (1997) focusing on 40 countries. Their results were 
significant, but suffered a measurement problem, as they made use of generation capacity as a 
proxy for investment, which constitutes a major measurement problem (especially as the 
division of investment between generation, transmission and distribution tends to vary from 
country to country). Another shortcoming of the study was their failure to include post-
reform data, as private investments would be more sensitive to political and intuitional 
factors. 
The study conducted by Fiorio et al (2007) examined the impact of electricity market reform 
on consumers’ satisfaction in fifteen selected European Union countries. Their empirical 
findings suggest that privatization alone does not lead to lower electricity prices, neither does 
it enhance consumer satisfaction. Moreover, their findings showed that country-specific 
features do have a higher explanatory power than regulatory variables, and the process of 
electricity market reform among the selected EU countries is not systematically associated 
with lower electricity prices and higher consumers’ satisfaction. 
Nagayama (2007) investigated the effects of reforms in the electricity supply industry in 
developing countries focusing on three regions namely Latin America, the former Soviet 
Union, and Eastern Europe. Using panel data for 83 countries covering a period of seventeen 
years from 1985 to 2002, he examined how reform influenced electricity prices. The findings 
generated from the models suggest that the entry of independent power producers (IPP), the 
separation of generation and transmission segments, the establishment of a regulatory body, 
and setting up of a wholesale spot market had a significant of impacts on electricity prices, 
some of which are not consistent with prior expectations and signs. He concludes that neither 
unbundling nor the introduction of a wholesale pool market on its own can lead to lower 
electricity prices.   
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Thus, only when the independent regulatory body and unbundling co-exist it can lead to a 
reduction in electricity price. Also, that the interaction of privatisation, and the introduction 
of competition in the retail supply sector leads to lower electricity prices in some regions, but 
not in all. However, studies conducted by other scholars such as Zhang et al (2005) and 
Holburn (2001), suggested the contrary: that market reform in the electricity supply industry, 
to a large extent, led to a rise in the price of electricity bills. 
 Joskow (2008) examined the lessons learned from the introduction of market-oriented 
structures in the electricity supply industry. He argued that reform in the form of 
restructuring, deregulation, privatisation, regulation and competition does not guarantee 
lower prices of electricity. Furthermore, Zhang et.al. (2008) assessed the impacts of 
privatisation, competition and regulation on the performance of the electricity generation 
industry in developing countries. The study made use of panel data for 36 countries for the 
period from 1985 to 2003. Their findings confirmed there were impacts of these reform 
variables on electricity performance indicators such as electricity generation, generation 
capacity, labour productivity and capacity utilisation. They argued that on their own, 
privatisation and/or regulation does not always leads to any gain in performance, but when 
combined there is some form of positive interaction. They conclude that the introduction of 
competition in the electricity generation sector lead to an increase in generating capacity and 
enhanced the performance in general of the industry.  
In another study, Nagayama (2009) employed two separate empirical models to analyse the 
impact of electricity prices on the choice of liberalisation model, and the impact of the 
liberalisation model on electricity prices. The study focussed on panel data for 78 selected 
countries consisting of OECD countries, Asian developing countries, former Soviet Union 
countries and the Latin American countries. The multinomial discrete choice model was used 
and his findings suggest that electricity prices had a significant impact on the choice of 
liberalisation model that a country adopts. That is, in other words, higher electricity prices 
influence the type of reform model countries adopt.  
The study conducted by Holburn and Zelner (2010) suggested that contrary to conventional 
wisdom multinational enterprises do not invest less in politically unstable host countries as 
they pose greater investment risk. Instead, they argue that multinational enterprises vary in 
their response to host-country investment policy incentives as a result of differences in their 
organizational capabilities for assessing such risks and their ability to manage policy-making 
L i t e r a t u r e  R e v i e w                                                 P a g e  | 43 
  
decisions. Their study was based on two hypotheses: First, that firms operating from (home) 
countries characterized by weaker institutional constraints on policy makers or greater 
redistributive pressures associated with political rent seeking will be less sensitive to host-
country investment risk in their international expansion strategies. Second, firms from home 
countries characterized by stronger institutional constraints or strong redistributive pressures 
will seek less risky host countries for their investments. They adopted an industry approach 
based on the resource and capability theories by implying that firms developed market power 
in order to influence decisions and be able to secure their positions in the market. The 
shortcomings of this study are that the data they employed exclude observations on firms that 
are not involved in foreign direct investment at all, the implication is that it may led to 
selection bias, especially if the set of variables influencing a firm’s decision to invest abroad 
overlaps with those influencing investment destination choices (Shaver, 1998). Their findings 
also pertain to a single industry in the early stages of its international development. As firms 
gain more international experience, the relative influence of the home-country institutional 
environment and thus the capabilities that it fosters, may decline, and the importance of a 
firm’s international experience may grow (Perkins-Rodriguez, 2005). 
Furthermore, one of the key expectations of electricity market reform is a reduction in 
electricity price. Based on this hypothesis, Erdogdu (2011) examined the impact of electricity 
market reforms on electricity price-cost margins and cross-subsidy levels, focusing on both 
developed and developing countries. The study used panel data from 63 selected countries 
between 1982 -2009 (a period of twenty-seven years). The empirical findings suggest that 
there is no uniform pattern regarding the impact of power sector reform on price-cost margins 
and cross-subsidy levels across the selected regions as each individual reform had a different 
impact on price-cost margins and cross-subsidy levels for each country. Therefore, the 
outcome of the study supports prior expectations that reform prescriptions for a specific 
country cannot be easily and successfully transferred to another country without some 
amendments. Moreover, the study suggests that electricity consumption, the income levels of 
countries and country-specific endowments (such as natural resources and technological 
knowledge) constitute other key determinants of electricity price-cost margins and cross-
subsidy levels among countries.    
Meyer (2012a) examined the economies of scope in the U.S. electricity supply industry and 
the costs of vertical separation of different unbundling options between the years 2001 to 
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2008. The study identified three key unbundling models12 and the research findings suggest 
that if the generation segment of the sector is unbundled, while transmission, distribution and 
retail supply remained bundled, the average cost of generation will increase between 19 to 26 
percent (Meyer 2012, p.110). Alternatively, if generation and transmission remain integrated 
and distribution and retail (DRU) are unbundled, there was an 8 to 10 percent loss of 
synergies. The third option, a splitting of the transmission network (TU) from the rest of the 
sector, showed the lowest cost increase (approximately 4 percent). Intuitively, while there 
may be a loss of coordination economies between generation and transmission, this third 
option leads to the lowest increase in market risk13. This result supports previous studies 
(Brunekreeft and Meyer 2009) which conclude that significant economies of scope exist 
between the different segments of the electricity supply industry. 
In another study Meyer (2012b) reviews the basic theoretical and empirical literature of 
vertical economies and the costs of separating electricity supply into segments (i.e. the study 
of unbundling and ownership in the electricity supply industry). His findings suggest that 
unbundling of pure network monopolies such as transmission networks does not come 
without a cost, given the coordination economies between generation and transmission. Thus, 
theoretical and empirical literature suggest that network externalities may hinder investment 
inflow in the sector, except if there exist market mechanisms (such as local network pricing) 
to regulate and internalise the external effects (as in the case of the British and Norwegian 
models).  
   2.9.1 Electricity market reform delivers long-term benefits 
The increasing importance of electricity in globalised economics cannot be overemphasised 
as a driver for economic prosperity. Stable and affordable supply of electricity is key for the 
growth of industries and an essential ingredient for the everyday workings of modern 
societies (IEA, 2005). To this end, the liberalisation of the power sector is a development 
path and policy option for both developed and developing countries who have implemented 
or are considering the market-oriented reform. 
 Through liberalisation, incentives are created for the more efficient operation of an 
electricity system that promotes increasing private sector participation, an improving 
                                                          
12 Generation Unbundling (GU), Distribution and Retail supply Unbundling (DRU) and Transmission Unbundling 
(TU). 
13 Market risk occurs as a result of the separation of generation and retail supply in the utility system. It is 
important to consider this risk when considering vertical restructuring in the electricity supply industry. 
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electricity generation mix and protect investors and customers against expropriation of assets 
and monopoly market power. After three decades of market-oriented reform in the electricity 
market, lessons can now be drawn from the experience of the pioneering countries and 
regions. Although some these pioneering countries have experienced significant success for a 
number of years, liberalisation has been shown not be an event, but rather a long process that 
requires on-going government commitment (i.e. a full-package of reform14), as no reform 
model is complete on its own.  
However, for a country to obtain the full benefit of the reform (interaction effects), regardless 
of its approach to market-oriented reform, the process demands strong government 
commitment. To large extent political commitment plays a key role, in the absence of that, 
regulatory uncertainty may well be self-fulfilling and undermine the expected outcome of the 
reform. Liberalised markets are prompted by competition. Thus allowing private sectors to 
participate breaks down the traditional vertically integrated utilities. Also, separating each 
segment as an independent entity promotes the decentralisation of the decision making 
process and increases labour productivity (see chapter four).  
In other words, a full reform package shows total commitment of the government to the 
reform and is a strong tool to ensure continuous development towards achieving effective 
markets.  
  2.10 Conclusion 
The shortcomings of previous studies show the need for further study in this field. The 
prescriptions for reform and the analysis of the problems encountered have sometimes been 
approached using wrong variable specifications, sometimes there are problems of 
endogeneity, simultaneity and measurement problems. Some of the problems are due to lack 
of a sufficient data set, although there now seem to be sufficient available data to boost 
research in this field. We intend to improve on the previous studies by conducting more 
robust tests, including dummy variables in our model when necessary and also making use of 
pre and post- panel data of reform variables. Furthermore, we examine the political economy 
of political institutions and the regulatory agency role in shaping firm’s investment decisions 
in the African electricity power industry.  
                                                          
14 A Full reform package refers to a country adopting the four reforms (privatisation, regulation, competition 
and unbundling). 
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Chapter 3 
The economics of electricity market reform: a cross country 
analysis 
This chapter presents some snapshots of reform outcomes in different regions of the world, 
given that there are limited studies that have examined cross-country electricity market 
reforms using econometric techniques.  Here we focus on countries that have adopted 
electricity reforms and explore the novel characteristics adopted in their reform processes as 
this can offer potential insights into African electricity reform processes. 
The global trend of market-oriented reform in electricity markets simply follows a pattern of 
private sector participation (especially in the generation segment), competition, the 
establishment of an independent regulator, and separation of different segments of the 
industry into independent entities. The process towards achieving all this has be difficult, 
especially for developing countries. This section covers reform in developing regions of the 
world (i.e. Latin American electricity markets, Asian markets and African power markets). 
We also draw on experiences from the developed world (European markets, North America 
and Australia & Oceania) to inform our analysis.  
3.1 Motivation for Electricity Market Reforms 
 
Power sector reforms in developing economies are undertaken within diverse political, 
economic, and structural contexts. Many of the reforms were initiated as a condition of 
securing loans and aid from the international financial institutions (most notably the World 
Bank) to combat economic crises. Consequently, power sector reforms have taken a variety 
of forms and paths (Bacon and Besant-Jones, 2001; Millan et al., 2001). Given this 
background, it is perhaps not surprising that many reforming developing countries have 
encountered unexpected problems and have only achieved, to some extent, their goals 
(Jamasb, 2006).  
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Table 3.1: Drivers of Electricity market liberalisation policy 
Electricity market drivers Sources 
Developed economies: 
Due to monopolistic excess capacity of the power 
utilities, innovation and increasing demand for 
affordable energy. 
i).Economic and political ideological change: 
Involving private sector in the management of public 
utilities 
ii).Technological advancement: Breakthrough in 
innovation such as combined cycle gas turbines   
 
iii). EU Reform directives: European Union 
directives to all its members to open their retail 
markets 
 
Developing economies: 
Generally due to poor performance of the electricity 
sector, poor funding, energy subsidies, lack of 
investment to expand networks, and a lack of routine 
maintenance culture  
iv).Economic crisis recovery policy plan: As a result 
of debt and financial crisis, IMF introduced 
Structural Adjustment Programme. 
v).Conditionality of lending policies and donors: 
World Bank and IMF made reform a condition for 
developing countries to access to loan facilities 
 
 
Table 3.1 shows the difference drivers of electricity market reform in developed and 
developing economies. The sources of these motives differs also, as developing countries 
embarked on the liberalisation of the electricity market as an economic strategy to attract 
increasing private sector investment. 
In addition to these differences, reforms in the electricity markets has been pursued under 
different institutional and structural regimes. Countries with strong institutional frameworks 
and government commitment experience relative success (such as Norway, New Zealand and 
Great Britain). Others, especially from sub-Saharan Africa (such as Namibia, Malawi and 
Zimbabwe) remain a disappointment due to their weak institutional framework and continued 
government intervention in the process. Moreover, developing countries have tended to 
mimic the design and model adopted by the developed countries, a model which literally does 
not fit with their institutional framework (i.e. what works for developed countries with strong 
institutions may not work for less developed countries with relative weak Institutions).  
3.2 Electricity market reform; exogenous and endogenous driving forces 
Electricity market reforms are either exogenous or endogenous, exogenous forces refer to the 
external forces that influence the adaptation and implementation of the reform, especially in 
developing countries. The majority of electricity market reform in developing countries were 
as a result of economic crisis. The external forces like World Bank and IMF loan/debit 
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conditionality in securing/accessing loan and management of debit. The other endogenous or 
internal forces driving reform related to local reasons, such as the poor performance of state-
own power utilities, which has led to high costs and frequent power outages. Other 
endogenous reasons include the inability of the public-own power utilities to secure either the 
required funds for routine maintenance, or funds for network expansion. Many developing 
countries power sectors are financially distressed because of poor resource management and 
low productivity and inefficiency in its management (Besant-jones, 2006). 
Historically, most of the developing countries embarked on market-oriented reform of their 
electricity markets because of endogenous factors. The expected outcome is to improve the 
quality of service, offer a reliable and affordable power supply, to increase the population’s 
access to electricity, to achieve financial stability, and to increase total net electricity 
generation and installed capacity. 
However, reforming the electricity market could be seen as exogenously given, in the sense 
that while international financial institutions such as World Bank could only play an advisory 
role on the reform process, the full implementation of such policy falls solely on the 
government of the country. For instance under-investment in the industry to a large extent is 
among the main rationale to why developing countries embarked on reform. Prior to the 
reform era, the main challenge faced by the industry was the issue of cost recovery and 
underpricing. Over two-thirds of African power utilities set tariffs lower than cost, with only 
one-fifth of them charging prices that cover their full capital cost (Kessides, 2012b). As 
expected, market-oriented reform especially privatisation enhances the revenue of the power 
utilities (see Tanzania electricity market reform experience), but the problem is that countries 
involved are not under any rule to follow hundred percentage the World Bank directives 
(Besant-jones, 2006). 
In the next section we consider case studies of countries from 6 regions of the world as the 
objectives for reforming differs among developed and developing countries. In each of the 
country, studies we seek to key lessons relating to the reform, its achievements, and the 
challenges faced.  
3.3. Overview of Electricity market reforms in Latin American countries 
It is generally agreed that it was in Latin America where electricity reform started, and reform 
has been influential and far-reaching. Prior to reform, the sector was made up of vertically 
integrated state-owned utilities characterized by low productivity, prices lower than cost, low 
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access of electric power to rural dwellers, low quality of electricity services, high political 
interference and over employment. Thus over this period, the electricity supply industry in 
the region was financially unstable, underperforming and had low investment in capacity 
expansion and in regular plant maintenance (Balza et al. 2013). 
Most, if not all, the countries in the continent have adopted electricity market reform. Some 
have progressed to the level where a competitive electricity market has been established, such 
as in countries like Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Peru and El Salvador (Nagayama 2007). There 
are also a few countries in the region that still maintain a state - owned vertically integrated 
electricity sector, like Venezuela. 
Studies carried out by McKenzie and Mookherjee (2005) analysed public opinion on the 
impact of privatization in the electricity supply industry in the Latin American countries of 
Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico and Nicaragua. The majority of the people interviewed rated the 
benefits derived from privatization as low, although their study shows that privatization has a 
positive correlation with reduced poverty in the region as it has contributed to increased 
access to electricity, especially for the rural dwellers.  
Moreover, contrary to McKenzie and Mookherjee’s (2005) results, Gaviria (2006) found that 
the poorest quintiles of the region’s households were the most likely to disapprove of 
privatization in the electricity power sector. Also, in 2012, a public opinion survey by 
Latinobarometro (2012) indicated that a high percentage of people were dissatisfied with 
privatized public firms in the three observed Latin America countries - Chile (82%), Peru 
(67%), and Argentina (64%). 
In addition, Estache, Guasch and Trujillo (2003) examined the impact of price-cap regulation 
on privatized utility firms in the Latin American region. They conclude that lack of “political 
will” or commitment by the government to effectively monitor the process of regulation did 
not lead to the expected efficiency gains from the reform benefitting customers. Their 
findings suggest that countries with a weak institutional setting performed poorly, especially 
when they set ambitious reform plans. On the other hand, governments of countries with 
strong, reliable institutional frameworks and sustained commitment to reform fared much 
better, even with modest reform plans (Tongia, 2003; Heller, Tjiong, and Victor, 2004;  
Jamasb et al., 2005; Besant-Jones 2006; Balza et al 2013). 
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In general, regulatory governance was identified as the key element for improvement in the 
performance of the sector. In terms of specific country experience: 
Chile 
Chile is often referred to as the first country that started market-oriented electricity reform. 
The government of Salvador Allende has introduced an economic reform which involved 
regulation of power sector, but this was completely reversed by the neo-liberal free market 
orientation of the Pinochet regime. Realising the importance of cost recovery in the public 
sector, the military government of Chile in 1982 decided to reform tariffs before the 
privatisation of the electricity utility industry.  
Fisher, Gutierrez and Serra (2004) analysed the impact of market reform in the Chilean 
electricity supply industry in terms of  installed capacity, electricity generation, energy sold, 
labour productivity and profitability. They found an increase in installed capacity from 4,016 
MW in 1988 to 10,045MW in 2000.  There was also an increase in foreign investment, a fall 
in unit costs, a decline in the rate of energy losses, and a rise in labour productivity while the 
price charged by the operators decreased (although this was attributed to the low fuel price at 
the time of the research). They concluded that the growth in access to electricity services in 
the most rural areas was a result of the subsidy introduced by the government. Pollitt (2004) 
examined the progress and lessons learnt from Chilean electricity reform. He suggested that 
while the initial market structure and regulatory arrangements did give rise to certain 
problems, the institutional setting was the key that facilitated the reform process. In fact, his 
study indicates that Chile’s power market successfully achieved its target of lowering 
electricity prices and offering a reasonable rate of return for investors in spite of the markets 
being small. Pollitt maintained that Chile was able to achieve this outcome due to a 
combination of free entry into the generation sector and a price restraint imposed by the 
marginal cost based bidding system in the power pool (which limited the short run exercising 
of market power by the three incumbent generators15).  
 
 
                                                          
15 It should stressed that the particular institutional designs adopted in Chile are a legacy of the economic 
policies of the military dictatorship. The framework has had economic legacy: an institutional setting that 
maintained a status quo which protected the property rights of initial owners of capital in the electricity 
sector. 
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Argentina 
Electricity reform in Argentina followed most of the features of the standard textbook reform 
model. In 1992, the Argentine electricity power sector was restructured with 80 percent of 
power generation, all the transmission network, and up to 60 percent of all distribution 
networks transferred to private firm ownership (Pollitt 2008). The state-owned utility 
corporation was unbundled which led to the creation of five generating firms, three 
distribution firms while a system regulator (CAMMESA) was established to regulate the 
industry.  
The Argentine electricity reform model was based on the lessons learned from the Chilean 
experience, especially as regards to full-scale unbundling and allowing competition in the 
sector. It was meant to dynamically drive down horizontal market power and promote 
competitive wholesale electricity markets (Kessides 2012). Another novel aspect of the 
restructuring of the electricity sector in Argentina was that transmission expansion was no 
longer the responsibility of the state, but rather that of the users, (as the users have to propose, 
approve and pay for major expansion work to be carried out) (Littlechild and Ponzano 2008; 
Littlechild and Skerk 2008).  
 A study by Gonzales-Eiras and Rossi (2007) examining the progress of market reform in the 
electricity power sector in Argentina finds an increase in electricity access and quality of 
service. They also suggested that increased access and quality of service in the electricity 
sector led to a decrease in the frequency of low birth weights and child mortality ratios 
(although they were cautious about these results).  
Haselip et al (2005) assessed the impact of electricity market reform on poor dwellers in the 
city of Buenos Aires. Their findings suggested that the reform was successful, as wholesale 
electricity prices dropped significantly from US$ 48.76/MWh in 1992 to US$ 25.67/MWh in 
1997. As the reform allowed competition within the privatised generation market, it also 
attracted new market entrants to the industry, the number of firms increasing from 13 in 1992 
to 44 in 1997 (Estache et al., 2000).  
The study by Nagayama and Kashiwagi (2007) supports the findings of Haselip et al (2003), 
that the electricity reform in Argentina was successful prior to the economic crisis of 2002. 
Their study traces the history of market-oriented reform in the Argentine electricity power 
sector and assessed the progress made prior to, and after, the macroeconomic crisis of 2002. 
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They suggested that Argentine success was due to the unbundling of electricity supply 
businesses and the introduction of competition, experience learned from Chile.  
Brazil 
The power sector reform in Brazil dated back to 1995 with an electricity act which authorised 
the privatisation of Electro-bras (Brazil’s major electricity utility corporation). Independent 
power producers were allowed access to the power generation market and the government 
established a nationwide power grid and a wholesale electricity market. However, the 
Brazilian government were more cautious in the reform process and the reform was 
characterised by mixed ownership, limited vertical unbundling, and weak competition in the 
sector. Moreover, the distribution network was privatised without a comprehensive reform 
blueprint and before an independent regulatory body was set up (Kessides 2012).  
Brazil’s experience raises serious questions concerning the efficacy of private ownership of 
power generation in developing countries like Brazil, where there are a large number of 
hydro-dams that required coordinated regulation (Kessides 2012; Dutra and Menezes, 2005). 
In addition, Mota (2003) examined the impact of market reform on the Brazilian electricity 
supply industry (ESI) using a social cost-benefit approach from 1995 – 2000. He found that 
the distribution supply companies recorded huge gains in labour productivity, reductions in 
average cost and efficiency improvements over this period ((figure 3.1).  
Figure 3.1: Labour Productivity of distribution and supply businesses in Brazil (1991 -2000 
For instance, during the first phase of privatization in 1991, real controllable costs declined of 
R$1.2 billion, a reduction of 43 percent in the real controllable cost per unit. Likewise, during 
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1995 -2000 there was a further reduction of R$477 million. There were also efficiency gains 
as a result of an increase in labour productivity. They conclude that there has been an 
improvement in the quality of service since the privatization of distribution companies in 
Brazil, but they also argued that to sustain it constant and efficient monitoring is essential 
(Mota 2002). 
Mota (2004) subsequently compared the performance of privatised Brazilian electricity 
distribution network companies against that of some U.S privately-owned counterparts. To 
measure the efficiency of the respective distribution networks he adopted the benchmarking 
techniques of data envelopment analysis (DEA) and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). His 
findings suggested that Brazilian electricity distribution companies’ efficiency is catching up 
with that of the United States.  
Bolivia 
The electricity reform in Bolivia in 1994 took a different dimension, as Bolivia opted for both 
vertical and horizontal separation. The electricity market reform in Bolivia was a component 
of the wide-ranging economic reform adopted by the government due to the debt crisis.  In 
1994, the state-owned utilities were privatised, and the power sector was fully unbundled. A 
wholesale electricity market was set up, consisting of regulated contracts supported by a spot 
market, with distribution firms required to buy up to 80 percent of expected demand based on 
three-year contracts. The state-owned utility – Empresa Nacional de Electricidad (ENDE) the 
largest power company in the country - was divided into three generation units and a 
transmission grid. The generation sector was capitalized, while the transmission grid was 
privatised as a common carrier (ESMAP 2000). Meanwhile, the company in charge of 
electricity distribution - the Empresa de Luz y Fuerza Electrica de Cochabamba (ELFEC) - 
the Cochabamba electricity distribution company was privatized, while the Compania 
Boliviana de Energia Electrica (COBEE) – consisting of electric utility generation and 
distribution companies were already partly unbundled before the full reform programme was 
introduced. This arrangement saw the World Bank closely involved in the planning, finance 
and support of the reform programme (Williams and Ghanadan 2006). 
Colombia 
The mid-1990s wave of liberalization reform which has swept across many power sectors in 
the Latin American countries saw Colombia’s power sector benefit from political and 
economic stability as well as structural and institutional reforms. The industry was 
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deregulated in 1994 following the enactment of electricity laws 142 and 143 that provide the 
current framework for the electricity sector. Colombian government control over all aspects 
of the electricity supply industry - power generation, transmission, and distribution - was 
broken. The Colombian electricity supply industry reform focused on offering incentives for 
utility efficiency and productivity levels through the introduction of market competition, 
independent grid access, and markup price regulation for power distribution. The Colombian 
reform was inspired by the British reform model (Pombo and Taborda 2006).  
Colombia now operates a mix of partly state-controlled utilities companies operating 
alongside private firms. Power generation (ISAGEN) and distribution networks are operated 
by several public and private utilities. Two of the country’s largest energy companies are 
state-owned but also are listed on the stock exchange. ISA, who went public in 2000, and 
ISAGEN (Colombia’s state power generation company), which also floated on the 
Colombian stock exchange. ISAGEN owns and operates five power plants with a total 
installed capacity of 2,132 megawatts (MW), or 16 percent of the national grid’s total 
capacity (Viscidi 2010). 
Larsen et al. (2004) examines and evaluates the progress of the Colombian electricity market 
reform from the period deregulation took place in 1994 to 2002. The Colombia model is of 
interest as it is one of the most open electricity markets in the developing world. Furthermore, 
Colombia has had no blackouts since deregulation, in contrast to a number of neighbouring 
countries in the region. Colombia also managed to impose a regulatory environment that kept 
investment at a reasonable level.  Their findings indicated significant efficiency 
improvements following market reform. They found a significant fall in the number of 
employees for each MWh produced, from 0.58 employees in 1997 to 0.49 in 1999, with an 
improvement of 15% alone in 1999.  They also measured system losses in transmission and 
distribution, which in times past in Colombia had been notably high compared to other 
countries in the developing world. Their results showed a significant fall in system losses 
from 22.5% in the year before reform to 15% in 2000.  
Another important measure of industry performance tested by Larsen et al (2004) was 
consumers’ satisfaction, analysed by measuring the rate electric/energy bills are paid when 
due (i.e. establishing what fraction of the bills issued are actually paid on time). Their results 
showed an improvement in the rate of responsiveness of consumers, the time being cut from 
an average of 81 days in 1996 to only 34 days in 1999, an improvement of approximately 
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60%. Such changes significantly improved the cash flows for the distribution companies 
involved and, together with the increase in people actually paying their bills on time and the 
consequent reduction in distribution losses, benefited the economy. 
Pombo and Taborda (2006) assessed the performance, efficiency and productivity of 12 of 
Colombia’s distribution network companies from 1994 to 2001. They measured performance 
by contrasting changes in mean and median financial and other performance indicators by 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum and Pearson tests. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) was used to 
evaluate efficiency. The nature of the dataset allowed the estimation of a Malmquist 
productivity index, and to review its evolution over time. Their results indicate there was an 
improvement in the main performance indicators of profitability, input productivity, and 
output following the reform. Plant efficiency and productivity increased after the reform, 
mainly in the largest utilities used as benchmarks in the DEA efficiency score measures. 
However, they found less efficient power distribution companies did not improve after the 
reform and were not able to undertake plant restructuring so as to catch-up in plant efficiency 
terms with respect to the Pareto efficient input allocations. They conclude that the 
econometric results on DEA efficiency scores suggested a positive effect of policy reform. 
Peru. 
In Peru, the experience of electricity market reform could be described as somewhat mixed. 
According to Torero and Pasco-Font (2001), the power sector reform between 1994 and 1997 
was a huge success. It brought significant improvements in labour productivity, a quality 
service, a reduction in supply losses and an increase in power generation. At the same time it 
had a positive effect on the quality of life of the populace through increased access to 
electricity. For instance, in 2001, the Edelnor electric distribution company has reported 83 
percent of Lima dwellers were connected to the national grid.  
However, comparing the average Peruvian electricity price with other Latin America 
countries, it appears that while Peru’s average electric energy tariff in the residential sector 
was lower than in either Argentina or Chile, it was higher than that of Colombia and Ecuador 
(Torero & Pasco-Font 2001). 
Perez-Reyes and Tovar (2010) assessed the extent to which the reform of the Peruvian 
electricity market had improved the efficiency of the 14 distribution companies between 1996 
and 2006, using a stochastic frontier approach. Their findings suggest that the reform process 
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led to the firms becoming more efficient. Moreover, the time trend and private management 
of the distribution companies were variables that positively contributed to the levels of 
efficiency. 
According to Balza, Jimenez and Mercado (2013), following the reform, the inflow of private 
investment to the industry has increased, especially in the power generation sector. Figure 3.2 
shows the private electricity investment flow in the Latin American region from 1984 to 2011 
totalled US$155 billion, an increase of 38 percent of the average fixed capital formation. 
In sum, the argument over the effects and impact of market-oriented reform on electricity 
market in Latin America is ongoing. Some people suggest that reform has contributed 
significantly to increased electricity access, and an improved quality of services (Torero and 
Pasco-Font 2001). On the other hand, others have criticised the reform as contributing to 
poverty levels in many Latin American countries (Torero and Pasco-Font 2001; Eduardo and 
Ugo 2002; Estache and Trujillo 2007; Balza et.al 2013). It was in the Latin American region 
that electricity reform was first started and, until now, it is no easy task to arrive at a 
definitive conclusion as to the effect of the reforms.  
 
 
Figure 3.2: Figure 3.2: Private Investment in Electricity Power Sector in Latin America, 1984 -
2011(As a percentage of the average Gross Fixed Capital Formation).  
Source: Balza, Jimenez and Mercado (2013) 
                       
3.4 Electricity Market reform in European Countries 
The pre-reform structures of electric utilities in many European countries were mainly based 
on vertical integration, with the state/municipal authorities owning and operating the 
electricity industry. The sector was characterised by high regulation with limited competition, 
thus, customers did not have options on supply. Also, there was no third party access to the 
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transmission grid (Fiorio et.al. 2007). However, the introduction of market-oriented reform in 
the UK and the Nordic countries in the late-1980s brought a gradual change in the electricity 
industry in the European Union. In 1996, the European Union (EU) issued the first directive 
to her member states over the need to open up their retail markets, at least partially, by the 
Millennium. The directive’s objectives were to:  
 (i) Have a separation between potentially competitive and monopolistic segments,  
(ii) To offer alternative supply options for industrial and household users, and  
(iii) To increase the autonomy of the transmission networks among the member states. 
 The short-coming of the EU 1996 directive, however, was that while it did permit the 
establishment of a wholesale market and/or an independent regulator within member states, it 
also allowed members to avoid total compliance without any serious penalty. By 2001, 
fifteen EU countries (except Greece) had opened their retail market (Thomas 2006b). In 
2003, a new electricity directive was introduced by the European Union. It emphasised the 
need for member states to introduce further competition in generation and retail supply while 
regulating transmission and distribution to avoid the creation of monopolies. The directive 
was modified in July 2007 to allow member states to include legal unbundling of 
transmission and distribution networks, permitting the free entry of new firms into the 
generation and retail supply markets. Member states were also expected to set up an 
independent arbitrator to regulate the industry.  
In 2009, the European Commission adopted another package of electricity market reforms, 
which aimed to harmonize the two Directives of 1996 and 2003 (Jamasb and Pollitt 
2005).This came into force in 2011. The areas the 2009 Directive addressed were that of 
consumer choice, fairer prices, and cleaner and secure sources of energy supply. The 
commission intended to achieve their goal by:  
(i) Encouraging member states to cooperate in cross-border energy trade,  
(ii) To improve on the effectiveness and performance of their national regulators;  
(iii) To promote and encourage cross-border collaborations in the areas of research and 
development, 
 (iv) To increase Investment through private sector participation, and  
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(v) To increase market accountability and transparency on network operations among 
member states.  
The overall aim of the directive was the creation of a strong market-based system; a single 
European electricity market to promote efficiency and productivity among EU countries. But, 
due to the reluctance of some member states (who feared domination by larger members), 
there was a lack of political will power to ensure the full implementation of these measures. 
Instead, some member states (France, Italy, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands) still 
maintain the old model and have switching rates that remain below 10 per cent. In countries 
like Finland and Spain, switching rates are slightly above 10 per cent, while in the UK and 
Nordic countries the switching rate is above 20 percent (Defeuilly, 2009). 
Despite the European Commission’s efforts to develop a Europe-wide single model then, 
there presently exist different types of ownership, degrees of integration and openness, and 
market concentration among the member states. So, it is difficult to argue that a unique style 
of market-oriented reform was adopted by the member states. 
United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom electricity reform is often referred to as the standard textbook model. 
Prior to reform, the British electricity supply industry was characterised as been vertically 
integrated, controlled and operated by a state-owned power utility firm- the Central 
Electricity Generation Board (CEGB). It was restructured in 1990 under the economic policy 
of Margaret Thatcher, the then Prime Minister of the Great Britain. The hallmark of the 
restructuring was the separation of generation and supply from the transmission and 
distribution grids, with the former under competition and the latter under a regulated 
monopoly. Generation was entrusted to three companies – National Power, Power-Gen and 
Nuclear Electric. National Power and Power-Gen were quickly privatized. In 1996 the 
Nuclear Electric plant was sold off as British Energy (Newbery and Pollitt, 1997) and twelve 
regional electricity distribution companies (RECs) were established to replace the former area 
boards (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2007). Prior to this, however, the government set up an electricity 
pool, a market mechanism through which electricity would be traded in the UK. They also 
abolished the electricity council and created a system of independent regulation, headed by 
the Director General of Electricity Supply, covering England, Wales and Scotland. This was 
supported by a regulatory office, the Office of Electricity Regulation (Offer) to regulate the 
newly private electricity industry. In 1999, the separate regulatory bodies for gas and 
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electricity were merged to form OFGEM16 with the intention to promote competition, 
regulate price and protect consumers’ interest. Furthermore, a series of regional consumer 
committees, (the electricity consumer’s committees), were established to replace the 
electricity consultative councils (See figure 3.3) 
Despite the reform, there is evidence market power exists in the generation markets in the 
U.K electricity supply industry. The markets did not function properly due to limited price 
discovery, slow market entry (due to uncertainties caused by regulation) and strategic bidding 
by suppliers (to take advantage of the market design). OFGEM, therefore, stepped up 
measures accordingly when presented with evidence of market power abuses. Regulatory 
remedies have included price caps, divestiture to decrease market concentration and the 
introduction of market abuse conditions into the licences of certain generators (Green 1998; 
OFGEM 2000; and Wolfram 1999). 
                                                          
16 The Office of Gas and Electric Markets – regulatory body in the United Kingdom.  
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Figure 3.3: Structure of Electricity Industry at Restructuring in the United Kingdom 
While these interventions have stabilized prices and did not discourage market entry, they 
were not successful in reducing market prices to marginal cost. 
Domah and Pollitt (2001) conducted a study of the privatisation of the twelve regional 
electricity companies in England and Wales using social cost- benefit analysis. Their results 
showed that privatisation had significant net benefits, but that it was unevenly distributed 
across time and groups in society. 
Electricity sector reform in Northern Ireland took a different dimension, as power generation 
was split into three separate firms, each firm having long-term power purchase agreements 
with the transmission and distribution network. The privatisation of the generation companies 
yielded positive results as there was an improvement in efficiency and productivity, although 
the price of electricity did not come down, nor did the power purchase arrangement have a 
significant effect on consumers (Jamasb et al. 2005). 
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The Nordic countries electricity market reform 
The Nordic electricity market consists of Norway, Sweden, and Finland which liberalized and 
integrated their respective electricity markets in 1998. Denmark later joined in 2000 (Bang et 
al. 2012). Between 1991 and 2000, the electricity supply industry of these countries was 
opened up for restructuring (Amundsen & Bergman 2006). Norway was the first in the region 
to deregulate its electricity market in 1991 in line with the textbook standard model, except it 
did not privatise the companies created. In 1996, Sweden introduced competition in 
generation and supply but retained transmission and distribution as regulated monopolies. 
While Finland liberalised its electricity supply industry in 1995, the path they took was 
unique in the sense that it was a gradual process; by 1997 there was free access to enter the 
industry for private producers, thus customers had the option to choose the supplier of their 
choice. Another hallmark of the Finnish reform was the separation of generation and supply 
from transmission and distribution, although the distribution networks were not fully 
unbundled. In Denmark, they introduced market-oriented reform in the power sector in 2000, 
but it was not until 2001 that it fully liberalised the sector (Bergman 2003). 
The reforms were aimed at increasing industry efficiency by promoting competition in 
generation and retail supply, removing every form of cross-border barrier (such as border 
tariffs), establishing a common power exchange and increasing the production of electricity 
(Bang et al. 2012). Table 3.1 depicts production of electricity among the four Nordic 
countries in 2001. 
The integration of the power markets in Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark significantly 
constrained the major power companies’ ability to exercise market power within their own 
national borders. Amundsen and Bergman (2002) examined the impact of co-ownership of 
the major electricity power companies in Norway and Sweden on the electricity market. Their 
simulation results suggest that partial ownership among major producers in both countries led 
to an increase in horizontal market power and a rise in the market price of electricity. The 
issue of market power arose as the dominant companies tended to use production capacity to 
take advantage of the consumers, although the possibility of the dominant firms exercising 
this market power was checked by the independent regulator (Bergman 2003). 
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Table 3.2: The Production of Electricity by the Dominant Companies in the Nordic Area (2001).  
Countries Plants/Companies Production (Two) Share of Production (%) 
Sweden Vattenfall 76.6 48.54 
 Fortum 29.6 18.75 
 Sydkraft 32.7 20.72 
 Others 18.9 11.98 
 Total 157.8 49.98 
Norway Skatkraft 33.3 27.32 
 Norsk hydro 9.8 8.04 
 Others 78.8 64.64 
Total Total 121.9 38.61 
Finland Fortum 40.4 56.42 
 Pohjolan voila oy 15.9 22.21 
 Others 15.3 21.37 
 Total 71.6 22.68 
Denmark Elsam 16.1 44.72 
 Energi E2 11.8 32.78 
 Others 8.1 22.50 
 Total 36.0 11.40 
Source: Bergman (2003) 
France 
France started electricity market reform in 2000 following the approval of the law to 
implement the European Commission Directive of 1996. The reform led to the establishment 
of an independent industry regulator, a regime of regulated third party access, and the 
introduction of a wholesale electricity market. The reform opened the industry for more 
suppliers to enter the market, thus granting the consumer a wide option from which to select 
their energy supplier. The reform was partial however as the sector is still vertically 
integrated, with EDF17 the major producer (70 percent owned by the government). As EDF 
operates at all stages from generation to transmission, to distribution and to retail supply, the 
reform is more in the form of an accounting separation between transmission and generation 
(Heddenhausen, 2007). 
Germany 
Prior to reform, the German electricity market was dominated by eight firms, but these were 
merged to form four vertically integrated electricity companies who control 90% of the 
generation capacity, all aspects of transmission, 75% of the distribution networks, and over 
50% of the retail supply (EC-Germany 2007). 
                                                          
17 Électricité de France S.A. is a French electric utility company, founded on April 8th 1946, in Paris, and largely 
owned by the French government. 
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Since Germany implemented the 1996 European Commission directive in 1998 the country 
has seen the complete liberalisation of its electricity supply industry, the abolition of 
territorial monopolies over electricity generation and supply, and the introduction of third 
party access. The structure of the industry is controlled by the public electricity supply 
companies and the private investor, allowing the system to remain both vertically and 
horizontally integrated.  
Italy 
 The structure of the Italian electricity supply industry is similar to that of France and 
Germany. In 1999, the government passed a law for the enforcement of the European 
Commission Directive of 1996. They liberalised the electricity supply industry by creating a 
state-owned transmission utility operator, then privatising some state-owned power stations 
of ENEL18 so as to reduce its control to 50% by 2003. Thus, like in France, ENEL are still 
involved in all stages (generation, transmission, distribution and retail supply). ENEL control 
40% of generation and all aspects of transmission and distribution, except for a few cities 
where local municipalities control distribution (EC-Italy 2007). The major problem of the 
Italian electricity supply industry is seen as the sometimes unnecessary intervention of the 
government. 
Spain 
Market-oriented electricity reform started in Spain with the passing into law in 1994 of the 
act that empowered the government to reform the industry. The key features of the reform 
include; (i) the setting up of an independent joint public-private transmission system regulator 
(REE) with the aim to regulate both transmission and distribution utilities, (ii) the separation 
of generation and retail supply, and (iii) the introduction of competition. Later, in 2006, a 
wholesale electricity market was created known as the Iberian Electricity Market (MIBEL), 
which united with the Portuguese electricity market to form a single market. The main 
objective behind MIBEL was to promote collaboration between the two countries, to improve 
industrial efficiency and to remove any form of cross-border barriers. The short-coming of 
the Iberian electricity market was the lack of transparency in transactions, so retail and 
                                                          
18 Enel, formerly National Entity for Electricity (Ente nazionale per l'energia elettrica), was first established as 
a public body in 1962, and later transformed into a limited liability company in 1992. In 1999, following the 
liberalization of the electricity market in Italy, Enel was privatized and, as of May, 2015, the Italian government 
holds 25.5% ownership of the company.  
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industrial consumers of electricity were worse off under the market as they were paying 
higher prices. The system also failed to attract foreign investors. Moreover, the major 
incumbent generation companies prevented new entrants into the system, so the system 
remained dominated by the three major generation companies (European Commission-Spain 
2007). 
Poland 
Liberalisation of the power sector in Poland can be dated back to the end of the Cold War era 
when the country transformed its economic ideology from socialism to that of a free market 
economy. In 1990 it started restructuring the electricity supply industry with the creation of 
two generation companies, namely New Transco and the Polish Power Grid Company (PSE) 
to manage generation, while all distribution networks and some generators were merged into 
joint stock companies which were later sold off (with limits on foreign ownership of 50%). 
The structure of the industry was both vertically and horizontally integrated, allowing the 
industry to be operated by state-owned companies and private investors.  
The liberalisation process was gradual and, out of seventeen generating companies, only four 
companies are owned by private investors, while out of thirty-three distribution companies, 
only one is owned by a private firm. There was subsequently a reversal of the early reform, a 
re-definition of the role of the independent regulator, and a merger of generation companies 
(Poludniowy Koncern Energetyczny and the holding company for Belchatow-BOT, the two 
major firms that produce 50% of the total electricity production in Poland). The reform 
witnessed an increase in average electricity tariffs by 35% in the first two years, improved 
cost recovery and the removal of cross subsidies (Williams and Ghanadan 2006). 
Kaminsk (2011) examined Polish electricity market structure and the effect of market power. 
The study was based on the structure that was established by the government in 2007, using a 
game-theoretic model of the power generation market (the PolMark model). The study found 
evidence of the impact of market power in the Poland power generation sector. The result 
showed a significant and positive relationship between electricity prices and production 
volumes. His findings indicates that under the competitive condition the average wholesale 
electricity price declines by 14.7% and the production volume rises  by 6.7% when compared 
to the reference condition. Similarly, the result confirms the dead weight loss was estimated 
at the level of 123.6 MV. This implies the value reflects the net social loss resulting from 
uncompetitive market equilibrium. 
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Greece 
Prior to reform, the Greek electricity sector was based on a vertically integrated, state-owned 
company (Public Power Corporation) as the major producer. The liberalisation process 
started in 1999, with the enactment of a law which seeks to comply with the European 
Commission Directive of 1996. According to the provision of the law, generation and supply 
would be separated from transmission and distribution, with the former under free market 
competition and the latter under a regulated monopoly. The law sought to create a generation 
pool and a wholesale electricity market (Iliadou 2009). The law came into force in 2001, and 
the main aim of the reform was to improve economic efficiency in the sector, to increase 
productivity, to attract foreign investment and to reposition the sector in line with the 
European Commission directive.  
Further amendment of the electricity reform law in 2007 granted all consumers a choice of 
energy supplier as the law unbundled the distribution network operator and created an 
independent regulator for the sector. The major operator (Public Power Corporation) still 
plays a dominant role in power generation, power supply markets and regulates customer 
tariffs. The government continues to subsidise electricity to the populace, which makes the 
sector less attractive to foreign investors. Hence, while the Greece electricity industry fully 
complied with the European Commission directives the structure is still evolving. 
Turkey 
Historically, the Turkish power sector was vertically integrated and dominated by the 
activities of the state-owned company (TEK). In 1982, a law was passed for the abolition of 
the state-owned company’s full control over the power generation sector of the industry. This 
law allowed private participation in power generation and introduced purchase agreements, 
allowing independent power producers to sell their electricity to TEK. Two years later, the 
state-owned electricity company (TEK) was restructured. However, it was not until 1993 that 
TEK was privatised, being split into two, with one company to manage generation and 
transmission (TEAS) and the other all distribution networks (TEDAS). In 2001 a full scale 
liberalisation process was introduced in the Turkish electricity market, as TEAS was 
restructured into three new state-owned public companies, and generation was separated from 
transmission. One of the companies (EUAS) has the responsibility to manage the generation, 
one the transmission networks (TEIAS) and the last acts as a wholesale electricity company 
(TETAS) (Erdogbu, 2010, 2009 and 2007). Subsequently, the distribution network (TEDAS) 
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was restructured and divided into 21 distribution regions. Three of them were fully privatised, 
while the rest remain state-owned enterprises (Chalvatzis and Bora, 2011). 
3.5 Electricity Market reform in North America 
The United States of America 
For most of its history, the United States power sector developed based on a state by state 
level. Each state of the federation has its own electricity industry, normally in public-private 
ownership. Although the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), an independent 
regulatory agency within the Department of Energy, had made some changes in the system 
(see Table 3.2), the United States had never adopted a uniform, comprehensive, federal 
electricity market reform programme, so has witnessed only limited liberalization and not a 
fundamental electricity sector restructuring (Joskow, 2008). Electricity regulation in the US is 
under the control of municipal, state and federal authorities who regulate prices at which 
electric utilities can sell to retail consumers. Price regulation is anchored on the principle that 
utility companies should be able to recover costs and make fair returns for the service they 
provide. 
Prior to the 1990s reform, a bulk power system involved three major interconnected 
networks, namely the Eastern, Western, and Texas power grids. These grids connected 
electric utilities in one part of the country to another. The early 1990s witnessed the 
introduction of reforms in the sector because of a rapid rise in electricity prices, and a 
growing belief that some monopolies were being protected, causing serious inefficiencies in 
the system (Choynowski 2004). 
The reforms initiated were mainly to introduce competition into the wholesale market and 
among independent power producers and to enhance wholesale power transactions so that 
retail customers and local distribution networks could afford to buy power from a wide range 
of sources (see Table 3.3).  
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Table 3.3: Major legislative changes in the United States electricity supply Industry. 
Act or Order Year Description 
Public Utility Holding 
Company Act (PUHA) 
1935 Prevented holding companies from controlling large shares of 
the electricity market 
Public Utility Regulatory 
Policies Act (PURPA) 
1978 Increased the competition in the generation segment by 
requiring utilities to buy electricity from qualified non-utilities 
(under certain rules and restrictions). 
Energy Policy Act (EP Act) 1992 Relaxed the barriers to entry in the generation and eased market 
exchanges between utilities and other generators. 
ORDER 888 1996 Allowed third party access to the transmission network in order 
to prevent monopoly behaviour by transmission companies. 
ORDER 889 on OPEN 
ACCESS SAME –TIME 
INFORMATION SYSTEM 
AND STANDARDS OF 
CONDUCT (OASIS) 
1996 Required an on-line information system to be built to give real-
time information to all market participants on transmission 
capacities. 
Source: Pineau (2000), and http://www.ferc.fed.us) 
By 2006 many states had adopted one or other form of restructuring in their electricity supply 
industry and others were planning to do so (Kwoka, 2008). Despite the reform, Sioshansi 
(2008) argued that the pace of growth in retail supply markets was slow and efforts to 
introduce a national competitive electricity market have stalled. He cited as causes; 
 (i) the California power sector crisis of 2000,  
(ii) mixed outcomes from states that had introduced electricity reform  
(iii) a below par performance of the wholesale market and  
(iv) Congress’s nonchalant attitude in pushing for retail competition at a national level.  
The California power crisis of 2000 tops the list, as a consequence of which many of the 
state’s electricity generation utilities were declared bankrupt. This resulted in restrictions on 
electricity consumption, and some parts of the state experienced total blackouts. The 
California experience is unique to the United States, because it shows that retail tariffs must 
be set to recover costs and also tariffs should be flexible so as to allow consumers to adjust to 
changes in prices in the wholesale market. Finally, the market power of the producers has to 
be closely monitored so as to avoid similar cases in the future. 
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Table 3.4: Summary of the status of Electricity restructuring by different states in the US. 
Level States (date of beginning of retail 
competition) 
Description of the situation 
Advanced – 
Restructuring Legislation 
enacted (21 states). 
Although some the states 
have since suspended 
their restructuring 
program. 
Arizona (1999), Arkansas (2002), 
California (1998), Connecticut 
(2000), Delaware (1999), Illinois 
(1999), Maine (2000), Maryland 
(2000), Massachusetts (1998), 
Montana (2000), Nevada (2000), New 
Hampshire (1999), New Jersey 
(1999), New Mexico (2001), Ohio 
(2001), Oklahoma (2002), Oregon (-), 
Pennsylvania (1999), Rhode Island 
(1998), Texas (1998), and Virginia (-) 
These states either have retail 
competition or have a date 
scheduled in the Act for the 
introduction of retail 
competition. Later a standard 
cost solution is proposed based 
on state’s recommendations.  
Recent- Comprehensive 
Regulatory order issued 
(3 states) 
Michigan(active),New York(active) 
and Vermont(No) 
Implemented retail 
competition but still not 
enforced by the law. 
Initial-Legislative 
investigation in ongoing.  
Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, District 
of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, 
North Dakota, South Carolina, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, 
Washington, West Virginia, 
Wisconsin and Wyoming 
No schedule exists for retail 
competition. Regulated 
monopoly at the distribution 
and supply level still holds 
Sources: US EIA, 2010. 
Canada 
The Canadian electricity market to a large extent resembles that of the United States, insofar 
as each of the ten Canadian provinces has its own district legislation over the sector. The 
structure of Canada electricity sector is mainly dominated by government-ownership (See 
Table 3.4). In 1996, however, Alberta introduced an electricity market reform, separating 
power generation and power supply from transmission and distribution networks. They 
introduced competition in the former, thus enabling consumers to select their supplier, while 
the latter was treated as a regulated monopoly. A wholesale electricity pool was also created. 
Their experience was successful, as the reform led to an improvement in the quality of 
service, and enhanced industrial efficiency and improved productivity in the sector.   
On the other hand, the story was different for Ottawa. Their reform was not successful 
because of mismanagement and political interference, which led to crisis, and finally the 
government abandoned the reform programme (Sioshansi 2008).     
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Table 3.5: The Structure of the Canadian Electricity Market 
Provinces Vertical 
Integration 
Horizontal 
Integration 
Market Type Ownership 
Newfoundland Fully Highly Monopolistic  Government  
Edward Island Fully Partially Monopolistic Private owned 
Nova Scotia Fully Highly Monopolistic Private owned 
New Brunswick Fully Highly Monopolistic Government 
Quebec Fully Partially 80% Monopolistic 80% owned by 
Government 
Ontario Partially Partially Monopolistic Government 
Manitoba Fully Partially Monopolistic Government 
Saskatchewan Fully Highly Monopolistic Government 
Alberta Restructured Restructured 80% Monopolistic Government/Private 
British Columbia Fully Highly Monopolistic Government 
Source: U.S EIA 2010, Pineau (2000) 
3.6 Electricity Market reforms in Australia and New Zealand 
Australia 
The liberalisation of the electricity sector in Australia can be traced to the state/province of 
Victoria. Prior to reform, the state of Victoria’s electricity supply industry was vertically 
integrated, with a state-owned company operating and managing the sector. In 1991, the state 
of Victoria introduced a reform programme and restructured the industry. The state-owned 
company was divided into three companies, with one to manage the power generation, 
another to operate the transmission networks and the third company took overall 
responsibility of all distribution networks and power supply. The distribution network was 
later sub-divided into five distribution companies, while the generation utility was split into 
seven different companies. In 1994, following the successful implementation of the 
restructuring programme, the state of Victoria established a wholesale electricity pool. This 
was merged with the state of New South Wales’ wholesale market in 1998. The successful 
merger of the two wholesale markets gave rise to a national wholesale electricity market. 
The market-oriented reform in Australia was successful, as shown by improved industry 
levels of efficiency, productivity, capital and capacity utilization and a reduction in energy 
losses. However, the process adopted varies from state to state. In states like New South 
Wales, Victoria and Queensland full-scale liberalization in the power supply market has been 
achieved, while the state of West Australia still retained the traditional vertical integration 
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structure. It is worthy to note, that the largest gainer from the reform process in the Australian 
electricity market were the industrial or commercial users, as opposed to the retail/residential 
consumers who experienced little or no change in the real average price of electricity (Abbott 
2006). 
New Zealand 
Prior to the introduction of liberalisation policies in New Zealand, electricity generation and 
transmission were the responsibility of the Ministry of Energy, while power distribution 
networks and retail supply were managed by the Electricity Supply Association. Under this 
structure, the power sector suffered due to inefficiencies which were largely attributed to poor 
investment decisions, a lack of incentive to improve on the quality of service, and the cross 
subsidisation of electricity to the populace. In response, the central government passed 
legislation to establish an Electricity Corporation of New Zealand (ECNZ) in 1987, with the 
responsibility to coordinate all aspects of the electricity industry in the country. Under the 
provision of the 1986 Electricity Act, the transmission grid was set up as a separate entity, 
although still a subsidiary of ECNZ (Choynowski 2004). Table 3.5 below shows the timeline 
of the ECNZ from its inception to the time it was split. Prior to 1992, all wholesale and 
transmission activities were managed and operated by ECNZ while retail and distribution19 
activities were managed by 61 publicly owned ‘franchise’ companies.  
 Table 3.6:  Split of New Zealand Electricity Corporation (ECNZ) 
Year Changes 
April -1987 ECNZ was set up as a company under the State-Owned Enterprises 
(SOE) Act 1986 
May-1993 Transmission activity moves from ECNZ to “Transpower”. Transpower 
was set up to run transmission in New Zealand. 
Feburary-1996 Contact Energy commenced by acquiring some of ECNZ’s generators 
July-1998 Electricity Industry Reform Act 1998 split ECNZ further into three 
state-owned generators: Genesis Power Ltd, Meridian Energy Ltd and 
Mighty River Power Ltd 
Source: Shen and Yang (2012). 
New Zealand introduced further market-oriented reform in her electricity industry in 1998, 
with a new electricity law which seeks the liberalisation or restructuring of the industry. The 
law provides the fundamental framework needed to support competition in generation and 
power supply markets. This Electricity Industry Reform Act saw generation divided into four 
companies, with one of the companies capturing 25 percent of the total ECNZ capacity. 
                                                          
19 The Electricity Supply Association is the company in-charge of the distribution networks in the New Zealand 
in 1990s. 
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Another feature of the Act was the establishment of a spot market into coordinate balancing, 
transmission usage and ensure security requirements. However, the experience and the 
impacts of the New Zealand reform is mixed, although the average national consumer price 
of electricity has been relatively stable, albeit slightly increasing in recent years (Shen and 
Yang, 2012).  
  3.7 Electricity Market reforms in Asian Countries 
Significant progress had been made in liberalizing the power sector in Asian countries, 
especially in south-east Asian countries. The main rationale for restructuring was to attract 
private capital to the sector, to enhance efficiency and to provide a regular power supply to 
the populace. Reform usually began with promulgating legislation and passing it into law 
(See Table 3.7).  
 Table 3.7: Year of restructuring/policy change for Asian electricity supply industries 
Countries Year Electricity Law/Act 
Bangladesh 1996 Bangladesh Energy Regulatory Commission act,2003 
China 2002 Electricity Act of 1996 amended in 2002 
India 2003 The Electricity Regulatory Commission Act 1998, 
Japan 1996 Japan Electricity Reform Act of 1996, amended in 2005 
South Korea 1998 Electricity Business Act 1998 amended in the year 2000 
Philippines 2001 The Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) 
The Renewable Energy Act (2008) 
 Sources: Author Analysis 
Bangladesh 
Over 35 percent of the population of Bangladesh lacks access to an electricity supply due to 
poor infrastructure development, poor maintenance of electricity facilities, poor performance, 
inefficiency and a lack of resource for investing. All these factors caused the government to 
embark on a restructuring programme in the sector. First, the Dhaka Electric Supply 
Authority (DESA) was established by the government to manage and operate the electricity 
distribution system of the capital city Dhaka. In 1992, the Electricity Act was amended to 
enable private investors to participate in all forms of power generation, except nuclear energy 
(Gupta, Ferdous and Saleque, 2012). 
In 1996, a new reform programme stipulated the restructuring of the sector by allowing 
Independent Power Producer (IPO) projects to be built on an owner operator basis.  A 
purchase agreement was signed, allowing independent operators to sell power to the 
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Bangladesh Power Development Board, DESA and the Rural Electrification Board (REB). In 
1998, competition was introduced and generation was separated from transmission and 
distribution networks. Currently, over 1430mw of IPP generating plants have been built and 
generate about 40 percent of the total Bangladesh electricity supply (Gupta, Ferdous and 
Saleque, 2012). 
Nevertheless, the overriding problems faced by the sector are poor institutional capacity and a 
lack of skilled manpower. For the sector to improve and meet future power demands there is 
a need to establish an independent regulator, to create a wholesale electricity market and to 
promote a favourable environment which encourages foreign capital to invest in power 
generation and manage transmission and distribution networks.   
China 
Another country that had made tremendous progress in electricity market reform in Asia is 
China. China’s power sector is second only to the United States in terms of energy production 
and electricity demand. However, as the past two decades have seen the sector plagued by 
inefficiency, a shortage of electricity supply and/or unreliable power supplies a decision was 
taken to restructure the power sector. 
In order to attract private capital into the power sector, a separate corporate entity was created 
in 1977 and assigned with the responsibility to manage (and operate) both the generation and 
transmission networks. The Ministry of Electric Power were abolished. It was not until 2002 
however that the reform kicked-off, with the separation of generation from transmission and 
distribution. While competition was introduced in generation, transmission and distribution 
are highly state- regulated. The generation sector was sub-divided into five corporations, and 
an independent regulatory agency was set up in 2003 to regulate the sector (Du et.al, 2009). 
Currently, the Chinese electricity supply industry remains dominated by state planning 
enterprises (at the centre) and decentralized generation utilities (at the periphery).  
According to Yeoh and Rajaraman (2004) if China is to achieve a steady power supply and 
complete its reform process, then it is important to place less emphasis on political and 
economic expansion, and instead encourage/promote economic efficiency and the well-being 
of its populace. 
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India 
The Indian electricity supply industry is characterized by ineffectiveness, frequent blackouts, 
theft, corruption, and has suffered from capacity shortages and uncollected bills. These 
factors have made the sector financially unhealthy, so frustrating its capacity to invest in a 
new power system. The condition of the sector was so poor, that industrial users across India 
have exited the national grid and set up their own on-site power generation plants (Joseph, 
2010). This is despite the Electricity Supply Act of 1991 which allowed private investors to 
invest in power generation and to sign long-term purchase agreements to sell power to the 
Electricity Board (Choynowski 2004). Following the law’s amendment, several states in 
India initiated reform by separating social obligations from commercial responsibilities. Each 
state seeks to increase the sector’s self- generation of funds and to reduce its reliance on 
government budgets. Thus, to strengthen the restructuring process, the Electricity Regulatory 
Commission Act (1998) was passed into law, and led to the establishment of Central 
Electricity Regulatory Commissions (ERCs), with the responsibility to regulate tariffs for 
central generating agencies and to also coordinate inter-state transmission networks (See 
Table 3.7).  
The 12th Energy Plan (2012-2017) was published in 2012.The Plan highlighted the 
achievements of the previous Plan, which included the increase in the total number of rural 
electrification projects to 560,000, extra capacity of 54,964 MW added to the system, and the 
installation of a further 70,286 circuit km of transmission lines. A total capacity addition of 
118,536 MW is planned for the 12th Plan period, including 30,000 MW of grid-connected 
renewable capacity, comprising of 15,000 MW wind, 10,000 MW solar, 2,100 MW small 
hydro and 2,900 MW of biomass/fuels (Planning Commission of the Government of India: 
2012). 
 In addition, the 12th Plan targets: 
 (i) the creation of a National Grid, through the development of an HVDC connector to the 
country's Southern electricity grid,  
(ii) an increase in HVDC and 765 kV links throughout the grid to improve capacity.  
(iii) the integration of renewable energy into the power generation mix by increasing 
renewable energy capacity and providing incentives for low-cost transmission development 
to connect new renewable capacity. 
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Table 3.8: Status of electricity market reform in the India States 
State Scope of Reforms Year of Reforms 
Andra Pradesh Generation unbundled,  
ERC created,  
Distribution Unbundled 
1999 
1999 
2000 
Assam ERC created 2001 
Delhi ERC created 
Generation, transmission & distribution unbundled 
Partial privatization of distribution 
1998 
2002 
2002 
Gujarat ERC created 
Legislation to allow restructuring passed 
1999 
2003 
Haryana Generation unbundled 
ERC created 
Distribution unbundled 
1998 
1998 
1999 
Karnataka Generation unbundled 
ERC created 
1999 
1999 
Madhya Pradesh ERC created 
Generation, transmission & distribution unbundled 
1999 
1999 
Orissa Generation unbundled 
Partial privatization of generation  
ERC created 
Distribution unbundled 
Partial privatization of distribution networks 
1996 
1996 
1996 
1998 
1998 
Rajasthan ERC created 
Generation, transmission & distribution unbundled 
1999 
2000 
Uttar Pradesh ERC created 
Generation unbundled 
Partial unbundling of distribution network 
1998 
2000 
2000 
**ERC denotes Electricity Regulatory Commission. Sources: (Choynowski 2004) 
 
While the full impact of the reform had yet to be felt, according to Bhattacharya (2012), there 
remained peak capacity shortages and energy losses, and the government still cross-
subsidised electricity for those in the agricultural sector. 
Japan 
The Electricity Act of 1995 provided the legal framework for the restructuring of the 
electricity supply industry in Japan. It permitted private investors to invest in the power 
generating plants, and also participate in competitive bidding in the electricity wholesale 
market. In order to maintain high performance in the sector, the government monitors 
electricity prices of each IPP by comparing their performance with others (Nakano and 
Managi, 2008). The Japanese electricity market reform has also been characterized by caution 
and its gradualness.  
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South Korea 
The South Korean government began power sector reform by promoting and encouraging a 
greater role for private investors in power generation projects in 1998. Prior to this period, the 
electricity supply industry in the country had been dominated by a vertically integrated state-
owned-corporation (KEPCO). In 2001, power generation of KEPCO was sub-divided into 
five companies, four of these mainly reliant upon thermal and hydropower generation and 
one for nuclear generation. But in 2004, the government of South Korea suspended its 
electricity market reform based on a recommendation from the Joint Committee on Energy 
Policy. They cautioned that the benefits associated with electricity market-oriented reform 
were mainly theoretical than real. The suspension interrupted the original privatization plan, 
the introduction of competition in generation utilities and the creation of wholesale and retail 
electricity markets (Lee and Ahu, 2006). 
The Philippines 
The introduction of market reform in the power sector in the Philippines started with two 
executive orders in 1987, which established an energy regulatory board whose 
responsibilities were to regulate electricity tariffs. In 1992, the board’s regulatory function 
was expanded to include (i) regulating tariffs charged by the National Power Corporation 
(NPC), distribution utilities, and electric power corporations, and (ii) reviewing and 
approving private power purchase contracts entered into by NPC and the private utilities. The 
Electric Power Industry Reform Act was amended in 2001 to allow full-scale liberalization of 
the electricity industry, with generation utilities separated from transmission and distribution 
networks. The introduction of competition in the generation sector witnessed an increase in 
the number of independent power producers granted access to the sector, while transmission 
and distribution networks remained under-regulated monopoly. An independent regulatory 
agency was set up, and a wholesale and retail market was created. The wholesale prices were 
fixed on an hourly basis through a bidding system. 
Although the restructuring policy was seen as the right decision, full implementation was a 
problem, the reform was slow and the customers were yet to fully reap the benefits 
(Choynowski 2004).      
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3.8 Overview of Electricity Market reforms in African countries 
The African Electricity Market is characterized by small systems, with over three-quarter of 
the region’s installed capacity coming from South Africa and North Africa (figure 3.4). 
 
Figure 3.4: Share of Installed capacity in Africa (2014) 
Sources: IEA (2014) and World Bank (2014). 
 
Power sector reform in the Africa region has been widespread. There have been attempts to 
improve the performance of state-owned vertically integrated power utilities, to establish new 
regulatory authorities, private management contracts and concessions have been awarded, 
and private sector participation has been sought in the form of Independent Power Producers. 
As of 2012, out of 54 countries in the region, 30 had enacted a power sector reform law, 
while all the countries in our sample (table 3.9) had introduced some form of private 
participation20. Half of the countries had privatized power generation, one-third had 
privatized their state-owned power distribution utilities, two-thirds had established a 
regulatory oversight authority, one-thirds had partially unbundled their power system21 and 
more than two-third had independent power producers (table 3.8). 
However, while about one-third of the countries have adopted three or four of these reform 
components, few have adopted all of them. In most countries, for example, the state-owned 
power utilities still maintain their dominant market position. 
                                                          
20 Except Malawi and Namibia which are without private sector participation (IPPs) yet. 
21 Except Uganda which has full vertical unbundling of their power market structure. 
30%
29%
41%
Figure 3.4 - Share of Installed capacity in Africa (2014)
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T h e  E c o n o m i c s  o f  e l e c t r i c i t y  m a r k e t  r e f o r m                P a g e  | 77 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.9: Performance indicators of Power sector reform in Africa 
Key Indicators Number of Countries (%)  
Corporatization/commercialization                24 (44%) 
Independent power producers                30   (56%) 
New electricity Act                30   (56%) 
Establishment of Independent regulator               24   (44%) 
Unbundling                 12   (22%) 
Privatization of distribution               12    (22%) 
Privatization of generation               15    (28%) 
Sources: Eberhard et al. (2008), IEA (2013), AFREPREN (2003), African Energy outlook (2014). 
Private sector involvement is either temporary (for example, a limited-period management 
contract) or marginal22. In most cases, the state-owned utility serves as a single buyer of 
privately produced electricity while still maintaining its own generation plants.  Tables 2.9 
and 2.10 presents the timelines of the reforms implemented and current market conditions 
(i.e. showing the percentage of private sector participation) so far in the region. 
  3.9 The Power sector in Africa: Country Specifics 
 
The performance of the power sector in the African region varies widely depending on the 
level of economic development of a country, the institutional framework, the political 
environment, the market structure, as well as the approach used to reform the electricity 
industry. This section provides a detailed overview of the power sector in the region based on 
the findings of various country studies. African experiences in power sector reform, as will be 
seen, have been dominated by partial reform; in the form of partial privatization and partial 
unbundling. 
                                                          
22 Exceptions are Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Mauritius, Morocco, Tanzania and Tunisia, where IPPs have contributed 
significantly (up to 40%) to overall electricity production. Although Togo is not among the countries 
considered, the first IPP in the country - Centrale Thermique de Lome, has added 100MW to the grid and 
nearly doubled national supply (Eberhard and Gatwick, 2011) 
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Table 3.10: Electricity Reform Timeline in 30 African Countries 
Country Electricity Law/Act Corporatization/ 
Commercialization 
Regulation 
 
(IPPs) Unbundling 
 
Management/Concession 
Contracts 
Privatization  
 
Algeria 2000 Implemented -2000 Implemented -2002 2002 Implemented(2003) Pending Pending 
Angola 1996 Implemented -2003 Pending 2003 Pending  Implemented -1997 Pending 
Botswana 2003 Implemented -2005 Pending 2007 Pending Pending Pending 
Burkina Faso 1997 Implemented -2007 Pending 1998 Pending Implemented -2010 Pending 
Cameroon 1999 Implemented -1997 Implemented -1998 2000 Implemented -2001 Implemented -2001 Implemented -2001 
Cape Verde 1998 Pending Implemented -2003 1998 Pending Implemented -2010 1999 
Congo DR 2006 Implemented -2010 Pending 2000 Pending Pending Pending 
Congo Rep 2003 Implemented -2001 Pending 2001 Pending Pending Pending 
Cote d'Ivorie 1989 Implemented -1995 Implemented -1998 1994 Pending Implemented -1990 Pending 
Ethiopia 1997 Implemented -1997 Implemented -1997 1999 Pending Implemented-2007 Implemented -2001 
Egypt 1996 Implemented -1997 Implemented -1997 1998 Implemented -2001 Implemented -2001 Implemented -2001 
Gabon 1992 Implemented -1999 Implemented -2010 1993 Implemented -1993 Implemented -1996 1997 
Ghana 1997 Implemented -1997 Implemented -1997 2000 Implemented -2008 Implemented -1997 Implemented -2005 
Kenya 1997/2006 Implemented -1995 Implemented -1997 1997 Implemented -1997 Implemented -2006 Implemented -2001 
Madagascar 1998 Implemented -1998 Implemented -2003 1999 Implemented -2008 Implemented -2006 Pending 
Malawi 1995 Implemented -1998 Implemented -2007 2001 Implemented -2001 Implemented -2001 Implemented -2000 
Mali 1994 Implemented -1998 Implemented -2000 1994 Implemented -1995 Implemented-1995 Implemented-2000 
Mauritius 1996 Implemented -1991 Pending 1997 Implemented -1997 Pending Pending 
Morocco 1992 Implemented -1997 Pending 1994 Implemented -1998 Implemented - 1996 Implemented -2001 
Mozambique 2001 Implemented -2000 Implemented -2008 2003 Implemented -2000 Pending Pending 
Namibia 1995 Implemented -1995 Implemented -2000 None Implemented -1998 Pending Implemented-2001 
Nigeria 2005 Implemented -1988 Implemented -2005 1999 Implemented -2007 Implemented- 2013 Implemented-2012 
Rwanda 2008 Implemented -2011 Implemented -2011 2011 Pending Implemented -2012 Implemented-2011 
Senegal 1995 Implemented -1998 Implemented -1998 1997 Pending Implemented - 1999 Implemented – 2003 
South Africa 1995 Implemented -2002 Implemented -1995 2003 Implemented -2001 n/a Pending 
Tanzania 2002 Implemented -2003 Implemented -2006 2004 Pending Implemented - 2002 Pending 
Tunisia 1996 Implemented -1998 Pending 1996 Pending Pending Pending 
Uganda 1999 Implemented -1999 Implemented -2000 2000 Implemented -2001 Implemented-2001 Implemented-2001 
Zambia 1996 Implemented -1997 Implemented -1997 1997 Pending Pending Implemented-2001 
Zimbabwe 1996 Implemented -2002 Implemented -2002 1998 Pending Pending Implemented-2002 
Sources: Each countries utility Annual Report, African Development Indicators (World Bank), African Development Bank, African Infrastructure database (World Bank).  
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Table 3.11: Current Market conditions in the African Power Sector (2013). 
Country Segments/Operator Utility Company Capacity in kw 
(2013) 
% Power Sector Share 
Algeria Generation 95% State (S) Societe Nationale de l'Electricite et du 
Gaz (Sonelgaz)  
 
15,100,000  5% private sector ownership in the form of IPPs and Concession in both generation 
and Distribution sectors. 
Transmission S 
Distribution S 
Angola Generation 70% state (S) Empresa Nacional de Electricidade 
(ENE) 
 
1,155,000 30% in form of IPPs and Concession agreement in Power generation and 
Distribution Transmission S 
Distribution concession 
Botswana Generation S Botswana Power Corporation (BPC) 132,000 There is no private sector participation, rather BPC import electricity from Eskom 
(South Africa). 
Transmission S 
Distribution S 
Burkina Faso Generation 85% State (S) Société Nationale Burkinabè 
d’Electricité (SONABEL)  
 
252,000  SONABEL still dominates the sector, there is little private sector participation in the 
sector. Transmission S 
Distribution S 
Cameroon Generation 49% State (S) Société Nationale d'Electricité 
(SONEL)  
 
1,155,000  AES-SONEL owns and operates a 51% concession over the power sector for 20 
years.  
Transmission 51% Private 
Distribution 51% Private 
Cape Verde Generation 51% State Electricidad e Agua (ELECTRA) 
 
89,800  The State owns 51% of Electra, with private companies holding 34%, and 
municipalities in the country 15%.  
 
Transmission S 
Distribution 51% State (S) 
Cote d’ Ivoire Generation Concession Compagnie Ivoirienne d’Electricité 
(CIE) 
 
1,222,000 The private sector (EDF and SAUR) has a 51% share of the industry, and the state 
retains the remaining 49%. Transmission S 
Distribution Concession 
Congo DR Generation 95% State (S) The Société National d'Electricité 
(SNEL) 
2,437,000  There is little private sector ownership. In 2011, the government made an effort to 
privatize the sector, but this failed  due to the extensive damage inflicted on the 
SNEL’s infrastructure during the civil war. 
Transmission 95% State (S) 
Distribution 95% State (S) 
Congo Rep Generation S The Société National d'Electricité 
(SNE) 
559,000   There is no private sector ownership in the sector. 
Transmission S 
Distribution S 
Egypt 
 
Generation Concession Egyptian Electricity Holding 
Company (EEHC) 
26, 910,000  EEHC owned 90% while the remaining 10% are owned by the independent power 
producers. Transmission S 
Distribution Concession 
Ethiopia Generation 70% state (S) Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation 
(EEPCO) 
2,061,000  EEPCO controls 70% in generation segment of the industry; the remaining 30% held 
by the private sector. Transmission S 
Distribution S 
T h e  E c o n o m i c s  o f  e l e c t r i c i t y  m a r k e t  r e f o r m                P a g e  | 80 
 
 
 
Gabon Generation 49% State (S) The Société d'Electricité et d'Eaux du 
Gabon (SEEG). 
415,000 SEEG has 49% of the sector while the private sector owned 51% (based on IPPs and 
concession agreement in generation and distribution). Transmission S 
Distribution concession 
Ghana Generation 61% Volta River Authority (VRA) 1,985,000   VRA has 61% of the generating sector while the remaining 39% is owned by the 
private sector in the form of IPPs and concessions. Transmission S 
Distribution S 
Kenya Generation 54% State (S) Kenya Power  (KPLC) 1,698,000  KPLC has 54% of the generating segment while the private sector owned 46% 
through IPPs and concession agreements. Transmission S 
Distribution S 
Madagascar Generation 65% State (S) Jiro Sy Rano (JIRAMA) 430,000  JIRAMA control 65% in generation segment of the industry while the private sector 
retains the remaining 35%. Transmission S 
Distribution S 
Malawi Generation 50% State (S) The Electricity Supply Corporation of 
Malawi (ESCOM) 
287,000  ESCOM has a 50% share in the generating segment of the industry, with the private 
sector retaining the other 50% in the form of IPPs and concessions. Transmission S 
Distribution S 
Mali Generation 66% State (S) Énergie du Mali (EDM-SA)  304,000  A private sector firm  (IPS West Africa) holds 34% in mainly generation segment of 
the Malian utility (EDM–SA) while the  remaining 66% are in the hands of the 
government of Mali. 
Transmission S 
Distribution S 
Mauritius Generation 46% State (S) The Central Electricity Board (CEB) 
 
900,200  CEB has 46% in the generating sector, with private producers retaining the other 
56% in the form of IPPs. Transmission S 
Distribution S 
Morocco Generation 60% State (S) Office National de l'Electricité et de 
l'Eau Potable (ONEE)  
6,620,000  ONEE has 60% share while the private sector holds the remaining 40% in the form 
of IPPs and concession in a generation.  Transmission S 
Distribution Concession 
Mozambique Generation 46% State (S) Electricidade de Mozambique (EDM) 
 
2,428,000  EDM focuses on the transmission and distribution networks, and the Hydroelectric 
Cohora Bassa (HCB) in-charge of power generation. HCB controls 85% of the total 
generation while the IPP and other fuel-powered generators generate 15% 
Transmission S 
Distribution S 
Namibia Generation S Namibia Power (Nampower) 508,000  Nampower controls generation and transmission while distribution is undertaken by 
the City of Windhoek and two regional distribution companies. Transmission S 
Distribution Regional 
Nigeria Generation 20% State (S) Power Holding company of Nigeria 
(PHCN). 
8,100,000  In 2013, the Nigerian government relinquished ownership of 18 electricity 
companies held by the PHCN (6 generation and 11 distributions). The Private sector 
now owns 80%, while PHCN holds the remaining 20%. 
 
Transmission Concession 
Distribution Private (100%) 
Rwanda 
 
 
Generation 80% State (S) Rwanda Electricity Corporation 
(RECO) 
57,000  RECO control 80% in the generation segment of the industry, while the private 
sector (in the form of IPPs) holds 20%. Transmission S 
Distribution S 
Senegal Generation 40% State (S) Société Nationale d’Electricité 638,000  The Private sector holds 60% (in the form of concessions and IPPs in the generation 
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Transmission Concession (SENELEC) segment) while the SENELEC retained the remaining 40%. 
Distribution Concession 
South Africa Generation 95% State (S) ESKOM 44,260,000  ESKOM control 95% of the total market in generation and the private sector 
accounts for remaining 5% while the regional companies (municipalities) are 
responsible for 55% in the distribution and the remaining 45% from Eskom. . 
Transmission S 
Distribution Regional 
Tanzania Generation 60% State (S) Tanzania National Electric Supply 
Company (TANESCO) 
841,000  TANESCO control a 60% in the generating segment of the sector, and the remaining 
40% is held by the private sector in the form of IPPs and concessions. Transmission S 
Distribution S 
Tunisia Generation 88% Société Tunisienne d’Electricité et du 
Gaz (STEG) 
 
3,652,000  With the liberalization of the sector, STEG holds a market share of 88%, while 
private sectors hold 14%. Transmission S 
Distribution S 
Uganda Generation 20% State (S) Uganda Electricity Board (UEB) 539,000 In 2001, with the unbundled UEB23, the private sector controls 80%, while the state 
holds 20% in generation and distribution. The state regulates the activities of the 
sector.   
 
Transmission S 
Distribution 20% State (S) 
Zambia Generation 94% State (S) The Zambia Electricity Supply 
Corporation (ZESCO) 
 
1,679,000  In the power sector in Zambia, there are 3 operators, ZESCO, and two private sectors 
operators (CEC and Lunsemfwa). In generation (ZESCO 94%, CEC 4%, Lunsemfwa 
2%), transmission (ZESCO 69%, CEC 29%, Lunsemfwa 2%) and for distribution 
(ZESCO 70%, CEC 25% and Lunsemfwa 5%). 
Transmission 69% State 
Distribution 70% State 
Zimbabwe Generation 90% State Zimbabwe Electricity Supply 
Authority Holdings (ZESA) 
 
2,035,000  There are a few small private sector firms operating (either providing stand-alone 
systems in remote communities or back-up systems through large urban companies 
for some schools and hospitals). Government dominates the sector. 
Transmission S 
Distribution 60% State 
                                                          
** S = State  
**Concession as used here means that the government of various countries entered into agreement with a private firm to manage the sector on their behalf for a certain 
number of years. 
23 UEB was fully unbundled resulting in three separate companies; the Uganda Electricity Generation Company Ltd, the Uganda Electricity Transmission Company Ltd and 
the Uganda Electricity Distribution Company Ltd. 
Source: Each countries utility Annual Report, African Infrastructure database (World Bank) and World energy council database. 
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3.9.1 Status of the Power Sector in Africa 
Algeria 
The state-owned vertically integrated Sonelgaz24 controls all the three main segments of 
electricity supply (generation, transmission, and distribution) in Algeria. In 2002, a new 
electricity law converted Sonelgaz into a private company and revoked its monopoly on the 
power sector, although the Algerian government continues to hold all of the company's 
shares. In the same year (2002), an independent regulatory authority was created- the 
Electricity and Gas Regulatory Commission (CREG), to regulate, formulate policies for the 
industry and also to ensure non-discriminatory access to the networks. The long run plan was 
to eventually split Sonelgaz into separate generation, transmission, and distribution 
companies though these plans faced domestic opposition from organized labour (Werenfels, 
2002). Government plans to privatize Sonalgaz were not realised, and instead, a joint venture 
with Sonatrach was created25, to form the Algerian Energy Company (AEC), to pursue 
partnerships with foreign investors. 
Angola 
Extensive damage and decades of underinvestment in the power sector infrastructure during 
the 30 years of civil war (1972 -2002) in the country has caused Angola to suffer from an 
undersupply of power and frequent outages26. 
 Since the end of the civil war, the government has embarked on a restructuring programme 
to reform the power sector and reposition it to boost generating capacity, increase access, and 
to repair and expand the networks to other parts of the country. In 2003, the government, 
permitted private sector access to the generation segment of the industry to build and operate 
plants to increase generation capacity, selling their electricity to the state-owned corporation 
under Memorandums of Understanding (ADB Report, 2014 and African Energy Outlook 
2012). 
                                                          
24Sonelgaz (Socièté Nationale de l'Electricité et du Gaz), is a state-owned utility in charge of electricity and 
natural gas distribution in Algeria. Founded in 1969, it replaced the previous body Electricité et Gaz d'Algérie 
(EGA), and has monopoly power over generation, transmission and distribution of electricity, and the 
distribution and selling of natural gas within the country. As of 2010, it generates approximately 29 billion kWh 
a year, sells 4.6 billion cubic metres of gas a year, and has a work force of about 20,000 people (Sonelgaz web 
site). 
25 Sonatrach is an Algerian government-owned company formed to exploit the hydrocarbon resources of the 
country. It also has some oil concessions overseas in Libya, Mauritania, Peru, Yemen and Venezuela (Sonatrach 
web site). 
26Rapid urbanisation and the explosion in informal settlements around the main cities in Angola has driven a 
dramatic rise in the number of illegal connections to the national grid, further exacerbating power shortages 
(KPMG 2013). 
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According to the Angola electricity law,27 an independent regulatory body was to have been 
established, to be known as the Institute for Electricity Regulation (IRSE), to regulate the 
activities in the power sector. However, at the time of reporting, it has been established but is 
not in operation.   
While the Ministry of Energy and Water (MINEA) is responsible for power sector policy 
formation, coordination and implementation, the main power utility company (the Empresa 
Nacional de Electricidade - ENE) is a state-owned vertically integrated electricity provider 
that has historically suffered from an over-dependence on government funding, a low tariff 
structure that does not cover costs, and the inability to collect revenue from numerous illegal 
connections (KPMG 2013). ENE manages the transmission network and operates 80% of 
power generation facilities and the distribution system (outside of Luanda). In the state 
capital (Luanda), power distribution is managed by the Empresa de Distribuição de 
Electricidade (EDEL). 
 In 2012, the government sought regional collaboration with the government of Namibia to 
increase its electricity supply by undertaking the 600MW Baynes power project, developing  
a transmission line linking the Angola grid to that of Namibia and, by extension, to the 
Southern Africa Power Pool (AfDB, 2013). 
Botswana 
The Botswana Power Corporation (BPC) is the state-owned vertically integrated national 
power utility with a monopoly over all the segments (generation, transmission and 
distribution) of the electricity supply industry. The Botswana government regulates the power 
sector through the Energy Affairs Division of the Ministry of Minerals, Energy, and Water 
Resources, which in turn, monitors BPC. 
In 2007, the government amended the Electricity Law to facilitate private participation in the 
power sector. However, there are currently no specific plans to unbundle the power utility. As 
of 2013, there is only one IPP operating (APR Energy), which operates a 70 MW diesel 
emergency power plant at Matshelagabedi. The lack of full reform in the sector has 
contributed to the following:  
                                                          
27 A/96 of 1996 (General Law of Electricity) and Lei General de Electricidade, Lei No. 14 
E c o n o m i c s  O f  E l e c t r i c i t y  R e f o r m                             P a g e  | 84 
 
 
 
 There is no systematic reserve generation capacity and, since 1992, Botswana has 
imported large quantities of electricity. In 2008, about two-thirds of its total electricity 
consumption was imported from South Africa (BPC Annual Report 2012).  
 Only 49 percent of Botswanans are connected to the national grid. Although BPC 
increased residential connection at the rate of 13 percent per year from 2002 to 2011, 
this is not yet enough (BPC Annual Report, 2012). BPC is currently expanding its 
coal-fired generating capacity by about 1,200 MW to compensate for the downturn in 
the availability of power imports from South Africa. The first phase, a 600 MW plant, 
started in 2012 (Vagliasindi and Besant-Jones, 2013). 
 The financial performance of BPC has not improved. For instance, in 2011, the total 
operational cost of the three segments (generation, transmission and distribution) rose 
by 25%, driving the average cost to 85 thebe/kWh. The net effect was a 22% increase 
in total operating costs, against an 18.2% growth in revenue (BPC Annual Report, 
2012). 
Currently, two-thirds of the electrification network in the country is concentrated in the 
eastern part of the country and does not reach the more sparsely populated areas in the central 
and western regions of Botswana. This has prompted the government to improve the 
electricity supply in rural areas through the Renewable Feed-In Tariffs (REFIT) policy, 
which was approved in June 2012.This policy was expected to subsidse renewable energy 
production, oblige BPC to purchase electricity produced from renewable sources at cost-
reflective prices, and increase production and grid connection opportunities for small 
renewable power generators. However, as of 2014, the REFIT Policy is still to be 
implemented. 
Burkina Faso 
The Société Nationale d’Electricité du Burkina Faso (SONABEL) is the state-owned 
vertically integrated power supply utility. SONABEL controls all the three main segments of 
electricity supply (i.e. generation, transmission and distribution). Although the electricity law 
of 1998 was approved so as to break the SONABEL monopoly, it is yet to be fully realized. 
In 2004, the generation segment was opened to private sector participation so as to promote 
competition while transmission and distribution remain a regulated monopoly.  
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In 2007, a law28 regarding the regulation of the electricity sector in Burkina Faso was 
enacted, based on the recommendations of the PPIAF studies29. This provided for the creation 
of a new regulatory authority, the Autorité de Regulation du Sous-Secteur de l’Electricité 
(ARSE)30, but it is the Ministry of Trade is responsible for setting electricity tariffs in the 
country. However, the overall generation capacity in Burkina Faso is below 80 MW, with 
70% of this supplied by thermal power stations. There is no national transmission network 
and the distribution network is limited. Given the growing demands for power, and the high 
cost of using diesel oil to generate power in Burkina Faso, the government is seeking to 
import electricity from neighbouring Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana. In 2000 only 6.9% of the 
country’s population had access to electricity. However, the situation had improved to13.1% 
by 2012 (World Bank Report, 2013). 
Cameroon 
The national utility company - Société Nationale d’Electricité (SONEL) - controlled the 
three core segments of the power industry in the country. Yet in 1990, only 29% of the total 
population were connected to the national grid, a figure that increased to 49% in 2010 and in 
2012 it was 53.7% (World Bank Development Indicators, 2014). The regions that suffer the 
most from a lack of electrification are those with large rural concentrations, notably 
Adamaoua, the East, Extreme North, North, North-West, and South-West regions, where 
access is 10 percent among the poor and 33 percent among non-poor populations. 
In the late 1990s, the government of Cameroon recognized the need to restructure its power 
sector31, as economic growth had seen electricity demand grow quickly from both households 
and industrial users (and particularly from ALUCAM, an aluminium smelter that consumed 
approximately one-third of the total power supply). Moreover, as SONEL suffered from poor 
collection rates and low tariffs, it faced a growing debt burden which it was unable to service. 
In response, the government embarked on a series of power sector reforms, starting with the 
amendment of Electricity Sector Law in 1998 which laid the groundwork for the privatization 
of SONEL (IFC, 2012 and PPIAF, 2012). The same year, an independent regulatory agency 
                                                          
28 Electricity Law no. 027-2007/AN of Burkina Faso. 
29 World Bank Public-Private infrastructure advisory facility. 
30 Decree no. 2008-369/PRES/PM/MCE/ MCPEA, On April 16, 2010, the five members of ARSE were appointed 
for a five-year term.   
31 Due to low generation capacity and access to electricity coupled with increasing in population. Dependence 
on hydropower has left the Country vulnerable to drought. 
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(ARSEL - Agence de regulation du Secteur de l’electricite) was established to regulate the 
entire sector, formulate policy and issue licences/permits to prospective private producers. 
 In 2001 SONEL was privatized and a private American firm (AES SONEL) acquired 51% of 
power generation and 51% of both transmission and distribution segments. The national grid 
is composed of three distinct networks—the south interconnected network (RIS), the north 
interconnected network (RIN), and the east network (RE) (PPIAF, 2012). In 2012, the 
government embarked on diversification of the power generation mix so as to incorporate 
renewable sources such as solar and biomass in order to boost off-grid connection.  
Cape Verde 
 
In 1999, the Empresa Pública Electricidade e Água (ELECTRA)32 was privatized and the 
government sold 51% of the shares to a Portuguese consortium with a 50-year concession. 
The government retained 34% while the municipalities hold 15% of the share value. Initially, 
the consortium was not able to achieve commercial viability in balancing the low regulated 
tariff with increasing costs and it became insolvent in 2005, the power supply being plagued 
by extended blackouts.  
In 2003 the government set up a regulatory authority - Agência de Regulação Económica 
(ARE)33 - to regulate and assist the vertically integrated state-owned power utility. In 2006, 
the Cape Verde government re-acquired 51% of the share value of Electra and re-capitalized 
it. It currently holds an 85% share, with the local municipalities retaining the rest. In response 
to the utility’s financial problems in 2004, the government sought assistance from the African 
Development Fund Electricity Transmission and Distribution Network Development Project 
to upgrade power distribution networks and to improve service quality. This enabled the 
country to achieve a relatively high rate of electrification, with about 66% of the population 
connected to the national grid (PPIAF, 2011). 
 
 
 
                                                          
32 Electra is Cape Verde’s national power utility and supplies electricity to the nine inhabited islands of the 
country. It also operates as a water distribution utility in the four main islands. 
33 The Economic Regulation Agency is a multi-sectorial regulatory agency covering three sectors – Electricity, 
Water and Sanitation (PPIAF, 2011) 
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Congo Democratic Republic/ (Congo-Kinshasa), 
The Congo Democratic Republic, a country rich in mineral resources, has also experienced 
years of ethnic conflicts, wars and mismanagement and this caused long-term 
underinvestment in electricity infrastructure development. The government of the Congo DR 
had an installed generation capacity of 2442 MW in 2006, of which only 1170 MW is 
available, thus resulting in just 15% of its population having access to electricity.  The 
Societe Nationale d’ électricité (SNEL), the state-owned sole provider of electricity in the 
country, controls all three core segments of the industry (i.e. generation, transmission and 
distribution) (AICD 2009). 
In order to increase generation capacity, the government of Congo DR has signed an 
electricity trade agreement with neighbouring countries and is supporting capacity expansion 
projects. Inga 111, for example, is a project that is jointly owned by five southern African 
countries (Angola, Botswana, Congo DR, Namibia and South Africa) and is expected to 
increase regional generation capacity by 2000 MW (African Power Outlook, 2010). 
The Congo DR has not attempted much in terms of power sector reform/restructuring, a part 
from an amendment of the electricity law in 2006 that allowed private sector participation in 
the sector, while the state-owned power utility company SNEL was converted into a Public 
Liability Corporation in 2010. As of 2014, EDC and Hydoforce are the only two independent 
private producers in operation in the power generation and distribution segments, 
contributing 5% in power generation and distribution. SAF Energy operates as an 
independent private transmission company in the transmission segment of the sector 
(Ministry of Energy, Congo DR, 2014). 
The Republic of Congo / (Congo-Brazzaville) 
Societe Nationale d’Electricite (SNE), the state-owned vertically integrated company, 
controls all aspects of power generation, transmission and distribution, but the rate of 
electricity consumption is low due to the limited transmission network that mainly serves the 
two most populous cities in the country (Brazzaville and Port Noire).  
The country has made little progress in power sector reform following a decade of political 
instability and armed conflicts. These conflicts exacted a heavy toll on the country’s power 
sector and, as a result, two-third of the populace (1997 -2000) were without power supply.  
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To improve the electricity situation in the country, the government embarked on power sector 
reform by amending the Electricity Law in 2003 to allow private sector participation. In the 
same year, SNE was converted from a public utility company to a commercial corporation. 
Moreover, while an independent regulatory authority was established (Agence de regulation 
du Secteur de l’Electricite - ARSEL), the Ministry of Energy, Mine and Hydro is responsible 
for formulating policies and issuing permits/licences to prospective investors.  
The country has a generation capacity of around 511 MW as of 2013 which consists of the 
hydroelectric plants in Moukoukoulou and Djoué (which provide 74 MW and 15 MW 
respectively), the gas powered thermal plant in Brazzaville (32 MW), and the gas-fired plant 
at Pointe Noire has a capacity of 300 MW. The Imboulou hydroelectric power station 
currently produces 90 MW34 (World Bank 2014).  
The challenge faced by the Republic of Congo’s power sector is that it still underdeveloped 
in terms of generation capacity, electricity access, and reliability of power supply. Though the 
country no longer depends on imports from the Democratic Republic of Congo, the power 
supply is still unreliable. Regular outages characterised the Congo republic power sector, 
which have forced both the firms and households to accumulate a stock of self-generation 
capacity of 207 MW. Also in term of access to electricity is well below the average when 
compared to other African peers in both urban and rural areas (Pushak and Briceno-
Garmendia, 2011).  
Cote d’ Ivoire (Ivory Coast) 
The power sector reforms in Cote d’Ivoire started in 1990 due to the financial state of the   
state-owned power utility, Energie electrique de Cote d’Ivoire (EECI). A French company - 
CIE (the Compagnie Ivoirienne d’Electricite) - were granted a 15-year concession for 
operation and management of power generation and distribution segments, while the 
government controls the transmission segment, as well as the import and export of electricity. 
The EECI was responsible for monitoring the implementation of the concession awarded to 
CIE (UNDP 2007). 
The handover of the utility management to a private firm was successful in the sense that in 
the first year of operation CIE recorded a net profit of over US$ 600 million (UNDP 2007). 
This provided a further incentive to the government to further deregulate the sector and, in 
                                                          
34 The Imbooulou hydro station was built with a capacity of 120MW. 
E c o n o m i c s  O f  E l e c t r i c i t y  R e f o r m                             P a g e  | 89 
 
 
 
1994, the Government chose to boost power generation to meet increasing demand by 
reducing its control over the sector. This saw more private independent power producers 
(IPPs) enter the sector such as CIPREL35 (the Compagnie Ivoirienne de Production 
d’Electricite), which built and operates a 210 MW natural gas/open cycle power plant with a 
19 year concession contract, and Azito36 with a 288 MW natural gas/open cycle power plant 
with a 24 years concession contract (Eberhard and Gatwick, 2011). 
 In order to strengthen the institutional framework the government created the FNEE (Fonds 
National de l’Energie Electrique) to ensure financial support to the sector (UNDP 2007), and 
the second phase of restructuring was launched in 1998. This time, the government focus was 
on making the sector profitable, and this included the creation of three new state entities:  
(i). ANARE (the Autorite Nationale de Regulation du Secteur de l’ Electricite) was the 
regulatory authority with the responsibility to issue permits/licences to private firms that wish 
to invest in the power sector. ANARE formulates, coordinates and implements government 
policies in the power sector. It also has a responsibility to regulate the transmission, imports 
and export of electricity in the country. 
(ii). SOGEPE (the Societe de Gaston du patrimoine du Secteur de l’Electricite) was 
responsible for marketing and attracting investors to the sector.  
(iii). SOPIE (the Societe operation Ivoirienne d’Electricite) was in charge of the general 
operation of the entire sector (Eddy, 2005).  
In 2011, the third phase of the restructuring was launched. The government merged SOGEPE 
and SOPIE to create a new electricity company named Energies de Côte d’Ivoire (CI-
ENERGIES37) which focuses on planning, strategy development and investments in the 
sector (Amidou Traore, 2013). However, ANARE continues to act as a regulator with 
reinforced powers to ensure the protection of consumer interests and the settlement of 
disputes. 
 
                                                          
35 The Equity partners of the consortium are SAUR International with 88% (Joint Venture between French SAUR 
Group owned by Bouygues, 65% and EDF, 35%). 
36 The Equity partners of the consortium are Cinergy (Joint Venture between Swiss ABB, 50% and French EDF, 
50%). 
37 On 21 December 2011, the Government approved decrees n°2011-470 and n°2011-471 merging SOGEPE 
and SOPIE.  
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Egypt (Arab Republic) 
In March 1998, following amendment of the electricity law No. 18 (1996), the Egyptian 
Electricity Authority (EEA) separated distribution from generation; the distribution entities 
becoming seven vertically integrated subsidiaries that served geographic zones as local 
monopolies. The EEA continued to be responsible for transmission networks, dispatching, 
planning for a new generation and transmission projects, and the purchase of electricity 
produced by build, own, operate, and transfer (BOOT) projects. In 2000, the EEA was 
renamed the Egyptian Electricity Holding Company (EEHC) and was made responsible for 
the planning, development, and operation of the government-owned electric utilities.  
In July 2001, the government deepened restructuring by unbundling the power system into 
thirteen companies (five generation, one transmission, and seven distribution). Each 
generation and distribution subsidiary was established as a separate corporate entity with its 
own board. This process of corporatization apparently reflected the government’s intention 
that the EEHC should be expected to finance its own projects (Vagliasindi and Besant-Jones 
2013). However in 2002, after the Egyptian government listed the seven distribution 
companies for offer on the Egyptian Stock Exchange, investors’ lack of interest prevented the 
realization of this plan. Since then, the government has not shown any further interest in 
privatizing any of these entities. In the same year (2002), under electricity law number 164, 
the Egyptian government established a wholesale power pool in power generation. This 
enables the sector to coordinate generation and identify who is dispatching at specific times 
(each generator bids for dispatch and their generating units are scheduled to dispatch on the 
basis of these bids, the bids are based on costs). Due to the high growth rate of the power 
sector, the Egyptian government created two additional distribution companies in 2004. Thus, 
Egypt is currently served by nine electricity distribution companies, six generation 
companies, and one Transmission Company, all of which are affiliated to EEHC. Presently, 
while generation and distribution are under concession, EEHC manage and control the 
transmission segment. 
Egypt faces a major challenge in providing sufficient electricity from its primary energy 
source (oil and natural gas), which currently contributes as much as  95% of the total energy 
resources needed for generating electricity in Egypt (IEA,2014). In early September 2014, the 
country experienced one of its most severe blackouts in a decade, which resulted in 
disruptions in the metro train service, and forced a number of businesses to shut down. In 
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response, the government are expanding the grid by incorporating renewable energy mixes in 
order to strengthen the system, with advances in smart grids, communications and 
technologies to support supply and distribution of generated power to the mass market (The 
National Business, March 2015). 
Ethiopia 
To cope with the increase in the demand for electricity supply as a result of the rapid rise in 
economic growth the Ethiopian government embarked on power sector reform. According to 
the Ethiopia Electric Power Corporation (EEPCO), the power sector is worth US$ 3 to 4 
billion per year. The long-term plan is to maximise the country’s power potential, which is 
currently believed to be 45,000MW hydropower, 10,000 MW geothermal and 1.03 million 
MW wind power (EEPCO, 2015). The power sector reform process may be classified into 
two phases. 
The first phase consisted of the issuance of the 1994 Energy Policy and promulgation of 
Investment Proclamation No. 37/1996, the enactment of Electricity Proclamation No. 
86/1997 (Electricity Proclamation), and the establishment of the Ethiopian Electric Power 
Corporation (EEPCO) in July 1997 which was corporatized under regulation 18/1997 to run 
the electricity trading business on commercial principles. In 1998, the government 
established an independent regulatory agency (Ethiopia Energy Authority) to regulate the 
activities of the Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation (EEPCO). The objective of EEA was 
“to promote the development of efficient, reliable, high quality and economical electricity 
services”. The formation of the Electricity Operations Council (Ministers Regulation No. 
49/1999) in May 1999 culminated the first phase of the reform.  
The second phase of the reform process was launched by the enactment of Energy 
Proclamation No. 810/2013 (Energy Proclamation) on November 19, 2013, and proclaimed 
in the official Negarit Gazeta on January 27, 2014. As part of this second phase of the reform 
process, EEPCO has been unbundled into two separate entities, (the Ethiopian Electric Power 
(EEP) and the Ethiopian Electric Utility companies (EEU)38. EEP was established to 
undertake electrical power generation, transmission construction and operation while EEU 
undertakes electricity distribution, network construction and operation, and purchases bulk 
electrical power to sell to consumers. EEU is managed by the Indian Power Grid Company 
                                                          
38 Through Council of Ministers Regulation No. 302/2013 and No. 303/2013 (EEP Regulation and EEU 
Regulation) respectively, enacted on December 27, 2013 
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on a two-and-a-half-year management contract signed on December 17th, 2013. Both EEP and 
EEU are government owned enterprises accountable to the Ministry of Water, Irrigation, and 
Ministry of Energy as directed by Public Enterprises Proclamation No. 25/2014.  
Gabon  
Hydroelectric dominates power generation and accounts for 76% of Gabon’s power 
production39. The state-owned vertically integrated power utility - the Société d'Electricité et 
d’Eaux du Gabon (SEEG) – had a monopoly over generation, transmission and the 
distribution of electricity and the distribution and supply of water (UNDP 2012). In 1997, it 
sold a 51% share in SEEG to a French consortium owned by Vivendi. Electricity prices have 
fallen since that time, largely because Vivendi has improved the country’s generating 
capacity and reduced the transmission and distribution losses to 19%. The remaining shares 
of SEEG are owned by SEEG employees (5%) and the public (44%) (UNDP 2012).  
SEEG supplies electricity to the cities of Libreville, Port Gentil and the inland city of 
Franceville. A current investment venture proposes improving the quality of supply and 
extending electricity to other areas of the country (Gabon National Infrastructure Master Plan 
2012). In 2010, the government established a multi-sectorial regulatory authority Agence de 
Regulation du Secteur de l’eau Potable et de l’energie electrique (ARSEE) to regulate 
activities in energy and water service.  
Ghana 
Ghana is a country with a semi-liberalised electricity industry which is dominated by three 
state-owned vertically integrated utilities namely the Volta River Authority (VRA), the 
Ghana Grid Company (GridCo), and the Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG) while 
independent power producers (IPPs) have a marginal share in the industry. The VRA was 
established by an Act of Parliament in 1961 (the Volta River Development Act, 1961 
(No.46)) with primary responsibility for generation and part responsibility for distribution of 
electricity in the northern part of the country40. GridCo is responsible for transmission and 
system operations whereas the ECG is responsible for the distribution of electricity in other 
parts of the country.  
                                                          
39 The power generating dams in Gabon are Tchimbele (69 MW), and Kinguele (58 MW) on the M’Bei River, 
and Poubara on the Ogooue River. Other electricity generating stations are powered by gas-fired thermal 
plants (210 MW) and a heavy-fuel power station (30 MW). 
40 In the mid-1980s, as a result of extension of the national grid, Brong Ahafo, Northern, Upper East, Upper 
West and the Ashanti regions were added to VRA coverage (Hunt 2002). 
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In 1997, the government of Ghana accepted a final white paper and recommendations to 
restructure the Ghanaian power sector. Reform in the sector was seen as necessary due to 
frequent power failure, unreliable power supply, over billing by the state-owned utility 
corporation and a lack of sufficient funds to invest in new power stations. Within the same 
year, the government of Ghana established two independent regulatory agencies                  
(Public Utilities Regulatory Commission (PURC)41 and Energy Commission (EC)42 charged 
with the responsibility to formulate energy policies, create a suitable environment for 
investment and the regulation of electricity tariffs.  In 1999, VRA entered a joint venture 
agreement with the USA based firm (CMS Energy) to generate 220MW (Kapika and 
Eberhard 2013). 
However, the reform did not fully commence until 2000, when the first independent power 
provider - Takoradi International Company (TICO) entered the industry. Despite this, the 
progress of the reform was slow until 2008 when the Volta River Authority (VRA) was 
unbundled and generation separated from transmission, though the VRA also retained its 
national distributor status (Kapika and Eberhard 2013). Although the reform of the Ghana 
electricity market is on-going the expectation was that liberalization of the sector would 
increase the inflow of foreign investment to the sector. To date, it has fallen short in this 
regard. 
Kenya 
The Kenya power sector reform occurred in two phases. The first phase commenced with the 
enactment of the Electric Power Act 1997. The priority was to ensure an efficient power 
sector that would be able to provide a reliable power supply and to meet the demand of the 
populace. To this effect, the KPLC (Kenya Power and Lighting Company) assets were 
divided among two successor companies. The KPLC retains the assets for transmission and 
distribution, while the Kenya Electricity Generating Company (KenGen) was placed in 
charge of most of the electricity generation assets (The Point, 2003). Under this arrangement, 
all the electricity generated must be directed to the KPLC for transmission and supply to 
                                                          
41 PURC is loosely referred to as the ‘economic regulator’, and is primarily responsible for tariff setting, 
performance monitoring, promotion of competition and complaints handling, it also regulates water 
resources.  
42 The EC is referred to as the ‘technical regulator’, and is responsible for licensing, technical standards and 
performance monitoring. It also renders policy advice on the energy sector to the Minister. The EC is also 
responsible for the petroleum and gas sector (Kapika and Eberhard 2013). 
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national consumers. Similarly, in the same year (1997) the Electricity Regulatory Board 
(ERB) was established to perform regulatory oversight over the sector43.  
Under the first phase, there was an increase in installed generation capacity from 870 MW to 
1,162 MW, although only 1051 MW was operational in 2003 (The Point, 2003; and UNDP 
2007).  
 In 2006, another Act, the Energy Act 2006 was passed. The main features of the 2006 Act 
were the renaming of the Electricity Regulatory Board (ERB) into the Energy Regulatory 
Commission (ERC)44, the setting up of a Rural Electrification Authority, expanding the 
number of network service providers, and creating an Energy Tribunal to settle conflicts and 
disputes. The Act of 2006 commenced the second phase of the restructuring in the sector, and 
saw the government sell 30% of its stake in the Kenya Electricity Generating Company 
(KenGen). In the same year the government formed two additional companies because of the 
poor financial condition of KenGen, as the law prevented financially fragile companies from 
raising large amounts of capital in the stock market. The two companies are Kenya Electricity 
Transmission Company Limited to operate in parallel with the Kenya Power and Lighting 
Company (KPLC)45, and the Geothermal Development Company (GDC) which was 
established to exploit the huge untapped geothermal energy potential in the country  
Furthermore in 2010, in an effort to meet the increased demand for power the government 
embarked on a diversification of the power generation mix.  There was also an increase in the 
number of private power producers in the sector, from two IPPs in 1995 to over fifteen IPPs 
in 2010. Typical examples were the geothermal plant (Olkaria III at 48MW) and a diesel-
fired thermal plant, Kipevu II (at 74MW)46 (Kenya Power, 2014). 
                                                          
43 The ERB is charged with the responsibility to oversee the formulation, coordination and implementation of 
energy policy in the industry, and also the setting of electric tariffs, the issuing of licence permits to private 
sector investors, and to coordinate tenders. 
44 The ERC’s mandate extends beyond the power sector and includes natural gas, renewables and all other 
forms of energy.  
45 The laws regulating the financial market in Kenya requires the government to inject new capital into any 
listed company, it can do so only by buying additional number of shares, either in a rights issue or increased 
issued shares. Thus the most direct effect of such a move would be to alter the shareholding structure and, in 
the case of KenGen (from a 70:30 percent share structure, any such changes would most likely see KenGen run 
afoul of the Capital Market Authority rules on continuous listing obligation, which require any listed company 
to have at least 25 percent of its issued shares held by the public (“State’s Big Return in Power Business” Daily 
Nation, July 27, 2009). 
46 Olkaria III, developed by OrPower4, began commercial operation in 2000. Similarly Kipevu, developed by 
Tsavo commenced operation in 2001. 
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To a large extent, Kenya’s power sector has experienced some positive impacts as a result of 
the reform, with the generation segment unbundled also as a result of the public sale of shares 
in KenGen. The entry of IPPs has increased the installed capacity under private ownership 
from 16% in 2001 to 46% in 2013, although the transmission and distribution sectors are still 
bundled. However, despite all these achievements, the increase in the cost of electricity in 
Kenya is a hindrance to both expansion of electricity supply in the rural areas, and to meet the 
demand from industrial (especially mines) and residential households in the urban area. 
Madagascar 
Madagascar is endowed with abundant energy sources but historically did not have the 
necessary means to exploit them.  Madagascar’s energy balance shows that about 80% of its 
overall energy consumption is based on biomass (mainly firewood 68%, charcoal 10% and 
other biomass 2%), 17% on petrol (transport), and just 2% on electricity (hydropower and 
diesel power plants) and 1% on coal (Ffooks and Glass, 2014).  Electricity and water services 
are provided by the vertically integrated state-owned power utility - Jiro sy Rano Malagasy 
(JIRAMA) which operates and controls all the three key segments of the industry – (i.e. 
generation, transmission and distribution). In 1999, the JIRAMA monopoly was broken as 
the government sought to open the sector up for private sector participation through the 
award of concessions or permits to the private sectors. In 2003, the government established 
an independent electricity regulator, the Office de Régulation de l'électricité (ORE), with the 
responsibility for granting permits/licences and concessions to private suppliers from 
Madagascar and abroad (Ffooks and Glass, 2014). 
The challenges facing the sector are the high electricity price (which has risen by 13% on 
power consumption exceeding 230kWh, with local reports citing a further increase of 25% in 
prices possible), and frequent power cuts- which are largely attributed to over-dependence on 
hydroelectric dams. The government is considering building a nuclear plant and developing 
renewable sources of energy, mainly wind and solar energy. In order to encourage the 
development of renewable energy, the government has exempted related equipment from 
incurring customs fees and Value Added Tax. The Government Finances Law of 2013 also 
allocates 25.7% of the public investment programme (PIP) to the sector to promote energy 
use, especially that of renewable energy (Ffooks and Glass, 2014). 
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Malawi 
Malawi power sector generation is dominated by hydropower plants, though thermal (diesel 
and gas-fired plants) and small photovoltaic systems are also in use. The total installed 
capacity of ESCOM (the Electricity Supply Corporation of Malawi Limited) is about 302 
megawatts, of which 94% is generated by hydropower and the remaining 6% is thermal. 
Almost all the major existing hydropower plants in Malawi are located in the Southern region 
of Malawi along the Shire River (the main outlet of Lake Malawi)47, except for 4.5 MW 
which is located in the Northern region on Wovwe river, Malawi’s biggest river. A 
significant number of industrial enterprises in the country have their own installed diesel and 
petrol operated generators due to the unreliable power supply from the state-owned power 
utility. Electrical power is transmitted to all other parts of the country through 132 kV 
network grids with 66 kV being used in some areas. Overall, the electricity network of the 
country is not in very good shape, resulting in substantial losses in the transmission and 
distribution networks of about 18% - 22% of the generated electrical energy (ESCOM, 2013).  
The Electricity Supply Corporation of Malawi (ESCOM) was converted into a limited 
liability company in 1998 under the Companies Act of 1984. In 2004, a new legal framework 
for the sector was passed, comprising the Energy Regulation Act, Electricity Act, and Rural 
Electricity Act. In 2007 a new independent regulator was created: the Malawi Energy 
Regulatory Authority (MERA (Mloza-Amiri, 2005 and Gamula, 2013). Overall, Malawi has 
implemented 60% of identified best-practice institutional reforms48 for the power sector, 
which puts it ahead of the average score for Sub-Saharan Africa. In spite of the reform, there 
is no current private sector participation in the country’s power sector49.  
However, the Malawi power sector has suffered considerably from unreliable power supplies 
because a majority of her hydro generators are old and their operation is affected by droughts, 
floating aquatic weeds/plants and debris being transported in the rivers (ESCOM, 2013).  
                                                          
47 Power stations in Malawi are Tedzani I and II - 40 megawatts (1977); Nkula A 120 megawatts (1981); Wovwe 
– 4.5megawatts (1995); Nkula B – 24megawatts (1996); Tedzani III -50.  
48 Best practice reforms refer to processes whereby knowledge concerning policies, administrative 
arrangements, or institutional structures across states, sectors and periods are explicitly utilised to inform 
decision making (Stone, 2001). 
49 Private sector participation in the power sector in Malawi remains a challenge due to the government 
subsidy provided to ESCOM, which gives an unfair advantage to ESCOM over any competitors who might 
invest in the sector. Hence ESCOM has remained the sole company in charge of the three segments 
(generation, transmission and distribution). 
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Mali 
In 1994, the Malian government attempted to privatize the state-owned power utility 
company Energie du Mali (EDM) due to the Company’s high levels of debt, but after 
resistance from labour unions and protests from the general public, it was abandoned. Instead, 
in an effort to improve the Company’s financial and operating performance, a management 
contract was awarded in 1995 to Société d’Aménagement Urbain et Rural (SAUR) a 
French–Canadian consortium made up of Hydro-Québec (Canada) and Électricité de France 
(EDF). However the management contract was terminated in March 1998 after relationships 
between the foreign managers and the Malian board of directors deteriorated (Clark et al. 
2005 and UNEP, 2007). EDM has since undergone three phases of reform. The first phase 
saw the transfer of the decision-making power to a foreign firm/professional partner to 
manage the affairs of the corporation. The next phase saw the setting up of a mixed 
investment company management system, a stage which prepared the company for 
privatization, and the last stage saw the privatization of the national utility company in March 
2000 (UNEP, 2007). 
 
In 2000, the Malian government signed a 20-year concession contract with SAUR/IPS-West 
Africa who acquired 60% of EDM, with the government retaining ownership of the other 
40%. Regulatory bodies were established – the Electricity and Water Regulatory Commission 
(CREE) and the Agency for the Development of Household Energy and Rural Electrification 
(AMADER). AMADER is responsible for off-grid energy service and generation systems 
below 250kw, while the CREE provides assistance for the general development of the sector, 
controls tenders and grant concessions, and approves tariffs. However in 2005, SAUR 
decided to pull out of the concession agreement with the government and handed its shares 
back to the government in October. Thereafter the Malian government entered into a 
partnership with the Aga Khan Group, with 66% of the shareholding held by the government 
and 34% by the Aga Khan Group (UNEP, 2007).  
 
This arrangement seems to have been effective as, according to World Bank Enterprise 
surveys, the share of firms relying on their own generator fell from 45 percent in 2003 to just 
over 23 percent in 2007, and the share of power consumption supplied through own 
generation fell by half to 16 percent over the same period. Transmission and distribution 
E c o n o m i c s  O f  E l e c t r i c i t y  R e f o r m                             P a g e  | 98 
 
 
 
losses due to power outages were less than 2 percent of sales, which is among the lowest on 
the continent (Briceno-Garmendia et al. 2011).  
However, EDM still depends on the government subsidy to be functional and the institutional 
framework of EDM continues to be a challenge, as EDM currently manages both electricity 
and water services (Briceno-Garmendia et al. 2011). 
Mauritius 
The Central Electricity Board (CEB), a state-owned power company controls transmission, 
and distribution, and generates 60% of all the electricity used, with the remaining 40% being 
purchased from sugar estates (independent power producers). The Mauritius transmission 
grid is based on a network of 66 kV lines, which form a ring around the island linking the 
main demand centres, with some cross-links. The average electricity costs are relatively high; 
reflecting the fact most power generation is based on imported fossil fuel. The power sector 
in Mauritius has undergone restructuring during the last few years, moving from a state of 
almost complete dependence on fossil fuel for electricity generation to a position whereby 
most of the electricity is generated from coal and bagasse (Deepchand, 2005).  
 The government, through the CEB, sought to improve electricity supply in the country by 
establishing an integrated Electricity Plan (IEP) 2002–2012 to provide a reliable, affordable 
and sustainable electricity supply for Mauritius and Rodrigues. The major milestones of this 
plan included expanding electricity generation capacity from 237 MW to 664 MW, 
commissioning 6.3 MW engines, upgrading of electricity network, and a scaling up of 
renewable energy - with a targeted 4.8 MW increase in production (Mutanga, 2014).  
The second Integrated Electricity Plan of 2012 - 2022 seeks to build on these 
accomplishments by optimising the use of the existing power system to keep the cost of 
electricity low, to encourage demand-side management, and to provide continued private-
sector opportunities in the energy sector. The plan expects peak electricity demand will 
increase to 574 MW under the base case scenario and 702 MW under the high-case scenario, 
implying an annual increase of 14.4 MW over the period 2013–2022 (Mutanga, 2014). The 
challenge facing the Mauritian power sector, like that for many African and developing 
economies, is to attain an effective energy mix that can boost power generation and satisfy 
demand. 
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Morocco 
Morocco is the only North African country with no own oil resources, but the largest energy 
importer in the region. The country is faced with the challenging task of meeting the rising 
demand for electricity while keeping its import bill under control. Against this backdrop, 
Morocco embarked on restructuring her power sector.  
The electricity market in Morocco is dominated by the government controlled operator 
ONEE (Office National de l’Electricité et de l’Eau Potable). ONEE owns and manages the 
transmission network, the distribution network is operated as a concession, while independent 
power producers are active in power generation (although ONEE acts as the single buyer in 
the sector). The power distribution concession involves seven local municipal utilities, also 
known as “Régies” (utilities for distribution of electricity and water owned by a municipality, 
group of neighbouring communes), as well as four private distribution utilities, also known as 
“gestionnaires délégués” (Ameground, 2015). 
Morocco’s effort to restructure its power sector and reposition it to be competitive and 
sustainable was encouraged by the World Bank. In 1994, the government of Morocco 
adopted a decree which allowed the national power monopoly ONEE to enter into power 
purchase agreements with Independent Power Producers (World Bank, 1994).  In 1996, 
ONEE awarded CMS Energy and ABB Energy 30-year concession agreements under a 
competitive bid tender. The agreement consisted of two elements. The first was to manage 
two currently operating 348-MW coal-fired/steam-based generation units under a 30-year 
concession arrangement. The second consisted of power plant expansion and the building of 
two similar specification generators under a build-transfer-operation (BTO) arrangement 
(Ameground, 2015). 
In 2006 the first combined cycle power plant, a joint venture between ONE, Siemens and 
Endesa, was commissioned (World Bank, 2007). In 2008, the Moroccan government decided 
to further open the power generation market to private investors. Private power producers 
were allowed to own and operate plants with capacities not exceeding 50MW, and sell their 
electricity directly to large industrial consumers. In 2010, a new Renewable Energy Law was 
passed which set a new legislative framework for the promotion of renewable investments 
and established a procedure for the authorisation of renewable energy installations (as well as 
production, distribution and trade) in the country. This created a new market in which certain 
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industrial customers are allowed to freely choose their electricity suppliers (Brand and 
Zingerle 2010). 
However, the power sector still faces financial difficulties including: (i) a tariff structure that 
does not reflect the sector’s operating costs; (ii) the low collection (payments) rate and 
difficulties in recovering debts from certain distributors and the public sector; (iii) the 
excessive use of expensive heavy fuel oil and diesel in energy production as a consequence of  
delays in investments in large cost-effective generation facilities; and (iv) the growing burden 
of  debt service (ESMAP 2011). 
Mozambique 
Mozambique is rich in energy resources and endowed with hydropower potential but the 
devastating effects of the civil war, which lasted for a decade and a half50, left the country’s 
infrastructure in a poor condition and chronically underdeveloped. The need for restructuring 
in the power sector of the country was paramount as there were no direct transmission lines 
from the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric dam to the capital city Maputo or other southern regions 
of the country. In 1997, the government of Mozambique accepted a World Bank report on 
reform and regulation of its power sector and the National Energy Strategy Act was passed in 
2000, establishing a single-buyer model. The state-owned vertically integrated utility 
corporation the Electricidade de Mozambique (EDM) is the dominant player in the industry.  
 In 2001 the power generation segment was unbundled, Transmission remained regulated by 
the government, while private sector participation in the form of IPP and leases/concession 
contracts was permitted for distribution networks (NVE 2004). Thus, with the support from 
the World Bank, Mozambique was able to implement an eight year energy reform and access 
programme (ERAP), with the objective of expanding the transmission network, attracting 
foreign investors and improving the quality of life of the populace in the rural and pre-urban 
areas in the country (Mahumane and Nadand, 2012). In 2008, the electricity regulatory 
authority was established (the Conselho Nacional de Electricidade - CNELEC), although the 
Ministry of Energy is in charge of the implementation of projects, coordinating electrification 
investment and rural electrification. The state-owned utility company (EDM) now focuses on 
the transmission and distribution networks, while Hydroelectric Cohora Bassa (HCB), the 
hydroelectric company jointly owned by Portugal and Mozambique, operates and manages 
                                                          
50 The Mozambique civil war started two years after independence from Portugal. The war broke out on 30th 
May, 1977 and ended on 4th October 1992. 
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hydropower activities.  HCB generates up to 85% of the total generation capacity of the 
country while the IPP and other fuel-powered generators generate 15% (ACID, 2009).  
Namibia  
The challenge faced by Namibia’s power sector is the volume of electricity that it imports. 
Declining in power supply from the Southern African Power Pool has exposed the country to 
high degree of uncertainty in relation to future supply as Namibia has been unable to enter 
into long-term contracts with its major supplier, Eskom and lack the capacity to be 
independent.  
In 1996, Namibia’s first experiences of private participation in the power sector occurred 
when Northern Electricity began to operate the distribution system in the north of the country 
under a concession agreement. The industry regulator, the Electricity Control Board (ECB) 
was established in 2000, with Namibia’s Ministry of Mines and Energy responsible for 
energy policy formulation and direction, and the ECB mandated to regulate the energy sector. 
The sector is dominated by the state-owned and vertically integrated NamPower, which 
owns and operates most of the country’s generation and transmission assets, as well as some 
distribution facilities in the rural areas of central and southern Namibia.  The majority of the 
distribution of the power supply is undertaken by the City of Windhoek (the country’s largest 
distributor), while the rest is managed by two regional electricity distribution companies 
(REDs) – the Northern RED (Nored) which covers most of the northern part of the country 
stretching to the Caprivi Strip, and the Erongo RED (Erongored), which covers the central 
coastal region to the west of the country including Walvis Bay and Swakopmund – and by 
numerous small municipal distribution operations (Kapika and Eberhard, 2010). 
Under the new management, Northern Electricity Company, experienced improvement in 
terms of collection bills, reduction electricity theft rate, increase in power-system reliability 
and the connection rate improved. Despite these significant positive attributes, and the 
liberalisation of the sector in 2000, private-sector participation in the industry is virtually 
zero. The country’s flagship Kudu gas-to-power project is facing ongoing delays and the 
expectation that independent power producers (IPPs) would form an important part of 
achieving indigenous generation continues to be unfulfilled. The ECB has made good 
progress, but more work remains if the security of electricity supply is to be obtained (Kapika 
and Eberhard, 2010). 
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Nigeria 
In 2005, the government of Nigeria enacted legislation (the Electric Power Sector Reform 
Act) in order to create a clear regulatory framework that encourages more competitive 
markets and, at the same time, attracted private investors and ensured the economically sound 
development of the system. The Act was designed to reposition the power sector from a 
government controlled, heavily subsidized system to a privatized, largely market-based, 
industry. Subsequently, in 2005, the government of Nigeria changed the name of the utility 
from the National Electricity Power Authority (NEPA) to the Power Holding Company of 
Nigeria (PHCN) and established an independent regulatory authority the Nigerian Electricity 
Regulatory Commission (NERC) to regulate the sector and issue operating licences.  
In 2007, the government unbundled the sector by creating 18 successor companies – 6 
GENCOs51, 11 DISCOs52 and 1 TCN53. In addition, the NERC has licensed about 70 
Independent Power Producers and 10 National Integrated Power projects (NIPPs) in the 
country (KPMG, 2013). Implementing the 2005 Reform Act has been challenging for the 
Nigerian government and progress stalled between 2007 to 2009. However, the process was 
revitalized in 2010 with the establishment of the Presidential Task Force on Power (PTFP) 
and a roadmap for power sector reform was published in August 2010 (KPMG, 2013, PWC, 
2013). 
Having established the framework and institutions for power sector reform, the reform 
process was completed in 2013 with the handing-over of the power stations (Gencos and 
Discos) to the successful bidder companies and the signing of an agreement with a Canadian 
firm - Monitola Hydro International (MHL) to manage the Transmission Company of 
Nigeria54. There are high expectations that the present reform will not only improve 
                                                          
51 Afam Power Plc, Egbin Power Plc, Kainji/Jebba Hydro Electric Plc, Sapele Power Plc, Shiroro Hydro Electric Plc 
and Ughelli Power Plc. 
52 The eleven electricity distribution companies in Nigeria are: Abuja Distribution Company, Benin Distribution 
Company, Eko Distribution Company, Enugu Distribution Company, Ibadan Distribution Company, Ikeja 
Distribution Company, Jos Distribution Company, Kaduna Distribution Company, Kano Distribution Company, 
Port Harcourt Distribution Company and Yola Distribution Company. 
53 The Transmission Company of Nigeria. 
54 Manitoba won the contract to manage operations of TCN in July 2012 at a price of $23.7 million for three 
years. The contract requires that MHI take over the staffing and management of key departments of TCN (such 
as the Systems Operations, Transmission Service Provider, National Control Centre, Information Technology 
and Market Operations). 
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electricity supply but also aid energy diversification and development in Nigeria (PWC, 
2013). 
Rwanda 
Rwanda is trying to bridge its widening energy deficit, which is putting pressure on its 
economy. With an installed capacity of 120 MW, the challenge faced by the Rwanda power 
sector is high, with power outages (an average of 14 blackouts per month), high energy prices 
and shortfalls in revenue collection. The cost of energy has risen to $0.22 per kilowatt-hour 
(KWh), compared with $0.08 to $0.10 in the rest of the East African region (World Bank 
2013). However, connectivity to the national grid remains relatively low, at 15 percent of 
households.  
Restructuring of the power sector in Rwanda started in 2001 when the Rwanda Electricity 
Corporation (RECO) was created and it assumed all of Electrogaz’s electricity- related 
activities, assets, and liabilities. A regulatory authority was also established, known as the 
Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Agency (RURA), with the responsibility to regulate both the 
power and gas sectors. The Electricity Law of 2008 split the state-owned power utility 
company RECO into separate electricity and water parastatals. The two separate water and 
electricity successor utilities (RWASCO and RECO) were re-integrated in 2010 as the 
Energy, Water and Sanitation Authority (EWSA). 
In 2014, EWSA was split into two different bodies again. The Water and Sanitation 
Corporation Ltd is in charge of ensuring the supply of clean water, while the Rwanda Energy 
Group is responsible for electricity.  The latter is subdivided into the Energy Development 
Company Ltd (which is in charge of energy generation and network expansion), and the 
Energy Utility Company Ltd (for supply and distribution of electricity).  
In support of power sector reform, the Rwandan government has approved a number of legal, 
regulatory, and private-sector development initiatives. The government expects an additional 
65.5MW to be generated after the completion of ongoing projects, which include Nyabarongo 
I MHPP (28MW), Kivuwatt -Gas (25MW), Giciye MHPP (4 MW), and the IPP Solar PV 
power plant. The government has set a national target to increase the country’s electricity 
access to 70 per cent by 2017, which includes a plan to increase installed capacity to 
1,160MW by 2017 (AfDB, 2104). 
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Senegal 
Not until 1998 were major power sector reforms undertaken in Senegal. 
Senegal’s power sector was split into three entities: Senelec (the national utility), the Agency 
for Rural Electrification (Agence Sénégalaise d'Electrification Rurale, ASER), and the 
Electricity Regulatory Board (Commission de Régulation au Secteur de l'Electricité, CRSE). 
While electricity generation, mainly on a Build-Own-Operate (BOO) basis, is open to the 
private sector, Senelec (the sole buyer) signs power purchase contracts with independent 
power producers (Niang, 2006, Niang, 2011, Ngom, 2009, Sari, 2009). 
 In 1999, the government made an attempt to privatize SENELEC (Société nationale 
d'électricité du Sénégal) but failed55. A second attempt was made in 2001 (after a new 
government came into power), but this too was unsuccessful (Gökgür and Jones, 2006).  
 In 2003, the government adopted a new strategy reflecting the lessons learned over the 1999-
2002 period. It aimed at expanding and improving the reliability of SENELEC’s generation, 
transmission and distribution system, and high priority was placed on mobilizing private 
resources for generation expansion under IPP arrangements (World Bank, 2013). Due to poor 
market design and poor implementation of the new strategy, it did not yield the expected 
outcomes, in spite of the assistance provided by the World Bank and bilateral donors in the 
form of budgetary support. Instead, SENELEC ended up in crisis56 and the country witnessed 
recurrent blackouts with un-served demand reaching 105GWh in 2008 (World Bank 2013 
and Mawhood and Gross 2014). 
The Senegalese power reform has not achieved its key objective and disagreements within 
the Government, have contributed to the cancelling of plans for new short-term capacity 
additions and significant delays in the negotiation of IPP arrangements (World Bank 2013 
and Mawhood and Gross, 2014). 
 
 
                                                          
55This was due to disagreements between the private partners and the Government on issues related to 
investment plans and tariffs (UNDP, 2007). 
56 Senegal’s electricity sector is caught in a downward spiral caused by the poor state of SENELEC’s finances 
and the sector’s under-investment. SENELEC’s under-capitalization and structural operating deficit (caused by 
low tariffs and lagging budgetary transfers) perpetuates inefficiency by preventing it from investing in the 
required maintenance of aging assets and non-liquid fuel-based generating plants, which could improve its 
cost structure in the long-run while improving the quality of service (World Bank, 2013). 
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South Africa 
The South African power sector has always been dominated by the state-owned and vertically 
integrated utility (Eskom). It enjoys a near monopoly in both generation and transmission 
segments, accounting for about 96% of the country’s total installed generating capacity and 
95% of generated electricity57. It also controls virtually 100% of the transmission assets, 
although in the distribution segment Eskom’s dominance is less pronounced as it shares the 
sector with municipal distributors. It still controls 45% of distribution networks, with the 
remaining 55% provided by 188 local authorities (Eskom Annual report, 2012).  
South Africa is a member of the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP), a regional body of 
different national electricity utility companies, organised under the auspices of the Southern 
African development community. It is the only member that has achieved self-sufficiency in 
electricity production. Although Eskom imports power from some SAPP member countries 
such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia, it is mainly for peak load 
management, and is also contractually bound to take electricity from a hydro plant in 
Mozambique. However, at the same time, Eskom sells electricity to the neighbouring 
countries of Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe      
(ESKOM, 2012). 
However, following the change of government in South Africa in 1994, the need to reform 
Eskom was a top priority in the government agenda. In 1995 the National Electricity 
Regulator was established with the legal mandate to issues permits/licences to prospective 
electricity suppliers, to approve their tariffs, to monitor the quality of supply, and to settle 
disputes.  
In 1998, the government approved a white paper on energy policy which emphasized the 
need to increase private sector participation in the sector and to promote efficiency through 
competition. In line with the vision of the policy, Eskom was converted into a public liability 
company through the Eskom Conversion Act of 2001  
                                                          
57 Although Eskom does not have exclusive generation rights, it has a practical monopoly on bulk electricity. It 
also operates the integrated national high-voltage transmission system, and supplies electricity directly to 
large consumers such as mines, mineral resources producers and other large industries. In addition, it supplies 
electricity directly to commercial farmers and, through the Integrated National Electrification Programme 
(INEP), to a large number of residential consumers. It also sells in bulk to municipalities, which distribute to 
consumers within their boundaries (NERSA, 2015). 
 
E c o n o m i c s  O f  E l e c t r i c i t y  R e f o r m                             P a g e  | 106 
 
 
 
In 2004, the government set a target of a 30 percent increase in generation capacity from the 
private sector in order to create competition, but the target was not met. In 2006, the 
Department of Energy and Mineral Resources unsuccessfully sought to procure two gas 
turbine power plants to complement generation during peak loads.  
Since 2008, there has been a decline in the generation capacity of Eskom and this has put 
Eskom under significant pressure to boost generation capacity and provide a stable supply of 
power. The National Energy Act, (No. 34) of 2008, put into effect a number of proposals 
from the White Paper on Energy Policy that had thus far not been addressed. For instance, 
while the white paper indicated that reform should ultimately result in customers having a 
choice of supplier, little progress had been made (Newbery 2009). In 2010, the Integrated 
Resource Plan 2010 (IRP 2010) and the Policy-Adjusted IRP set out a 20-year electricity plan 
(2010–2030) for South Africa to increase capacity and change the nation’s energy mix.  
Despite the limited reform to date in South Africa, some achievements have been seen. For 
instance, access to electricity supply has improved with 3.5 million new households 
connected to the national grid between 1994 and 2001. In 2010, access to electricity was 
82.7% and in 2012 it has increased to 85.4% of the population (World Bank Development 
Indicators, 2014). 
Tanzania 
Over the past two decades, the power sector in Tanzania faced enormous challenges 
including capacity shortages, mismanagement, low investment and poor maintenance of 
aging plants, coupled with an increase in electricity demand. Hence, it was vital for the 
government of Tanzania to restructure and reposition the sector to be productive, efficient, 
and attract more private investment in line with the country’s economic policy (Vision 2025). 
In 2002, the government amended the Electricity Law and approved an arrangement to 
contract the management of TANESCO (the Tanzania Electricity Supply Company Limited) 
to NETGroup Solutions Ltd of South Africa58. In the same year the first independent power 
producer (Independent Tanzania Power Limited (IPTL)) was incorporated into the power 
generation segment, and in 2004, another private producer Songas was added to the system. 
Both IPTL and Songas produced power and fed it into the national grid59 (Ghanadan and 
                                                          
58 The initial arrangement was for two years, later extended to another two and half years in 2004. 
59  Songas produces 190 MW using natural gas and IPTL produces 100 MW using heavy fuel oil.  
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Eberhard 2007). Apart from IPTL and SONGAS there are other smaller private producers 
(Aggreco, Symbion Power LLC), with Aggreco and Symbion (emergency power plants60), 
and Wentworth Resources61 (Tanzania Ministry of Energy and Minerals, 2011). 
In 2005, legislation was passed to form a Rural Energy Agency and Rural Energy Fund 
(REA/REF), which pursues non-commercial rural electrification initiatives and started 
functioning in 2007. The Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority (EWURA) was 
approved in 2006 and became operational the same year, with the task to ensure regulatory 
oversight to promote sector investment (Tanzania Ministry of Energy and Minerals 2014). 
Tanzania’s reform outcomes were mixed. The early years of the management contract with 
NETGroup was successful as revenue collection of TANESCO increased, although the 
contract was subsequently terminated. Operational efficiency improved and the number of 
customer connections to the national grid increased62. However, the average price of 
electricity gradually also went up, from 6.2 US cents/kWh in 1993 to 10.7 US cents/kWh in 
1996 and had increased by 12.69% in 2013 (Eskom, 2015), as the government cut the 
electricity tariff subsidy from 100 kWh in 2003 to 50 kWh in 2012 (Kapika and Eberhard, 
2013). Installed capacity has more than doubled (from 482 MW in 1992 to 1564.1 MW in 
2012), and there is also an improved energy mix which has reduced the overdependence on 
hydropower63. 
Despite these achievements, there are still challenges such as; the high commercial and 
technical losses, the low level of revenue collection, the use of expensive thermal power in 
power generation and, during the dry season, water level decreases cause most of the 
hydropower plants to shut down (TANESCO Financial Report, 2014). 
Tunisia 
Prior to the 1980s, access to electricity was low as only 6% of the rural population were 
connected to the power grid. In the 1990s, the figure had increased to 54%, due to the 
growing economy and rising living standards and this led to a significant increase in 
                                                          
60 Emergency power plants started operating in December 2010, after Tanzania experienced a heavy drought 
which reduced power generation capacity from 561 MW to 120 MW. 
61 Wentworth Resources, formally known as Artumas Limited, operates in the Islands and it is engaged in 
generation, transmission and distribution.  
62 For instance the customer-to-employee ratio was improved from 67 in 2001 to 97 in 2003 and the number 
of customers increased from 450,947 in 2001 to 530,000 in 2004, and in 2013 is 1,200,000. 
63 Prior to the reform, most power generation stations in Tanzania were hydro (about 80% in the 1990s), the 
remaining 20% were diesel generators. In 2012 the mixture is 35% hydro, 61% thermal, and 4% renewable 
energy. 
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electricity demand and consumption, resulting in the saturation of the grid (REEEP, 2014). In 
addition, some power plants and facilities were too antiquated. As a consequence, overload 
losses and high voltage drops occurred on a frequent basis. To address these issues in 1996 
the government embarked on a restructuring of the Société Tunisienne de lˈElectrićité et du 
Gaz (STEG), the state-owned vertically integrated utility company. While STEG had a 
monopoly over power generation, transmission and distribution, the Electricity Law of 199664 
opened the way for independent power producers to enter the power generation segment on 
condition that STEG65 remained the single buyer of the power produced (STEG Annual 
report, 2013). 
 In 2002, Tunisia's first independent power producer (IPP) – the Carthage Power Company 
was completed and became operational. A second IPP, a 13.5 MW associated gas plant began 
producing in 2003, operated by the Societe d’Electricite d’El Bibane (SEEB). The 
liberalization of the power sector has helped to expand electricity access significantly, from 
54% in the 1990s to 99% of the population in 2013. Tunisia subsequently created a legislative 
framework for the implementation of a national energy and renewable energies development 
programme (Loi n° 2009-7 and Implementation decree No. 2009-2773 of 28th September 
2009), which opens up various investment and development opportunities to private 
operators. 
As of 2014, the total installed capacity of Tunisian power generating system is 4,799MW, of 
which STEG owns and operates 86%, the remaining 14% are operated by IPPs (Bureau of 
Statistics, Ministry of Industry, Tunis). However, Tunisia’s energy mix largely dominated by 
fossil fuels, a large percentage of which are imported. These fossil fuels produce more than 
98.8% of the electricity generated in the country, leaving only a tiny percentage of electricity 
produced from renewable energy. To promote and support the diversification of energy 
sources and increase the percentage of electricity produced from renewable energy sources 
STEG has created a subsidiary dedicated to renewable energies (STEG Annual Report, 
2014).  
Despite the success of the reforms, the Tunisian power sector faces a big challenge as 
electricity supply is heavily subsidised. The average retail prices is 0.14 TND/kWh in 2012, 
                                                          
64 Law N° 96-27, dated 01/04/1996, authorised the State-owned power utility to grant electricity generation 
licences to independent producers with a view to its exclusive sale to STEG. 
65 The conditions of the power purchase agreement (PPA) are partially defined in the call for tender of the 
concession contract and in part subject to the final negotiations between the concessionaire and STEG (Bureau 
of Statistics, Ministry of Industry, Tunis).  
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which is significantly lower than average production costs (0.26 TND/kWh in 2012). In 2012, 
energy subsidies amounted to 5,600 million TND (3,100 million EUR), 20% of the public 
budget, and 9% of GDP (STEG Annual Report, 2014).  
Uganda 
In the late 1980s the Ugandan Government embarked on an Economic Recovery Programme 
(ERP) with support from the World Bank and the IMF as the economy was immersed in 
economic crises and suffered political instability. Electricity production had fallen from 
150MW in 1963 to 60MW in 1995 (Kuteesa et al. 2010).  
Prior to reform, the Ugandan power sector was dominated by a state-owned, vertically 
Integrated Uganda Electricity Board (UEB).  In 1997 the government initiated a power sector 
reform aimed at unbundling the sector, enhancing the quality of service, improving on 
connectivity and reliability, reducing losses and attracting capital from the private sector 
(Mawejje et al., 2012). 
In 1999 Parliament enacted new electricity legislation, mandating the government to   
liberalise the power sector, establish new institutions and seek private sector participation. 
The legislation also provided for the establishment of an autonomous regulatory body to 
regulate the electricity industry and a Rural Electrification Trust Fund (RETF) to provide 
electricity supply to the rural area. The regulator, the Electricity Regulatory Authority (ERA), 
became operational in 2000. 
In 2001 the Uganda Electricity Board (UEB) was unbundled into three separate companies 
namely: The Uganda Electricity Generation Company Ltd; The Uganda Electricity 
Transmission Company Ltd; and The Uganda Electricity Distribution Company Ltd 
(UEDCL). The concession for the generation segment was signed in 2002 and started 
operation the same year. In 2004 the electricity distribution segment was converted into a 
private firm (UMEME), being managed and operated under a 20-year concession agreement 
(Mawejje et al, 2012).  
As a result, of the reform, there has been an increase in investment in power generation, with 
the 250 MW Bujagali Hydroelectric Power Station constructed as a public-private project at a 
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cost of approximately US$862 million (ERA, 2013)66. In October 2013, the construction of 
the 183 MW Isimba Power Station67 commenced and is scheduled to be completed in 2018. 
Work also commenced in 2013, on the construction of the 600 MW Karuma Power Station, 
and completion is expected in December 2018.  
As of 2014 there are six operational mini-hydropower plants connected to the national grid 
supplying 65 MW: Nyagak I (3.5 MW), Kabalega (9 MW), Kanungu (6.6 MW),           
Bugoye (13 MW), Mubuku I (5 MW), Mubuku III (10 MW), and Mpanga (18 MW). In 
addition, there are two thermal power stations: Namanve Power Station is a 50 MW plant68, 
and Tororo Power Station a 70 MW thermal power station. There are also five sugar 
manufacturers in Uganda that have a total cogeneration capacity of 110 megawatts, of which 
about 50% is available for sale to the national grid69 (The East Africa, 2015 and ERA, 2014). 
In 2014, ERA licensed two solar power stations, each with the capacity to generate 10 
megawatts.  
Zambia 
Zambia had a total installed generating capacity of 2,177 megawatts (MW)70 in 2014. The 
power supply is dominated by the state-owned vertically integrated company, the Zambia 
Electricity Supply Corporation (ZESCO). There are two other important participants: the 
Copperbelt Energy Corporation (CEC), a private sector firm that purchases bulk power from 
ZESCO and supplies the copper mines and neighbouring communities, and the Lusemfywa 
Hydro Electricity Company that operates a 40 MW power station (the only independent 
power producer in the industry connected to ZESCO’s transmission network), which provides 
electricity to the Kabulu Manganese mine and to ZESCO (Vagliasindi and Besant-Jones, 
2013). 
                                                          
66 The consortium that owns the hydro power station includes: - the Aga Khan Fund for Economic 
Development, Sithe Global Power LLC (a subsidiary of the Blackstone Group), and the government of Uganda. 
Bujagali Energy Limited run the station on behalf of the shareholders. 
67 The station is 40 kilometres from Bujagali, and it will cost approximately US$590 million. It is a public 
enterprise venture with funding from the Export-Import Bank of China (Daily Monitor, March 2015). 
68 Owned by Jacobsen Electricity Company (Uganda) Limited, a subsidiary of Jacobsen Elektro, a Norwegian-
based power production company, built in 2008. 
69 These are the Kakira Power Station (52 MW), the Kinyara Power Station (40 MW), the Lugazi Power Station 
(14 MW), the Kaliro Power Station (12 MW) and the Mayuge Power Station (1.6 MW).  
70 There are seven power stations: Kafue Gorge (990 MW), Kariba North Bank (1080 MW), Victoria Falls (108 
MW), Lusemfwa and Mulungushi (56 MW), Small Hydro combined (25 MW), Isolated generation (8 MW) AND 
Gas Turbine (80 MW). 
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The low access to electricity and the poor financial condition of ZESCO led the government 
to embark on a reform of the power sector in 1995. An electricity law was passed mandating 
the government to restructure the power sector and establish new institutions to oversee the 
activities of the sector. In 1997, the Energy Regulation Board (ERB) was established (ERB, 
2000). 
In 2001, the government sought to break the monopoly of ZESCO. It sold 51% of its shares 
in the Mulungushi and Lunsemfwa power stations to Eskom (a South African company), 
29% to a local investor (Dagarnier) and 20% to Wand Gorge Investment. In 2003, ZESCO 
was partially privatized, as the government rejects full privatization in favour of divesture 
(IMF and IDA, 2005). 
In order to provide electricity for rural dwellers, the Rural Electrification Authority (REA) 
was established by the Act of Parliament No. 20 of 2003. The government also embarked on 
a strategy to diversify energy mix in power generation, as Zambia’s increasing reliance on 
hydropower was affected sharply during drought71. Although Zambia is endowed with 
renewable energy resources (solar, the wind and geothermal) that can be exploited for both on-
grid and off-grid systems, efforts to date to harness these resources have been minimal. National 
electrification has increased from 20% in 2000 to 48 % in 2012 (IRENA, 2013) while ZESCO’S 
consumers have expressed dissatisfaction with the poor quality of the electricity supply (ERB, 
2014). 
Zimbabwe 
Prior to 1985 Zambia and Zimbabwe had a joint electricity system with CAPCO (the Central 
African Power Corporation) producing hydroelectricity on behalf of the two countries. ZESA 
(the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority) was established in 1985, a vertically integrated 
monopoly responsible for generation, transmission and distribution. It is the sole exporter and 
importer of electricity in the country and the sole supplier of electricity to the public grids.   
In 1996 subsidiaries of ZESA were formed; the energy generating company the Zimbabwe 
Power Company (ZPC) and the Zimbabwe Electricity Transmission and Distribution 
Company (ZETDC).  
In 2001, the Rural Electrification Fund (REF) Act was passed into law. The REF is 
responsible for grid extension in rural areas and for supplying specific institutions, such as 
                                                          
71 Zambia witnessed droughts in 2005, 2008 and from mid-2014  to 2015 
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schools, clinics, government offices, and community-initiated projects. REF covers the cost 
of its operation through levies on electricity and petroleum sales and from the financial 
support it receives from the government and donors. Although access to electricity grew from 
27% to 34% between 1996 and 1999, and from 36.9% to 40.4% between 2010 and 2012, the 
rate of progress is slow (World Bank, 2014).  
In accordance with government policy to embark on reforms of the power sector, a new 
Electricity Act was enacted in 2002 leading to the restructuring of the Zimbabwe Electricity 
Supply Authority (ZESA). The vertically integrated utility was converted into separate 
successor companies (under ZESA Holdings), with the Zimbabwe Power Company (ZPC), is 
responsible for all generating stations and for the supply of power to the transmission grid), 
the Zimbabwe Electricity Transmission Company (ZETCO), the Zimbabwe Electricity 
Distribution Company (ZEDC), and POWERTEL. Powertel is primarily responsible for 
providing communication services to the power companies (MOEPD, 2004). In addition, the 
Act also provided for the setting up of an autonomous regulatory body that would oversee 
private investment in the power sector through appropriate regulatory, fiscal and 
environmental frameworks. 
In 2005, the Zimbabwe Electricity Regulatory Commission (ZERC) was established to 
strengthen the institutional oversight of the sector, with the expectation that private investors 
would be attracted into the sector.  
 In 2010, ZETCO and ZEDC were merged into a single company to save cost, and ZETDC 
(Zimbabwe Electricity Transmission and Distribution Company) is now responsible for 
transmitting and distributing electric power, billing, revenue collection and meter reading 
(MOEPD, 2013). 
Historically the Zimbabwe power sector had suffered from unsustainable operation owing to 
financial constraints as a result of inefficiencies in revenue collection, illegal connection and 
vandalism of distribution lines. Since 2012 the government has embarked on a programme to 
add new generating capacity and to rehabilitate old power stations so as to improve the power 
deficit, but its impact is still to be seen (Bloomberg, July 2015). 
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3.10 Conclusion 
As we have seen in this chapter, many developed and developing countries have embarked on 
different types of power sector reforms over the past three decades. These reforms have taken 
place against a backdrop of a wider pattern, a shift from state ownership and vertically 
integrated organization to public-private ownership and market-oriented structures (OECD, 
2000). The new approach to the power sector reflects a general dissatisfaction with the 
performance of traditional models of state-owned enterprise and the desire to improve the 
efficiency and enhance the productivity growth of this sector. Moreover, success recorded by 
pioneering countries (Chile, Great Britain and Norway), have contributed to the adoption of 
reforms in other countries (see section 2.2). 
The driving forces behind electricity market reforms in developed and developing countries 
seem similar but are different. Thus, in developed countries, the primary aim of reforms has 
been to improve the performance of relatively efficient systems, while in developing 
countries, the burden of financial constraints, price subsidies, low quality of service, low 
revenue collection rates, high transmission and distribution network losses, low access to 
electricity and underinvestment have meant that many governments are no longer willing (or 
able) to support the existing arrangements (Jamasb, 2006; Newbery, 2002; and Joskow, 
1998). In addition, international development agencies (World Bank and other International 
donor agencies) have provided support and/or promoted the implementation of power sector 
reforms especially in developing counties. This market-oriented reform came with some 
conditionality attached. Our study shows the experience of some of the countries across Latin 
America, Asia and African countries. One common policy lesson that cut across all the 
developing countries reviewed is that many of the countries lack some of the institutional and 
structure framework necessary to embark on a full implementation of the standard reform 
program. 
Secondly, electricity tariff reform continues to be a main challenge facing policymakers in 
developing countries. The problem of cost recovery, underpricing and subsidy continue to 
affect the industry (Kessides, 2012b). 
The policy lesson from Latin American countries, according to Mckenzie & Mookkherjee 
(2005); Gaviria (2006); Nagayama (2007); and Balza et al. (2013), is that majority of the 
countries in the region tend not to follow the reform sequence as introduced by the World 
Bank. For instance; Chile and Colombia privatised their power sector without introducing 
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unbundling (Fischer et al. 2003 and Nagayama, 2007; Pombo and Taborda, 2006). Similarly, 
in India some state privatised and introduced unbundling (Bhatia and Gulati, 2004), but did 
not establish a regulatory body nor introduced competition.  
As this chapter has shown, power sector reforms in Africa have taken place within diverse 
political, economic, and structural contexts. Many of the reforms were initiated as a condition 
from the World Bank for developing countries to securing loans and aid to combat economic 
crises. Consequently, power sector reforms have taken a variety of forms and paths (Bacon 
and Besant-Jones, 2001; Millan et al., 2001). Given this background, it is perhaps not 
surprising that many reforming countries have encountered unexpected problems and have 
only achieved, to some extent, their goals (Jamasb, 2006). 
The African experience with power sector reform has shown that implementing and 
sustaining workable restructuring, competition, and regulation is more complicated than 
initially anticipated. For instance, in both Malawi and Namibia, in spite of the reforms, not a 
single independent power producer has invested in the country (Mloza-Amir, 2005; UNDP, 
2007; and Kapika and Eberhard, 2013). 
Electricity systems in Africa vary significantly in size, structure, and generation mix and this 
complicates comparison and the transfer of experience. In addition, many reforming countries 
lack the necessary regulatory framework, experience, and skilled human resources. 
Furthermore, in most countries, reforms are constrained by weak institutions. In the case of 
Senegal for example, three attempts were made to privatize the national utility company 
without success, due to the poor institutional framework, poor market design and poor 
implementation strategy. In Tanzania, while the management contract with the NET Group 
saw the firm record success in revenue collection, improve efficiency and increase the 
number of customers connected to the national grid, the contract with NET Group was 
unceremoniously terminated before the due time (Kapika and Eberhard, 2013). 
Electricity market reform in developing countries must follow a logical sequence, as it is 
costly to undertake market-oriented reform in the wrong order. It is a combination of both 
institutional and structural reforms (i.e. vertical and horizontal restructuring of the industry). 
First, the reforming country must restructure its tariff structure, setting tariffs a little above 
(or equal to) the total expenditure of the operators and completely removing any form of 
subsidy in the industry. 
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Secondly, the establishment of a regulatory body and (especially the application of incentive-
based regulatory mechanisms), the total privatization of the industry. Third, it is necessary to 
introduce competition and separate the different segments of the industry into independent 
entities (In chapter four, we refer to it as government commitment) can lead to significant 
improvement in the performance of the electricity market in developing countries.  
However, most of the developing countries lack some of the essential ingredients and other 
pre-conditions for full implementation of the standard reform model, as outlined by main 
donors such as the World Bank. A majority of these countries have evolved or evolving into 
hybrid forms (i.e. partial reform of electricity reform). 
Lastly, market-oriented reforms in electricity markets that incorporated the local conditions 
will be successful and leads to improved efficiency and enhanced the productivity of the 
sector, increase private sector participation and offer a better quality of service (i.e. a 
combination of various reform variables lead to significant improvement) (Besant-Jones, 
2006). At the same time, flawed reform design and ineffective policy can undermine the 
benefits of reforms.  
The next chapter, the first empirical study in this thesis, examines to what extent do 
liberalization policies (in the form of regulation, privatization, introducing competition and 
unbundling) influence performance in the power generation sector. We test our hypotheses on 
power generation using four performance indicators (total electricity generation, installed 
capacity, labour productivity and generation capacity utilization) in the sector as dependent 
variables. 
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Chapter 4 
To what extent does liberalisation policy impact on electricity 
generation? A panel study of African countries power sector 
performance. 
4.1 Introduction 
One of the greatest challenges facing African countries in the 21st century is to achieve a 
reliable/sustainable power supply to enable her to cope with an increasing population and 
urban growth. In a bid to stimulate growth/development, and rise above the economic, social, 
political, and environmental crises that have beset the region over the last four decades, the 
governments of various countries of the region (together with the support of multilateral 
institutions) have introduced market-oriented economic reforms. Among these reforms are 
those aimed at improving the technical, financial, managerial and operational efficiency of 
the power utilities. These reforms come in the form of facilitating divestiture, offering 
management contracts, privatisation, granting concessions (with a view to guaranteeing 
future electricity supply in an open globalised energy market), and allowing independent 
power producers (IPPs) to invest in the electricity generation sector. The power industry in 
Africa, as we have shown in the previous chapter, was mainly characterised by chronic power 
outages, unreliable power supply, mismanagement of resources, low capacity utilisation and a 
high cost of production, deficient maintenance, poor procurement of spare parts, and high 
transmission and distribution losses.  
A reliable power supply is needed both to industrialize and to provide basic energy for the 
populace living off the grid in urban and rural areas in different countries of the region. 
Multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, African Development Bank, Inter- America 
Development Bank and other subsidiaries of World Bank (who are the main sponsors/donors 
of this programme) have stipulated the kind of reform programmes countries in the African 
region should adopt. It can take different forms, for instance: Electricity law amendments 
(which often involves a country’s national law making bodies amending an existing act/law 
and passing it into law); Corporatization, sometimes referred to as commercialisation (the act 
of transforming a government-owned utility into a limited liability corporate body); 
Restructuring the power sector (to allow private participation in the generation sub-sector – 
Independent power producers (IPP)); and the utility can be unbundled (that is breaking it up 
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into different components – generation, transmission and distribution). Sometimes, it can 
involve the privatisation of the different components of the electricity supply industry (either 
wholly or partially) although in the case of the African countries it is largely the latter.  
Another option is to create an autonomous/independent regulatory agency, rather than 
allowing direct regulation by government ministry/parasternal (AICD 2008).  
The type of market reform that is implemented depends on what is perceived as the country’s 
needs, for example: In the case of Ghana, electricity demand is outstripping supply, resulting 
in overloaded network grids coupled with obsolete plants which make power delivery very 
difficult. The load on the generation and distribution grid has grown at about 10 percent a 
year, but there had not been adequate investment and expansion of the electricity power 
generation infrastructure to match the growth in demand (Kusi 2005). In 1997, the Ghanaian 
Parliament passed two laws, (i) the Public Utilities Regulatory Commission (PURC) Act 538, 
and (ii) the Energy Commission (EC) Act 541, which established the legal and regulatory 
framework for electricity supply industry reforms. In 1998 the electricity corporation of 
Ghana was commercialized, becoming the Electricity Company of Ghana plc (ECG). Later 
the government of Ghana decided to partially unbundle the electricity power industry, and the 
distribution grid was assigned to the Volta River Authority (VRA)72, which has a subsidiary 
called the Northern Electricity Department (NED) which supplies power to the northern 
region of Ghana.   
This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section provides the motivation for our research 
and what the study aims to address. Section 4 develops the methodological framework, 
details the data set and provides the model specification. Section 5 states the research 
hypotheses. Section 6 presents the empirical model, results and analyses, the following 
section presents the empirical discussion and the last section concludes. 
4.1.1 What Does This Study Address? 
It is generally acknowledged in economic theory that unreliable power supply results in 
welfare losses (Kessides 1993). However, previous empirical studies in this field focus on the 
experiences of Europe, North America, South Asia and the Latin American regions, with few 
studies on the performance of the African electricity generation sector. One exception was 
                                                          
72 The Volta River Authority (VRA) is the state-owned power generation and transmission company. The VRA 
owns and operates the 1020 MW Akosombo hydropower plant and 160MW hydro generating station in 
Kpong. 
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Foster and Steinbuks (2009) who analysed the consequence of unreliable power supplies in 
Sub-Saharan Africa using data from the UDI World Electric Power Plants Data Base 
(WEPP), and the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey Database. Their study focused on the 
contribution of in-house generation of electricity by private firms in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Their findings suggest in-house electricity generation would remain a prevalent part of the 
system in Africa, even if power supply increases, the reason being that firms see it as an 
emergency back-up.  
Zhang et al. (2008) examined the effect of three reform indicators (privatization, competition, 
and regulation) on the general electricity sector reform process in 36 developing countries. 
Using the Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre (APERC) database, World Development 
Indicators, and the Industrial Statistics Yearbook, they constructed a panel (unbalanced) 
dataset and found insufficient evidence that reform variables on their own impacted on 
electricity sector performance (with the exception of competition). 
However, Zhang et al.’s (2008) estimation overlooked an important reform variable – vertical 
unbundling73. Also, only six African countries74 were included in the study. Second, the study 
was based on a general model, instead of a more specified interaction effect model (that is, 
allowing for more interaction effects among the reform variables). It is important to note that 
the cost of electricity generation constitutes the main factors that determines the final 
electricity prices. However, we made attempt to include this variable in our research, as it has 
been ignored so far in almost all cross-country econometric panel studies on the impact of 
market-oriented reforms in the electricity supply industry [See Erdogdu (2011), Nagayama 
(2007 and 2009), Zhang et al. (2008), Fiorio et al. (2007), Hattori & Tsutsui (2004) and 
Steiner (2001)]. Hence our study will incorporate this variable into our analysis, making an 
important contribution to the existing literature.  
This study combines the advantage of cross-country and panel (balanced) data analysis to 
examine how certain reforms - specifically structural and institutional changes - have 
influenced the performance of electricity generation sector in African countries. To do this, 
                                                          
73 Vertical unbundling is a key indicator in the power sector reform process. It helps to reduce the degree of 
concentration in the generation and distribution segment of the sector and also is a source of attracting 
additional investment from both the private and public sectors (Vagliasindi and Besant-Jones 2013). 
74 The six countries included in Zhang et al. (2008) are Algeria, Kenya, Morocco, South Africa, Tanzania and 
Zambia 
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we employ a panel data set from 30 African countries in the region with yearly aggregated 
data over a period of 24 years (1989 -2012).  
This chapter will seek to address and provide answers to the following questions: First, does 
liberalizing the electricity generation sector in developing countries increase electricity 
generation, promote efficiency, increase productivity and enhance capacity utilisation? (i.e. 
do market-oriented policies in the form of privatization, regulation, competition and 
unbundling have an impact on the performance of the power generation sector)? 
Second, does economic reform in the form of market liberalization in the electricity supply 
industry lead to more installed generation capacity (and hence output growth)?  
Thus, our specific objectives are: 
To estimate to what extent do reform policies affect power generation performance. 
To determine the impact of major countries on power generation trends in the region.  
To evaluate the status of electricity restructuring in the region and to offer suggestions on the 
way forward. 
This chapter does not investigate the effect of reform on household/industrial access to 
electricity, the quality of service and price, as the next chapters will treat these particular 
aspect. Our aim in this chapter is to examine to what extent do reform elements – such as 
privatization, competition, unbundling and regulation - enhance electric power generation in 
African countries.  
4.2 Overview of Power Generation Challenges in Africa.  
Africa’s power supply industry is facing many challenges, mainly due to an undeveloped 
power market (insufficient generation capacity) which has limited electricity supply, resulting 
in low access and service quality. The main obstacle to an increase in electricity generation 
capacity is the high cost of producing electricity and the government’s subsidy for 
consumption. In 2010, the average effective electricity tariff in Africa was US $0.14 per 
kilowatt-hour (kWh) against an average of US $0.18 per kWh in production costs. 
Consumption is effectively subsidized, but with significant disparities among African 
countries. For example, while electricity tariffs in South Africa and Zambia are among the 
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lowest in the world, prices in Djibouti and Gabon are among the highest globally, due to a 
reliance on diesel – based power - generation (ADB 2013). 
For the past three decades, the region has lagged behind other regions of the world in power 
generation and installed generation capacity, (see Figure 4.1). 
 
Figure 4.1: Total Electricity net Generation (billion kilowatt-hours) in 2012 
Source: Compiled by author from EIA (2012), and World Bank (2012). 
 
The average installed capacity in Africa in the 1980s and early 1990s was about the same as 
in the south Asian region but currently is lower than in any other developing region (AICD 
2008). Also, the cost of electricity generation is higher in the African region when compared 
to other regions of the world.  
 
Figure 4.2: Electricity Installed capacities (million kilowatts) 
Source: Compiled by author from EIA, (2012), and World Bank (2012) 
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The low level of power generation is attributed to the correspondingly low installed 
capacities and lack of investment in electricity network expansion in the region, especially in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. The progress recorded to date in the African region (excluding South 
Africa and the North African countries) is slow in this regard. As Table 4.1 below shows, 
between 2000 to 2012 East Asia added at least 10 percent in power generation, South Asia 
added at least 50 percent, while the African region recorded only 7 percent growth (EIA 
2012). 
Table 4.1: Developing Regions Installed Generation (million kilowatts) 1990-2012 
Developing Regions Total Installed Capacity 
(1990 -1999) 
Average Total Installed 
Capacity (2000 -2012) 
Average 
Africa 924.52 92.45 1555.26 119.64 
East Asia 5138.58 513.86 14043.62 1080.28 
South Asia 1093.92 109.39 2546.38 195.88 
Middle East 830.34 83.03 2065.49 158.88 
East Europe & 
Eurasia 
4164.87 416.49 6049.92 465.39 
South East Asia 640.58 64.06 1725.52 132.73 
South America 1353.29 135.33 2613.09 201.01 
Total 16145.79 1614.58 30587.37 2352.87 
 Source: Source: Compiled by author from (EIA, 2012, and World Bank 2012) 
4.3 Studies on the restructuring of Power Sector 
There is a large literature that has examined the impact of liberalization policies on the 
electricity supply industry. The category of studies includes country specific, cross-country 
and comparative analysis comparing power generation.  Some of these studies adopted a 
descriptive approach which merely reports the reform outcomes on power generation (World 
Energy Council 2002). Examples are Bacon (1995), Czamanski (1999) and Besant-Jones 
(2001), who describe and explain the principal driving forces behind developing countries 
power sector reform. Jamasb et al. (2005) used the concept of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors to 
explain the different rationale between developed and developing countries power sector 
reform. “Push” refers to unfavourable macroeconomic conditions that give rise to reform, 
while the latter relates to the incentives associated with power sector reforms. For example, 
Mawejje (2012) assesses the impact of liberalisation policy on Uganda’s power generation 
sub-sector. The study made use of descriptive data analysis methods augmented by empirical 
estimations of ordinary least square dummy variable models to estimate if the reforms are on 
track to meet its intended objectives. The results suggest that progress has been slow. 
However, other studies have carried out econometric empirical testing of the effect of 
liberalization/deregulation policies in the power generation sub-sector. 
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4.4 The Econometric approach to Power generation reform 
Before market-oriented reform was introduced in the electricity generation sector in the 
African region, the electricity power industry was made up of vertically integrated state-
owned utilities. Previous studies (Joskow 2008, Jamasb et al. 2005) have argued that state-
owned utilities are characterized by low productivity, with prices lower than costs, leading to 
severe difficulties in access to power in rural areas. 
Khanna and Zilberman (2001) analysed the contribution of regulatory and technical factors to 
power generation efficiency in India. They use data from 1988 to 1991 for sixty-three coal-
based power generators (plants). They measured efficiency by the amount of heat required to 
produce a net kWh of electricity and by electricity consumption. Their results suggest that 
energy efficiency was lower at plants operated by stated-owned power utilities than at private 
plants (holding constant factors such as power generator age and capacity utilisation). 
Secondly, they find that improving state management practices leads to higher performance 
and can match those efficiency rates seen in the private sector.  
Shanmugam and Kulshreshtha (2005) made use of a stochastic frontier production model 
(SFP) to examine the technical efficiency of fifty-six coal-based electricity power generators 
in India for the period 1994 to 2001.They estimated whether technical efficiency parameters 
changed during the period of their analysis. Their results suggest that technical efficiency 
levels did not vary much during this period; however they point out that there was variation 
in technical efficiency across the power generators. They estimated technical efficiency on 
plant age and region dummies, and their result shows there is a decrease in efficiency with 
age and efficiency is lower for plants located in the northern part of the country.  
Cubbin and Stern (2006) use data for 28 developing countries over the period 1980-2001 to 
determine whether the existence of a regulatory law and quality regulatory governance are 
significantly associated with high power generation performance. Their empirical results 
suggest that holding other relevant variables constant and allowing for country-specific fixed 
effects, a regulatory law, and higher quality governance is positively and significantly 
associated with higher per capita generation capacity levels and higher generation capacity 
utilisation rates. However, it is worth noting that the reform needs at least three years to have 
a positive impact. 
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Zhang, Yin-Fang et al. (2008) examine the restructuring of regulation and privatisation in the 
electricity utility industry in both developed and developing countries. They used an 
econometric approach to assessing the effect of privatisation, competition and regulation on 
the performance of the electricity generation industry using panel data for 36 developing and 
transitional countries over the period 1985–2003. The findings generated from the models 
suggest impact of the reforms variables on electricity installed capacity, net electricity 
generation, labour productivity and capacity utilization. In contrast, individually this reform 
variables do not have any impact on the electricity generation performance indicators, rather 
when there co-exist (interaction effect).  
 
Du, Limin et al. (2009) reviewed China’s experience of regulatory reforms in its electricity 
supply industry, with the central planning system broken up and a market-oriented reform 
introduced into the Chinese power sector. In addition, the former vertically integrated 
electricity utilities were divested and the generation sector was separated from the 
transmission and distribution networks. They assess the impact of regulatory reforms on 
generation efficiency of fossil-fired power plants using plant-level national survey data from 
1995 to 2004. An econometric method of Differences-in-Differences75 was used to estimate 
the effects of restructuring on the demand for inputs of employees, fuel and nonfuel 
materials. Their results suggest that the net efficiency improvement in labour input associated 
with the regulatory reforms is roughly 29 percent and the gains in nonfuel materials are about 
35 percent. However, there is no evidence of efficiency gains in fuel input associated with the 
electricity reforms. Sen and Jamasb (2010) use panel data for the period 1990-2007 to 
estimate ex-post power generation efficiency gains from Indian states. They examined the 
impact of electricity reforms on plant load factor (PLF), total generation, transmission and 
distribution losses. They find that the unbundling and tariff order variables are significant and 
have a strong positive effect on plant load factor (PLF), as does the ratio of industrial to 
agricultural electricity prices. Their results suggest that the Electricity Regulatory 
                                                          
75 Difference - in- difference refers to an outcome(s) observed for two groups in two time periods. For 
instance, if the first group is exposed to a treatment in the second period but not in the first period. Then the 
second group is not exposed to the treatment during either period. In the case where the same units within a 
group are observed in each time period (panel data), the average gain in the second (control) group is 
subtracted from the average gain in the first (treatment) group. This removes biases in second period 
comparisons between the treatment and control group that could be the result from permanent differences 
between those groups, as well as biases from comparisons over time in the 2 treatment groups.  
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Commission (SERC), unbundling and privatisation dummies have increased transmission and 
distribution losses, possibly due to the reduced ability to hide existing losses after reform. 
However, an alternative to the state-level approach employed by Sen and Jamasb (2010) saw 
Cropper et al. (2011) use data from 1994 -2008 to measure the impact of unbundling on the 
operating efficiency of the stated-owned thermal power generators in India. They take 
advantage of differences across states in the timing of reforms to examine the impact of 
reform policy on plant generator performance. Their results suggest that unbundling leads to 
significantly improved plant generating performance of about 4.6 percent and a 2.9 percent 
reduction in the number of power outages.  
4.5 Private participation in the electricity generation sector in Africa 
The first country in Africa to see private sector participation in the electricity sector was the 
Ivory Coast (cote d’ Ivorie) in 1989. Ever since, there has been an increase in private sector 
participation in the electricity power sector in Africa. Most countries in the region began 
privatizing and unbundling their vertically integrated state-owned utilities in the late 1990s 
into different segments – generation, transmission, and distribution. The aim of these reforms 
was to promote competition and to facilitate the entry of private investors into the sector. 
Most countries in the region involve the private sector in one of the following ways - 
management/ lease contracts, concessions, Greenfield projects, divestiture, privatization, 
unbundling and regulatory changes. 
As a result of private participation in the electricity sector of 39 countries in the region, the 
flow of private investment into the sector rose to $93,413.8 billion, with 197 electricity 
generation projects completed during the period 1990 – 2012, representing 45 percent of 
average fixed capital formation (see figure 4.3). South Africa is clear at the top of the table, 
showing that the majority of the power sector generation plant/station projects are located in 
the country. For most countries, the value of generation projects relative to the size of their 
economies is not large. However, for four countries (Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda and Tanzania) 
it is greater than 10 percent while for another four countries (Namibia, Guinea-Bissau, 
Malawi and Lesotho) it is less than 4 percent. We will explore in more detail private 
investment in the power sector in chapter five.  
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Figure 4.3: Electricity Generation Projects 1990 -2012 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the PPI Database/World Bank. 
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Figure 4.4: Sources of Electricity generation in Africa 2011 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the PPI Database and World Bank African 
development Indicator. 
 
Hydropower as a source for electricity generation still dominates the sector (see figure 4.4), 
contributing approximately 48% of total African electricity production. The top 10 largest 
markets for hydropower in the region in terms of capacity are Mozambique, Zambia, Congo 
DR, Ethiopia, Namibia, Sudan, Togo, Zimbabwe, Cameroon and Angola. In Mozambique, 
for example, an estimated 27–30GW of new hydropower and 2–3GW of pumped storage 
capacity was commissioned during 2012. In many cases, the growth in hydropower was 
facilitated by lavish renewable energy support policies from multinational agencies (World 
Energy Council 2013).  
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4.6 Methodology  
There are three main methods used in analysing electricity reform as identified by Jamasb et 
al (2004): an econometric approach, efficiency and productivity analysis methods, and 
comparative case studies. The first method (the econometric approach) is best suited to an 
analysis and testing of hypotheses on electricity reform and performance in the power 
generation sector. The second approach (the efficiency and productivity method) is best used 
when measuring the effectiveness with which inputs are transformed into outputs, relative to 
best practice. The third method of single-country or cross-country studies and case studies, 
Jamasb et al. (2004) maintain is suitable when an in-depth investigation or qualitative 
analysis is required. Thus, within these three methods, our study draws upon the first and an 
element of the third category. We will use both econometric and a cross-country approach to 
investigate to what extent do market-oriented electricity reform policies impact on power 
generation performance, focusing on 30 African countries.  
As stated by Jamasb et al. (2004) there is no definitive accepted measurement criteria or 
indicators for monitoring the progress of power sector reforms, impact and performance. 
Since our goal in this study is to propose a framework to analyse the impact of market-
oriented reforms on power generation in African countries, we are faced with a similar 
problem. To resolve this, we first state possible hypotheses we need to test if we are to 
understand the impact of liberalization policies on power generation. Second, we need to 
make choices on which indicators76 to use in this study and lastly, we need to specify a 
workable method(s) to measure them. 
This methodology represents a novelty with respect to most empirical studies in this field. To 
date, there has been limited empirical study that includes generation cost in the analysis, 
particularly for the Africa region.  (Vagliasindi and Besant-Jones, (2013).  
 
 
                                                          
76 For an indicator to be useful it needs to be based on a clear definition. Also, is it expressed in physical, 
monetary or qualitative terms? Most economic and utility indicators, such as consumption, costs, prices, and 
income, capacity, transmission and distribution losses are measured in some form of monetary and/or physical 
unit. However, major electricity reform variables such as privatization, regulation, unbundling the market, 
open/third party access are qualitative in nature. We account for these variables through the use of dummy 
variables. 
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4.6.1 The Data Set 
This study made use of a balanced panel data set. We used secondary data sourced from the 
World Bank Development Indicators, the World Bank Benchmarking database (2009), the 
US Energy Information Administration, the International Energy Agency, the African 
Development Bank, and the World Energy Council. Our analysis focuses on key electricity 
performance indicators such as net electricity generation, installed electricity generation 
capacity, electricity generation per employee (a proxy for labour productivity) and generation 
utilization. These indicators capture the actual electricity available to each country in the 
sample.  
Table 4.2 presents the definitions of the variables used in this study. Our data set is based on 
a panel of 30 African countries77 for the period 1989 to 2012. This study uses the level of 
private investment in the electricity generation sector as a measure of privatization instead of 
using a discrete/dummy variable of 1 or 0 as in other studies, (except for Balza (2013)). The 
benefit of this method is that it will capture the intensity of the privatization process78 better 
than the former. 
The year 1989 was selected as the start date because electricity reform was initiated for the 
first time in the Ivory Coast and the year 2012 represented the last year for which data were 
available at the time the research was conducted. It is important to note the reform process is 
on-going in some countries, so not all data exist for all of the years for all countries. Our 
panel dataset covers 30 countries for 24 years, thus, the total of a number of observations is 
720 (30 x 24). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
77 Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Congo Dem. Rep, Congo Rep, Cote d’ 
Ivorie, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
78  This study uses the World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) database. The PPI includes 
electricity projects in only the generation sector. 
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4.6.2. Core Indicators and Variable Derivation 
 
Table 4.2: The variables Description 
Variables Variable description Notation Sources 
Electricity net 
generation per 
capita 
Total electricity generated by the utility or generation company and 
independent power producers (IPPs) excluding that of captive 
generation (industrial or commercial ‘‘inside the fence’’, e.g. mines, 
factories) divided by the total population. Measured on GWh.  We 
transformed this variable using natural logarithms 
lnGEN EIA 
Installed 
electricity 
generation 
capacity per 
capita 
The maximum rated output of all the utility generators in a country 
divided by the population. It is expressed in megawatts (MW). 
We transformed this variable using natural logarithms 
lnGENCAP EIA 
Electricity 
generation per 
employee 
Total electricity generated divided by a number of full-time 
equivalent employee in the industry. This is a proxy for labour 
productivity. We transformed this variable using natural logarithms 
lnGENEMP derived 
Generation 
Utilization 
index 
Actual Electricity net generation (MW)
Installed  generation capacity (MW)
 X  
100
1
 
We transformed this variable with natural logarithms 
lnGENUTIZ derived 
Privatization Share capacity of private-owned capacities (%) PRIVTIZ World 
Bank 
Regulation 0 =No independent or autonomous regulatory Agency. 
1=Independent/autonomous regulatory Agency. 
 
REGU dummy 
Competition Percentage share of top 3 generating companies by capacity COMPET derived 
Unbundling 0 = Vertical Integration 
1= Restructuring through vertical separation  
 
UNBUND dummy 
Electricity 
Law79 
Amendment 
0= no electricity law/act amendment 
1 = There is an electricity law/act amendment 
 
ELELAW dummy 
IPPs80 0 = No independent power producer forbidden by law 
1 = There is Independent power producer 
IPPs dummy 
Generation 
cost 
Total expenditure (US$)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 (𝑘𝑤ℎ)
.  
We transformed this variable with natural logarithms 
lnGENCOST derived 
Gross 
Domestic 
Product per 
capita 
Measured GDP per capita (in US$ million) and at 2010 constant 
prices. We transformed this variable using natural logarithms 
lnGDP World 
Bank 
Population The number of people living a country at a particular period of time. 
We transformed this variable using natural logarithms 
lnPOPUL World 
Bank 
Industrial 
Output 
Manufacturing output as a percentage of GDP (%).We transformed 
this variable using natural logarithms 
lnINDUPUT World 
Bank 
 
                                                          
79 Electricity law/act amendment is when a country’s national law making bodies amend an existing act/law 
and is passes into law. 
80 IPPs are considered a quick and relatively easy solution to persistent supply constraints experienced in the 
African region (APEC Energy Working Group, 1997). It is important to note that IPPs should be established 
before sector unbundling. Establishment of an independent regulator is not a prerequisite since in the IPP 
contracts there are laid down rules in the form of a regulation.  
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4.7 Model Specification 
 
Our panel data analysis has three more-or-less independent approaches. They are as follows: 
(i) independently pooled panels, (ii) Fixed effects models, and (iii) Random effects models.  
The choice made by these methods depends upon the objective of our study and the relevant 
tests we want to carry out. We start with the standard panel data regression equation below to 
analyse the impact of electricity reforms on power generation performance. 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=2 𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑃
𝑆
𝑃=1 𝑍𝑝𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                              [4.1] 
In the model, i and t represent a unit of observation and time period respectively. j and p are 
indices used to differentiate between observed and unobserved variables. Xji and Zpi represent 
observed and unobserved variables respectively. Xji includes both reform indicators and 
control variables. Yit is the dependent variable that is, total net electricity generation, installed 
generation capacity, net electricity generation per employee - labour productivity, and 
electricity generation/average capacity – capacity utilization Index, while ε is the disturbance 
term and t is the time trend term. Because the Zpi variables are unobserved, there are no 
means of obtaining information about the ∑ 𝛾𝑃 𝑍𝑝𝑖 component of the model. For convenience, 
we introduce a term αi, known as the unobserved effect, representing the joint impact of the 
Zpi variables on Yit. So, our model may be rewritten as follows: 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=2 𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                              [4.2]                                                         
The αi element is vitally important in this analysis. If our control variables are so 
comprehensive that they capture all relevant characteristics/features, there will be no relevant 
unobserved characteristics. In that case, the αi term may be dropped and pooled data 
regression (OLS) will be used to fit the model, treating all the observations for all time 
periods as a single sample. However, since we are not sure whether the control variables in 
our models capture all relevant characteristics of the countries, we cannot directly carry out a 
pooled data regression of Y on X. If we were to do so, it would generate an omitted variable 
bias. Therefore, we prefer to use either a Fixed Effects (FE) or Random Effects (RE) 
regression. In the FE model, the country-specific unobserved effects (αi) are assumed to be 
the fixed parameters to be estimated. In the RE model, the country-specific effects (αi) are 
treated as stochastic.  
There are about 35 countries in the African region where one form of market-reform or other 
has been initiated in their electricity power industry but data is available only for 30 
countries. Moreover, since countries in the region did not start reforms at the same time, it is 
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important to focus on those with sufficient data. Therefore, we cannot be sure ex-ante 
whether the observations in our model may be described as being a random sample from a 
given population, and so cannot directly decide on which model specification - (Fixed effect 
or Random effect) to use. It will be decided by conducting a Hausman test (Erdogdu 2011). 
We formulate a regression model based on Zhang et al’s (2008) approach, as stated below, to 
analyse the impact of liberalization policies on the power generation sub-sector in Africa. 
ln𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑖 + 𝛽1(𝑹𝑖𝑡)+ 𝛽2(𝑷𝑖𝑡)+ 𝛽3(𝑪𝒎𝑖𝑡)+ 𝛽4(𝑼𝑖𝑡)+ 𝛿(𝑋)𝑖𝑡+ 𝑣𝑖+ 𝑢𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                             [4.3] 
Where Yit is the electricity generation performance indicator, 𝜑𝑖 is the intercept, and P, R, 
Cm and U are the main reform variables, Xit denotes the control variables (Electricity act/law, 
industrial output, GDP per capita, generation cost, IPPs. 𝑣𝑖 represents the unit-specific 
residual that differs between countries but remains constant overtime for any particular 
country; and 𝑢𝑡 stands for the time effect and differs across years, but remains constant for all 
selected countries in a given year; 𝜀𝑖𝑡 captures the error (disturbance) term. 
 
Based on our prior expectations, we estimate model [4.4], to explore the two variable 
interaction effects. 
 
ln 𝑌𝑖𝑡  = 𝜑𝑖 +  𝛽1 (𝑅𝑖𝑡) +  𝛽2 (𝑃𝑖𝑡) +  𝛽3 (𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4 (𝑈𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽5 (𝑅𝑖𝑡  𝑃𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽6 (𝑅𝑖𝑡  𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽7 
(𝑅𝑖𝑡  𝑈𝑖𝑡) +  𝛽8 (𝑃𝑖𝑡  𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑡) +  𝛽9 (𝑃𝑖𝑡  𝑈𝑖𝑡) +  𝛽10 (𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑡  𝑈𝑖𝑡) +  𝛿(𝑋)𝑖𝑡  + 𝑣𝑖 +  𝑢𝑡 +   𝜀𝑖𝑡      [4.4]                                                                                         
Furthermore, we will estimate both three and four variable interaction effects before selecting 
the most appropriate model specification.  
ln 𝑌𝑖𝑡  = 𝜑𝑖 + 𝛽1 (𝑅𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2 (𝑃𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3 (𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4 (𝑈𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽5 (𝑅𝑖𝑡  𝑃𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽6 (𝑅𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽7 (𝑅𝑖𝑡  𝑈𝑖𝑡) 
+  𝛽8 (𝑃𝑖𝑡  𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑡) +  𝛽9 (𝑃𝑖𝑡  𝑈𝑖𝑡) +  𝛽10 (𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝑈𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽11 (𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑃𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽12(𝑅𝑖𝑡 𝑃𝑖𝑡 𝑈𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽13(𝑅𝑖𝑡 
𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝑈𝑖𝑡) +  𝛽14 (𝑃𝑖𝑡 𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑡  𝑈𝑖𝑡) + 𝛿(𝑋)𝑖𝑡   +   𝑣𝑖  +  𝑢𝑡 +   𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                    [4.5]                                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
ln 𝑌𝑖𝑡  = 𝜑𝑖 + 𝛽1 (𝑅𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2 (𝑃𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3 (𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4 (𝑈𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽5 (𝑅𝑖𝑡  𝑃𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽6 (𝑅𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽7 (𝑅𝑖𝑡  𝑈𝑖𝑡) 
+  𝛽8 (𝑃𝑖𝑡  𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑡) +  𝛽9 (𝑃𝑖𝑡  𝑈𝑖𝑡) +  𝛽10 (𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑡  𝑈𝑖𝑡)  + 𝛽11 (𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑃𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽12(𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑈𝑖𝑡) + 
𝛽13(𝑅𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑈𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽14 (𝑃𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑡  𝑈𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽15(𝑅𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑈𝑖𝑡) +  𝛿(𝑋)𝑖𝑡   + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑢𝑡 +   𝜀𝑖𝑡            [4.6]    
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
In equation 4.3 to 4.6 we allowed for both the separate effects of the reform variables and 
their interactions (joint) effect to be examined. Thus, the impact of a reform variable is 
permitted to be influenced by the presence or absence of another reform variable. In other 
words, their effects may reinforce one another in terms of the performance of the electricity 
generation indicators. Reform variables may not have sufficient individual impact on the 
electricity generation indicators which is why is important to consider interaction effects in 
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our regression models. Rajan and Zingales (1998) employed interaction effects (terms) in 
their regression analysis of financial dependence and growth.  
4.7.1 A Priori expectations 
We expect the regulation variable to be exerting a positive influence as establishing a 
regulatory agency is sufficient to show the government is serious in its quest to allow private 
sector participation. Implication: 𝛽1 >  0 
Second, we expect in (equation 4.3) that as countries privatize their power generation sector 
(that is move from a state-owned utility to private-owned oriented), the total net electricity 
generation, installed capacity, labour productivity and generating capacity utilization will 
significantly improve. Implication: 𝛽2 >  0 
Third, as countries move further away from vertical integration to a more competitive power 
generation sector, labour productivity, and total net electricity generation and installed 
capacity will improve. Implication: 𝛽3 >  0 
Likewise, we expect a positive consequence of unbundling of the vertically integrated state-
owned power utilities (i.e., an increase in the level of unbundling in the power generation 
sector promotes a higher rate of capacity utilization, and greater in electricity generation, 
labour productivity and installed capacity). Implication: 𝛽4 >  0 
In addition, (equation 4.4 to 4.6) we expect the interaction effects81 of the reform variables on 
the performance indicators to be positive and significant in improving all the electricity 
generation performance indicators such as (total net electricity generation, installed capacity, 
labour productivity and the utilization of generation output).  Zhang et al. (2008), found that 
an allowance for interaction effects, produces stronger positive results. In other words, 
reforming countries are expected to benefit from adopting more than one reforms as it is a 
sign of total commitment which strengthens the system and promotes growth (𝑍 >  𝛽𝑗 > 0,
𝑗 = 5, 6, . . … . . , 15)  
4.8 Research Hypotheses 
Hypotheses (1 - 4) concerns market-oriented reforms and performance outcomes of the 
electricity generation sector. As we know, electricity generation is capital-intensive which 
                                                          
81 That is different form of interaction effect models - Two by two – Eq 4.4; three by three – Eq.4.5 and four by 
four-Eq. 4.6 
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involves long-term sunk capital (investments). Therefore, the implementation of reform in the 
form of establishing an autonomous regulatory body, vertical unbundling, introduction of 
competition and privatizing the sector is expected to be significantly associated with an 
increase in generation, labour productivity, higher capacity utilization, expansion of installed 
capacity. 
However, the key aspect of reform is that it leads to ‘an increase’ in total electricity 
generation per capita, installed capacity, labour productivity, and the capacity utilization rate. 
So, when compared to non-reformed markets, the former hold an edge over the latter in that 
the new entrants can spot opportunities that incumbents have not exploited. Also, a more 
competitive market is generally more conducive to better investment decisions and 
innovative outcomes. Hence, the below hypotheses will be tested to answer our research 
questions. 
First Hypothesis – Regulation 
 
The main aim of establishing a regulatory body is to protect consumers from monopolistic 
exploitation, to provide investors with protection from arbitrary political decisions, and to 
promote efficient operation and investment (Laffont & Triole, 1993). Hypothesis: The 
presence of an independent regulatory agency/body in the power sector will lead to an 
increase in labour productivity and generation capacity utilization rate, as well as an 
increase in total net electric power generation and installed capacity. 
Second Hypothesis – Privatization 
 
Privatization entails involving private sector capital in what were predominantly state-owned 
enterprises, either through partial or full sale of the shares owned by the government. We ask 
whether privatization leads to an increase in power generation and availability (e.g., by 
improving generator plant maintenance) and also reduces wastage (enhancing higher labour 
productivity and efficiency). Hypothesis: Countries that privatized their power generation 
will witness an increase in electricity generation, labour productivity, and capital utilization 
and so will attract more foreign capital.  
Third Hypothesis – Competition 
 
In utility industries, competition is regarded as a stimulus that enhances operational and 
technical efficiency (Leibenstein, 1966). In a competitive market, there is perfect information 
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on cost and price about the market. If firms in the industry are making excess profits/gain, 
and there is no barrier to entry, more firms will access the market (i.e. it will lead more firms 
to enter the market). Thus, it is expected that with more private producers in the power 
generation sector this will lead to an increase in electricity generation, lower the price and 
cost, and thereby increase the quantity of electricity demanded. Hypothesis: Competition will 
enhance labour productivity of the workers, increase capacity utilization and electricity 
generation too. 
Fourth Hypothesis – Unbundling 
 
Unbundling is the process of separating a vertically integrated state-owned power utility into 
different entities such as (generation, transmission, and distribution or creating regional 
companies within a country). Hypothesis: Unbundling will promote an increase in electricity 
generation, capacity utilization and efficiency.       
4.9 Preliminary evidence 
The selected countries in this study cover the entire five regions in the continent82. Moreover, 
using descriptive statistics is more meaningful for continuous than discrete variables, for 
which information is lost when assigning data to categories.  
Table 4.3 shows the descriptive summary of the performance indicators for the power 
generation segment in the region. There were arranged in order of gross domestic product per 
capita, which shows Botswana top in term of GDP per capita in the region, but South Africa 
has the highest electricity generation (GMh), installed Capacity, labour productivity and 
generating capacity utilization ratio. Thus, South Africa contributes 47% of the total 
electricity generation in the region. Likewise, in terms of installed capacities in the region, 
South Africa have 40 MW, Egypt which is second in the table with 18 MW and the last is the 
island of Cape Verde with 0.05MW.  
Furthermore, we found out that countries with electricity generation rates of less than 10 
GMh of the population have consistently lower GDP per capita. The only countries that have 
electricity generation of less than 10 GMh with higher GDP per capita are those with 
significant wealth in natural resources, such as Angola, Botswana, Gabon and Namibia (table 
4.3). 
                                                          
82 Central Africa, East Africa, North Africa, Southern Africa and the West Africa. 
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Table 4.3: Descriptive summary of the Power generation performance Indicators 
                Country Electricity generation per 
capita (GMh) 
Installed Capacity per capita 
(MW) 
Labour Productivity per 
employee (MW) 
Generation capacity utilization index 
(MW) 
1 Botswana 4.72039E-07 0.164 0.0021 510.936 
2 Gabon 1.10569E-06 0.379 0.0022 357.207 
3 Mauritius 1.34519E-06 0.666 0.0009 239.902 
4 South Africa 4.59123E-06 40.421 0.0059 497.548 
5 Namibia 5.14451E-07 0.361 0.0027 465.932 
6 Tunisia 1.04362E-06 2.569 0.0026 394.135 
7 Algeria 8.24764E-07 7.269 0.0013 368.659 
8 Cape Verde 3.55675E-07 0.055 0.0008 282.964 
9 Angola 1.51296E-07 0.825 0.0031 275.938 
10 Morocco 5.14652E-07 4.568 0.0081 331.024 
11 Congo, Rep. 1.53766E-07 0.129 0.0012 245.565 
12 Egypt 1.19577E-06 18.222 0.0026 440.047 
13 Cote d'Ivoire 2.55879E-07 1.195 0.0026 352.178 
14 Nigeria 1.39743E-07 5.867 0.0005 304.160 
15 Zambia 8.27281E-07 1.716 0.0021 499.731 
16 Cameroon 2.30078E-07 0.858 0.0011 448.233 
17 Senegal 1.62499E-07 0.382 0.0008 452.242 
18 Ghana 3.65732E-07 1.519 0.0008 475.109 
19 Kenya 1.53015E-07 1.164 0.0007 437.151 
20 Tanzania 7.88001E-08 0.741 0.0006 380.328 
21 Burkina Faso 3.00473E-08 0.159 0.0009 241.336 
22 Mali 4.91868E-08 0.198 0.0004 227.637 
23 Zimbabwe 6.53004E-07 2.030 0.0012 383.946 
24 Mozambique 3.80196E-07 2.368 0.0026 338.585 
25 Uganda 5.91289E-08 0.327 0.0010 511.347 
26 Rwanda 2.19722E-08 0.049 0.0005 356.362 
27 Ethiopia 3.54284E-08 0.809 0.0003 322.072 
28 Congo, DR 1.32226E-07 2.628 0.0005 326.936 
29 Madagascar 5.43147E-08 0.295 0.0013 309.764 
30 Malawi 1.02223E-07 0.254 0.0006 500.169 
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Table 4.4 illustrates the link between the reform variables and the performance indicators in 
the power generation segment. However, we only compare countries that have adopted 
similar reforms and exclude those that have not. With regard to regulation, there were 23 
countries in our sample that established a regulatory authority to properly monitor and control 
the activities of utilities operating in the sector. On average, 15 experienced a positive 
outcome (i.e. the percentage change in average annual electricity generation from before to 
after the reform was greater than zero), 8 countries experienced a negative outcome, while 7 
countries did not introduce an independent regulatory authority. 
 Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics of the performance indicators and reform variables83 
Performance 
Indicators 
Category                                Key Reform Indicators 
Regulation Competition Unbundling Privatisation 
Total Electricity 
Generation 
Max. %Δ 
(country) 
293.15 
Mozambique 
237.31 
Cape Verde 
143.48 
Ethiopia 
936.39 
Mali 
Min. %Δ 
(country) 
-85.74 
Namibia 
2.49 
Zimbabwe 
-88.62 
Namibia 
-81.59 
Namibia 
Median %Δ  74.54 73.32 64.18 -36.43 
Installed  
Capacity 
Max. %Δ 
(country) 
187.55 
Cape Verde 
246.95 
Ethiopia 
201.97 
Ethiopia 
223.66 
Ethiopia 
Min. %Δ 
(country) 
-12.62 
Namibia 
1.34 
Nigeria 
-99.66 
Mali 
-27.32 
Botswana 
Median %Δ 44.19% 56.82 41.69 58.27 
Labour  
Productivity 
Max. %Δ 
(country) 
1990.9 
Gabon 
355.88 
Cote d’Ivorie 
1550 
Cote d’ Ivorie 
400 
Mozambique 
Min. %Δ 
(country) 
-0.22 
Cape Verde 
11.36 
Cape Verde 
-84.72 
Ghana 
-91.5 
Zimbabwe 
Median %Δ 80 58.57 63.33 15.5 
Capacity 
Utilisation 
Max. %Δ 
(country) 
283.94 
Mozambique 
127.83% 
Cote d’ Ivorie 
46.31 
Nigeria 
447.74 
Mozambique 
Min. %Δ 
(country) 
-42.46 
Mali 
-42.19 
Mali 
-36.96 
Mali 
-99.9 
Mali 
Median %Δ 17.10 5.43 9.98 -2.78 
** %Δ signifies the average percentage change in the average yearly value of the performance indicator from 
the period before the implementation of the reform measure to the period after its implementation. The 
impact figures were derived from the average year of reform minus the average year of non-reform divided by 
the average year of non-reform multiplied by 100. Maximum (Max) indicates the largest positive percentage 
while Minimum (Min) indicates the largest negative percentage or smallest positive percentage. Also, the 
Median indicates the middle percentage (having ranked the countries from maximum to minimum), i.e., the 
percentage for which the same number of values are greater and less than this. 
In the same way, when considering competition, 20 countries introduced competition into 
their power generation sector, while 10 have still to do so. Out of the 20, on the average 16 
                                                          
83 The performance indicators are their raw form not per capita 
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countries had a positive outcome and 4 had a negative outcome. Also, when reviewing 
unbundling, 17 countries have implemented unbundling in their power generation, out of 
which 9 experienced a positive outcome and 8 had a negative outcome. We treat the shared 
capacity of private ownership in power generation as a proxy for privatization. Out of the 30 
countries, 13 had a positive outcome, while for 17 the impact of the reform was negative. 
4.10 Empirical Results and Analysis 
Most of the work in this field used a simple estimation procedure (Zhang et al. 2008 started 
with smaller equations, before moving to bigger ones), but in this paper we adopted the more 
orthodox procedure of estimation found in econometric models (i.e. we start with the more 
general equation (4.6), sequentially dropping insignificant variables based on t-test 
specifications until we arrived at a preferable model).  The advantage of using this procedure is 
that the general equation (4.6) might be 'over-parameterised' (i.e. Containing variables that 
play little or no role in terms of statistical significance), and so is not in a form which has any 
explicit economic interpretation. It is necessary to move from a general to specific model to 
overcome these weaknesses. 
We produced estimations showing the relationship between each of the dependent variables, 
namely, total net electricity generation per capita, installed generation per capita, electricity 
generation per employee, and generation capacity utilization and both the reform and control 
variables (See Table 4.5 for the estimation outcomes). Our empirical results reflect two sets 
of relationship: First, the individual reform variable’s impact on electricity power generation 
performance indicators. Second, the interaction effect on the electricity power generation 
performance indicators. We will base our analysis and interpretation of estimation results 
wholly on the interaction effect model (i.e., the specified model). Also, the adjusted R-
squared (shown in equation 2, 4 and 6 over 70 percent of the variation in the electricity 
generation performance indicators).  
Furthermore, we conducted Hausman test to select the preferred model. The p-value for the 
test show less than 1 per cent indicating that the random effect is not appropriate, thus the 
fixed effect specification is preferred. We tested the stationarity of the variables, and the time 
series proves to be stationary over the period covered (see figure 4.5) Evidence from the 
figure suggests that each time series is non-stationary. 
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Table 4.5: The estimation results output 
            Dependent Variables 
 
Explanatory 
Variables 
 
Electricity net generation per capita 
(logGenpcap)     
                
          (1)                         ( 2) 
Installed electricity generation capacity  
per capita (lngencap)  
              
         (3)                                 (4)                      
Electricity generation per employee 
(lngenemp)    
               
       (5)                                   (6)                    
Generation Utilization   (lngenutiliz)  
           
 
      (7)                                  (8)                       
Eq. (4.3) (4.4) Eq. (4.3) (4.4)       Eq. (4.3) (4.4)       Eq. (4.3) (4.4) 
R 0.131*** 
(0.051) 
0.098  
(0.068) 
0.0001 
(0.028) 
0.003 
(0.028) 
 -0.024 
(0.125) 
2.023*** 
(0.448) 
0.112** 
(0.457) 
0.107* 
(0.059) 
P 0.0007* 
(0.0004) 
0.0003 
(0.0005) 
-0.0001 
(0.0002) 
-0.0001 
(0.0002) 
0.001 
(0.009) 
0.001 
(0.0009) 
0.001 
(0.0003) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
CM 0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.0002 
(0.0007) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.002) 
U  -0.179*** 
(0.058) 
-0.017 
(0.090) 
0.121** 
(0.033) 
0.333*** 
(0.088) 
 0.113 
(0.147) 
0.098 
(0.224) 
-0.229*** 
(0.054) 
-0.106 
(0.080) 
IPP 
 
0.002 
(0.069) 
 
dropped 
0.084** 
(0.037) 
0.075** 
(0.037) 
0.112 
(0.163) 
0.082 
(0.162) 
-0.074 
(0.059) 
-01004* 
(0.061) 
ELELAW 
 
-0.062 
(0.062) 
-0.062 
(0.048) 
-0.005 
(0.035) 
-0.005 
(0.035) 
-0.328** 
(0.154) 
-0.285** 
(0.149) 
-0.029 
(0.056) 
-0.032 
(0.057) 
LNGENCOST -0.028 
(0.033) 
dropped 
 
0.016 
(0.017) 
0.0167 
(0.017) 
0.179* 
(0.079) 
0.130* 
(0.077) 
-0.049* 
(0.029) 
-0.043 
(0.028) 
LNGDP 
 
 0.632*** 
(0.085) 
0.666*** 
(0.085) 
0.579*** 
(0.473) 
0.562*** 
(0.048) 
-0.265 
(0.208) 
0.028 
(0.205) 
0.031 
(0.076) 
0.026 
(0.076) 
LNINDUPUT  0.031 
(0.033) 
0.051 
(0.032) 
-0.052*** 
(0.017) 
-0.049*** 
(0.017) 
0.142* 
(0.078) 
0.131* 
(0.077) 
0.114*** 
(0.029) 
0.126*** 
(0.029) 
RP  0.002** 
(0.0009) 
     0.001* 
(0.0007) 
RU  -0.842*** 
(0.266) 
  
 
 -2.934*** 
(0.491) 
 -0.187** 
(0.084) 
PCM   
 
 
 
 
 
   -3.585** 
(1.605) 
RPU  0.006** 
(0.002) 
      
CMU    -0.003*** 
(0.001) 
    
  
RCMU  
 
0.0085** 
(0.003) 
 
 
 
 
 -0.037*** 
(0.008) 
  
RCMU      0.049*** 
(0.007) 
  
Adjusted R-squared 0.92 0.92  0.97 0.97 0.79 0.78 0.46 0.45 
Preferred Model Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Fixed Effect 
Number of Obs 720 720 720 720 
N/B: *Indicates significant at the 10% level; **significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level.  Standard error in parentheses.
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Figure 4.5: Time series plots for the key electricity generation performance indicators 
African region84 reflects a region in serious need to transform its electricity market, as the 
region’s population is on the rise, with its 13.6 per cent of the total world population, 43 per 
cent of its population without access to electricity (World Bank 2014). Our results indicates 
that countries in which the government has shown more commitment in terms of reform of 
the sector has experienced increase in total net electricity generation per capita, installed 
capacity per capita and labour productivity. Figure 4.5 shows trends of the key electricity 
performance indicators over time. The total net electricity generation per capita in the region 
experienced great decline in early 1990s as a result of civil unrest in many African countries, 
which affected the electricity generation infrastructure, but recovery started in 1994. 
Similarly, there is continuous increase in installed capacity and the employee productivity in 
the industry in the region over time. But the rate of electricity generation capacity utilisation 
has been decreasing. The case of Namibia is due to increase in bulk electricity purchase by 
the mining activities, which make up/constitutes to 45 percent (Konrad, Adenauer and 
Stiffing; 2012). 
                                                          
84 This study focus only on 30 countries 
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4.10.1 Total net Electricity Generation per capita 
In Model 1, our test is to establish whether an increase in total net electricity generation can 
be attributed to market-oriented reform indicators. To do this, we will concentrate our 
interpretation on equation 2 (while equation 1 is the individual effect85). Our results show that 
the depth level of competition in the industry the tendency it individually significant and 
positive and are associated with an increase in total net electricity generation per capita, 
although privatisation was not significant. Unbundling is statistically not significant while 
negatively associated with total net electricity generation.  The unexpected negative sign can 
be explained by the fact that only a few African countries have their power sector vertically 
unbundled. It is important to note that unbundling is not an end itself, but rather a means to 
achieve better performance (Vagliasindi & Besant-Jones 2013). Meanwhile, the presence of 
an independent regulator is positive but statistically insignificant, suggesting that establishing 
a regulatory agency/body to monitor the power generation sector alone is not sufficient to 
lead to an increase in total net electricity generation per capita in the region.  
In contrast, when independent regulation co-exists with privatization our result confirms there 
is a positive correlation statistically significant at the 1% level. In other words, although 
regulation was insignificant when considered alone when it interacts with privatization it is 
significant, indicating that when a country introduces more than one reform it becomes more 
effective. Thus, when there is an increase in the share of private-owned utility generators this 
overshadows the negative effect of regulation alone. Based on this we conclude that 
privatization together with regulatory reforms is linked with an increase in total net electricity 
generation per capita. This finding is consistent with that of Zhang et al. (2008) and Steiner 
(2001).  
Also, when regulation interacts with unbundling, our result showed a negative but statistically 
significant impact. This is an unexpected outcome, but can be attributed to the poor level of 
independence enjoyed by the regulators in many African countries, as many of the 
commissioners fail to complete their tenure in office before being removed or are put under 
pressure to resign (Eberhard et al 2008). Thus, the gap between law and practice in Africa is 
wide. Also the little unbundling seen in the regional power generation sector has contributed 
to a poor payback, as most countries in the region (especially Sub-Saharan Africa) have a 
small power system which makes it difficult to have effective unbundling. Restructuring the 
                                                          
85 Equation 1, 3, 5, and 7 are individual effects, we only use them for comparison purposes in this study. 
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power generation sector to foster competition makes sense only for countries able to operate 
large/multiple generators at an efficient scale. 
As expected, the log of GDP per capita was positive and correlated with an increase in total 
net electricity generation per capita, which supports the theory that an improved economy 
results in higher average electricity generation per citizen.  Meanwhile, the electricity law and 
IPP were statistically insignificant and negative, thus, meaning not too much should be read 
into these results. 
4.10.2 Installed Generation capacity per capita 
Equations 3 and 4 show the outcome of the reform and control variables on installed capacity 
per capita in the electric power generation sector. Equation 4 shows unbundling on its own is 
statistically significant at the 1% level confirming that unbundling is associated with better 
power generation sector performance. This is also consistent with our hypothesis that 
unbundling promotes efficiency and an increase in installed capacity expansion.  
Turning to the effects of regulation, the presence of an independent regulator is positively 
associated with an increase in installed capacity in the sector, although it is not statistically 
significant. Privatization has a negative sign and is statistically insignificant, which confirms 
the findings of Zhang et al (2008). Indeed positive effects of (regulation and privatisation) 
have the unexpected sign, suggesting poor payback from this reform (i.e. on their own they 
may actually reduce installed capacity per capita). In other words, the insignificance of 
regulation and privatization can be attributed to the government’s overbearing influence in 
the sector, coupled with control of regulatory agencies and the partial scale of privatization in 
the power sector in the region. A study conducted by the World Bank in (2005) notes the 
damaging impact of poor regulation in electricity markets on economic growth (World Bank 
2005).  
In reality, the emphasis on independent regulation in the region is yet to be achieved, as 
regulators are far from being independent in many of the countries. Also, privatization of the 
power generation sector in many African countries can take the form of patronage, by the 
government to their supporters. For instance in Morocco the government sold power 
generation utilities to Moroccan elites in exchange for their support (Hibon 2005).  
The competition (individual) coefficients (equation 4.4 only) were statistically significant and 
positively associated with an expansion in installed capacity in the power generation sector. 
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This corresponds to the findings of Zhang et.al (2008). Under the interaction effect model, 
competition and unbundling were statistically significant, but showed a negative association 
with installed capacity expansion which contradicts our hypothesis.  In other words, the effect 
of competition on power generation is reduced by an increase in the degree of vertical 
unbundling of the sector. 
The effects of GDP per capita on capacity expansion are statistically significant and positive. 
These results are in line with our a priori expectation, as African countries experience 
increases in GDP per capita, it becomes a priority for the government to expand their 
installed capacity through in-house generation. Thus, in-house generation contributes around 
9 percent of the total installed generating capacity in the region (Foster & Steinbuks, 2009), 
although is not sufficient for the growing population. The presence of independent power 
producers also leads to an increase in installed capacity. This is in the form of private firms 
engaged in refurbishment86 of old generation plants and building new ones (Rosnes et al 
2009). As we saw in our results, IPPs was significant and positive in both columns 3 and 4. 
However, the coefficient of manufacturing output was statistically significant but has a 
negative sign. This could be as a result of the low productivity and underutilization of the 
generating capacity which dominates the power generating sector in the region.  
4.10.3 Electricity generation per employee  
In Model 3, we estimated electricity generation per employee (a proxy of labour productivity) 
and found that, of the four key reform variables used, only regulation was statistically 
significant and positively associated with an increase in labour productivity (i.e. there is a 
strong effect of an independent regulator on the latter). However when considering the 
interaction effects, this shows that regulation and unbundling were statistically significant, 
but negatively correlated with employee or staff productivity. The negative correlation 
signifies a reduction in the effect of regulation due to increased unbundling. This could be 
attributed to poor regulatory institutions and limited unbundling of the sector in the region, 
which has affected the productivity of the employees. It is an important fact that many 
African countries adopted partial unbundling and, as a result, the partial form of vertical 
unbundling undertaken does not appear to drive improvements in labour productivity. The 
most likely reason for this is that sometimes regulators are directed by the government to 
                                                          
86 Refurbishment refers to efforts either to prolong the life of an outdated plant whose operating life is coming to 
an end by restoring it to full operational status, or to repair generation assets that have been seriously damaged 
during war. 
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embark on policies that are not healthy for the sector. For example, Government ministries 
may direct the agencies to increase the number of their staff, in order to reward their 
supporters (i.e. leads to overstaffing).  
Also, the outcome of combining regulation and unbundling (RU) did not conform to our 
expected sign. The interaction coefficient was statistically significant but negatively 
associated with an increase in labour productivity. That is, instead of an increase in the 
productivity of staff as the number of private generators rises, productivity was decreasing 
(contrary to our previous result). The situation in most African countries is that of a hybrid 
power market (i.e. the state-owned utility still retains the dominant role in the sector), serving 
as a single buyer of electricity. We know that concessions, leases and management contracts 
in the power generation sector contribute to an increase in electricity generation per capita, 
given that labour productivity is driven by employment. Thus, the Government’s over-
bearing influence leads to overstaffing and affects labour productivity. Therefore this result is 
consistent with the view of Gassner et al (2007). 
Zhang et al. (2008) found the joint impact of market-oriented reform with privatization and/or 
regulation to be stronger than the individual effects. Although our results show regulation, 
competition and unbundling (which is positive and significantly improve the quality of labour 
productivity in the region). Thus it is worth noting that the depth the commitment of 
government are, the more likely a country is to obtain a better off performance of the 
indicators. However, there is no ‘standard’ reform model87 implemented in any of the 
observed countries in the region save one. Instead, a hybrid power sector has emerged.  
However, competition has a greater effect than regulation and unbundling, leading to 
statistical significance and a positive correlation with an increase in electricity generation per 
employee. 
The log of GDP per capita was not significant, suggesting decreasing returns in the 
productivity of labour in the power sector. Although most African countries experienced 
recent rapid economic growth of 4.5% in 2013, which is projected to reach 5.1% by 2016 -
(World Bank 2014), the growth rate has not done much in terms of enhancing the efficiency 
of the employee in the power sector. The population and manufacturing output (logged) was 
statistically significant and positively associated with an increase in labour productivity. In 
                                                          
87 In Uganda there is vertical unbundling, privatization, wholesale and retail competition and an functional independent 
regulator  
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other words, an increase in the working age population of the region leads to an improvement 
in labour productivity.  
4.10.4 Generation Capacity Utilization 
Table 4.5 (Columns 7 and 8) reports the outcome of Model 4 estimation results. This shows 
that three of the four reform variables are statistically significant and positively associated 
with an increase in generation capacity utilization. Privatization on its own led to an increase 
in generation capacity utilization in the model. In other words, the greater the degree of 
privatization, the greater the capacity utilization of the generating plants. Also, a 100 percent 
increase in regulatory reform leads to an increase in the rate of capacity utilization (i.e. a 
movement to regulation from a position of no regulation) by 11 percent in generation 
capacity utilization.  
In addition, the introduction of competition in the power generation sector leads to an 
increase in capacity utilization. But here, unbundling was insignificant and negatively 
associated with an increase in generation capacity generation. This is because the majority of 
power generation utilities in the African region are still vertically integrated. 
The product of regulation and privatization was significant at the 10% level and positively 
correlated with an increase in generating capacity utilization. Likewise, regulation combined 
with unbundling (RU) is statistically significant but negatively correlated with generation 
capacity utilization. While, the combination of privatization and competition (PC) are 
statistically significant, this variable is negatively associated with an increase in 
generation/capacity utilization. The negative sign can be explained by the fact that the 
majority of the electricity generation sector in the region still consists of vertically integrated 
state-owned companies.  
In addition, we obtained an unexpected sign from the IPPs, which was significant, but 
negatively associated with an improved utilization rate. The log of GDP per capita was not 
statistically significant. The deficiencies of the region’s power sector are affecting plant 
utilization. This can be attributed to the use of old or outdated plants whose operating life is 
coming to an end and also due to an increase in conflicts in the region, for example in the 
case of Angola, Rwanda, Cote d'Ivoire and DR Congo.  
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4.11 Sensitivity Analyses 
It is common practice in empirical studies to conduct a ‘robustness check’ to examine how 
regression coefficients behave when the regression specification is modified by adding or 
removing regresssors. As the accuracy of the results in Table 4.5 depends heavily on of 
parameter values, we have therefore tested the sensitivity of our result by removing the 
Republic of South Africa from the data, given its dominance in generation terms. Our 
hypothesis is that if the coefficients do not change significantly then we take it to be evidence 
that these coefficients are “robust” 88(Lu and White, 2014). 
 Figures 4.6 and 4.7 show the importance of the Republic of South Africa to the region in 
terms of electricity generation and installed capacity. Figure 4.6 shows that from 1989 to 
1991, South Africa total net electricity generation is higher than that of the entire region. 
More generally, South Africa alone contributes up to 40 percent of the total electricity 
generation in the region. 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Comparing Africa Region Total Net Electricity Generation to that of South Africa 
 
Figure 4.7 shows the installed capacity of the entire African region compared to that of South 
Africa. South Africa is again the top-ranked country in the region with the highest installed 
electricity capacity.  
 
                                                          
88 The word “robust” in this content should not be confused with the concept of robustness in the statistics 
literature, which refers to the insensitivity to covariate selection, typically extreme in some way. What we 
refer to here is the degree of insensitivity of an estimator to adding or removing sample observations. 
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Figure 4.7: Comparing installed capacity between Africa Region and South Africa 
 
4.11.1 The Importance of the Republic of South Africa in the Region 
We examined whether the importance of the Republic of South Africa to the region was 
distorting our results by excluding it from the data. The detailed results, as presented in Table 
4.6, revealed only a small variation in the interaction effect model in electricity generation 
installed capacity, labour productivity and capacity utilization. Our estimation coefficients do 
not change much, therefore we conclude that these coefficients are robust. 
The power sector reform in the Republic of South Africa in the 1990s is peculiar to its history 
and the transformation of decades of apartheid repression to a democratic setting. The energy 
policy white paper of 1998 gave expression to this policy shift and called for a short – term 
solution to deal with the huge backlog of the disenfranchised populace who remained 
unconnected to the national grid. For instance, a World Bank report on South Africa (OECD 
Economic Surveys on South Africa 2013) urged the state-owned power utility giant (Eskom) 
to build more power plants to meet the demands of the populace in South Africa. That 
shortcoming had been evident in 2006 when South Africa witnessed a shortage in the power 
supply which spilt over to the neighbouring countries of Zambia, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. 
One way forward lies in building new flexible power stations that will run on natural gas or 
heavy fuel oil as this will help the system cope with the variability in demand in the region.   
Equation 4.4 shows that random effects model is preferred to fixed effects reflecting that 
market-oriented reform on each country varies depending on the commitment of the 
government. 
 Table 4.6 presents the re-estimated model having dropped the Republic of South Africa from 
the model.
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Table 4.6: Estimation Results without Republic of South Africa 
                                                                                                                                 Table 4.6: Estimation Results without Republic of South Africa 
               Dependent Variables 
 
 
Explanatory Variables 
Electricity net generation per capita 
(loggenpcap)    
           (1)                         ( 2) 
Installed electricity generation capacity  per 
capita (lngencapt)        
      (3)                                              (4) 
Electricity generation per employee 
(lngenemp)    
                (5)                                   (6)                    
Generation Utilization   (lngenutiliz)  
        
     (7)                                (8)                       
Equ. (4.3) (4.4) Equ. (4.3) (4.4)       Equ. (4.3)         (4.4)       Equ. (4.3)      (4.4) 
R 0.136* 
(0.053) 
0.096 
(0.070) 
0.032 
(0.029) 
0.007 
(0.029) 
 -0.027 
 (0.128) 
0.002*** 
(0.457) 
0.113** 
(0.469) 
0.011** 
(0.060) 
P 0.0007* 
(0.0004) 
-0.0001 
(0.0006) 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.0003) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
CM 0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.0002 
(0.0007) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.002) 
U  -0.179*** 
(0.059) 
 -0.015 
(0.093)            
0.131*** 
(0.034) 
0.323** 
(0.089) 
 0.101 
(0.151) 
0.085 
(0.230) 
-0.236*** 
(0.055) 
-0.119 
(0.083) 
IPP 
 
-0.0192 
(0.0712) 
dropped 
 
0.094** 
(0.038) 
0.086** 
(0.038) 
0.117 
(0.169) 
0.092 
0.168 
-0.085 
(0.062) 
-0.112** 
(0.063) 
ELAW -0.063 
(0.065) 
-0.057 
(0.051) 
-0.005 
(0.035) 
-0.004 
(0.036) 
-0.351** 
(0.160) 
-0.302** 
(0.156) 
-0.025 
(0.058) 
-0.033 
(0.059) 
LNGENCOST -0.027 
(0.034) 
-0.0164 
(0.034) 
0.016 
(0.017) 
0.019 
(0.018) 
0.176* 
(0.079) 
0.130* 
(0.078) 
-0.050* 
(0.029) 
-0.046 
(0.029) 
LNGDP 
 
 0.630*** 
(0.086) 
0.663*** 
(0.087)         
0.579*** 
(0.473) 
0.568*** 
(0.048) 
-0.266 
(0.211) 
0.027 
(0.209) 
0.026 
(0.078) 
0.024 
(0.078) 
LNINDUPUT   0.030 
(0.034)        
0.050 
(0.034)         
-0.053** 
(0.017) 
-0.049*** 
(0.017) 
0.143* 
(0.079) 
0.130* 
(0.078) 
0.114*** 
(0.029) 
0.127*** 
(0.029) 
RP  0.002** 
(0.001) 
     0.001 
(0.0007) 
RU  -0.844** 
(0.270) 
  
 
 -2.934*** 
(0.500) 
 -0.176** 
(0.088) 
RPU  0.006** 
(0.003) 
      
PCM  -4.765** 
(1.935) 
 
 
 
 
   -4.585** 
(1.671) 
CMU  dropped  -0.003*** 
(0.001) 
    
  
RCM  
 
0.008*** 
(0.003) 
 
 
 
 
 -0.037*** 
(0.008) 
  
RCMU      0.048*** 
(0.007) 
  
Adjusted R-squared 0.90 0.90 0.97 0.97 0.76 0.78 0.42 0.47 
D-W test 0.21 0.24 0.40 0.41 0.61 0.63 0.25 0.26 
Preferred Model Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Random Effect 
Number of Obs 696 696 696 696 
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4.12. Discussion  
The results obtained in this study complement the earlier research in this field, such as 
Bortolotti et al. (1998); Pollitt (1997); Faye (2001); Cubbin and Stern (2006); Zhang et al 
(2008); Vagliasindi and Besant-jones (2013). We found that in the absence of an independent 
regulator and IPPs, it will be difficult to privatize or introduce competition in the electricity 
generation market. Our results contradict our hypothesis that the establishment of impartial 
regulators is the key driver of the electricity generation performance. Rather, we found that 
only when these reform variables co-exist in an electricity market is there a significant impact 
on power generation performance. 
 Our findings, which are consistent with the views of Zhang et al (2008) and Cubbin and 
Stern (2006), found that whenever regulations combine with privatization it leads to an 
increase in total net electricity generation per capita. As such, our results also correspond to 
that of Sen and Jamasb (2012) who found that vertical unbundling of integrated power 
utilities leads to an increase in installed capacity. 
As expected, privatization is a key indicator increasing total net electricity generation and 
generation capacity utilization. This was not surprising in a developing region like Africa, 
which lacks a strong institutional framework and is struggling with electricity market reform 
(when compared to western European, Nordic, and North America countries that have well-
organised capital markets and strong regulatory bodies to regulate the activities of the private 
sectors in the industry). 
In effect, the estimated model shows that the actual output of electricity generation compared 
to the level of installed capacity increases with an increase in private –owned capacities (P) 
and the presence of an impartial regulator (R). In addition, our finding suggests that the 
presence of a regulatory framework in the power generation industry promotes labour 
productivity. 
 It is interesting to note that, in a competitive environment, where privatized companies 
operate under an independent regulator, there tends to be an to improvement in the generation 
capacity utilization rate. 
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4.13 Conclusion 
It has generally been found empirically that the way to increase efficiency, electricity 
generation, labour productivity, and power generation capacity utilization in the electricity 
market is through restructuring vertically integrated structures to make them more 
competitive (Chen et al. 2013).  
Among many developing countries that embarked on, or are at the early stage of power sector 
market restructuring or reforms, the main objective has been to attract investors to expand 
network grids, increase capacity building and to be more efficient and productive.   
Reviewing our empirical findings in relation to our first hypothesis, we found there is no 
significant evidence that deregulation leads to an increase in total net electricity generation 
and installed capacity, but was significant and positively correlated with an improvement in 
labour productivity and an increase in generation capacity utilization rate. However, when 
considering the interaction effect, we found that when de-regulation and privatization take 
place it leads to an increase in total net electricity generation per capita. It is important to note 
that in restructuring power generation, one reform is not sufficient to bring about the desired 
outcome. Rather, developing countries have to design a mechanism where more than one 
reform variable is introduced in the electricity market.  
We did find (hypothesis 2) that privatization on its own leads to an increase in total net 
electricity generation per capita and capacity utilization, but has less effect on installed 
capacity and labour productivity. Considering the interaction effect model, we found 
privatization to be statistically significant and positively associated with an increase in total 
net electricity generation per capita, and an improved capacity utilization rate. Meanwhile, it 
is negatively correlated with electricity generation and capacity utilization when combined 
with competition. Nevertheless, privatization has been a key reform in African countries 
market-oriented reforms. In general, it is important to note that the outcome of privatization 
of the power generation performance indicators shows that, privatization is insufficient to 
lead increases in the sector, so it is pertinent to combine other reforms indices.  
Hypothesis 3 states that competition is the stimulus that enhances the performance of the 
sector. Our results showed competition is crucial to an increase in total net electricity 
generation, installed capacity and generating capacity utilization. Also, we found that when 
competition interacts with other reform variables, this contributes to an increase in power 
generation and the expansion of installed capacities. Although labour productivity and 
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capacity utilization were negatively correlated, both were statistically significant when 
implemented with privatization in electricity generation and generation capacity utilization, 
or with unbundling in installed capacity. Remarkably, competition in the power generation 
sector leads to an increase in total electricity generation, but not in labour productivity.  
Lastly, vertical unbundling (hypothesis 4) is positively and statistically associated with better 
performance in installed electricity capacity. However, unbundling had an unexpected 
negative sign in regard to total net electricity generation and generation/capacity utilization, 
and a positive sign associated with labour productivity. When implements with regulation, 
unbundling is significant, but is negatively correlated with electricity generation and also 
labour productivity. However, vertical unbundling in the African region is low and is only 
significant when it co-exists with regulation and competition in the instance of labour 
productivity. 
Finally, power sector reform outcomes in the region reflect where countries amended 
electricity law to attract independent power producers (IPPs), corporatisation of service 
provision, and the creation of new institutions such as a regulatory authority to support 
reform activities. While there is no strong commitment to fully embark on privatization and 
unbundling, as the government prefers to engage in public-private partnership. This system 
promotes a hybrid structure where the state-owned vertically integrated power companies still 
dominated as act as a single buyer. 
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Chapter 5 
Measuring technical efficiency in African countries electricity 
distribution companies: a stochastic input distance function 
approach. 
5.1 Introduction 
Governments of various African countries have embarked on restructuring their electricity 
markets for the past three decades, albeit with different levels of implementation among the 
countries in the region. Thus, while the problems confounding the sector are diverse and 
depend on each country, most analysts tend to focus on two key areas- improvements in the 
quality of service and the efficiency of the distribution utility companies in each country. A 
study into the electricity distribution sector presents an ideal example of how market-oriented 
reform is implemented in a regulated industry. Historically, the focus of the early researchers 
into electricity market reform was mostly in the power generation and retail supply sectors.  
Even though there is no single reform model applicable to all the countries in the region, 
market-oriented reform generally aims to transform the vertically integrated state-owned 
monopolistic enterprises into unbundled and competitive entities owned or partially owned 
by the private sector or through public-private participation (PPP). 
The rate of return has been the dominant method used in analysing utility firms’ performance 
for decades now. Though it comes with deadweight welfare losses because of monopoly 
pricing, it provides an incentive for regulated companies to minimise costs. Early regulators 
have adopted this approach based on the work of Crew and Kleindorfer (1987), Laffont and 
Tirole (1993), Armstrong et al. (1994), and Sappington (1994).  
There is a need to point out the potential conflict inherent between using incentive regulation 
and improving the quality of service in the industry. Incentive regulation does, to some 
extent, lead to a reduction in the quality of service and this results in a reduction in the socio-
economic optimum as identified by Spence (1975). Incentive regulation can be classified 
under different forms, the most commonly used are Price-cap and Yardstick regulation  
(Benchmarking). 
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 Price-cap methods require the utility’s prices to be regulated in accordance with a general 
price index such as the consumer price index minus X, sometimes referred to as CPI-X. The 
X-factor denotes the reduction in real cost  the utility firm aims to achieve. Thus, if the firm 
sets its cost reduction greater than the regulator’s targeted price, it keeps the remainder and 
earns an abnormal profit, but if the firm chooses not to reduce the price (to  less than the 
target price), then a price-cap is introduced. The problem associated with this method is the 
difficulty in setting the optimal X-value. 
Yardstick regulation theory, as developed by Shleifer (1985), emphasised benchmarking 
techniques as part of the regulation evaluation. This approach was based on parametric and 
non-parametric methods, namely Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), Corrected Ordinary 
Least Squares (COLS), Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), and Free Disposal Hull (FDH) 
respectively (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2001). Assessing the efficiency level of firms has played a 
vital role in measuring their performance, especially in a regulated sector characterized by 
natural monopoly, vertical integration and/or public ownership (such as electricity 
transmission and distribution) [Latruffe, et.al 2004]. Estimating a production/cost function 
appears to be a natural framework for modeling single-output production processes, but 
distance functions are more comprehensive for modelling multiple –output and multiple input 
production functions.  
Studies (Giannakis et al., 2005; Growitsch et al., 2009; Yang and Lu., 2006) have argued that 
for effective evaluation of efficiency in the electricity distribution industry the use of 
incentive regulation and benchmarking techniques need to be incorporated into the system of 
analysis. Therefore, benchmarking  is an essential approach in evaluating policy frameworks, 
efficiency improvements and also in comparing firms/companies performance outcomes in 
relation to best practice. Similarly, Forsund and Edvardsen (2003), Growitsch (2009), and 
Cullmann and Hirschhausen (2008) proposed the use of benchmarking in evaluating 
performance in the electricity distribution sector. 
Over the years, countries such as Australia, the Netherlands, the Nordic countries and the 
United Kingdom have adopted the benchmarking approach. The approach involves the 
comparison of firms and their relative efficiency scores, not based on the geographical 
horizon, but on cross-country analysis. The problem associated with this approach is that it 
assumes that electricity distribution utilities operating in the same region can be directly be 
compared with another or,  if not, their performance could be measured by introducing non-
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discretionary variables that will capture the factors that may affect the utility performance, 
but are beyond their control (Estache et al. 2004). Such factors include the environment, 
institutional structure, geographical and exogenous factors, all of which affect the cost and 
performance level of electricity distribution utilities.  
There are two contrasting views in terms of measuring efficiency improvement in the 
literature, concerning the way the environment should be treated. The first method treats 
environmental factors as influencing the production technology employed, so it is important 
to include such factors in the production function as regressors (Good et al.1993). The second 
method views environmental factors as affecting the technical efficiency of the utility firms 
(as opposed to the production technology), and so these factors are included in modelling the 
source of inefficiency in the model (Battese and Coelli, 1995). While non-discretionary 
factors such as population density (customer density), peak load and customer satisfaction 
ratio should also be taken into consideration, there is disagreement as to what extent some of 
these factors impact on the efficiency level of power distribution utilities. Growitsch et al. 
(2010) argued that, in the long run, utility firms adjust (at least to some extent) in their 
operating environment, and so non-discretionary factors do have a long – term  impact on 
their performance level and, as a result, witness diminishing returns in their efficiency scores. 
The main purpose of this chapter is to estimate and compare the (mean) efficiency of 
electricity distribution utilities in 16 African countries using a stochastic input distance 
function.  
In particular, we focus on what determines  the sources of technical inefficiency and the 
impact exogenous factors such as Customer Density, and Peak load have on the performance 
of the electric distribution utilities. We also examine how electricity distribution utilities in 
the African region seek to meet the rapidly growing electricity demand while fulfilling 
regulatory requirements and managing ageing assets effectively. We use annual data on 
inputs, outputs and exogenous factors to construct panel data for 16 countries covering 235 
electricity distribution companies over the period 2000 to 2013. Specifically, this study seeks 
to answer four key questions:  
 (i). what is the effect of exogenous factors (such as customer density and peak load on the 
distribution companies’ efficiency level?  
(ii). How do electricity distribution companies behave when the quality of service is 
incorporated into the EDISCOs production function? 
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(iii). Have market-oriented reforms (i.e. privatisation, competition, regulation and 
unbundling) improved the efficiency level of the EDISCOs in the region?  
 (iv). Do countries with one utility company have systematically lower power distribution 
efficiency scores than others  who possess many utility companies? 
This chapter is organised into the following sections: In section 5.2 we briefly summarise 
African electricity market reform as it has affected distribution networks, focusing on the 
three largest electricity distribution networks in the region. Section 5.3 contains the empirical 
literature review. Section 5.4 deals with the statistical approaches towards measuring 
efficiency, distinguishing between parametric and non-parametric approaches. Section 5.5 
justifies the technique/approach selected. Section 5.6 presents the model specification. 
Section 5.7 shows the dataset, choice of variables and variable description. In section 5.8, the 
methodology, which is employed, is outlined. Section 5.9 details the hypotheses which are to 
be tested. Section 5.10 discusses the empirical results, and lastly Section 5.11 draws the 
conclusion. 
5.2 The African Electricity Reform and Distribution Networks  
To examine the value chain of the electricity market, it is pertinent to differentiate between 
the various segments that make up the industry, namely electricity generation, electricity 
transmission, electricity distribution and, sometimes, retail supply. Electricity distribution 
grids take power from the high voltage transmission lines and lower it through transformers 
before distributing to customers (i.e. industrial, commercial and residential households). 
However, due to the nature of the industry, it enjoys a natural monopoly status. The sector is 
also one of the most politicised, this being due to service pricing and security of supply. 
Consequently, many African countries have established a regulator to monitor activities, and 
to avoid the abuse of monopoly power and the exploitation of customers. Therefore, African 
regulators faced the challenge of determining the optimal way to set prices and to provide 
incentives for the distributors (to improve their services and enhance their efficiency). Across 
the African countries, electricity networks are managed in different ways (see figure 5.1) 
although, over the last decades, almost all the countries in the region have come to belong to 
a regional power integration pool89. 
                                                          
89 Central Africa Power pool (CAPP), Eastern Africa Power pool (EAPP), North Africa power pool (NAPP), 
Southern Africa Power pool (SAPP) and Western Power pool.  
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This section focuses on the cases of the Republic of South Africa, Egypt, and Nigeria, the top 
three in terms of the distribution network in the region (see figure 5.2). Only these three 
countries had distribution networks over 50,000 km in 2013.  In recent years, the 
governments of these countries have implemented market-oriented reform aimed at 
increasing the private-sector role in their electricity distribution sector. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Map of Regional power distribution lines in Africa Region 
Source: IEA – Africa Energy Outlook (2014) 
 
5.2.1 Republic of South Africa 
South Africa is by far the biggest electricity producer and distributor in the region. In 1992, 
the government of the Republic of South Africa established a committee to oversee the 
transformation of its electricity supply industry (ESI) and produced a white paper on the way 
forward in the industry. In 1996, a national electricity regulatory body was established to 
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monitor the activities of the different segments that make up the industry and in 2004 the 
Electricity Distribution Industry (EDI) holding company was set up to implement the 
recommendation of the committee. The white paper had advocated restructuring the 
distribution sector into six regional electricity distributors (REDs)90 and reducing the number 
of municipalities involved in electricity distribution. The proposed restructuring of the 
electricity distribution industry (EDI) into REDs did not pass through parliament however, as 
local municipalities were opposed or outrightly hostile to restructuring due to a perceived loss 
in their revenues (Kessides et al, 2007). In 2010, the EDI holding company was transferred to 
the Department of Energy to manage and two years later, in 2012, the government of South 
Africa set up a Presidential Committee to review the EDI framework and come up with a 
more holistic approach on the way forward91. 
 
Figure 5.2: Length of distribution network lines in 2013 
Source: Author’s construction based on data from various countries electricity companies’ annual 
report and World Bank Development indicators database. 
 
Thus, electricity distribution is currently shared between the vertically integrated state-owned 
utility Eskom and 187 municipalities licensed by the National Energy Regulator of South 
Africa (NERSA). The local municipal distribution companies purchase all their power from 
Eskom and then distribute it to residential consumers, while Eskom distributes power to large 
                                                          
90 The first Regional Electricity Distributor was established in the Republic of South Africa in 2005, but only 
existed on paper. 
91 At the time of writing, no further reform has been undertaken in the industry 
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industries, mines, and big farms. The state-owned enterprise Eskom is a public entity, which 
is subjected to the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA), while the municipal electricity 
distributors are under the directive of the Municipal System Act (MSA) and the Municipal 
Finance Management Act (MFMA) (Gaunt 2008). 
5.2.2. The Arab Republic of Egypt 
The electricity distribution utilities in Egypt are owned and operated by nine electricity 
distribution companies92, under the supervision of a regulator, the Egyptian Electricity 
Holding Company (EEHC). The EEA Act of 2000 established the EEHC with nine 
distribution companies established in 2004. The electricity distribution companies in Egypt 
have increased the power supply, the residential power connection rate growing at an average 
of 4 percent each year. In 2012, 99.7 percent of the population had access to electricity, with 
a peak demand of 27000 MW, and the power outage rate was reduced to its lowest in the last 
12 years (2000 – 2012).  The percentage of transformer failure per year has also fallen 
substantially (by 40 percent) from 2000 and 2012 (EEHC 2013/14; Abdelfatah et al. 2013; 
and Vagliasindi and Besant-Jones 2013). 
Electricity distribution in Egypt is characterised by different voltages; medium level (which is 
for heavy industries) and lower voltage levels (meant for commercial and residential 
customers). In 2002, the medium-voltage distribution network extended to 113,399km while 
the low-voltage distribution network was 195,281. By 2014, the medium distribution network 
voltage had expanded by 33 per cent to 169,183km and the low distribution voltage to 
256,416 km (EEHC 2013/14 Annual Report). Thus, Egypt ranked as the  second largest 
electricity producer and distributor in the region after the Republic of South Africa. 
5.2.3. Nigeria (Federal Republic) 
In the case of Nigeria, privatisation of the sector started in 2005 but was not completed until 
2013, following the sale of six generation companies and eleven distribution companies93 to 
private sector companies. The government retained the role of regulator and grid operator, 
marking the beginning of a new era in the Nigerian distribution network. However, 
privatisation of the sector is yet to achieve a desirable result as there has been an increase in 
                                                          
92 Alexandria, Canal, El Behera, Middle Egypt, North Cairo, North Delta, South Cairo, South Delta, and upper 
Egypt 
 
93 Abuja Disco, Benin Disco, Enugu Disco, EKO Disco, Ibadan Disco, Ikeja Disco, Kaduna Disco, Kano Disco, Jos 
Disco, Port-Harcourt (PH Disco) and Yola Disco. 
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the number of outages (Nigerian Energy Support Programme, 2015). The length of the 
electricity distribution network in Nigeria comprises of 23,753km 33kv lines (medium 
voltage), 19,226km 11kv lines (low voltage), and 679km 33/11kv sub–stations (for industrial 
users).  
While the majority of countries in the study are dominated by vertically integrated state-
owned companies, the number of electricity distribution firms varies widely by country. The 
Republic of South Africa has the highest number of distribution companies (187 municipal 
distributors and a state-owned utility – EKOM), followed by Nigeria with eleven regional 
distribution companies. Egypt and Cape Verde ranked third in the table with nine distribution 
companies each, Namibia has four, Cameroon with three, Ghana and Zambia have two each, 
while the rest of the countries possess a sole distribution company.  
Table 5.1 shows that Egypt has the highest population with access to electricity (99.7 
percent), followed by the Republic of South Africa with 85 percent, and Cape Verde with 71 
percent.  The country with the lowest access is Malawi, with only 10 percent of her 
population having access to electricity, followed by Tanzania with 15 percent and Uganda 
ranked third with only 18 percent of the population with access to electricity. 
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                     Table 5.1:  Electricity Distribution Sector in selected African Countries, (2013) 
Country Operator in distribution segment Number of Discos Private Sector Participation Electricity access rate (%2012) 
Cameroon 3 Interconnected Network 3 Yes 54 
Cape Verde  9 regional distributors 9 Yes 71 
Cote d’Ivorie CIE 1 Yes 56 
Egypt  9 Regional Distribution companies 9 Yes 99.7 
Ethiopia Ethiopian Electric Utility (EEU) 1 Yes(Indian Private Company) 27 
Ghana ECG and NEDCO 2 No 64 
Kenya Kenya Power & Lighting Company Ltd (KPLC) 1 Yes 23 
Malawi ESCOM 1 Yes (Management Contract) 10 
Mozambique EDM 1 Yes (Management contract) 20 
Namibia 
CENORED, Erongo RED, NORED, and Southern RED 4 
Yes 47 
Nigeria 
11 regional electricity distribution companies 11 
Yes 56 
Senegal 
SENELEC 1 
Yes 57 
South Africa 
 187 Municipal electricity distributors  187 
No 85 
Tanzania TANESCO 
1 
Yes 15 
Uganda Uganda Electricity Distribution company ltd (UEDCL) 
1 
Yes 18 
Zambia CAPC and ZESCO 
2 
Yes 22 
Total  
235 
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5.3. Empirical Literature Review 
Resende (2002) applied the non-parametric (DEA) technique in assessing the relative 
efficiency of Brazilian electricity distribution companies. The study identified the 
significance of, and shortcomings with, the implementation of yardstick regulation in the 
industry. Although results indicated that most of the distribution firms in Brazil were 
inefficient, nevertheless he concluded that a yardstick mechanism is an appropriate tool in 
measuring productive efficiency.  
The study by Chien et al. (2003) used a DEA method to assess the relative efficiencies of 
seventeen electricity distribution district service centres in the Taiwan Power Company 
(TPC). Using three output variables (the total number of customers, the size of the 
distribution network, and transformer capacity) and two inputs (the total number of staff and 
general equipment), they found that most of the inefficient service centres presented 
increasing returns to scale. This led them to recommend a restructuring of the district service 
centres, through the merging of the poor-performing districts into the nearest efficient ones. 
Filippini et al. (2004) examined Slovenian electricity distribution companies using a 
stochastic frontier approach for the period of (1991–2000). Their findings indicated 
inefficiency, with distribution utilities not achieving the targeted minimum efficient scale. 
They concluded that the Slovenian regulatory authority should consider merging the 
inefficient and smaller distribution utilities with efficient larger distributors in order to 
minimise cost and enhance productive efficiency, a recommendation that corresponds to that 
of Chien et al. (2003).  
Lavado (2004) examined the efficiency level of the electricity cooperatives (ECs) in the 
Philippines using parametric and non-parametric approaches. In the study, the efficiency 
score of each distributor was ranked and compared to distributor benchmark checks. The 
parametric SFA results indicated that the average EC's performance was 34% away from the 
targeted frontier, while the non-parametric DEA estimation showed a higher score of 42%.  
Von Hirschhausen et al. (2006) computed efficiency scores of electricity utility networks in 
Germany using both parametric and non-parametric (SFA and DEA) approaches. Their 
findings (under both approaches) showed that the East German utility exhibited a higher level 
of average efficiency than their West German counterparts did.  Their findings also indicated 
low returns to scale of the companies, indicating that only a small number of distribution 
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companies had a significant cost disadvantage. Customer density was found to be a 
significant factor that influenced the efficiency score of the distributors, while grid 
composition did not have a significant impact. Finally, they suggested the quality of service 
be included in future studies as it will be informative for policy purposes, although this would 
require a substantial effort in terms of harmonising data collection and treatment. 
Bagdadioglu et al. (2007) employed DEA approach to examine the impact of merging 
electricity distribution companies on its efficiency. Their result suggests the mergers 
significantly would be able to improve the efficiency level of the distribution companies by 
reducing the average quantity of inputs used by 16 %. 
 Kopsakangas-Savolainen and Svento (2008) analysed the cost-effectiveness of Finnish 
electricity distribution companies. They conducted several estimations in order to select the 
preferred model, the tested models being based on Cobb–Douglas and Translog 
specifications. Their results show that the distributors are relatively inefficient in expenditure 
terms. They recommended reducing operation costs by merging low capacity firms with 
average size firms with high load factors. In conclusion, they suggested that all firms with 
unused capacity should seek to improve their cost-effectiveness rather than seeking to 
increase their average distributed volumes.  
Jamasb and Pollitt (2008) evaluated the regulation of the electricity distribution industry in 
Sweden using the Network Performance Assessment Model “NPAM”94. They compared the 
difference between NPAM and frontier benchmarking methods, and found that the former is 
good in identifying underperforming firms. These could then be subjected to scrutiny by the 
regulator in order to find the source of the inefficiency and to seek ways to remove it. They 
concluded by pointing out the NPAM model could not allow for innovation by actual firms in 
the industry, and so frustrates moves to promote the long –run objective of technical change, 
which is needed in the industry. In addition, the NPA Model is not capable of identifying and 
reflecting the dynamic and complex nature of the real firms in the industry.  
Growitsch et al (2010) examined the effect of environmental factors95 on the efficiency of 
Norwegian electricity distribution companies. The study investigated 128 Norwegian 
                                                          
94 NPAM is the reference firm model developed by the Swedish energy regulatory body (EMI) for measuring 
and monitoring the performance of the Swedish electricity distribution companies. 
95  Environmental factors can be considered to be beyond the control of the utility companies. There are two 
types of environmental factor: observable and unobservable. The observable ones are the factors they could 
identify, while the unobservable ones are the factors they could not identify. 
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electricity distribution utilities for a four-year period (2001-2004). They utilized data on 100 
geographic and weather variables to identify the source of inefficiency in the industry while 
controlling for the effect of observable and unobserved heterogeneity in the model. In their 
estimation, they employed factor analysis techniques so as to reduce the influence of 
environmental factors, splitting these factors into different composite variables to avoid the 
problem of multicollinearity. Then they estimated a stochastic frontier model based on 
Battese and Celli’s (1992; 1995) techniques and made use of the true fixed effects models 
developed by Greene (2004; 2005), with and without environmental variables (weather and 
geographical conditions). Their results showed some of the environmental variables had a 
significant effect on utility performance. However, in the fixed effects models the effects 
vanish.  
Simaba and Haghifama (2011) applied both non-parametric (DEA) and parametric (SFA) 
methods to measure the technical efficiency of 41 Iranian electricity distribution companies. 
They found that when the quality of service provided by electricity distribution companies 
increased by 1 percent, there was a corresponding 0.65 percent increase in the cost of 
production. Variables such as peak load and service area had a positive effect on the cost of 
production. 
Coelli et al. (2013) estimated the cost of improving the quality of the electricity distribution 
service using a multi-output (energy supplied, number of customers and service area), and 
input (Operating cost, capital, and quality of service (bad input)) model. In the study they 
incorporated environmental factors (underground line, small town [customer density], assets 
age, customer growth and HV industrial capacity) to vertify the impact of environment 
factors on the technical efficiency of electricity distribution companies using translog 
technology based on a parametric input distance function (IDF) approach. They employed a 
panel data of 92 electricity distribution units operated by ERDF (Electricite´ de France-
Re´seau Distribution) for three years (2003–2005). In order to evaluate the cost of improving 
the quality of service in the industry, they introduced the number of electricity interruptions 
(in days) as a proxy for quality of service in the model estimation. Their result shows that 
SFA models obtain a higher technical efficiency score than the parametric linear 
programming (PLP) approach. They found in both models (SFA and PLP) that at the first –
order coefficients level96 all the variables have the expected signs and are statistically 
                                                          
96 Another word for First-order coefficient is the first-order elasticities 
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significant at the 1% level. However, when considering the second-order coefficients97, the 
squared variables - capital (CAP), the number of customers (CUST), and quality of service 
(NINT) are insignificant. Moreover, their finding shows that the environmental factors are 
statistically insignificant, except for underground lines, the average age of assets, and the year 
dummies for 2004 and 2005, which are statistically significant and have an effect on the 
electricity distribution companies’ efficiency level. 
Furthermore, their findings showed that it would require a 6.8%, 0.5% and 2.5% increase in 
operating expenditure, capital, and quality of service, respectively, to have a significant 
positive effect on the number of customers and service area. They concluded that for 
effective regulation (and to improve the quality of service in the electricity distribution 
industry), the regulators have to introduce explicit regulation of the quality of service. This 
could be done by benchmarking the regulated price with its marginal cost in order to 
determine the efficiency level. 
Finally, Mullarkey et al (2015) applied a non-parametric DEA approach to determine the 
technical efficiency of the distribution network in Ireland. The results from the estimated 
parameters showed some intuitive understanding of the source of efficiency improvement in 
EDC in Ireland, namely merging small and less efficient EDCs with large ones would reduce 
the number of EDCs from 26 to 11 and increase the relative technical efficiency.  It also 
highlighted the overall efficiency of all the electricity distribution companies in a country that 
has experienced an improvement in its electricity supply because of the restructuring. Their 
findings suggest including diagnostic parameters in the model proves to be a superior 
variable as such, the proposed re-organisation of EDCs recorded higher efficiency scores of 
up 10%, as the number of EDCs were reduced. Their result confirms that environmental 
factors have a significant impact on the technical efficiency level of EDCs, resulting in an 
increase in the efficiency level of EDCs from 83 percent to 91 percent. 
There are few studies based on cross-country analysis on this subject matter (see table 5.2). 
Zhang and Bartels (1998) estimated efficiency scores using DEA. Focusing on three 
countries (Australia, New Zealand, and Sweden), they found that Australian electricity 
distributors were the most efficient, with average scores close to the frontier, with New 
Zealand following. Swedish electricity distributors had the worst efficiency score. They 
                                                          
97 Second–order coefficient could be referred to as the second-order elasticities. Based on theoretical 
expectations, the models ought to produce negative coefficients of outputs and positive coefficients of inputs.  
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concluded that the rate of decrease in efficiency depends largely on the number of 
distributors. Countries with a small number of distributors will experience a sharp decrease in 
efficiency levels, while countries with a large number of distributors will have a lower rate of 
decrease. The problem with this study is that it used data for just three inputs (number of 
employees, total kilometres of distribution lines and total transformers’ capacity (MVA)) and 
one output (number of customers served). We employed multiple outputs and input data in 
our study in order to capture key performance variables in our analysis of technical efficiency 
in the electricity distribution industry in African countries. 
Hattori (2002) conducted a comparative study of the technical efficiency of the United States 
and Japanese electricity distribution utility companies over a fifteen year period (1982 – 
1997) using the SFA parametric approach. Their results showed that, after controlling for 
environment factor effects, Japanese electricity distribution companies (on average) are more 
efficient than their U.S counterparts. They also point out the need for effective regulation of 
the industry as there is a tendency for inefficiencies to increase over time, and also the need 
for technological innovation in the industry (as the annual rate of  technological change has 
been decreasing). 
Edvardsen and Forsund (2003) examined the performance of 122 electricity distributor 
companies in five countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Netherlands) in 1997 
using DEA and Malmquist Productivity index methods. They found that Finnish electricity 
utilities exhibit a higher degree of productivity than other countries in the sample. They 
concluded by pointing out the need for the harmonization of data and the description of 
variables, a conclusion which corresponded to the recommendation made by Jamasb and 
Pollitt (2003).  
Jamasb and Pollitt (2003) conducted an empirical assessment of 63 electricity distribution 
companies in Europe using both parametric (SFA and COLS) and non-parametric (DEA) 
approaches. They found a substantial difference in estimated efficiency scores among the 
countries, while the choice of benchmarking techniques, model specification and input and 
output variables influenced the efficiency scores and the rank order of the firms among the 
countries in the sample. They concluded by emphasising the need for regulators to establish 
long-term commitments to achieve set objectives. They also recommended regulators identify 
appropriate variables and establish standard procedures for effective data collection. 
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Table 5.2: A summary review of cross-country studies 
Author(s) Data Inputs Outputs Method 
Zhang and Bartels 
(1998) 
32 electricity distribution utilities for 
Australia, 51 for New Zealand and 173 
Swedish electric distributors 
Number of employees; Total kilometres of 
distribution lines and Total transformers’ 
capacity (MVA) 
Total number of customers served Non-Parametric approach 
(DEA) and Monte Carlo 
Simulation 
Hattori (2002) Two countries comparative study (U.S 
and Japanese) Electricity distribution 
utilities (1982 – 1997) 
Labour, capital (MVA), Sales-residential 
(GWh), Sales-industrial and the number of 
utilities 
Load factor, Customer density, 
Consumption per customer(MWh), and 
the ratio of non-residential sales 
Parametric (SFA) 
Jamasb and Pollit 
(2003) 
63 electricity distribution companies in 
Europe 
Operating expenditure, Total expenditure, 
Network length, Transmission & 
Distribution losses, non-discretionary inputs  
Units delivered, number of customers 
and Network length 
Parametric (SFA) and 
Non-Parametric (DEA) 
Edvardsen and 
Forsund (2003) 
122 electricity distributors in five 
European countries 
Total operating cost, maintenance costs, 
distribution losses, total lines, and 
replacement value 
Energy delivered 
Number of customers 
DEA 
Malmquist index 
Estache et al. (2004) South America’s main electricity 
distribution companies 
Number of employees, distribution network 
and transformer capacity 
Total sales (GWh) Parametric (SFA) and 
Non-Parametric (DEA) 
Hattori et al. 
(2005) 
Comparative study on UK and Japan 
Comparative efficiency analysis of 21 
electricity distribution utilities (12 for 
the UK, 9 for Japan) 
Total expenditure Number of customers, Electricity units 
delivered in megawatt-hours (MWh)  
Customer density and load factor   
Parametric (SFA) and 
Non-Parametric (DEA) 
Apfelbeck et.al (2005) Regional electricity distribution 
companies in five East European 
countries and Germany 
Number of employees and length of the 
electricity grid  
Total sales (GWh) Parametric (SFA) and 
Non-Parametric (DEA 
Estache et al (2007) Southern Africa Power Pool (SAPP) Installed Capacity (MW) 
Number of workers (Labour) 
Generation (GWh) 
Number  of Sales (GWh) 
Number of Customers 
DEA and  
Malmquist Productivity 
Growitsch.et al (2009) 499 electricity distribution utilities from 
eight European countries 
Total expenditure, Number of customer 
minutes lost (proxy for quality of service) 
Number of customers 
Units of energy and  
Country dummy and Customer density 
Parametric (SFA) 
Jaunky (2013) Data from 12 Southern Africa Power 
integration pool (SAPP) 
Electricity supply (GWh) Number of Employees and Installed 
generation capacity 
Parametric (SFA) and 
Non-Parametric (DEA) 
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Estache et al. (2004) investigated the efficiency scores of South America's main electric 
distribution companies using both parametric SFA and non-parametric DEA methods. Their 
finding identified a weak consistency in the estimators used for the analysis. They were of the 
view that countries in the region should, as a matter of urgency, harmonise their regulatory 
database to enable international benchmarking comparisons among themselves. They 
identified that the operators of electricity distribution firms in the region have an information 
asymmetry advantage over the regulators and suggested, that through cross-country 
cooperation and comparative regulatory studies, regulators can gain a better insight into the 
operational dimensions of the industry and thereby more effectively regulate the industry. 
Hattori et al. (2005) examined the technical efficiency of UK and Japanese electricity 
distribution between 1995 and 1998. They adopted parametric and non-parametric (SFA and 
DEA) approaches and found that UK electric distributors are closer to their efficiency frontier 
than their Japanese counterparts are. They also found that regional electricity distribution 
companies in the UK exhibit greater productivity growth than their Japanese counterparts. 
Apfelbeck et al. (2005) studied the relative efficiency of four East European (Poland, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary) member countries. They measured and compared the 
relative efficiency of each country’s distribution companies against a German distribution 
company benchmark using both DEA and SFA. Their results indicate that Polish distribution 
companies are inefficient, while the Czech Republic and Slovakian firms recorded the highest 
efficiency score in the study. They concluded that the countries in the sample needed to 
deepen their reform processes in the electricity distribution sector. 
Estache et al. (2007) were the first to estimate productivity levels in the Southern African 
region. The study focuses on twelve Southern African electricity distribution companies. 
They examined the total factor productivity (TFP) of the largest operators in each of the 
countries from 1998 to 2005 using DEA to decompose and identify the source of change in 
TFP. They found there was a slight productivity growth in terms of technological 
improvement and the ability to reach more customers in the distribution utilities.  Their 
results also indicated that there was no significant improvement on the technical side (there 
was no change in the technical efficiency level). However, they concluded that it was too 
early to arrive at a conclusion on the potential for improvements expected from the reform 
ongoing in the electricity market.  
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Growitsch et al. (2009) examined the cost of improving the quality of service in 499 
electricity distribution companies in eight European countries98 using a parametric (SFA) 
approach based on multi - inputs, outputs, and environmental factors. They estimated two 
basic models. The first is based on one input (total operating expenditure) and two output 
variables (energy delivered and the number of the customers) with environmental factors 
(customer density and country specific dummy) included to account for national differences 
among the sample countries. The second model incorporated the quality of service as an 
undesirable input variable (a proxy for number of interruptions in electricity supply) to reflect 
the substitutive relationship between cost and duration of outages (i.e. an efficient firm ought 
to reduce the number of interruptions in service delivery while increasing the electricity 
supply level). Their findings indicated that incorporating the quality of service into the model 
does not affect scale efficiency, but that service quality should be treated as an integral part of 
efficiency analysis and incentive regulation regimes. 
 Their results showed the log of energy delivered and numbers of customers are statistically 
significant, and have the expected a priori sign. Likewise, environmental factors such as 
customer density and country specific dummies had a significant influence on the technical 
efficiency scores. The study shows that of the eight countries examined four (Norway, 
Sweden, Finland, and Netherlands) had a significantly higher technical efficiency than the 
rest.  Customer density has a significant impact on the level of the technical efficiency, as an 
increase in customer density leads to a rise in the efficiency of these EDCs. In addition, in a 
second model (with the quality of service factor included), the log of energy delivered and the 
log of  number of customers were statistically significant, thus the input variable - total 
operating expenditure increases as both output variables increase.  
Jaunky (2013) examined the divergence in the technical efficiency of electricity utilities in 
the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) within the period 2003 – 2010 using both SFA and 
DEA approaches. The study highlighted technical efficiency in generation, transmission, and 
distribution of the electricity market in the SAPP region. The found the South African 
vertically integrated company (Eskom) to be the most efficient firm, and the Mozambique 
state-owned utility firm (EDM) to be the least efficient. The study also explored technical 
efficiency convergence among the 12 countries, finding that the sub-region is converging fast 
towards its own technical efficiency steady state. There was also a positive association 
                                                          
98 United Kingdom, Ireland, Netherlands, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Italy and Spain 
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between consumer density and technical efficiency, which explains why the governments 
faces a big task in connecting rural villages to the national grid.  
The above studies have all used a variety of variables in estimating benchmarking models in 
the electricity distribution sector. However, the majority of the studies are based on a single 
country-specific framework, which suffers from the problem of  small sample sizes and a 
short sample period. They are also mainly focused on European and OECD countries. In this 
study, we aim to extend the models from the previous studies by making use of a detailed 
database covering  the activities of 234 electricity distribution companies in sixteen African 
countries over a period of thirteen years (2000 -2013). To the best of our knowledge, this 
study signifies the first attempt to measure the technical efficiency of electricity distribution 
companies in the wider African region.  
5.4. Statistical Approaches towards Measuring Efficiency 
During the last three decades there has been a significant reorganisation in the African 
electricity market (see Chapter three, section 3.6). The introduction of competition in the 
power generation sector (Chapter four, section 4.4) was more successful than in the 
transmission and distribution sectors mainly due to the nature of the latter sectors. Most of the 
studies of electricity distribution networks have acknowledged that there is an element of 
natural monopoly inherent in electricity distribution networks. In economic theory, a natural 
monopoly occurs when a single firm has the required resources and manpower to produce 
sufficiently and efficiently the required output of the  product(s) with the assumption that the 
long run average cost falls, as output vectors increase (i.e. the firm has increasing returns to 
scale) (Baumol et al 1982).  𝑌𝑖, 𝑖 = 1,.  .  .   .   , 𝑚:  
𝐶(∑ 𝑌𝑖𝑚𝑖=1 )  ≤ ∑ 𝐶(𝑌
𝑖)𝑚  𝑖=1                                                                                                    (5.1) 
Where Yi is the outcome vectors,  𝐶(𝑌)𝑖 is cost and the global sub-additive condition for a 
natural monopoly. 
The monopolistic characteristics of electricity distribution networks are derived from three 
components: i). the high degree of sunk investments in network assets (such as transformers 
and power lines), ii). economies of scale in electricity supply, and iii). economies of scope 
between customers and energy delivered in the network (Growitsch  et al, 2009).  
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Empirically, there have been different methods used in estimating efficiency scores of 
electricity distribution companies. There are two dominant approaches commonly used in the 
estimation of efficiency and productivity in this field -  Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), but there are also two other approaches - Free 
Disposal Hull (FDH) and Corrected Ordinary Least Square (COLS). DEA was first employed  
by Farrell (1957), and  FDH, originally introduced by Deprins et al (1984), are non-
parametric approaches. SFA, simultaneously developed by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt 
(1977) and Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977), and COLS, as suggested by Winsten (1957) 
and Greene (1980), are parametric approaches (see figure 5.3). The non-parametric approach 
uses linear programming to determine firms’ efficiency levels. SFA and COLS99 are built 
upon the assumptions of econometric regression methods to estimate cost and production 
functions (which depend on the ex-ante specification of the functional form and the 
decomposition of the residual into a non-negative inefficiency term and an idiosyncratic 
error). 
 
Figure 5.3: Efficiency frontier measurement methods 
Source: Author’s construction  
 
5.4.1. Data Envelopment Analysis 
The genesis of the application of DEA in the field of economics can be traced to the work of 
a Cowles commission monograph, entitled Activity Analysis of Production and Resource 
Allocation (Koopmans, 1951), which identified the similarities that exist between 
nonnegative prices and the use of mathematical (linear programming) knowledge in solving 
                                                          
99 One of the shortcomings of  COLS is that it is mainly limited to one output in the production function estimation 
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the problem of optimisation.  DEA is a non-parametric approach that centres on a piecewise 
frontier over the data, which evaluates the firms’ efficiency and relative productivity. DEA is 
commonly used for benchmarking analysis (that is to compare each operator with the best 
alternative operator(s)). 
The application of the DEA approach does not involve any assumption of a functional form 
relating to the variables (inputs and outputs)100. In practice, with a given set of inputs and 
outputs of different firms, empirically the DEA approach does not constructs a functional 
form. Therefore, using DEA helps a researcher to avoid misidentification and 
misspecification of frontier technology. DEA suits analyses with a small sample size. 
According to Nunamaker (1985) and Raab and Lichty (2002), DEA works well with a sample 
size that is double, or more than the sum of, the number of input and output variables used. 
   
5.4.2 Free Disposal Hull (FDH) 
The FDH approach101 was initiated by Deprins, Simar and Tulkens (1984) based on mixed 
nonparametric mathematical programming techniques. FDH approaches are mainly used to 
estimate a true (but unknown) production technology for efficiency and benchmarking 
measurement. The only difference between DEA and FDH is that the latter allows for non-
convexity102 whereas the former does not. 
FDH estimates non-convex production functions and compares other decision-making units 
by assuming there is free input – output dispersibility. It involves imposing plausible 
restrictions on the production process to construct a piecewise linear reference technology (or 
best practice frontier) on the input-output production combination. Intuitively, the FDH 
approach shows that a firm is inefficient if another firm uses less input in the production of 
similar outputs. 
 
 
                                                          
100  In contrast, using other analytical tools such as the econometric approach requires assumptions of a 
functional form (such as Cobb-Douglas or Translog). 
101 Is feasible with small  samples but only because it has no statistical properties 
102 Non-convexity refers to violations of the convexity assumption (that is when convexity assumptions are 
violated, then most of the good properties of competitive markets will not hold) In other words, non-convexity 
is associated with market failures. This could also refer to a situation where a particular combination of inputs 
are preferred to another. 
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5.4.3. Corrected Ordinary Least Squares (COLS) 
The corrected ordinary least squares estimator is a parametric method with a deterministic 
frontier. Winsten (1957) first suggested it. The method involves shifting the constant in the 
OLS estimation either upwards (for a production frontier) or downwards (for a cost frontier) 
as all points on the frontier either lie below or above the estimated function. Using this 
method ignores the possibility of exogenous shocks, measurement errors and noise 
(statistical) in the model. Therefore, this method is easy and simple but this simplicity in the 
model comes with a penalty, in that all the discrepancies are imputed to the error term, which 
captures the production inefficiency. COLS is also sensitive to outliers, as it tends to 
overestimate the efficient frontier, making the inefficiency score greater than it would 
otherwise be as a result (Kumbhakar et al. 2015). 
5.4.4 Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) 
SFA is a parametric approach which makes use of econometric models in an estimation 
process (either as a production, cost, or profitability frontier) in analysing efficiency and/or 
productivity in relation to the input and output variables. This approach was developed 
simultaneously by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and Van den Broeck 
(1977) in estimating the technical or productive efficiency. 
Estimation using this method involves two stages: (i). the frontier model is estimated by 
maximum likelihood. (ii). the outcomes from the first stage are used to construct measures of 
efficiency or inefficiency. 
In estimating technical or productive efficiency/inefficiency in production frontier analysis, 
we assume firms are using similar production technology. Efficiency in production is 
measured when a firm(s) reach their production possibilities frontier (i.e. a score equal to one 
(1) signifies full efficiency in the production process. If the score is less than one (1) then it 
signifies inefficiency in production). There is room for firms to change input combinations in 
an effort to achieve best practice and full efficiency. Thus, this method allows comparison 
among firms based on the best practice-benchmarking standard. 
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5.5. Technique/Approach selected 
One of the leading challenges involved in measuring the efficiency or inefficiency of a 
sector/industry, especially in a regulated industry such as a network utility industry, is clearly 
the need to identify appropriate indicators. 
The stochastic frontier analysis was selected over COLS and the nonparametric approaches of 
DEA and FHD because it allows random noise to be included in the model. The second 
advantage of using SFA is that it is possible to control for measurement errors, omitted 
variables and other misspecification (which are counted as inefficiencies). Deterministic 
models such as DEA and COLS are also very sensitive to outliers.  Moreover, because SFA is 
a parametric method based on regression, it is flexible enough to allow for the creation of 
confidence intervals for its parameters.  Finally, when dealing with panel data, the SFA 
method has an added advantage in that it is no longer necessary to specify the distribution of 
the inefficiency term.  
Traditionally, efficiency analysis in the electricity industry assumes that outputs are fixed 
(that it is the legal obligation of the EDISCOs to supply energy to all customers in its 
predefined service territory). Thus, EDISCOs are unable to control the amount of energy 
consumed (consumer demand). Therefore, since our aim is to assess the technical efficiency 
of these EDISCOs (under the objective of minimizing the amount of resources utilized), an 
input-oriented model was used. 
For the purpose of this study, we employed an input distance function (IDF). The IDF is 
preferred for the following reasons: 
(i). Electricity distribution companies (EDISCOs) have limited control over their outputs. In 
the short-run, they cannot influence the number of customers, nor the amount of electricity 
distributed, which are independently determined due to their derived nature. In terms of their 
inputs, they can, however, adjust to ensure that the network has the right capacity at all times. 
(ii). The essential purpose of regulation is to cut unnecessary cost, wastage in management 
and the use of input resources so that EDISCOs minimise costs, are efficient and produce at 
the optimal level.  
Figure 5.4 illustrates the input distance function, with two inputs, (𝑘1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑘2), used in the 
production of output,  𝒎. The isoquant, 𝐿𝐿′, is the inner boundary of the input set showing 
the minimum input combinations that are required to produce a given output vector. Thus 
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figure 5.4 shows the value of the distance function for a company (firm) producing output, 𝑚, 
using the available input variables combination at point D, which is equal to the ratio of 
AD/AC. 
 
Figure 5.4: The input distance function and the input combination 
 
 
5.6. Model Specification 
Assume the production technology (frontier) is known (although that is not normally the case 
we could measure the distance that each data point [country Distribution Company] lies). We 
can calculate a number of input variables (𝒙) that could be used to produce a certain amount 
of output(𝒚). In principle, for each data point for the linear combination of (𝒙/𝒚) we look for 
the best possible value of a scalar ρ103 such that (𝒙/𝝆, 𝒚) belongs to the same production set 
(feasible) bounded by the frontier, where ρ is assumed to be the technical efficiency score of 
an electricity distribution company. Therefore, literally, an efficient EDISCO can reduce its 
input by (1/𝜌) and still be able to produce the same amount of output. 
In reality, that is not the case as the production frontier is unknown. Instead, economists use 
data on a number of electricity distribution companies in the specified region to measure the 
distance so that the frontier fits to the data. In the case of this study, we employed the 
parametric technique to estimate an input distance function.                                                      
5.6.1 Stochastic Frontier Analysis Estimation 
In the course of analysing the technical efficiency of electricity distribution utility companies 
in Africa, it is vital we consider the impact of exogenous factors upon the technical efficiency 
of the distribution companies. As electricity distribution companies do not have absolute 
control over these factors then these factors could affect the quality of service provided. We 
                                                          
103 ρ is a non-negative scalar 
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seek to control for the impact of these exogenous factors (such as customer density and peak 
load) on technical efficiency. The first method involves including the factors in the 
production function. We assumed that differences in technology between regulation schemes 
for the case of M output and K inputs is specified as:  
Technology: 𝐱′= (𝑥1, 𝑥𝐾 ) is an input vector and 𝐲′= (𝑦1,…, 𝑦𝑅) is an output vector  
Assume the existence of a technology set 𝑇 (𝐱, 𝐲) = {𝐱, 𝐲:𝐱 𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝐲}                      
Input requirement set: 𝐼 (𝐲) = {𝐱:𝐱∈𝑇 (𝐱, 𝐲) 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝐲}                                                            
Input distance function: 𝐷𝐼 (𝐱, 𝐲) =max {𝜌 :( 1𝜌) 𝐱 ∈𝐼 (𝐲)}                                                        
Properties  
1. 𝐷𝐼 (𝐱, 𝐲) ≥ 1  
2. 𝐷𝐼(𝐱, 𝐲) is homogenous of degree +1 in 𝐱  
3. 𝐷𝐼 (𝐱, 𝐲) is increasing in 𝐱  
4. 𝐷𝐼 (𝐱, 𝐲) is decreasing in 𝐲  
From property 1,  
𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐼 (𝐱, 𝐲) −𝑢 = 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑢 ≥0                                                                                                  (5.2)  
From property 2,  
𝐷𝐼 (𝜏𝐱, 𝐲) = 𝜏𝐷𝐼 (𝐱, 𝐲); let 𝜏 = 1/𝑥𝐾 and let 𝑥𝑘/𝑥𝐾 ≡  ?̃?𝑘, then  
𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐼((1/𝑥𝐾) 𝐱, 𝐲) ≡ ln𝐷𝐼  (𝐱 ̃, 𝐲) = − 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝐾 + 𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐼 (𝐱, 𝐲)                                            (5.3) 
Use result 5.3 to write:  
−𝑙𝑛𝑥𝐾 =𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐼  (𝐱 ̃, 𝐲) −𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐼 (𝐱, 𝐲)                                                                              (5.4)                                                                                                               
Use equation (5.2) and (5.3) to write  
−ln𝑥𝐾 = 𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐼 (?̃?, 𝐲) −𝑢                                                                                             (5.5)                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
In equation (5.5), make three empirical assumptions:  
i). 𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐼 (𝐱 ̃, 𝐲) can be approximated by the sum of a translog function and a symmetric iid 
random variable: 𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐼 (𝐱 ̃, 𝐲) ≈ 𝑇 (?̃?, 𝐲) + 𝑣  
ii). The nonnegative slack variable 𝑢 can be approximated by an asymmetric iid random 
variable  
iii). The technology shifts over time 𝑡 through non-neutral technical progress  
Then we obtain the estimating equation based on stochastic input distance function 
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The assumption is that this production technology satisfies the condition as stated in Fare and 
Primont (1995), where 𝐷𝐼(𝑥, 𝑦)104 is non-decreasing, positively linearly homogeneous of 
degree one (1), concave in x and increasing in y. 
5.6.2 Stochastic Input Distance Function 
The IDF will take values in the range of greater than or equal to 1 if the input vector x is an 
element of the feasible input set, L(y).  Thus 𝐷𝐼(𝑥, 𝑦) ≥ 1 if  𝑥 ∈ 𝐿(𝑦), which implies that 
any electricity distribution company on the frontier of the input set will equal to unity (1). 
Following Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), Coelli et al. (2003) assumed that the translog input 
distance function is flexible and allows for the imposition of assumptions from 
microeconomic theory (such as homogeneity105, symmetry and monotonicity). 
The input distance function (IDF) is specified as  𝐷𝐼(𝑋, 𝑌) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝜌 ∶ (
𝑋
𝜌
) 𝜖 𝐿(𝑌)}                       (5.6)               
where the input set L(Y) stands for the set of all input vectors X ∈  𝑅+
𝐾 that can produce outputs vector 
Y∈  𝑅+
𝑀.,that is L(y) = {𝑥 ∈  𝑅+
𝐾 ∶ 𝑥 𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒 𝑦}                                                                     (5.7) 
 
Therefore, having imposed homogeneity of degree 1 in inputs, we recomposed the error 
model in which the inefficiency term is subtracted from the composed error of production 
function. Equation (5.8) illustrate the translog input oriented distance function for panel data 
estimation based on time varying efficiency. 
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 (5.8)                                                                                                                              
The composed error term emerges by interpreting the negative of the log of the input distance 
function as a measure of inefficiency: 
TtniuvDv ititIititit  1,1,ln   with the usual stochastic frontier analysis 
assumptions:           
    22 ,0~,0~ uitvit NuNv                                                                                           (5.9)                                                                                       
                                                          
104 X and Y variables denotes input and output respectively in distance function 
105 Homogeneity is discussed often in microeconomic theory. A function is regarded to be of homogenous of 
degree n, that is if n=1. So if output is increased by 1 and all the inputs increase by the same proportion, thus 
we refer to it as of homogenous of degree 1. 
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Here the property of homogeneity of degree 1 in inputs is implicitly imposed by the use of: 
 Kkk xxx 
~
 as the typical input variable. The property of symmetry of the second order 
terms requires the restrictions: srrs    and kjjk   .  
In this chapter, a two –stage approach is used where the efficiency scores (as estimated by 
exponentiating the Jondrow et al. (1982) estimated conditional mean of the inefficiency 
components) are further regressed against the exogenous reform variables:                                                                                                                        
Thus, according to the time-varying specification of the electricity distribution companies’ 
inefficiency, the technical efficiency of the EDISCOs 𝑖 at period 𝑡 could be defined as         
𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖 = exp(− ?̂?𝑖) ≡ exp (− ?̂?((𝑢𝑖 𝜀𝑖𝑡⁄ )) =  𝛿0 +  ∑ 𝛿𝑙𝑙 𝑧𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝑤𝑖                             (5.10)                             
We estimated our empirical model based on Kumbhakar et al.’s. (2015) written command 
codes procedure, using STATA 13 software.    
Although, the two stage approach is biased and inefficient because Z-variables are omitted 
from the first stage. Also the error terms in the second stage do not comply with classical 
OLS assumptions since the dependent variable is generated from stage 1 where the errors are 
assumed not to have classical properties. This is the critique developed by Schmidt and Wang 
(2001) in their work published in journal of productivity analysis. However, the model can be 
better treated by using, for example, the Battese-Coelli (1995) conditional heteroskedasticity 
procedure in which the stochastic frontier analysis error assumptions are stated as in equation 
(5.11 and 5.12). 
𝑣𝑖𝑡  ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2) 𝑢𝑖𝑡  ~  ⋮ 𝑁(𝜇𝑖𝑡, 𝜎𝑢
2) ⋮                                                                                  (5.11)  
And 𝜇𝑖𝑡 =  𝛿0 + ∑ 𝛿𝑙𝑙 𝑧𝑙𝑖𝑡                                                                                                 (5.12)                                
5.7. Dataset, choice of variables and Variables Description 
The dataset used in this study is a balanced panel dataset consisting of 224 observations from 
sixteen African countries with 235 distribution companies (DISCOs) for the years 2000 to 2013. 
The data was obtained mainly from the World Bank – Africa infrastructure database (Electricity 
and National data domain), electricity regulatory websites, the annual report and financial 
statements of each distributor in each country, the PPIAF-Public-private infrastructure advisory 
facility, World Bank Development Indicators, and the World Bank enterprise database. We 
harmonized the data to avoid measurement errors and arranged it in the appropriate format for 
estimation. Part of the harmonization process involved converting all the monetary values into a 
Measuring Technical Efficiency in Electricity Distribution Companies                               P a g e  | 177 
 
 
 
single monetary unit (US$, using 2005 as the base year) as all the sixteen countries examined in 
this study make use of a different currency (see table 5.3).       
5.7.1 Choice of Variables                                                                                                                                                              
The selection and measurement of variables for inputs, outputs, and exogenous variables have to 
be restricted to the common variables the national regulators use and are in accordance with 
international experience in electricity distribution benchmarking.  
5.7.2 Input variables 
The input variables used in the study are total operating expenditure (TOPEX – monetary 
value), the number of distribution transformers (NUMTRM - physical level), and the number 
of employees (EMPLY - the sum of the permanent staff). We know that the distribution utilities 
in this region historically were mainly government-owned and over staffing may be present due 
to weak institutional frameworks as politicians often interfered in the affairs of the utilities (Lin 
2005). The fourth input variable is the length of the distribution voltage network (DISNET - the 
physical level, measured in kilometres). We also used quality of service (QTYSER) as an 
[undesirable] input, measured as the number of outages in a year.  
 5.7.3 Output Variables  
Three output variables are considered in this study. These are energy delivered, the number of 
customers (the aggregate number of people connected to the national grid) and service area.  
The energy delivered (ENERDED) records the amount of electricity generated minus the total 
transmission and distribution loss. A high distribution system loss is a factor to worry about as it 
could lead to frequent outages. In Africa and other developing economies utility regulators often-
taxed the operators of the electricity distribution networks to ensure low distribution losses 
(World Bank, 2009).  
We assumed the number of customers (CUSTOMER) has an exogenous influence on the 
distributors as there do not have power over who to supply power to or not. The service area 
(SERAREA) can be measured in different ways (Kittelsen, 1993). In this study, we use the 
number of the population that has access to electricity. 
The service area (SERAREA) can be measured in different ways (Kittelsen, 1993).  In this study, 
we use the number of the population that has access to electricity.  
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5.7.4 Exogenous Factors 
To account for variations in inefficiency beyond managerial ability we include exogenous 
variables. These factors can be either observable or unobservable (i.e. outside the distributor’s 
control) and may affect efficiency. In this study, we prefer to refer or call it exogenous factor 
rather than environmental factors, because of the nature of the variables. As there are limited 
available data on environmental factors in the region. We used two exogenous factors; the first 
variable we consider is Customer density (CDENSITY - the number of customer per network 
kilometre).  
Another exogenous variable we considered is The Peak load106 (PLOAD) - the maximum 
load of the interconnected system(s) during a particular period in a year. In case a country has 
multiple interconnected systems, it is the sum of peak demands of each of the systems during 
a particular season in the year. In the case of Africa, consumer demand for electricity for the 
winter/rainy season may be double that for the summer/ dry season. The peak load does, 
largely, affect the technical efficiency of the distribution company.
                                                          
106 Peak load refers to a period in which electricity distribution is expected to be significantly higher than 
average supply level. This is different from peak demand. In terms of energy use, peak demand is used to refer 
to a high point of consumer demand, which often attracts high billing. It is argued that peak users should bear 
the marginal operating and capital costs. 
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Table 5.3: Data and Variables Description 
Index Name(s) Unit Variables used in the previous studies Variable description 
Input Variables 
Total operating 
expenditure (TOPEX)     
US$D 
(millions) 
Giannakis et al.(2005);Hattori et al. (2005);Yu et al.(2009), Charnes et al.(1989); 
Miliotis (1982); Jamasb and Pollitt (2003); Korhonen and Syrjanen (2003); Giannakis, 
et al. (2005) Yang and Lu(2006); Growitsch et al.(2009);Coelli et al.(2013) 
Comprises all recurrent costs plus depreciation plus financial costs 
(such as debt service and interest charges, foreign exchange losses), 
before taxes. 
Length of the 
Distribution  voltage 
networks  (DISNET)     
km Giannakis et al.(2005); Mullarkey et al.(2015); Miliotis (1982); Zhang and Bartels 
(1998); Lo, Chien and Lin (2001), Chen (2002); Pacudan and de Guzman(2002) 
Resende(2002); Jamasb and Pollitt (2003); Korhonen and Syrjanen (2003); Estache et 
al.(2004);Giannakis, et al. (2005); Yang and Lu(2006); Coelli et al.(2013) 
The total length of distribution networks in kilometres. 
Number of Distribution 
transformers 
(NUMTRM)   
Total number 
all rating 
(number) 
Yang and Lu(2006);Resende(2002);Chen (2002);Lo, Chien and Lin (2001); Estache et 
al.(2004) used Transformer capacity; Pacudan and de Guzman(2002) 
Total number of distribution transformers installed (all ratings). 
Number of Employees 
(EMPLY)     
(number) Hattori (2002); Mullarkey et al.(2015); Pollitt(1995); Weyman-jones (1995); Zhang 
and Bartels (1998); Pacudan and de Guzman(2002); Estache et 
al.(2004);Resende(2002); Growitsch et al.(2009); 
The number of full-time equivalent employees is calculated as the 
number of hours worked by full-time and part-time employees 
divided by the number of hours in a full working day. 
Quality of service 
(QTYSER) 
 
(number of 
occurrences  
per year) 
Giannakis, et al. (2005); Coelli et al.(2013) Frequency number of outage or blackouts  in  a number of days in a 
year. 
Output Variables 
Energy delivered 
(ENERDED) 
Gigawatt hour 
(GWh) 
Giannakis et al.(2005); Hattori et al. (2005);Yu et al.(2009); Miliotis (1982); 
Bagdadioglu et al.(1996); Lo, Chien and Lin (2001); Pacudan and de Guzman(2002); 
Jamasb and Pollitt (2003); Giannakis, et al. (2005); Hattori et al.(2005); Yang and 
Lu(2006); Von Hirschhausen et al(2006) 
Total electricity generation minus the total transmission and 
distribution loss.  
Number of Customers 
(CUSTOMER) 
(numbers) Giannakis et al.(2005); Hattori et al. (2005); Mullarkey et al.(2015); Miliotis (1982); 
Pollitt(1995); Bagdadioglu et al.(1996); Zhang and Bartels (1998); Lo, Chien and Lin 
(2001); Chen (2002);Pacudan and de Guzman(2002); Resende(2002); Jamasb and 
Pollitt (2003); Korhonen and Syrjanen (2003); Giannakis, et al. (2005); Hattori et 
al.(2005); Yang and Lu(2006);Von Hirschhausen et al(2006); Estache et al.(2004); 
Growitsch et al.(2009);Coelli et al.(2013) 
A total number of utility connections based on the total number of 
medium and low voltage users, High voltage users are not considered 
because these voltages are mainly for industrial users. 
Service Area 
(SERAREA)  
(%) Mullarkey et al.(2015); Miliotis (1982); Pollitt(1995); Bagdadioglu et al.(1996); 
Pacudan and de Guzman(2002); Estache et al.(2004); Growitsch et al.(2009);Coelli et 
al.(2013) 
Percentage of Population with access to electricity 
 Exogenous Variables 
Peak Load (PLOAD) 
 
Annual-on-
grid (MW) 
Pacudan and de Guzman(2002); Giannakis, et al. (2005); Von Hirschhausen et 
al(2006) 
The maximum load of the interconnected system(s) during the year in 
question. In the case where a country has multiple interconnected 
systems, it is the sum of peak demands of each of these systems. 
Customer Density  
(CDENSITY)  
Per km2 Hattori (2002); Hattori et al.(2005); Growitsch et al.(2009)  Number of people per square kilometre 
Reform Variables    
Privatisation (PRZ) Percentage Zhang et al.(2008); Vagliasindi and Besant-Jones (2013) Share capacity of private-owned capacities (%) 
Regulation (REG) Dummy Zhang et al.(2008); Vagliasindi and Besant-Jones (2013) 0 =No independent or autonomous regulatory Agency. 
1=Independent/autonomous regulatory Agency. 
Competition(CMT) Derived ratio 
(%) 
Zhang et al.(2008); Vagliasindi and Besant-Jones (2013) Percentage share of top 3 generating companies by capacity 
Unbundling(UBN) Dummy Vagliasindi and Besant-Jones (2013) 0 = Vertical Integration 
1= Restructuring through vertical separation  
Load Factor (LOAD) Ratio  Azad et al.(2015); Jamasb et al (2005) Ratio of average energy delivered per hour to the maximum hourly demand 
Fuel Type (FUEL) Proportion (%) Sarica and Or (2007); Diewert and Nakamura (1999); Pollitt (1995) Share of oil/gas from the total net electricity generation 
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 5.7.5. Data Structure and Countries Comparisons  
An overview of the data is presented in table 5.4. The difference in size between utilities is 
large, as revealed by the high spread between the minimum and maximum values and the 
standard deviation. A summary of individual country data is shown in table 5.5. We simply 
take the geometric mean107 or weighted average for each of the countries in the sample to 
evaluate their relative performance.  
 
Table 5.4: Descriptive statistics of variables 
Variable Unit Measurement Average Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Input Variables      
Topex    US$ dollars 62505525 170523924.6 6329.943    898439146 
Disnet     Km 64059.34     119001.4         415 453502 
Emply numbers 8138.17 11422.11 659 47580 
Numtrm numbers 41036.85   108656.5            91 574420 
Qtyser number  per year 2818.12     20040.37         4.2 223227 
Output Variables      
Customer numbers 2634031 5829500 20165 29700407 
Enderded Giga-watt hours (GWh) 23.71 53.535 0.129 223.57 
Serarea Percentage (%) 40.14     26.195 4.8 99.8 
Exogenous Variables      
Cdensity Per km2 73.52   48.304           2 191 
Plaod Annual-on-grid (MW) 4450.65    9638.071        38 44005 
No of Observation numbers 224    
 
With regard to table 5.5, the absolute size of the ‘big three’ (South Africa, Egypt, and 
Nigeria) is obvious in all dimensions, except for the quality of service (which is the number 
of outages for customers per year). South Africa tops the ranking in terms of total operating 
expenditure, the number of transformers installed, and the country with the largest number of 
electricity distribution companies, the largest distribution network length, management of 
peak load and the amount of energy delivered. It ranks second in percentage of the population 
with access to electricity (service area) and the number of customers. Egypt is largest with 
respect to the number of customers, and also the percentage of the populace with access to 
electricity. It was second in terms of the number of transformers, energy delivered, and 
                                                          
107 The geometric mean is used commonly when comparing differences among countries, regions or firms (i.e. based on 
their merit or efficiency).  
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management of peak load. Nigeria registers the highest number of employees (EMPLY) and 
population density (CDENSITY).It ranked second in terms of distribution network length and 
number of electricity distribution companies. Namibia has the smallest number of distribution 
transformers (NUMTRM), customer numbers (CUSTOMER), population density 
(CDENSITY) and quality of service (QTYSER). The island of Cape Verde has the smallest 
distribution network length (DISNET), the lowest number of employees (EMPLY), energy 
delivered and the poorest peak load management. It ranks third in terms of the highest 
percentage of the service area (SERAREA) and the number of electricity distribution 
companies. Meanwhile, Uganda has the lowest operating cost in the study.   Malawi has the 
lowest percentage of the population with access to electricity (SERAREA).  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Measuring Technical Efficiency in Electricity Distribution Companies                               P a g e  | 182 
 
 
 
Table 5.5: Geometric summary statistics, average country value (2000 – 2013) 
Country TOPEX DISNET EMPLY NUMTRM QTYSER CUSTOMER ENERDED SERAREA PLOAD CDENSITY 
Cameroon 611923 19082 3378 6957 1014 537180 3.96 48 625.29 39.86 
Cape Verde 380390 714 705 252 177 67050 0.22 65 52.53 118.50 
Cote d'Ivorie 781998 17464 1519 8516 58 842885 4.39 56 610.57 56.37 
Egypt 5078648 120183 11142 136576 57 22892010 98.78 99 19407.98 73.98 
Ethiopia 4506863 21249 10768 9294 123 897811 3.01 19 558.05 79.09 
Ghana 278901321 18573 4394 8778 286 245793 6.24 56 1364.77 82.56 
Kenya 9949767 22042 5758 4035 78 875772 4.98 22 959.09 65.47 
Malawi 535550 3646 2133 1066 141 165859 1.5 8 271.41 143.81 
Mozambique 3967623 8797 3117 154 22 326292 11.85 10.3 360.79 27.70 
Namibia 2688694 19123 902 145 6.3 43953 1.32 40.4 514.56 2.45 
Nigeria 366924 198284 39861 21766 303 3902861 16.43 48 4282.12 159.79 
Senegal 608249 11847 2418 3493 938 573212 1.66 49.2 407.38 61.06 
South Africa 596212260 399359 32771 427930 16 8575700 205.97 75.32 35668.28 39.94 
Tanzania 228556 22421 5065 7168 149 625358 2.82 12.24 1894.8 43.89 
Uganda 56282 8789 1425 5419 241 294724 1.91 12.6 435.4 151.18 
Zambia 31108279 17801 3855 1036 45 326777 8.2 18.6 1490.6 16.18 
 
 *** The top three are in bold, while the three lowest are in italics 
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  5.8. Methodology 
In this study, we expand upon the SFA production function as used by Coelli et al. (2013) 
and Growitsch et al. (2009) based on the panel data method. We estimated four models108, 
with each model consisting of two steps.  This is to enable us to verify the impact of 
exogenous factors on the level of technical efficiency of each of the country EDISCOs. 
Therefore, we incorporated the number of interruptions (a proxy for quality of service) as an 
undesirable input as one of the four input variables (see Coelli et al. 2013, Growitsch et al. 
2009 and Giannakis et al. 2005). Our assumption is that a rational electricity distribution 
operator considers the penalty (imposed by the regulator) for a frequent interruption of power 
supply and compares it with the price of the input variables needed to prevent interruptions, 
and then decides on the best production options. 
Table 5.6 summarises the various models employed in the analysis.  
Table 5.6: Model specification and variables employed for analysis 
  Model 1     Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Inputs     
     
Reference Variable: Total operating cost 
                        
𝑋1: Number of Transformers installed                                
𝑋2: Number of Employees                             
𝑋3: Length of Distribution Network                           
𝑋4: Quality of Service (undesirable input)                          
Output     
𝑌1: Energy Delivered                           
𝑌2: Number of Consumers                           
𝑌3: Service Area                           
Exogenous     
𝑍1: Customer Density                     
𝑍2: Peak Load                       
 
 
 
 
                                                          
108 The logic of estimating four models is to enable us to examine the direct impact of exogenous factors on 
the technical efficiency of electricity distribution companies and to examine the impact of quality of service 
(i.e. the number of outages) on the efficiency level of the EDISCOs in the region. 
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  5.8.1 Model 1 (General) 
This is the general model and all other models treated in this study employ a variation of the 
variables used in this model. It incorporates the key variables (inputs and outputs) used in the 
industry that impact on the technical efficiency level of the electricity distribution companies. 
We estimated the Input Distance Function alone. 
  5.8.2 Model 2 (Traditional) 
Exogenous factors affecting the technical efficiency of electricity distribution companies 
were found by previous scholars such as Mullarkey et al. (2015); Coelli et al. (2013); Yu et 
al. (2009); and Growitsch et al. (2009) to have important efficiency effects. In this study, we 
use peak load and customer density as our exogenous factors.   
  5.8.3 Model 3 (Quality of Service)  
Model 3 incorporates the quality of service variable (which is the number of interruptions in a 
year) as an undesirable input variable. That is, we treat the number of outages as a ‘bad’ input 
based on an assumption that there is a substitutive relationship between total operating cost 
and number of outages. This interruption in customer service could be in the form of both 
unplanned interruptions and planned ones (due to routine maintenance of the network).  
  5.8.4 Model 4 (Comprehensive) 
Due to the weaker institutional nature of the electricity distribution industry in developing 
countries, we extended model 3 to include exogenous factors which can affect the quality of 
service. 
  5.9. Tests of Hypotheses 
It has been argued that inclusion of quality of service into technical efficiency analysis tends 
to alter the optimal firm size. Kwoka (2005) suggested that the smaller the firm size, the 
better in terms of reliable quality of service. This is because they are closer to the end users 
and have better customer information (i.e., they have a higher degree of responsiveness, for 
instance, how long does it take the operators to restore power when there is outage or connect 
customer to the grid)? 
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Moreover, any country that has a small number of electricity distribution companies tends to 
have higher economies of scale (as these firms enjoy a relatively lower cost over the country 
with many utility firms). 
In this study, we seek to verify the following hypotheses; 
 (i) Exogenous factors (such as customer density and peak load) do have a significant impact 
on the technical efficiency of EDISCOs in the region. 
(ii) As regulators set the benchmark for the quality of service, EDISCOs respond by either 
improving their service to achieve the target, or face the penalty. Thus in order to avoid the 
penalty, they improve their performance (i.e., technical efficiency). 
(iii) Whether countries that adopted market-oriented reforms in their electricity distribution 
sector performed better than others that did not.  
(iv). That a country with many and/or large EDISCOs is more efficient than countries with 
less/few EDISCOs (economies of scale).  
In our model estimation, we compared the sixteen countries’ performances against each other 
to identify if a particular country or a group of specific countries dominate. We then 
conducted consistency or robust checks by excluding a particular country and checking if 
there was a significant difference in the industry technical efficiency. The estimated technical 
efficiency levels will be used to rank EDISCOs, to identify under-performing EDISCOs, and 
those at, or close to, the efficiency frontier. This information is, in turn, useful in helping 
governments in the region to design public policies or programmes to improve the overall 
efficiency level of both private and public companies in the industry (Kumbhakar et al. 
2015). 
  5.9.1 Correlation Analysis of Input and Output Variables 
We analysed the relationship between input and output variables using correlation techniques. 
In principle, input and output variables are expected to be positively correlated (Mullarkey et 
al. 2015). Therefore, the higher the degree of correlation between the input and output 
variable, the stronger the tendency of the relationship will be. Table 5.7 shows the correlation 
coefficients for the respective inputs/outputs. The correlation between the input and output 
variables is in the range of 0.2 to 0.9. 
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From Table 5.7, it can be concluded, as we might expect, that there exists a strong 
relationship between the number of transformers (installed) and the Energy delivered 
(Pearson’s value of 0.9729). It implies that as the number of power transformers installed 
increases, it leads to an increase in the energy supply to the consumers, thereby reducing the 
transmission and distribution losses. Likewise, the table shows there is a weak relationship 
between Total operational cost and number of customers (0.2039). 
  Table 5.7: Correlation outcome between Input and Output variables 
 X1:Topex X2:Numtrm X3:Emply X4:Disnet Y1:Enerded Y2:Customer Y3:Serarea 
X1:TOPEX 1.0000       
X2:Numtrm 0.8301    1.0000      
X3:Emply 0.4843    0.6180    1.0000     
X4:Disnet 0.6113 0.8383    0.7880    1.0000    
Y1:Enerded 0.7531    0.9729    0.6042    0.8836    1.0000   
Y2:Customer 0.2039    0.5478    0.3934    0.6762    0.6791    1.0000  
Y3:Serarea 0.3939    0.5269    0.3360    0.5500    0.5795    0.6836    1.0000 
 
The assumption of isotonicity between the input and output variables is satisfied. Literally, it 
means that the relationship between input and output should not be erratic. Thus, increasing 
the value of the input variable does not lead to a decrease in the output, but rather to an 
increase in the value of output. 
  5.10. Estimation, Results, and Discussion 
The estimated coefficients of the four models are presented in table 5.8 (the maximum 
likelihood approach was employed in the estimation). All the variables are expressed in 
logarithmic deviations from mean values. The first order coefficients that are associated with 
outputs and the inputs may be interpreted as distance function elasticities. Some gamma (γ) 
variables were removed because of collinearity problems. 
The first column in table 5.8 contains an indication of the parameters of all the models which 
are the translog specification  for the production function. The second column identifies the 
variables employed in each of the models. The final four columns represent our modelling 
results (Models 1 – 4).  
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Model 1 could be referred to as the General Model. In this model, only the log of customers was 
significant of the  first order and with a correct sign, while energy delivered squared  and the 
number of customers squared are statistically significant at the second order.  
Model 2 accounts for the impact of exogenous factors on the EDISCOs performance. Our result 
shows that only log of customers is statistically significant in the first order, though both output 
and input variables show the expected signs. However, in the second order, the log of customers 
squared is the only statistically significant variable.  
Model 3 incorporated the quality of service as an undesirable input in the model. Our results 
show  log of energy delivered, log of customers and log of employees are statistically significant 
at the first order coefficient. In the cross-term effects (i.e. the second order), it is the only log of 
customers squared that is statistically significant.  
In model 4, we added exogenous factors to the model 3 specifications. Our result shows that the 
output variable log of energy delivered and an input variable (log of employees) are significant of 
the first order. Also at the second order log of energy delivered is statistically significant.  
   5.10.1 Efficiency Estimates 
The parameter estimates are interpreted based on stochastic frontier analysis. All the variables in 
Table 5.8 contain information on distance function elasticities for models (1 - 4) concerning the 
input variables used in producing the output variables. Equation 5.9 and 5.10 are the elasticities 
of distance function of the input and the output shares. 
The coefficient of input variables used show that only the estimated elasticity of number of 
employees is significant, and the only significant estimated elasticities of the output variables on 
the number of customers and energy delivered. Therefore as the elasticity of the mean value of 
the output values is increasing, if the number of customers connected to the national grid 
increases by 1%, the demand of energy supply is raised by 1%. Thus there is no corresponding 
increase in input variables (distribution line length of the network, the number of employees and 
the number of transformers installed to meet the demand of customers). As shown in the results, 
all the input variables have negative signs (except for distribution line length in model 3), 
indicating a decrease in the value of the efficiency estimates of the electricity distribution 
companies. As the technical efficiency in table 5.8 ranges between 0.89 and 0.90, with an 
average efficiency of 0.895, this implies a technical inefficiency level of 12.4% for the electricity 
distribution companies in the region.  
Measuring Technical Efficiency in Electricity Distribution Companies                                          Page | 188 
 
188 
 
However, it is possible for countries with high output-input utilisation ratios in electricity 
distribution (in terms of the number of customers per employee ratio) to perform less well in 
terms of technical efficiency scores when compared to countries with a low number of customers 
per employee ratio. Moreover, our findings show an increase in technical efficiency of 1% in 
model (3) and (4) when the quality of service variable is incorporated into the model, which 
implies that the management of the electricity distribution companies are mindful when there is a 
regulatory body in a country, (whose duty is to effectively monitor and set benchmarks on the 
quality of services). 
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Table 5.8: Estimated results of parameters of the Input distance production function on Technical Efficiency 
 
Note: Significance; ***:1% level, **: 5% level, *: 10% level. Standard errors are reported in Parentheses 
IDF represents Input Distance Function 
EXF denote Exogenous Factors 
QS stands for Quality of Service 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model  4 
  Parameters          Variables IDF Alone IDF with EXF IDF  with QS IDF with  QS  &EXF 
𝛼0  constant -153.459*** (16.294) -154.806***(17.1358) -148.9253***  (17.6599) -244.8423*** (24.9438) 
𝛼1(𝑙𝑛𝑦1) lnenerded -0.0264         (0.1024) -0.0212        (0.1021) -0.2094*          (0.1114) -0.5322***     (0.1542) 
𝛼2(𝑙𝑛𝑦2) lncustm 0.1959**      (0.0694) 0.2023***    (0.0684) 0.1287*            (0.0754) 0.0124             (0.0899) 
𝛼3(𝑙𝑛𝑦3)  lnserarea -0.0275         (0.0929) - -  -   
0.5𝛼11(𝑦1
2) lnenerded2 -1.1883*       (0.7132)  -1.1048         (0.7336) 0.2297              (0.6447) 2.4072**         (1.2191) 
0.5𝛼22(𝑦2
2) lncustm2 -0.0026**     (0.0008)        -0.0027***   (0.0008) -0.0016*           (0.0009) -0.0051            (0.0011) 
0.5𝛼33(𝑦3
2) lnserarea2 0. 0011         (0.0093) 0.0023           (0.0094) 0.0007              (0.0093) 0.0039              (0.0108) 
𝛼12(𝑦1 * 𝑦2) lncustded -0.0325         (0.1359) -0.0280          (0.1333) -0.0294             (0.0217) -0.0786***       (0.0246) 
𝛼13(𝑦1 * 𝑦3) lnenearea -0.0227         (0.1103) -0.0293          (0.1099) -0.02639           (0.9996) -0.0665             (0.1208) 
𝛼14(𝑦2 * 𝑦3) lncustarea -0.1444         (0.1061) -0.1488          (0.1049) -0.1533*           (0.0862) -0.0789             (0.0920) 
𝛽1(𝑙𝑛𝑥2𝑛) lnnumtrm -0.0978         (0.1137) -0.1077          (0.1132) -0.0319             (0.0967) -0.1231             (0.1314) 
𝛽2(𝑙𝑛𝑥3𝑛) lnemply -0.8881***   (0.1836) -0.8899***    (0.1849)       -0.6788***       (0.2001) -1.2500***       (0.2328)    
𝛽3(𝑙𝑛𝑥4𝑛) lndisnet -0.0889         (0.0889) -0.0941          (0.0909) 0.1143               (0.0794) -0.1247             (0.0825) 
0.5𝛽11(𝑥2
2) Lnnumtrm2 0.1109*        (0.0603) 0.1187*         (0.0616) 0.0089               (0.0318) 0.0296               (0.0399) 
0.5𝛽22(𝑥3
2) lnemply2 8.4122          (6.0001) 8.2942           (6.0188)       1.2992               (6.1673) 2.5464               (6.6769) 
0.5𝛽33(𝑥4
2) lndisnet2 0.5088***    (0.1738) 0.5296 ***    (0.1805) 0.0556               (0.1346) 0.1847               (0.1362) 
𝛽12(𝑥2* 𝑥3) lnnumply -2.0989***   (0.7764) -2.1883***    (0.7935) ---------- ---------- 
𝛽13(𝑥2* 𝑥4) lnnumnet 0.4267          (0.2899) 0.4601            (0.2932) ---------- ---------- 
𝛽14(𝑥3* 𝑥4) lnempnet 2.5076***    (0.6435) 2.5797***      (0.6591) ---------- ---------- 
𝛾1(𝑦1*𝑥2) lnenedply -0.7982         (0.6235) -7.0752           (0.6243) ---------- ---------- 
𝛾2((𝑦1*𝑥3) lnenedtrm 0.3739          (0.2988) 0.3795            (0.2962) ---------- ---------- 
𝛾3(𝑦1 *𝑥4) lnenednet 0.0013          (0.2859) -0.0583           (0.3051) ---------- ---------- 
𝛾4(𝑦2 *𝑥2) lncustply -0.1454         (0.1117) -0.1462           (0.1108) ---------- ---------- 
𝛾5(𝑦2 *𝑥3) lncusttrm 0.1568          (0.2502) 0.1472            (0.2463) ---------- ---------- 
𝛾6(𝑦2 *𝑥4) lncustnet -0.0209***   (0.0061) -0.0216***     (0.0061)   ---------- ---------- 
𝛾7(𝑦3 *𝑥2) lnserply 0.1392          (0.1617) 0.1341            (0.1612) ---------- ---------- 
𝛾8(𝑦3 *𝑥3) lnsertrm -0.0474         (0.0439) -0.0485           (0.4388) ---------- ---------- 
𝛾9(𝑦3 *𝑥4) lnsernet -0.0268         (0.0974) -0.0202           (0.0981) ---------- ---------- 
𝛾10(
𝑥4
𝑦5
) lnsaifi ---------- ---------- 0.0018              (0.0015) -0.0016             (0.0025) 
𝛾11(
𝑥4
𝑦5
)2 lnsaifi2 ---------- ---------- -0.0004             (0.0004) 0.0004              (0.0006) 
𝛾12(
𝑥4
𝑦5
)*𝑦1 lnsaifded ---------- ---------- -0.0193*           (0.0093) -0.0341**         (0.0156) 
𝛾13(
𝑥4
𝑦5
)*𝑦2 lnsaifcust ---------- ---------- -0.0008              (0.0006) -0.0009             (0.0010) 
𝛾14(
𝑥4
𝑦5
)*𝑦3 lnsaifarea ---------- ---------- -0.0006              (0.0018) 0.0003              (0.0019) 
𝛾15(
𝑥4
𝑦5
)*𝑥2 lnsaiftrm ---------- ---------- 0.0148*             (0.0069) 0.0137             (0.0104)      
𝛾16(
𝑥4
𝑦5
)*𝑥3 lnsaifply ---------- ---------- 0.0090               (0.0123) -0.0047            (0.0172) 
𝛾17(
𝑥4
𝑦5
)*𝑥4 lnsaifnet ---------- ---------- 0.0029               (0.0019) 0.0025             (0.0022) 
Z-variables Exogenous Factors      
𝑧1(𝜑1) Peak Load ---------- -0.0165          (0.0231) ---------- -0.0594***    (0.0193)         
𝑧2(𝜑2) Customer Density ---------- 0.0356           (0.0468) ---------- 0.0310           (0.0501) 
Time (years) t^2 0.0765***   (0.0081) 0.0772***      (0.0085)     0.0743***        (0.0088) 0.1222***     (0.0124) 
  Log likelihood         115.366 115.987 98.792 60.895 
bc_t Tech_Efficiency 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.79 
 Number of Obs 224 224 224 224 
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 5.10.2 Robustness Check 
Our motivation in this section is to identify if excluding the Republic of South Africa (the 
dominant producer in the region) from the estimation has a significant impact on the technical 
efficiency level of the electricity distribution companies in the region.  
Table 5.9 shows the technical efficiency of EDISCOs (without the Republic of South Africa) 
in the model. Most of the estimated parameters are statistically significant at the 1% and 
10%, which corresponds to a good fit of the models estimated. Most of the first-order 
coefficients have correct signs; which implies that the monotony conditions required by 
economic theory are satisfied, and that the input distance function is monotonically 
increasing in inputs and decreasing in outputs. 
In Model 7, Saifi109 was incorporated into the model and the following variables are 
statistically significant; the output variable of the log of energy delivered and the input 
variable of the log of employees. The estimated parameter of the time trend in table 5.9 
suggests the mean inefficiency is statistically significant and positive, which implies a 
decrease in efficiency level of the distribution companies. However, other parameters 
estimated offer more insights into the technical efficiency levels – the energy delivered and 
energy delivered square with their corresponding signs in both model (7) and (8) 
respectively. These results reveal that without South Africa there is a significant decrease in 
energy supplied by these EDISCOs in the region, especially in model 8. Similarly, when 
comparing the efficiency level of distribution companies without South Africa, the average 
technical efficiency decreased by 3% from 90% to 87%. 
However, the impact of exogenous factors on the performance of electricity distribution 
companies is weak, except in model 8, where peak load is positive and statistically 
significant. This reveals that the electricity distribution companies find it difficult to meet 
power demand during the peak periods, which impacts on their efficiency level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
109 SAIFI is derived by taking the total number of customer interruptions divided by the total operating cost. 
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Table 5.9: Estimated result of parameters of the Input distance production function without South Africa  
 Note: Significance; ***:1% level, **: 5% level, *: 10% level. Standard errors are reported in Parentheses 
 
   5.10.3 Model Selection  
 
In this section, we employed log-likelihood ratio (LR) test to choose the preferred model. We 
start with the general model, the log-likelihood-ratio test for the stochastic frontier for model 
1 as against model 2, and for model 3, as against model 4. The null hypothesis state that 
adding exogenous variables does not improve the model. However, the alternate hypothesis 
stated that including the exogenous variables do have a significant impact in the model. 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
     Parameters          Variables IDF Alone IDF with EXF IDF  with QS IDF with  QS  &EXF 
𝛼0  constant 0.6000***   (17.576)    0.6000***(18.4225) 0.4999*** (18.7424) 0.4999***(28.4815) 
𝛼1(𝑦1) lnenerded 0.991           (0.1989)      0.9917          (0.2340) 0.9961***      (0.2336) 0.9005***   (0.3242) 
𝛼2(𝑦2) lncustm -0.0009***  (0.1724) 0.0005          (0.1832) 0.0068            (0.1407) -0.0133        (0.1392) 
𝛼3(𝑦3)  lnserarea -0.0363        (0.2489) -0.0433         (0.2555) 0.0006            (0.1793)  -0.0003       (0.1827)      
0.5𝛼11(𝑦1
2) lnenerded2 -0.9012*      (1.1995) -1.3011         (1.2868) -0.6005           (1.1949) -0.7999        (1.3679) 
0.5𝛼22(𝑦2
2) lncustm2 -0.0001        (0.0021) -0.0007         (0.0022) -0.0001            (0.0017) -0.0002        (0.0017) 
0.5𝛼33(𝑦3
2) lnserarea2 0.0004          (0.0241) 0.0006           (0.0248) -0.0009            (0.0176) 0.0001          (0.0179) 
𝛼12(𝑦1 * 𝑦2) lncustded 0.0074          (0.2921) 0.0077          (0.2974) -0.0904            (0.0454) -0.0086         (0.0491) 
𝛼13(𝑦1 * 𝑦3) lnenearea 0.0019          (0.2331) 0.0023          (0.2347) -0.0015            (0.1985) -0.1938         (0.1264) 
𝛼14(𝑦2 * 𝑦3) lncustarea -0.1443         (0.1112) -0.1978         (0.1354) -0.1985*          (0.1334) -0.1938         (0.1264) 
𝛽1(𝑥1) lnnumtrm 0.6997***    (0.2362) 0.6996***    (0.2576) 0.6017***       (0.1762) 0.5067**       (0.2662) 
𝛽2(𝑥2) lnemply -0.9016***   (0.4739) -0.9014         (0.4755) -0.6008            (0.4619) -0.5991          (0.5006) 
𝛽3(𝑥3) lndisnet 0.1947           (0.0934) 0.1952          (0.2278) 0.2025              (0.1511) 0.1044           (0.1739) 
0.5𝛽11(𝑥1
2) lnnumtrm2 -0.0876*        (0.1682) -0.0862         (0.1775) -0.1968***       (0.0585) -0.1886**      (0.0845) 
0.5𝛽22(𝑥2
2) lnemply2 -2.0001         (14.3063) -20001.         (14.429) -2.0004            (17.0948) -2.0000          (15.5542) 
0.5𝛽33(𝑥3
2) lndisnet2 -0.0019         (0.3868) -0.0015          (0.4652) 0.0011              (0.2437) -0.0007*        (0.3162) 
𝛽12(𝑥1* 𝑥2) lnnumply -07979          (2.0085) -0.7978          (2.0342) ---------- ---------- 
𝛽13(𝑥1* 𝑥3) lnnumnet -0.4949          (0.7097) -0.4949          (0.7152) ---------- ---------- 
𝛽14(𝑥2* 𝑥3) lnempnet -1.3981          (1.0523) -1.2981          (1.0687) ---------- ---------- 
𝛾1(𝑦1*𝑥2) lnenedply 0.6014          (1.8252) -0.6014          (1.8437) ---------- ---------- 
𝛾2((𝑦1*𝑥1) lnenedtrm 0.6955           (0.5126) -0.7951          (0.7164) ---------- ---------- 
𝛾3(𝑦1 *𝑥3) lnenednet 0.1053           (0.6621) 0.1052           (0.7164) ---------- ---------- 
𝛾4(𝑦2 *𝑥2) lncustply 0.0031           (0.3122) 0.0031           (0.3175) ---------- ---------- 
𝛾5(𝑦2 *𝑥1) lncusttrm -0.1941          (0.5285) -0.1937          (0.5479) ---------- ---------- 
𝛾6(𝑦2 *𝑥3) lncustnet -0.0612          (0.0188)  0.056             (0.0199)            ---------- ---------- 
𝛾7(𝑦3 *𝑥2) lnserply 0.1004           (0.3831) 0.1005           (0.3911) ---------- ---------- 
𝛾𝑥1) lnsertrm 0.0057           (0.1195) 0.0067           (0.1263) ---------- ---------- 
𝛾9(𝑦3 *𝑥3) lnsernet 0.0018           (0.2282) 0.0019           (0.2393) ---------- ---------- 
𝛾10(
𝑥4
𝑦5
) lnsaifi ---------- ---------- 0.0046            (0.0036) 0.0028            (0.0041) 
𝛾110.5(
𝑥4
𝑦5
)2 lnsaifi
2 ---------- ---------- -0.0001           (0.0009) -0.0002          (0.0005) 
𝛾12(
𝑥4
𝑦5
)*𝑦1 lnsaifded ---------- ---------- -0.0070*         (0.0211) -0.0013          (0.0233) 
𝛾13(
𝑥4
𝑦5
)*𝑦2 lnsaifcust ---------- ---------- -0.0014           (0.0018) -0.0004           (0.0017) 
𝛾14(
𝑥4
𝑦5
)*𝑦3 lnsaifarea ---------- ---------- -0.0027***     (0.0033) -0.0021          (0.0037) 
𝛾15(
𝑥4
𝑦5
)*𝑥1 lnsaiftrm ---------- ---------- 0.0035*          (0.0149)  0.0008           (0.0154)     
𝛾16(
𝑥4
𝑦5
)*𝑥2 lnsaifply ---------- ---------- 0.0107            (0.0279) -0.0043           (0.0286) 
𝛾17(
𝑥4
𝑦5
)*𝑥3 lnsaifnet ---------- ---------- 0.0049            (0.0037) 0.0030*          (0.0035) 
 Exogenous Factors      
𝜃1(𝜑1) Peak load ---------- -0.1061          (0.0531) ---------- -0.0045          (0.0413) 
𝜃2(𝜑2) Customer Density ---------- 0.1955***      (0.0807) ---------- 0.3927            (0.0750) 
Time (years) t^2 0.07476*** (0.0088) 0.0006**        (0.0003) 0.0006***        (0.0009) 0.0007***      (0.0001) 
  Log likelihood         -46.700077 -46.63441 -25.405337 -31.882418 
 Technical Efficiency 0.72 0.72 0.747 0.743 
 Number of Obs 200 200 200 200 
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The LR test for the model 1 against 2, we reject the null hypothesis and state that electricity 
exogenous variables affects the efficiency of distribution companies (i.e. there do consider 
the peak load and service area in their production function). In the second test, we compare 
the model 3 and model 4 (i.e. when the undesirable variable - the quality of service enter the 
DISCOs production function, also exogenous variables considered in the model). As the 
DISCOs works to meet the targets set by the regulators, the log-likelihood test shows that we 
fail to reject the null hypothesis, but indicated that in the presence of quality of service alone 
in the production function is preferred to the combination of exogenous factors and the 
quality of services. However, we should not read too much meaning to the likelihood ratio 
test.  
In table 5.9, the log-likelihood ratio results were all in negative signs. This could be as result 
of excluding South Africa from the model (i.e. South Africa constitute an outlier in the 
model). The LR test in table 5.9 corresponds to previous test in table 5.8, (i.e. we preferred 
Model 6 to model 5 and model 7 to that of 8).  
  5.10.4    Second Stage Estimation  
In this section we adopted a two-step approach (see chapter four model specification). After 
calculating the technical efficiency score of the EDISCOs in the region, we assess the impact 
market-oriented reform has on the electricity distribution companies’ performance (i.e., the 
technical efficiency). The panel data approach enables us to investigate whether a company 
effect is fixed or is random. Likewise, we compared the effect of the reform on each country, 
recognising the heterogeneity effect in the model. We conducted the Hausman specification 
test to select the preferred model (i.e. either a fixed effect model or random effect model). 
Thus, we signify the equation. 
𝑇𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑃𝑟𝑣𝑧𝑖𝑡, 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡, 𝐶𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑡, 𝑈𝑛𝑏𝑛𝑖𝑡, 𝑁𝑒𝑑𝑐𝑠𝑖𝑡,𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡,   𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡,)                          (5.13)                                    
Where, i is the country, t is the years of observation. Teff is the technical efficiency, Prvz 
denotes Privatisation of the EDISCOs, Regu represents Independent regulator, Cmpt stands 
for competition in the industry, and Unbn represents Unbundling. Similarly, we included 
control variables in the model, such as Load factor and Fuel type, these being the key 
determinants of the company’s technical efficiency. Nedcs represents the number of 
electricity distribution companies in each country.  
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Regulation, and Unbundling are market reform dummies variable assigned 1 for the years 
following adoption of reform, and zero (0) for years without reform in each of the countries. 
Privatisation represented the percentage share of private-owned capacities, and Competition 
is a concentration ratio measured as the total electricity output of the three highest EDISCOs 
in the sector.  
In equation 5.14, we included individual country, time specific dummies, and reform variable 
interaction effects in the model. We formulate a Fixed or Random effect model (equation 
5.14), to analyse the combined impact of market-oriented policies on the electricity 
distribution companies’ technical efficiency in Africa.  
𝑇𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑖 + 𝛽1(𝑃𝑟𝑣𝑧𝑖𝑡)+ 𝛽2(𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡)+ 𝛽3(𝐶𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑡)+ 𝛽4(𝑈𝑛𝑏𝑛𝑖𝑡)+ 𝛿(𝑋)𝑖𝑡+ 𝑣𝑖+ 𝑢𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖  (5.14)         
Where Xit denotes the control variables (Load Factor, Fuel Type and Number of electricity 
distribution companies).  𝑣𝑖, represents the unit-specific residual that differs between 
countries, (but remains constant for any particular country),  while 𝑢𝑡 denotes the time effect 
(which differs across years but is constant for all countries in a particular year) and 𝜀𝑖 stands 
for the error term. Based on our prior expectations, we estimate model (5.14) to explore the 
two, three and four variable interaction effects. Also we identify the coefficient of the shock 
(v) in the estimation model as (vsigmas), and that of u with usigmas.  
Figure 5.5110 illustrates the overall trend of technical efficiency of the countries over the 
period observed. As revealed in the figure, the Cameroon and Uganda electricity distribution 
companies’ technical efficiency started at a lower level than other countries, but have shown 
a gradual improvement. Meanwhile, South Africa and Egypt started with high levels of 
efficiency but have experienced deteriorations in the quality of electricity supply over the 
period. This is attributable to inadequate planning and maintenance from Eskom (South 
Africa national utility company) and the municipal councils respectively. The political 
uprising in Egypt also negatively impacted on the quality and efficiency of the distribution 
companies in the country between 2011 and 2012 (KPMG, 2015). 
                                                          
110 Where TEFF denotes Technical Efficiency, t is the years (2000-2013), Idcode 1-16 indicates countries. 
Idcode1-Cameroon, idcode2-Cape Verde, idcode3-Cote d’Ivorie, idcode4-Egypt, idcode5-Ethiopia, idcode6-
Ghana, idcode7-Kenya,idcode8-Malawi, idcode9-Mozambique, idcode10-Namibia, idcode11-Nigeria, 
idcode12-Senegal, idcode13-South Africa, idcode14- Tanzania, Idcode 15- Uganda, and Idcode16-Zambia. 
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  5.11 The Impact of Market-Oriented reform Policies on the EDISCOs Performance 
Table 5.10 shows that the fixed effect model is preferred over the random effect and pooled 
regression model based on the Hausman specification test. To establish to what extent 
market-oriented policies influence the electricity distribution companies’ performance (i.e. 
technical efficiency) we will concentrate our interpretation on model 4, while models (1), (3) 
and (5) will be used for comparative purposes. In model 4 only unbundling among the reform 
variables is statistically significant and positively associated with electricity distribution 
companies’ performance. However, our control variables (such as the type of fuel used, and 
capacity load) are statistically significant, but are negatively associated with technical 
efficiency, which contradicts economic theory, which reveals  that gas fired power plants are 
more efficient than power plants based on other sources of energy. The overload of installed 
transformers in the region leads to the negative sign on the variable.  
Individually (except for unbundling) the other reform indicators used are not sufficient to 
increase the technical efficiency level of the electricity distribution companies in the region. 
Moreover, the interaction effect variables regulation and unbundling are statistically 
significant, but negatively associated with an increase in EDISCOs technical efficiency.    
In other words, regulatory effects undermine the effect of separation of the entities. Similarly, 
when competition co-exists with unbundling, this is statistically significant at 5%, but 
negatively associated with the electricity distribution companies’ technical efficiency. It 
implies that unbundling is less effective in a country with little or no competition in the 
sector. Most African countries only introduced limited competition, as the state-owned utility 
companies dominate the industry. 
However, when considering the three by three interaction effect, our result reveals that the co-
existence of regulation, competition and unbundling were statistically significant and positively 
associated with an increase in the electricity distribution companies efficiency level. Thus, 
African countries have to deepen their restructuring, as our finding suggests, in order to obtain 
optimal results, each country should adopt at least three reforms. This result is consistency with 
Zhang et al. (2008), although differs in that Zhang et al. (2008) did not estimate a three by three 
interaction effect model. 
Lastly, with the time effect in all the models, year 2007 is the turning point among the countries 
examined. All coefficients for the year (2007) are statistically significant and positively 
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associated with an increase in technical efficiency in the region, with the average of distribution 
losses across the region at their lowest (average of 16.99%). 
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Figure 5.5: Technical Efficiency of Electricity Distribution Companies over time in the Region 
 
Source: Authors construct (STATA 13) 
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                                                                                                         Table 5.10:Second stage Estimation Results 
                  Pooled Regression Result                         Fixed Effect Result                         Random Effect Result 
Explanatory Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
PRVZ 0.0001        (0.0001) 0.0004      (0.0009) -0.0001        (0.0005) 0.0003       (0.0004) -0.0926      (0.0001) 0.0004      (0.0009) 
REGU -0.0364**  (0.0168) -0.1654)    (0.1044) -0.0019        (0.0078) -0.0048      (0.0431) -0.0025      (0.0077) -0.1654     (0.1045) 
CMPT -0.0005**  (0.0002) -0.0011     (0.0039) 0.0002         (0.0002) 0.0001       (0.0006) 0.0002        (0.0002) -0.0011     (0.0014) 
UNBN -0.0350**  (0.0135) 0.0262       (0.1059) 0.0110         (0.0075) 0.1085**   (0.0438) 0.0107        (0.0075) 0.0262       (0.1059) 
FUEL 0.0103**   (0.0058) 0.2040***  (0.0627) -0.0148***  (0.0380) -0.0142***(0.0440) -0.0142*** (0.0373) 0.0204*** (0.0627) 
LOAD -0.0002      (0.0005) -0.0004      (0.0005) -0.0002        (0.0004) -0.0003      (0.0005) -0.0002       (0.0004) -0.0004      (0.0005) 
NEDCs -0.0009      (0.0008) -0.0022*** (0.0008) omitted omitted 0.0022        (0.0007) -0.0022      (0.0008)   
Interaction Effects       
PRZCMP --------------------- 0.2340      (0.00001) --------------------- -0.0471      (0.0514) --------------------- 0.0234       (0.00001) 
PRZREG --------------------- -0.0002     (0.0020) --------------------- -0.0001      (0.0005) --------------------- -0.0002      (0.0012) 
PRZUBN --------------------- -0.0007     (0.0008) --------------------- -0.0001      (0.0003) --------------------- -0.0007      (0.0007) 
REGCMP --------------------- 0.0026*     (0.0015) --------------------- 0.0001        (0.0006) --------------------- 0.0026*     (0.0015) 
REGUBN --------------------- 0.1559       (0.1207) --------------------- -0.1379*** (0.0505) --------------------- 0.1559       (0.1207) 
CMPUBN --------------------- 0.0002       (0.0011) --------------------- -0.0011**   (0.0005) --------------------- 0.0002       (0.0012) 
PREGMPT --------------------- -0.0389      (0.0001) --------------------- 0.0178        (0.0689) --------------------- -0.0389      (0.00002) 
PREGUBN --------------------- -0.0004      (0.0012) --------------------- 0.0007        (0.0005) --------------------- -0.00004    (0.0012) 
REGCMUBN --------------------- -0.0034      (0.0014) --------------------- 0.0016**    (0.0007) --------------------- -0.0034**  (0.0014) 
PREGCMTUNB --------------------- 0.00001     (0.00001) --------------------- -0.0870       (0.0531) --------------------- 0.00001      (0.00001) 
t_dummies       
t_2001 0.0195        (0.0238) 0.0082        (0.0302) 0.0059       (0.0102) 0.0082        (0.0111) 0.0062         (0.0101) 0.0082       (0.0302) 
t_2002 0.0239        (0.0281) 0.0056        (0.0290) 0.0048       (0.0102) 0.0072        (0.0107) 0.0052         (0.0101) 0.0056       (0.0290) 
t_2003 0.0348        (0.0282) 0.0178        (0.0294) 0.0121       (0.0103) 0.0111        (0.0108) 0.0126         (0.0102) 0.0178       (0.0294) 
t_2004 0.0361        (0.0283) 0.0235        (0.0294) 0.0143       (0.0103) 0.0153        (0.0108) 0.0148         (0.0102) 0.0235       (0.0294) 
t_2005 0.0505**    (0.0292) 0.0427        (0.0297) 0.0131       (0.0111) 0.0124        (0.0113) 0.0138         (0.0109) 0.0427       (0.0297) 
t_2006 0.0567**    (0.0294) 0.0489        (0.0301) 0.0159       (0.0112) 0.0128        (0.0115) 0.0167         (0.0111) 0.0489       (0.0301) 
t_2007 0.0734**    (0.0297) 0.0614**    (0.0303) 0.0340*** (0.0114) 0.0345***  (0.0118) 0.0347***   (0.0113) 0.0614**   (0.0303) 
t_2008 0.0818***  (0.0305) 0.0681**    (0.0306) 0.0384*** (0.0118) 0.0397***  (0.0119) 0.0391***   (0.0117) 0.0681**   (0.0306) 
t_2009 0.0906***  (0.0304) 0.0772**    (0.0306) 0.0463*** (0.0118) 0.0479***  (0.0120) 0.0471***   (0.0117) 0.0772**   (0.0306) 
t_2010 0.0877***  (0.0308) 0.0729**    (0.0309) 0.0474*** (0.0120) 0.0485***  (0.0121) 0.0481***   (0.0119) 0.0729**   (0.0309) 
t_2011 0.0911***  (0.0304) 0.0769**    (0.0306) 0.0515*** (0.0118) 0.0519***  (0.0119) 0.0521***   (0.0117) 0.0769**   (0.0306) 
t_2012 0.0956***  (0.0303) 0.0794***  (0.0305) 0.0567*** (0.0117) 0.0588***  (0.0119) 0.0573***   (0.0117) 0.0794*** (0.0304) 
t_2013 0.1000***  (0.0306) 0.0894***  (0.0307) 0.0602*** (0.0120) 0.0617***  (0.0122) 0.0608***   (0.0119) 0.0894*** (0.03071) 
Constant 0.9543***  (0.0394) 0.9703***  (0.0941) 0.9119*** (0.0307) 0.9194***  (0.0418) 0.8816***   (0.0405) 0.9703*** (0.0941) 
Preferred Model Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Fixed Effect 
Number of Obs 223 223 223 223 223 223 
Note: Significance; ***:1% level, **: 5% level, *: 10% level. Standard errors are reported in Parentheses. 
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  5.12 Discussion 
This section focuses on the individual country technical efficiency based SFA result and our 
first hypothesis, whatever a country with many electricity distribution companies obtain a 
higher efficiency level. In other words, frequent electricity interruption affects the technical 
efficiency and the reliability of power supply in the region. Given the lack of an adequate 
distribution infrastructure, the electricity delivered to the customers is less than the amount 
actually generated, because of factors such as damaged power lines, transmission technical 
losses and high theft of electric power in the region (KPMG, 2015). 
  5.12.1 General Models Analysis and improvement path of inefficient EDISCOs 
The average technical efficiency value indicates the overall efficiency of the EDISCOs. Thus 
if the technical efficiency score equals 1, this signifies that the EDISCOs are efficient. If the 
score is less than 1 then they are identified as inefficient. The result in table 5.11 indicates 
that three EDISCOs (Cameroon, Ethiopia, and Uganda) are inefficient as their average 
technical efficiency level is less than the model specific average (0.89), with the other 13 
EDISCOs operating on/or above the average technical efficiency level of 0.895 (see table 
5.11). These three countries have similar conditions and patterns of system losses in their 
electricity distribution networks, and we infer that the following could contribute to their 
below average performance.  
Fifteen years after privatisation of the former National Electricity Company of Cameroon 
(Sonel)111, consumers still face an average service with high outages (many households may 
not have power for days), an outcome which is attributed to insufficient distribution line 
length (Ossono 2014). The Ethiopian electricity distribution network is largely undeveloped 
as 85% of the population  lives in a rural area without access to the national grid, and only 2 
million people live in urban areas with access to electricity. Thus, electricity distribution 
losses in Ethiopia are high, with an average 21.1% in 2013, which makes the little 
improvement achieved insignificant (USAID 2015). 
The Uganda power distribution sector suffers a similar pattern of system losses, although the 
private company (UMEME) managing the electricity distribution networks in Uganda has 
                                                          
111 An American company AES Sirocco in 2001 acquired the Sonel - Cameroonian National Electricity 
Corporation and invested over US685 million-dollar equivalent of 400 billion CFA in the sector. 
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made significant progress in bill collection, the billing collection rate being 95.1 percent in 
2013. Although the  target is to reduce distribution losses to 13.25% by 2018 this is still 
below the World Bank benchmark of 12% (ERA 2011, 2013). 
The technical efficiency scores of each of the countries in Table 4.11 show that there is not 
much difference between technical efficiency levels in countries with many EDISCOs and 
others with few/one distribution company. 
       Table 5.12: Efficiency score of all models estimated 
EDISCO Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Average No EDISCOs 
Cameroon        0.65 0.65 0.73 0.73 0.69 3 
Cape Verde 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 9 
Cote d’Ivorie 0.98 1 0.87 0.87 0.94 1 
Egypt 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 9 
Ethiopia       0.88 0.88 0.86 0.86 0.87 1 
Ghana 0.96 0.99 0.76 0.99 0.93 2 
Kenya         0.87 0.87 1 1 0.94 1 
Malawi 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1 
Mozambique 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1 
Namibia 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 4 
Nigeria 0.96 0.96 0.94 0.94 0.95 11 
Senegal 0.90 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.94 1 
South Africa 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 187 
Tanzania 0.91 0.91 0.98 0.99 0.95 1 
Uganda       0.62 0.62 0.99 0.95 0.80 1 
Zambia 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 2 
General average 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.90 235 
      Source: Authors calculation based on estimation using STATA 13 
  5.12.2 Benchmarking of Selected Countries in the Region 
In advanced economies electricity distribution networks report from 3% to 10% in 
distribution losses, and exhibit constant returns to scale. In the case of African countries, the 
majority of the countries have distribution losses of up to 22%, leading to a greater 
inefficiency in electricity distribution. Figure 4.6 shows distribution losses in the region are 
evenly distributed, with the mean level of losses at 19.72% and 17.52% and the median level 
at 21.75% and 18.81% in the year 2000 and 2013 respectively. Countries with losses beyond 
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Figure 5. 6: Distribution losses as % of total output sent to customers (2000 - 2013)
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the 20% benchmark112 in 2013 are Ghana (21.55%), Namibia (27.72%) and Tanzania 
(20.45%). The countries with losses below the 20% benchmark in 2013 are Cameroon 
(16.05%), Cape Verde (18.53%), Cote d’Ivorie (19.47%), Egypt (11.14%), Ethiopia 
(18.98%), Kenya (17.98%), Malawi (19.84%), Mozambique (17.77%), Nigeria (15.34%), 
Senegal (15.98%), South Africa (8.49%) and Zambia (18.6). Countries in the region that have 
not adopted reforms in their distribution sector have higher distribution losses that exceed the 
benchmark. The green trend in figure 4.6 shows the percent change in the distribution losses 
achieved by a country over time. 
Figure 5.6: Distribution losses as % of total output sent to customers (2000 - 2013) 
Source: Author’s construction based on data from World Development Indicator, Africa development 
indicators, and EIA  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
112 The 20% benchmark is used by the World Bank as good performance indicator for developing countries and 
it is calculated as 10% (for technical losses) and another 10% (for non-technical losses, often referred to as 
commercial losses). 
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  5.13 Conclusion 
 Efficiency and benchmarking analysis are essential tools used in network utilities research 
and the regulatory context, especially in testing the impact exogenous factors have on 
electricity distribution companies’ performance or the choice of relevant models. In this 
chapter we have presented an empirical analysis of the effect of peak load and customer 
density on the performance of sixteen African countries electricity distribution companies. 
The African region is a suitable case for such a study because of its large number of 
EDISCOs, and the desire to improve its electricity market through market-oriented reforms of 
the sector. 
This is the first attempt to measure technical efficiency of electricity distribution companies 
in the region. This study shows that technical efficiency does not depend wholly on firm size 
or the number of electricity distribution companies a country possesses, but rather that the 
presence of a regulatory body in a country can influence the quality of service, which directly 
affects technical efficiency.  
In addition, African countries stand a better chance of improving the quality of service, 
ensuring a reliable power supply and a reduction in the percentage of distribution outages if 
they adopt at least three reforms. 
We believe that our results may be improved upon with the availability of more data, 
especially data on energy sold (MW), bill collection data, the amount of illegal connections 
and data on the time it takes the distribution operatives to response to outages in the region. 
Overall, the result suggests that the amount of energy delivered, the number of customers, the 
number of transformers and the number of employees are relevant input and output variables 
in measuring technical efficiency of electricity distribution companies. Moreover, the 
difference between technical efficiency levels of countries with many EDISCOs and others is 
only slight. The time effect in the SFA-IDF models implies that we need to be aware time-
invariant inefficiencies may be embodied in the efficiency score of EDISCOs, which is 
important for ranking firms and use in regulatory benchmarking. 
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Chapter 6 
Similar situations, different Outcomes: Explaining the factors 
influencing PPPs-Investment inflow in the African Electricity 
Market 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Having examined the extent to which some African countries have improved technical 
efficiency in their electricity distribution sector in the previous chapter, this chapter seeks to 
explain why some countries in the region attract more public-private partnership (PPPs) 
investments than others in the electricity market. Why are PPPs the dominant form of 
investment in the electricity supply industry nowadays, especially in developing countries? 
Why is it that certain forms of PPPs are common in the sector?  And how have different 
reforms/economic policies impacted on attracting PPP investment in the electricity supply 
industry in the region? Answering these questions gives us an insight as to why PPP’s are 
considered the better option (especially for developing economies). 
The introduction of PPPs in developing countries could not be attributed to internal 
processes. Rather, it is a child of coincidence based on the Washington Consensus113 and 
shared by some international private entities and a set of developing countries that consider 
PPPs as the best option to improve power sector infrastructure. The main justification, as 
recorded in the literature, is due to the lower cost, greater efficiency and higher quality of 
service delivery provided by private participation over the public (Vaillancourt-Rosenau, 
2000 and Hammami et.al. 2006).   
Despite the adoption of market-oriented reform in the power sector, invariably supported by 
the World Bank and other donors, there seems to be different patterns in the inflow of PPP 
investment and the number of projects among developing countries. This trend is weaker in 
low-income countries such as Sub-Saharan Africa, compared to other developing countries. 
                                                          
113 The Washington Consensus refers to a set of economic policies designed specifically for developing 
countries. It was sponsored by two Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank and International Monetary Fund). 
For more details on the Consensus see [Stiglitz (1998); Gore (2000); Williamson (2000) and Rodrik (2006)]. 
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East Asia and the Pacific, Eastern Europe and Latin America attract more power sector 
projects and higher investment values than the African countries. 
  Although most of the countries in Africa have involved the private sector in their electricity 
sector, such projects have had mixed results, especially when compared to other developing 
regions. It is estimated that the African region needs 7000 megawatts (MW) yearly to meet its 
energy demand by 2020 (World Energy Outlook, 2014). It requires investments of up to $27 
billion annually. Presently, the combined installed capacity in the region is not sufficient to 
meet this demand, thus there exists the possibility to partner with the private sector to attract 
meaningful PPP, so as to address the gap in the power sector investment shortfall (UNECA, 
2014 and Eberhard and Shkaratan, 2012).  
Using data from the World Bank PPP database, the World Development Indicators, African 
Development Indicators, Worldwide Governance Indicators, the Enterprise Survey and the 
US Energy Information Administration, we construct a panel (unbalanced) data analysis of 
private investments and the frequency of power projects in the electricity sector in twenty-
eight African countries. Relaxing the standard assumption regarding the determinants of 
investment in infrastructure sectors, we analyse the impact of variables that represent 
differential institutional capacities, good governance factors, macroeconomic conditions, and 
economic reform policies on a country’s ability to attract public-private investment into the 
power sector. 
To achieve the above objectives, this study seeks to answer the following questions: 
i). To what extent does market-oriented reform matters in attracting private sector 
participation in electricity market in developing economies? 
ii). Do African countries with strong political institution structure (such as a strong judicial 
system, a low corruption rate, and adherence to the rule of law) can reduce investment 
uncertainty and promote higher private sector participation?  
iii). Do macroeconomic stability (i.e. low inflation, access to capital) promotes increase in 
private sector investment in African electricity market? 
The reform experience in the power sector among the developing countries is based on the 
notion that the key objective is to change the institutional and structural framework of the 
industry, so as to enable the operator to enhance their performance and be more efficient. 
Since the Chilean experience in the early 1980s, the implementation of reform in the power 
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sector has become a prerequisite for the main donors such as the World Bank and IMF, 
before the granting of loans or the providing any form of assistance (Bigsten and Mutailenwa, 
1999). However, although the content of power sector reform differs from country to country, 
there are similar/common patterns/sequences in restructuring such as establishing 
independent regulatory agencies, privatisation of the sector (so as to permit greater private 
participation in the industry), and introducing competition (especially in power generation 
and retail).   
To the best of our knowledge this study constitutes one of the few empirical attempts to 
discuss and analyse the drivers of PPP investments in the power sector in the African region. 
This chapter is organised into the following sections. In section 6.2, we discuss the PPP in the 
power sector, with a focus on the types of PPP.  In section 6.3, we briefly summarise African 
experience of PPPs in the power sector. Section 6.4 deals with the conceptual framework and 
provides the literature review. Section 6.5 deals with the methodology and model 
specification and Section 6.6 presents the preliminary evidence. In section 6.7 we specify the 
estimation and empirical results and the section 6.8 deals with Robustness check, lastly 
section 6.9 draws the discussion and conclusion. 
6.2 Public-Private Partnership in Electricity Market 
Prior to the early 1980s, many developing countries (including African countries) advocated 
import-substitution industrialisation and industrial protection policies. However, over the past 
three and a half decades there has been a shift in economic policy in many countries in the 
African region. This led many to undertake restructuring/reforms in their power sectors to 
enhance the quality of service, to increase electricity access to their populace, and to improve 
management efficiency in the industry. However, the governments in the region were 
constrained by limited fiscal resources, capital shortages and the mismanagement inherent in 
the state-owned enterprises/corporations (SOEs). Increasing population in the region, which 
gave rise to a higher demand for electricity, saw governments seek greater involvement of the 
private sector in the delivery and financing of power generation, transmission and distribution 
as a quicker means to solve the problem. This was encouraged by multinational institutions 
such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the African Development Bank, 
and other bodies from EU, United Kingdom, and the United States (Kirkpatrick et al, 2006, 
Biglaiser and DeRouen, 2006).  
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Public-Private Partnerships in the power sector have grown substantially since 1991, with the 
number of electricity projects concluded attracting further private investment (see figure 6.1). 
The figure, below shows significant progress made in both the number of projects executed 
and the value of investments made in the sector, with the number of projects oscillating 
between 120 and 460 per year since 1996114.  
 
 
Figure 6.1: World Trends for PPP Projects and Total Investment from 1991 to 2015. 
Source: World Bank and PPIAF, PPI Project Database 
Overall, investment commitments reached a peak in 2012, with countries in Latin America, 
East Asia and the Pacific accounting for 33 percent and 25 percent respectively in terms of 
the number of projects, and 37 percent and 20.9 percent of all the PPP investment in the 
power sector.  
Private sector participation in the power sector take different forms. Thus, PPPs could be sub 
grouped into four models in which the private entity engages in either designing, building a 
new power plant, or refurbishing or expanding an existing one. The type of PPP investment 
that dominated the market is the Greenfield type (70.9 percent of number of projects and 15.8 
percent of the 125,607 projects attributed to divestures in the sector between 1991 and 2015 
(see Table 6.2). 
 
                                                          
114 Although there was decline in 1994 in terms of number of projects and in the value of investment in after 
2012, which shows a 20.2% increase in value of investment in 2012, compare to 2013.  
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Figure 6.2: Number of Projects and Investments among the regions 
Sources: World Bank and PPIAF, PPI Project Database 
Management and lease contracts have been rare in the electricity market compared to other 
investments. Management and operation contracts with foreign or local firms to manage the 
sector contribute just 0.07 percent of the 796,877 projects.  
6.2.1 Patterns of PPP Activity  
Across the developing countries, public-private partnership in the power sector accounts for 
more than 60 percent of infrastructure investment in the power sector. The most revealing of 
the data relates to the variation in the number of projects and the value of investment attracted 
by different developing regions (Table 6.2). Initial growth in PPPs in the power sector was 
driven by the Latin American countries’ readiness to involve the private sector.   
In the early 2000s, there was an increase in PPP growth in other developing regions, 
especially in power generation. The PPP bias towards middle income developing countries 
such as the Latin America region has been confirmed in a number of studies. IMF studies 
found that countries with a large population, with a strong rule of law, political stability, high 
energy consumption and stable macroeconomic indicators benefitted most (Trebilcock and 
Rosenstock, 2014; Hammami, Ruhashyankiko, and Yehoue, 2006).  
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Table 6.1: A Typology of PPPs Projects in the Power Sector 
PPPs Type Description Sub-Type 
 
 
Brownfield Concession 
Refers to when a private firm takes over the management and operation of a 
state-owned enterprise, in a bid to extend, complete, or rehabilitate the facilities 
to be more efficient and profitable. The private firm bears the risk involved and 
benefits from the yields. Brownfield concessions are normally for a specific 
period of time.  
ROT – Rehabilitate, operate and Transfer 
RLT – Rehabilitate, lease/rent, and transfer 
BROT- Build, rehabilitate, operate, and transfer 
 
 
Greenfield Concessions 
It captures a situation when a private entity builds and operates a facility for a 
period of time, as agreed with the state-owned enterprises. 
BLT – Build, lease, and transfer  
 
BOT - Build, operate, and transfer 
 
BOO – Build, own, and operate 
 
 
Management and 
Lease Contracts 
When a private firm agrees to manage a state-owned power utility for a specific 
period of time (and terms and conditions apply). Here the government shares the 
risk involved and the benefit with the private firm (depending on sharing ratio 
underlying the contract). 
Management Contract 
Lease contract 
 
Divestiture 
This is the transfer of ownership of a state-owned enterprise to a private firm. 
This process could see full-private ownership, or partial ownership.  
Full Ownership – the entire facility is sold by the 
government. 
 
Partial Ownership – Government retain some 
percentage of the ownership of the utility. 
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Table 6.2: Type of PPPs Investment in the Power Sector (1991 to 2015) 
Regions Brownfield Divestiture Greenfield Management & 
Lease Contract 
Total 
East Asia & Pacific 7071 21897 137875 0 166,843 
Europe & Central Asia 16017 55760 43698 92 115,567 
Latin America & the 
Caribbean 
72482 35555 186657 210 294,904 
Middle East & North 
Africa 
6607 224 17943 0 24,774 
South Asia 342 10470 153662 286 164,760 
Sub-Sahara Africa 2755 1701 25568 5 30,029 
Total 105274 125607 565403 593 796,877 
Sources: World Bank and PPIAF, PPI Project Database 
6.2.2 The difference between PPP-Investment and Private Investment in the Electricity 
Market 
The fundamental difference between the PPP-investment and private investment in the 
electricity market is mainly in the contacts structure and risk involved. Whereas, private 
sector investment is the total transfer of ownership of public utilities assets permanently to a 
private firm(s). This form of ownership could be in different form, the notable example is the 
divesture (see table 6.3) 
Table 6.3: Responsibilities and Role of Public and Private sector under different form of 
PPP-Investment 
Option  
                      From         
Concession Management/ 
Lease Contracts 
Divestiture 
Asset Ownership Public/Private Public Private 
Operation and Maintenance Private Private Private 
Capital Investment Private/Public Public Private 
Commercial Risk Private Public Private 
Duration 5 – 10 years 5 – 10 years Long -terms 
 
Divestiture in electricity market reform is generally considered to be an instrument of 
competition, because it impacts on both the management and ownership structure of the 
public utilities, thus it is a full private sector participation in electricity market (Green, 1996). 
However, for PPP-investment, the government-owned public utility shared some 
responsibilities and role with the private sector firms. In other word is a system where public 
or state- owned entity and private sector entity shared the provision of public assets and/or related 
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services for general public benefit, through asset ownership, operation/maintenance, investments 
being made by and/or management undertaken by the private sector entity for a specified period 
of time, where there is a substantial risk sharing with the private sector. 
6.2.3 Reasons for Private Sector Participation in Electricity Market Reform 
 
There are two approaches to assess the effects of liberalisation reforms on PPP-investment in 
electricity market. First, to examine private investment in conjunction with public investment 
(i.e. the ratio of private investment over a total investment in the sector) or secondly, examine 
the novel metric (confidence measure) that promotes public sector to attracting private 
investment in the electricity market. These two approaches can provide insights to the effects 
of market-oriented reform on PPP-investment performance in the electricity market. 
However, in each case, it is important to consider the availability of reliable data. The 
unavailability of sufficient data on public investment in electricity market in developing 
countries makes it “hard” to use the first approach.  
In the light of historical experience, private sector investment in electricity market reform in 
developing countries is a sign of response to incentives and risk return trade-off in the 
industry. Government commitment and regulatory framework in the industry contribute 
significantly to attracting private investors to the industry. The economic crisis, debt burden, 
poor electricity supply and a lot more in the early 1990s led many developing countries to 
opening up of their electricity market for private sector participation (IEA, 2003). However, 
the investment atmosphere was further strengthened by introducing liberalisation policy to 
the state-owned power utilities, countries started by amended their electricity law to enabled 
privatisation, competition in the sector and improved the quality of power supply. Also, some 
others established regulatory agency to monitor and protect the private sector investments. 
Some of the countries like India went further to abolished the single buyer model, and 
thereby increases the level of private sector participation in the industry. 
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6.3 The Africa Electricity Market and Private-Public Partnership Investment Flow 
trend 
In the 1990s, there was a policy shift from a Keynesian presumption that essential services 
(such as the provision of electricity) are best delivered by the state, toward the Hayekian 
assumption that favours grating opportunities to the private sector to share the risk and 
benefits involved. The Hayekian notion was based on the fact that state involvement leads to 
greater failure. The electoral victories of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in the United 
Kingdom and the United States of America, respectively, the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
and the advances in technological innovation in the telecommunications industry marked a 
turning point, as developed countries authorised the greater participation of the private sector 
in provision and management of essential services. Decision-makers and leaders in Africa, 
however, were less prepared to embrace such change, unlike their counterparts in Latin 
America and the ex-communist countries, who readily bought into the new paradigm of 
private sector participation in the provision of essential amenities (Nellis, 2005). 
The general factors that motivate developing countries governments to seek PPPs could be 
summed up as: first, replacing poorly performing state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with private 
counterparts whose main aim is to reduce waste and maximize profit, thus leading to 
improved delivery of service and a reliable power supply. Usually, this involves changes in 
technical and managerial capacity, brought into the sector by the private operative. The 
second motivation is a sharing of the risk involved. The desire to allocate part of the risks and 
benefits to the private sector see developing countries’ governments keen to involve the 
private sector. Third, governments may seek PPPs as a means of satisfying the growing 
demand, without compromising due to budget constraints, and to also fulfill political 
promises (Trebilcock and Rosenstock, 2015). 
PPPI started slowly in Sub-Saharan Africa, with 25 projects between 1991 and 1993, rising to 
70 from 1994 – 97, and to 140 projects from 1998 to 2003. However, these represented only 
6.3 percent of the total number of electricity projects sponsored through PPPs in the 
developing countries. 
Nonetheless, of the 2,983 PPPs projects concluded in the power sector between 1991 and 
2015, 196 were shared among over 40 different countries in Sub- Sahara Africa. 60 of those 
projects are located in South Africa (our study excludes Swap-PPP’s in the region that were 
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conducted in exchange for natural resources with some countries such as Angola, Congo DR, 
and Zambia and China).  
6.3.1. Private Sector Investment in the Electricity Market in Africa 
The current capital investment in Sub-Sahara Africa’s power sector (from all sources) is 
approximately US$4.6 billion per year, which is below the US$26.7 billion recommended by 
the World Bank (UNECA, 2011). The private sector contribution is relatively less than the 
current amount, because private investors prefer thermal generation, rather than developing 
hydropower. Moreover, governments’ efforts at involving private sector to rural 
electrification projects were not successful, due to the low return on such investment 
(UNECA, 2014). 
Historically, the main sources of investment in the power sector in Africa are the government 
and donor agencies. In recent years, these sources of funding have declined. Thus one 
alternative funding source are the PPPs. Equally, the variation in the number of projects and 
the value of investments in power generation is noticeable, with over two-thirds of the PPP 
projects and investments in the generation segment, while the remainder is shared between 
the distribution and transmission segments (see figure 6.3).  
 
Figure 6.3: PPPs Projects in power sector segments of African economies (1991 to 2015) 
Sources: World Bank/PPIAF database (2015) 
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The fewer projects in transmission and distribution sectors could be attributed to the nature of 
the sector, which is often characteristicied as a natural monopoly, including economics of 
scale and scope, and sunk costs, which private investors may not be willing to bear. In the 
transmission segment, some countries in the region (such as Nigeria) only involve private 
sectors in the form of management contract. While in the case of the distribution segment, the 
opposition of unions and political considerations may be factors for low private sector 
participation. Among the projects executed in the electricity distribution and transmission 
sectors were five natural gas-fired power plant projects115 (valued at US$ 2.2 billion), some 
of which are close to completion, while others have various phases of the project completed 
(UNECA, 2011). 
As shown in figure 6.3, between 1991 to 2014, the Republic of South Africa (50) has the 
highest number of projects among the countries in the region, with Uganda (16), Kenya (16) 
and Morocco (13) following. The process of introducing private sector participation in the 
industry varies across countries in terms of strategy, pace, sequence and its scope.  A number 
of countries in the region (such as South Africa, Morocco, Nigeria, Uganda and Kenya) have 
allowed the private sector (independent power producers) access to their generation segment, 
while transmission and distribution remain under state control. Other countries in the region 
have allowed private sector participation in both generation and distribution segments, such 
as (Morocco and South Africa).  
 
6.4 Conceptual framework, literature review and Hypothesis  
The theoretical framework underpinning the public-private partnership in the electricity 
market is based on the theory of X-efficiency developed by Leibenstein (1966). He is of the 
opinion that public institutions and state-owned enterprises are inefficient because of 
government intervention. X-inefficiency among SOE is as a result of a lack of competition 
and the market structure, while such SOE are also highly bureaucratic, giving rise to a need 
for private sector participation in the industry if efficiency is to be improved. 
In the study of electricity market reform, the role of institutions/government commitment, 
economic reform strategies and macroeconomic stability have attracted the interest of both 
theoretical and empirical analysts. Therefore the critical question is why are African countries 
                                                          
115 The Biskra Gas-fired Power Plant (Algeria), the Sidi Krir 1 Power Plant (Egypt), the Sunon-Asogi Gas-fired 
Power plant (Ghana), the Azura-Edo Gas-fired power plant Phase 1 (Nigeria) and the Songas-Gas fired power 
projects (Tanzania). 
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falling behind in attracting public-private investment inflows into the power sector when 
compared to other developing countries? (It is important to note that this study focuses on 
“attracting PPP Investment” rather than “reform success”).  
Previous studies have linked the increase in PPP investment to the type of government in 
power (Jensen 2002, 2003; Li and Resnick, 2003), to low corruption rates (Mathur and Singh 
2013; Biglaiser and Danis 2002), to political stability, to policy credibility and to the 
establishment of a regulatory framework which lowers the perceived risk of expropriation in 
the industry (Kerf et al. 1998, Pargal, 2003 and Holburn and Zellner, 2010). Institutional 
frameworks, for instance judicial strength and the rule of law, are also important (Staats and 
Biglaiser, 2012, Levy and Spiller 1994). Investors are most likely to invest in countries with 
secure property rights, strong political institutions, and political stability so as to minimise the 
investment risk. 
6.5. Factors contributing PPP Investment inflow into the Power Sector 
We identify four major factors that influence PPP investment flows: 
6.5.1. Market-Oriented Reform 
Economic policies in the form of market-oriented reform have a significant effect on 
electricity market performance. It is effective, due to the nature of the industry, for the 
government to establish an independent regulator to monitor and direct the activities of the 
operators (firms). Establishing a regulatory body is key in attracting private sector investment 
(Pargal, 2003). Wallsten (2002) suggested that countries with independent regulatory 
institutions in place before privatisation experienced an increase in private sector investment. 
 Moreover, the monopolistic nature of the market is a thing of concern to the government, and 
most governments in the region have introduced competition by allowing private sector 
participation (especially in power generation and gradually in the distribution sector). 
Therefore, we hypothesise that: 
Hypothesis 1: Market-oriented reform in the form of regulation, privatization, competition 
and unbundling is positively associated with private sector investment in the electricity 
market in African economies. 
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6.5.2 Government Commitment  
This is a critical factor for successful attraction of PPP. The incumbent governments in the 
region have to attract private investors to invest in the power sector. In fact, due to the 
capital-intensive nature of the industry with its large sunk costs, the government should 
amend existing Electricity Acts to enable greater private sector participation. For instance, the 
power sector reform in Great Britain can be attributed to the then Conservative Party 
government of Margaret Thatcher, which revalorized the entire electricity market system. It 
was the first attempt to apply reform insights on a large scale and it is often regarded as the 
'standard text book model’ of electricity sector reform (Victor and Heller, 2007). Similar 
ideological principles and political commitment aided the reform of the power sector in both 
Norway and New Zealand (Bacon and Beasant-Jones, 2001). 
On the contrary, any country that is characterised as unreliable, unstable, corrupt and/or 
ineffective will experience affliction in attracting a private sector participation (Howell, 
1998). Given the nature of investment in this industry is long-term, with sunk costs, and as 
most of the projects are irreversible and non-tradeable, investors consider government 
commitment in the host country before committing to invest. The risk of nationalisation, 
expropriation of assets, conflicts and inability to repatriate profits can force the private sector, 
to either cancel or withdraw totally from such projects (Henisz, 2002a; 2002b). In other 
words, a region or country with an effective bureaucratic structure, rule of law, a political 
stable environment, democracy, and less corruption is likely to attract more private sector 
investment in its electricity market. Dethier et al (1999) reported that countries with a 
democratic system of government is more likely to adopt market-oriented reform, which in 
turn facilitates an increase in private sector participation. Based on the above, we developed 
the third hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: Corruption, political instability, and governmental ineffectiveness are 
negatively associated with public-private partnership in electricity market investment in 
African market.  
 
6.5.3 Institutional Capacity 
The role of strong and efficient institutions cannot be overemphasised in attracting 
investment to the power sector in developing countries, especially in the African region. 
Scholars such as North (1990), Sherwood, Shepherd and Macrcos de Souza (1994), Brunetti, 
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Kisunko, and Weder (1997) emphasised the role of courts and the rule of law for accelerating 
inward investment. Institutions also refers to formal and informal rules that constrain the 
actions of individuals, firms and government corporations (North, 1990). Institutions reduce 
uncertainty in the system (North, 1991). This idea has been incorporated into empirical 
studies as one of the key determinants of foreign direct investment in developing countries. 
Scholars such as Altomonte (2000) and Morisset (2000) include variables in their studies to 
control for institutional differences across countries. Developing countries that have achieved 
an increase in PPPI in the power sector are hypothesised to be those with a system which 
protects private investment and a mechanism that effectively enforces the law, (i.e. if a 
contract is cancelled, full compensation is paid without any bureaucratic delay). No matter 
the parties involved this leads to a conclusion that weak institutions are a threat to increased 
PPP inflows into the power sector in developing countries (Lamech and Saeed, 2003). An 
independent regulatory body is another factor that signals to investors a commitment (and 
credibility) to protect the capital and revenue of the investing private firms.  
Figure 6.4 shows the relationship between the institutional framework and market-oriented 
reform in the power sector. As revealed by figure 6.4 the institutional structure of a country in 
the process of implementing a reform in the industry is important. One key component of the 
institutional framework is efficacy of the legal system, and its ability to protect and guarantee 
the security of investors against unnecessary government interference in the system. There is 
empirical evidence that countries with strong institutional frameworks, strong legal, and 
property rights systems perform better in attracting private investment into their electricity 
market (Knack and Keefer, 2005, De Soto, 2000). Thus, we hypothesise that: 
Hypothesis 3: The Institutional framework is positively associated with an increase in 
public-private partnership investment in African electricity markets. 
 
6.5.4 Macroeconomic Stability  
Investment in the power sector is considered as a long term commitment by investors, as the 
return on investment is over the life span of the project. Therefore, stable macroeconomic 
policies are necessary to attract PPP investment into the power sector. As most of the 
investment is denominated in US dollars, whereas power purchase agreement payments (the 
main source of revenue) are denominated in local currency, private sector investors are 
exposed to currency risk.  
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High level of economic/financial instability hinders private sector participation in the 
industry. This instability can be in the form of volatility in the exchange rate and or inflation, 
as both have a negative impact on private sector investment in the electricity market 
(Aizenman, and Marion, 1995). Ghura and Hadjimichael (1995) identified macroeconomic 
uncertainty and instability as the factors responsible for low investment in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Using indicators such as inflation, exchange rates, fiscal policy and structural and 
institutional variables, their findings suggest that macroeconomic uncertainty is negatively 
associated with private investments in the region.  Therefore, we conclude with the fourth 
hypothesis that: 
Hypothesis 4: Macroeconomic instability is adversely associated with public – private 
partnership investment in electricity market projects among African countries. 
6.6. Methodology and Model Specification 
This study seeks to establish the relationship between dependent variable and the explanatory 
variables and control variables, for 28 African countries over a period of twenty-five years 
(1990 – 2014). The time period and number of countries in our study are determined by the 
availability of data. 
We employed a panel data analysis similar to the (chapter four method), different in the sense 
that due to missing observation in the data we have an unbalanced panel116. The regression 
equation below to analyse the impact of political institutional/government commitment 
indicators, market-oriented policy, and macroeconomics stability variables on private sector 
investment in African electricity market. 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=2 𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑃
𝑆
𝑃=1 𝑍𝑝𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, where t = 1, . . . , T                                              [6.1] 
In the model, Yit is the dependent variable (net private sector investment in electricity market 
per population), i and t represent a unit of observation and time period respectively. j and p 
are indices used to differentiate between observed and unobserved variables. Xji and Zpi 
represent observed and unobserved variables respectively. Xji includes both reform indicators 
and control variables. Because the Zpi variables are unobserved, there are no means of 
obtaining information about the ∑ 𝛾𝑃 𝑍𝑝𝑖 component of the model. For convenience, we 
introduce a term αi, known as the unobserved effect, representing the joint impact of the Zpi 
variables on Yit. So, our model may be rewritten as follows: 
                                                          
116 We entered zero where there is missing observation, which makes the common factors smooth in the time 
domain and make it balanced. 
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 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=2 𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                              [6.2]                                                         
The αi element is vitally important in this analysis. If our control variables are so 
comprehensive that they capture all relevant characteristics/features, there will be no relevant 
unobserved characteristics. In that case, the αi term may be dropped and pooled data 
regression (OLS) will be used to fit the model, treating all the observations for all time 
periods as a single sample. However, since we are not sure whether the control variables in 
our models capture all relevant characteristics of the countries, we cannot directly carry out a 
pooled data regression of Y on X. If we were to do so, it would generate an omitted variable 
bias. Therefore, we prefer to use either a Fixed Effects (FE) or Random Effects (RE) 
regression. In the FE model, the country-specific unobserved effects (αi) are assumed to be 
the fixed parameters to be estimated. In the RE model, the country-specific effects (αi) are 
treated as stochastic.  
6.6.1 Classification of Sample Countries 
In the Table, below, the 28 countries have been divided into three groups, based on their 
income levels. (We also provide results with and without South Africa).  
 
6.6.2 Dependent Variable (Y) 
Data on the dependent variable are extracted from the World Bank’s PPIAF database 
electricity sector. The dependent variable is the real total net private sector investment in the 
electricity sector. We converted the nominal value of the total net private investment into real 
term by dividing by a GDP deflator (2000) based on US dollars. We also transformed the 
variable with a natural logarithm. Although a better dependent variable would be private 
sector investment in the electricity sector as a share of GDP, this was impossible due to 
missing data for many of the countries (see the table 6.4 for the average variables summary 
statistics of the variables).  
In addition, we apply a score factor by subtracting the log of real private sector investment in 
the electricity industry with the log of size of population of each of the country. Our 
dependent variable is the log of real private sector investment per capita. 
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Table 6.4: Classification of 28 African Countries according to income levels (2014) 
Low Income Lower Middle Income Upper Middle Income 
Burkina Faso Egypt Algeria 
Ethiopia Morocco Angola 
Madagascar Cameroon Botswana 
Mali Cape Verde Gabon 
Mozambique Ghana Mauritius 
Rwanda Kenya Namibia 
Senegal Nigeria South Africa 
Tanzania Zambia Tunisia 
Uganda   
Zimbabwe   
Source: World Bank/ PPI Database 
6.6.3 Explanatory Variables (𝑿𝒊) 
Each of the explanatory variables that was chosen represents a factor that is considered to 
determine PPP Investment in the sector.  
Market-oriented policy (economic reform) variables encompass the most common economic 
reforms initiated by the World Bank and other donors and policy makers in developing 
countries. These include establishing an independent regulatory body (Regul), privatisation 
of the state-owned enterprise (Privtz), creating competition for the state-owned vertically 
integrated firms (Compt) and separation of the different power sector entities (Unbund). We 
measured these indicators in percentages except for regulation and unbundling, which are 
dummy variables (see table 6.4). These variables are sources from PPI database for 
privatization, while regulation, competition and unbundling were derived. 
Political Institutional/government commitment, are indices identified that may affect the 
extent of private sector participation in the electricity market. Private sector investors 
consider: Corruption index–measured as the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain. Captured from 0 to 100, with 0 the most corrupt and 100 the least corrupt 
(Corrpt). Political stability is captured as the perceptions of the likelihood of political 
instability and/or politically-motivated violence. With 0 indicates most violent and 100 is 
least violent (Polst). Rule of law is measured as perceptions of the extent to which there is 
confidence in and abidance by, the rule of society. Additionally, 0 was allocated to countries 
with low rule of law and 100 to countries with high rule of law (Rulaw) and Judiciary 
independence (Judindp) captures perceptions of the quality of public services, civil service 
and its independence from political pressures. A value of 0 indicates countries with low 
judiciary independence, and 100 the countries with strong judiciary independence. For 
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Political institution and government commitment matters, we used institutional and 
governance variables obtained from World Bank development indicators database to test on 
hypothesis 2 and 3 for its impact on the public-private partnership investment on the 
electricity sector (see table 6.4). 
Lastly, we employed the following variables to capture the macroeconomic stability: (i) 
Inflation and (ii) Access to capital. Inflation is measured as the percentage of annual growth 
rate of the GDP deflator (Infatn). Access to capital is the domestic credit available to private 
sector by banks as the percentage of GDP (Asscap). For a detailed explanation and 
description of the variables (see table 6.4). In sum, these explanatory variables represent the 
three factors identified in the literature that matter for the private sector participation in the 
electricity market.  
6.6.4 Control Variables (𝒁𝒓𝒊) 
Control variables do not directly have impact on the dependent variable, but may explain 
some portion of the variation in the real private sector investment per capita in the electricity 
market in the African economies. The following are the control variables used in this study; 
(i) Real GDP per capita and (ii) Energy consumption 
Real GDP per capita is used as a prosperity indicator, which maintains that countries with 
high per capita GDP are more likely to attract more private sector participation in their 
electricity supply industry (Grosse, 1997). We measure the GDP per capita in US$ dollar 
base on year 2000 (Rgdpcap).  Energy consumption is the amount of the energy used by the 
both industrial and residential users annually (Enecons). Data for this variables were 
obtained from World Bank development indicator and US energy information agency. We 
expect the private sector investment in electricity market may be affected by real GDP per 
capita, and energy consumption.  Also we did not include any country specific variables in 
the equation, because it reduces the degree of freedom, thereby affect the power of the tests 
of hypothesis relating to the parameters of the model. 
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Table 6.5: Dataset Variables Description 
Dependent Variable Unit 
 
Notations Description 
Investment in energy with private 
participation (constant 2000 US$) 
US $ dollars NetInvest Investment in energy projects with private participation covers infrastructure projects in energy (electricity generation, 
transmission and distribution) that have reached financial closure and directly or indirectly serve the public. Divided by 
GDP deflator index (US$) to convert to real investment in electricity market. 
Explanatory Variables    
Regulation Dummy Regul 0 =No independent/autonomous regulatory Agency in the respective year 
1 =Independent/autonomous regulatory Agency.  
Privatization % Privtiz Share capacity of private-owned capacities (%) 
Competition HHI % Compt  Percentage share of government control as relates to private  sector participation in the sector 
Unbundling Dummy Unbund 0 = Vertical Integration 
1= Restructuring through vertical separation  
Corruption Index Percentile 
Rank 
Corrupt Control of Corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, as well as 
"capture" of the state by elites and private interests.  With 0 corresponding to lowest rank, and 100 to highest rank. 
Political Stability Percentile 
rank 
Polstab Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or 
politically-motivated violence, including terrorism.  With 0 corresponding to lowest rank, and 100 to highest rank.   
Rule of Law Percentile 
Rank 
Rulaw Rule of Law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. With 0 
corresponding to lowest rank and 100 to highest rank. 
Judicial Independence Percentile 
Rank 
Judepen It captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence 
from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies. Percentile rank indicates the country's rank among all countries covered by the aggregate 
indicator, with 0 corresponding to lowest rank and 100 to highest rank.   
Access to Capital - Domestic 
credit to private sector by banks 
(% of GDP) 
% Asscap Domestic credit to private sector by banks refers to financial resources provided to the private sector by other depository 
corporations (deposit taking corporations except central banks), such as through loans, purchases of non-equity securities, 
and trade credits and other accounts receivable that establish a claim for repayment. For some countries these claims 
include credit to public enterprises. 
Inflation % Infatn Inflation as measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP deflator shows the rate of price change in the economy as a 
whole. 
Control Variables    
Real GDP per capita Constant 
2000 US$ 
Rgdpcap GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. It is calculated without making deductions for 
depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant price using year 
2000 U.S. dollars. 
Population Number 
(total) 
Popul Total population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or 
citizenship. The values shown are midyear estimates. 
Energy Consumption Kwh 
(Billion) 
Enecons Electric power consumption by the industrial and residential users annually 
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6.7. Preliminary evidence 
In this section, we present preliminary evidence about private sector investment behaviour in 
relation to reform indicator, political institutions and macroeconomic stability performance in 
selected African countries. Before proceeding with estimation analysis, we conducted 
correlation matrix between pairs of explanatory variables used in the regression. Table 6.5 
show the correlation matrix of the regresssors, and indicates the presence of multicollinearity 
between political institution/government commitment variables. 
  6.7.1 Overview of dataset and countries comparisons 
A summary of individual country data is presented in table 6.6. We simply take the average 
over the respective years for each of the countries’ variables in the sample to evaluate their 
relative performance.  
The share of private investment per capita among African countries was generally higher in 
Cape Verde (57.9%), Morocco (18.9%), Gabon (14%), and the least in Ethiopia (0.04%), 
Madagascar (0.03%) and Burkina Fasco (0.02%). It appeared middle income and upper 
middle income countries maintained higher share of the private sector investment per capita 
than the low income countries.  
Mauritius has experienced relative stability politically, with strong judiciary, adherence to 
rule of law and high real GDP per capita may be attributed to high private sector investment 
per capita in the power sector (4.8%), although with low participation in terms adopting 
reforms variables.  With low implementation of market-oriented reform in power sector in 
Botswana, only 40% private sector ownership in terms of capacities, no competition, as the 
government control 99.8% of the sector. But over the period, its share of private sector 
investment per capita has increase by (1.3%) as mainly as a result of strong political 
institutions influence.  
In 1999 Cape Verde privatised the state-owned Empresa Pública Electricidade e Água 
(ELECTRA), with 51% ownership retained, established an independent regulator, with 
private sector participation in power generation in form of  independent power producers, but 
relatively no attempt to unbundled the sector. 
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Table 6.6: Correlation of the Explanatory Variables 
Variables ASSCAP COMPT CORRPT PRIVTZ LNENECONS INFATN JUDINDP POLST REGUL LNRGDPCAP RULAW UNBUND 
ASSCAP 1 -0.499 0.565 0.183 0.415 -0.421 0.718 0.369 0.011 0.633 0.578 -0.028 
COMPT -0.498 1 -0.202 -0.042 -0.746 -0.003 -0.307 0.095 0.014 -0.356 -0.176 -0.207 
CORRPT 0.5657 -0.202 1 0.014 -0.024 -0.299 0.892 0.762 -0.072 0.465 0.899 -0.192 
PRIVTZ 0.183 -0.042 0.014 1 0.131 0.163 0.135 0.086 -0.092 0.176 0.076 0.091 
LNENECONS 0.415 -0.747 -0.025 0.131 1 0.225 0.183 -0.249 0.187 0.286 0.013 0.375 
INFATN -0.421 -0.003 -0.299 0.163 0.225 1 -0.288 -0.131 0.228 -0.349 -0.240 -0.011 
JUDINDP 0.717 -0.307 0.892 0.134 0.183 -0.288 1 0.674 -0.036 0.592 0.899 -0.063 
POLST 0.369 0.095 0.762 0.086 -0.249 -0.131 0.674 1 -0.150 0.484 0.804 -0.299 
REGUL 0.011 0.014 -0.072 -0.092 0.187 0.229 -0.036 -0.150 1 -0.280 -0.014 0.318 
LNRGDPCAP 0.633 -0.356 0.465 0.176 0.286 -0.349 0.593 0.484 -0.280 1 0.521 -0.004 
RULAW 0.578 -0.175 0.899 0.076 0.013 -0.240 0.899 0.804 -0.014 0.521 1 -0.059 
UNBUND -0.028 -0.207 -0.193 0.092 0.375 -0.011 -0.063 -0.299 0.318 -0.004 -0.059 1 
Note: Those highlighted numbers indicate the presence of multi collinearity among political institutions/government commitment variables
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However, Cape Verde has experienced gradual economic growth, with reflective political 
stability, less corruption, and strong judiciary. The combined effects of these factors has 
influence the share of private sector investment capita. 
Gabon is relatively strong due to rich natural resources which attributed to high real GDP per 
capita. It embarked on reform with privatisation of state-owned vertically integrated power 
utility - the Société d'Electricité et d’Eaux du Gabon (SEEG), established independent 
regulatory, separated power generation from other two. The sector has experienced increase 
in relation to private sector investment capita within the period. 
Low-income countries faced low real GDP per capita, and weak political institutions. 
Embanked on market-oriented reform in the late 1990s, as an economic reform aimed to 
secure loans, encourage diversification of the economy and stabilisation of the power supply.  
Ethiopia has experienced low economic growth within the period, coupled with weak 
institutions, low energy consumption has affected the private sector investment per capita. 
Although the government unbundled the sector, it has not really attract much private sector 
investment in the sector as expected. 
Burkina Fasco state-owned SONABEL still dominates the sector with little private sector 
participation. The country characterised with fragile institution, poor real GDP per capita and 
partial implementation of the reform. Not much has been experienced in this country in term 
of increase private sector investment. 
Similarly, Madagascar, although richly endowed with abundant energy resources, but with 
poor real GDP per capita, weak institution, averagely corrupted tends to reduce the private 
sector investment in the sector. 
However, what factors and lessons we can draw from these preliminary evidence is that real 
GDP per capita is the sole determinant of the private sector investment in the region. As 
middle countries appeared to increase their share of private sector investment by increasing 
their energy consumption, as result of rise in economic growth. In low-income countries, 
however, low energy consumption, and poor access to capital sharply reduce the private 
sector investment. In all, the countries in the sample has experienced an increase in terms of 
increase in the number of private sector owned capacities in the sector.
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Table 6.7: Average variables summary statistics and country ranking (1991 -2014) 
Country Netinvtcap Regul Privtz Compt Unbund Corrpt Polst Rulaw RGDP Infatn Judindp Enecons Asscap 
Algeria 0.0665 0.48 15.24 92.07 0.48 29.603 10.04 24.13 1957 13.54 28.85 24.24 13.56 
Angola 0.0012 0.72 50 99.09 0 4.75 19.96 5.96 414.83 26.86 10.02 2.36 8.25 
Botswana 0.0129 0.12 40 99.84 0.12 78.3 80.6 67.89 3423.5 8.26 69.86 2.14 19.2 
Burkina Faso 0.0002 0 26.8 99.83 0 48.295 38.14 35.08 230.33 2.86 28.88 0.53 14.52 
Cameroon 0.0011 0.64 24.64 99.12 0.52 11.73 26.71 12.76 614.38 3.79 21.48 3.52 11.61 
Cape Verde 0.5790 0.6 23 99.94 0 64.1 76.4 66.1 1396.7 1.76 59.55 0.18 36.66 
Congo Rep 0.0449 0 76 99.86 0 12.39 19.74 9.51 1134.5 7.17 8.64 0.5 7.64 
Cote d’Ivorie 0.0128 0.64 97.36 98.77 0.36 24.38 13.35 12.31 600.14 5 20.78 2.99 18.5 
Egypt 0.0105 0.56 37.5 80.48 0.64 38.56 24.09 49.32 1564.3 9.65 41.13 81.08 38.71 
Ethiopia 0.0004 0.68 24 99.01 0.24 29.31 11.68 27.08 156.31 10.01 26.25 2.55 13.35 
Gabon 0.1404 0.16 72 99.62 0.56 26.74 54.27 37.8 4333.9 6.38 28.23 1.2 10.37 
Ghana 0.0206 0.68 83.2 98.4 0.36 54.12 42.19 50.31 295.98 21.32 52.94 6.12 11.13 
Kenya 0.0154 0.32 76 98.75 0.64 15.8 13.89 19.16 437.17 11.26 35.36 4.22 24.96 
Madagascar 0.0003 0.6 36 99.68 0.24 49.46 38.83 34.95 245.45 12.9 26.94 0.93 11.39 
Mali 0.0108 0.56 64 99.79 0.44 34.19 43.73 39.72 232.16 3.47 20.94 0.62 14.43 
Mauritius 0.0479 0.36 68 99.3 0 70.99 76.86 79.86 4064.8 5.59 72.77 1.63 65.72 
Morocco 0.1887 0.68 53.52 95.15 0.64 52.52 34.18 52.64 1506.8 1.91 52.49 16.68 43.86 
Mozambique 0.0337 0.4 52 97.63 0 37.69 49.18 29.63 287.09 18.75 37.69 5.79 14.37 
Namibia 0.0010 0.56 76 99.63 0.64 66.13 65.44 58.39 2280.2 8.32 61.03 2.27 42.26 
Nigeria 0.0058 0.36 68.4 94.08 0.36 9.78 7.65 10.83 436.84 21.6 14.08 13.79 14.91 
Rwanda 0.0183 0.36 38 99.95 0.36 47.39 21.54 26.63 272.84 10.08 35.44 0.25 9.96 
Senegal 0.0112 0.64 56.16 99.59 0.64 48.58 33.29 48.22 509.06 3.28 46.82 1.47 22.32 
South Africa 0.0632 0.36 70.72 58.87 0.44 66.64 39.4 55.94 3307.9 8.84 71.35 186.12 64.74 
Tanzania 0.0087 0.24 72 99.25 0.48 26.98 32.61 41.28 353.21 15.6 35.6 2.49 9.04 
Tunisia 0.0296 0.4 88 97.24 0 57.61 44.31 52.27 2429.9 4.61 65.69 9.42 57.09 
Uganda 0.0194 0.6 47.44 99.63 0.52 20.52 13.56 36.93 289.75 12.19 36.85 1.53 8.22 
Zambia 0.0344 0.68 69.6 98.27 0.52 29.21 50.85 36.99 292.5 37.04 22.98 7.36 7.97 
Zimbabwe 0.0203 0.44 34.68 97.96 0.48 11.79 16.63 7.88 446.52 3.01 18.46 8.9 39.57 
** The top three countries in each variables are highlighted in bold, While the three lowest are in italics.  
The dependent variable derived from Net total private investment divided by the total population of each country.  
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  6.8 Estimation and Empirical Results  
The regression model used is to gauge our hypotheses to empirically test the impact of 
market-oriented reforms, institutional and government commitment indicators and 
macroeconomic stability variables on the public-private investment in the electricity supply 
industry, using aggregated cross-sectional data for a sample of 28 countries in Africa during 
1990 – 2014. A number of adjustments were made to correct for heteroscedasticity, we used 
log of private sector investment in electricity supply industry minus by the population as a 
dependent variable to avoid heteroscedasity. This approach also provides a robustness check 
to validate our findings when the economic giant of the region is excluded. 
  6.8.1 Empirical Results 
In this section, we employed the orthodox (stepwise) estimation to test our hypotheses on the 
factors influences the private sector investment. Starting (with individual variables 
estimation, before moving to more complex one).  
𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖 = f (regul, Privtz, compt, unbund) + (corrpt, judindp, polst, Rulaw) + (infatn, 
Asscap, lnrgdpcap, lnenecons) + 𝜀𝑡                                                                                  (6.2) 
Where: Regul       =    Regulation 
             Privtz       =    Privatisation 
             Compt      =    Competition 
             Unbund    =    Unbundling 
             Corrpt       =   Corruption 
             Judindp     =   Judiciary Independence 
             Polst         =   Political Stability 
             Rulaw       =   Rule of Law 
             Infatn        =   Inflation 
             Asscap      =   Access to capital 
             Lnrgdpcap =  log of real GDP per capita 
             Lnenecons =  log of energy consumption         
The estimates results are reported in table 6.8. The parameters on natural logarithms are 
interpreted as elasticities. The political institution/government effectiveness model as 
presented in column 1 explains the percentage variation in PPPI in the region. The second 
and third columns report the market-oriented reform and macroeconomic stability and control 
variables. Then four columns deals with unified models percentage variation with the 
incorporation of interaction effect mode. We produced estimations showing the relationships 
between the log of net private-public investment per capita in power sector with its key 
determinants, market-oriented reform variables and control variables.  Our empirical results 
are classified into two set of relationship:  
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       Table 6.8: Estimation Results of Factors Determining Private Sector Investment in Africa 
 
Explanatory variables 
Institution and government 
commitment 
           
Market-oriented reform  
          
Macroeconomic stability and 
Control Variables 
           
        Unified Models 
           
Variables Name Parameters Eq.1 Eq.2 Eq.3 Eq.4 
Corrpt    𝒙𝟏 -0.040     (0.032)              -------------------- -------------------- -0.010       (0.039) 
Judindp 𝒙𝟐 -0.011     (0.011) -------------------- -------------------- -0.023       (0.034) 
Polst 𝒙𝟑  0.012     (0.023) -------------------- --------------------  0.012       (0.027) 
Rulaw 𝒙𝟒  0.049     (0.033) -------------------- --------------------  0.052       (0.037) 
Regul 𝒙𝟓 -------------------- -0.256   (0.525) -------------------- -2883.222 (2.301) 
Privtz 𝒙𝟔 -------------------- -0.009   (0.008) -------------------- 0.158**    (0.082) 
Compt 𝒙𝟕 -------------------- -0.024  (0.119) -------------------- 0.210        (0.162) 
Unbund 𝒙𝟖 -------------------- -0.119   (0.498) -------------------- (Omitted)
117 
Infatn 𝒙𝟗 -------------------- -------------------- -0.021        (0.019) -0.029       (0.019) 
Asscap 𝒙𝟏𝟎 -------------------- -------------------- -0.024        (0.002) -0.003       (0.028) 
lnrgdpcap 𝒍𝒏𝒙𝟏𝟏 -------------------- --------------------   3.161**    (1.558)  2.158       (1.667) 
lnenecons 𝒍𝒏𝒙𝟏𝟐 -------------------- -------------------- -2.024***   (0.737) -1.494       (0.962) 
Interaction effect models118      
Regvtz 𝒛𝟏 -------------------- -------------------- --------------------  29.141     (55.993) 
Regmpt 𝒛𝟐 -------------------- -------------------- --------------------  29.039     (56.255) 
Regund 𝒛𝟑 -------------------- -------------------- -------------------- 2894.117  (5575.946) 
Primpt 𝒛𝟒 -------------------- -------------------- --------------------  -0.002**  (0.0009) 
Priund 𝒛𝟓    -0.067*     (0.038) 
Comund 𝒛𝟔    -29.167     (56.245) 
Reprmt 𝒛𝟕    -0.294       (0.565) 
Reprnd 𝒛𝟖    -29.175     (55.986) 
Prmund 𝒛𝟗    0.292        (0.562) 
Recound 𝒛𝟏𝟎 -------------------- -------------------- -------------------- (Omitted)
119 
Repround 𝒛𝟏𝟏 -------------------- -------------------- --------------------  0.003        (0.007)  
R-squared  0.37 0.27 0.092 0.31 
constant  -3.468*** (0.566) 0.0467   (11.402) -19.649**  (9.199) -33.237*   (18.790) 
Preferred Model   Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects 
Number of groups   28 28 28 28 
Number of observation   126 126 126 700 
       Note: The dependent variable is the log of real private sector investment per capita (lnnetinvestcap). Standard error are in parentheses 
       *, **, *** indicate significance of the coefficient respectively at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level.
                                                          
117 STATA drop Unbund due to collinearity. 
118 Interactions effect model is the interplay among explanatory variables that produces an effects on the outcome dependent variable (lnnetinvpul) which is the different from the sum of effects of the 
individual predictors. If two explanatory variables interact in determining a response variable when the partial effect of one depends on the value of the others (see appendix for detail) 
119 The interaction of regulation, competition and unbundling was dropped due to collinearity. 
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First, the individual institutional, liberalisation reform and macroeconomic stability variable’s 
impact on PPP-investment in the power sector. Second, reflects the interaction effect on the 
PPP-investment performance as result of combination effect of the market-oriented reform in 
the electricity market. We carried out some model diagnosis tests in order to strengthen our 
results. We conducted Hausman test in order to choose the preferred model, and Wooldridge 
test for autocorrelation in panel data. Also, the adjusted R-squared (in table 6.8) show the 
model explained 31 variations the key determinant of PPP-investment in power sector in the 
region. Thus, these shows there are other factors that prevent the flow of PPP-investment in 
power sector in Africa region. Nevertheless, the rise in economic growth in the region for the 
last decade has not influenced the full private sector participation in the power sector reform. 
Some of these factors are as a result of low or non-existent of sovereign credit ratings among 
these countries and the absence of proper financial instruments to handle the risks associated 
with power projects and among other factors inherent in electricity market. 
6.8.1 Political Institution/government commitment 
 In column 1, our objective is to establish the proportion of the variation in the private sector 
investment per capita that can be explained collectively by the political 
institution/government commitment. Our results show that the institutional variables could 
only explained 37% variation in the private sector investment in the sector. Thus, none of the 
variables were statistical significant, although the political stability and rule of law variables 
were positive. Therefore, African economies with stable judicial system (i.e. independence 
from elites and political pressures, adherence to rule law and political stability all maintained 
the appropriate signs, but statistically insignificant) which shown that political institution 
matters, but it is not the sole factors that influences private investors decision. Furthermore, 
our findings shows that most corrupt countries in the region attracted less PPP-investment, 
which is if one-unit increase in corruption leads to 4.0% less in PPP-investment. This result 
corresponds to Emirullah & Azam (2006) on the study of public-private partnership in 
ASEAN countries in provision of infrastructure120 in emerging markets. 
  6.8.2 Market-oriented reform 
Our result in column 2 showed the variation of all the market-oriented variables are 
statistically insignificant, but with appropriate sign. Turing to the effects of the market-
                                                          
120 PPI database classifies infrastructure into four sectors – Electricity, Telecommunication, Transportation and 
Water. 
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oriented reform shown that establishing regulation, privatising inefficient state-owned 
enterprise, introducing competition and separating the segment of the industry individually is 
necessary conditions, but not sufficient to influence the outcome of the private sector 
investment in the sector. 
  6.8.3 Macroeconomics stability and control variables  
Intuitively, the parameters in column 3 shown only the real GDP per capita was positive and 
statistically significant at 5%. (i.e. countries with higher real GDP per capita are more 
designated to attract more private sector investment as they are have higher purchasing power 
and greater projected demand in the power sector. This result was consistent in all our 
specifications. Therefore, for every dollar increase in real GDP per capita promotes higher 
private sector investment in the power sector by 99%. This could confirm that real GDP per 
capita is a good indicator, as the private sector invests in countries with the affordability to 
pay for its services. 
   6.8.4 The Interaction Effect Models 
We experimented with different model by the including the interaction effect as reported in 
table 6.8. Our result is reported in (column 4). Based on our model selection this is refers to 
as the preferred model. The result shown individual market-oriented variables are statistically 
significant, some with expected signs.  However, there is evidence of crowding-out of private 
sector investment in power sector. Our result suggests that countries with deepen market-
oriented reform attract lower private investment flows. For instance, higher percentage of 
countries in the region that have adopted at least two reform variables experiences reduction 
in  total net private sector investment by 6% and 29% respectively. In addition, with rise in 
establishing regulatory bodies, privatizing new projects, introducing competition and 
separating the three segment of the sector leads to increase in private sector investment in the 
sector by 3% holding other factor constant (i.e. government commitment in electricity market 
reform matters in attracting PPP-investment, thus corresponding to our chapter four results). 
   6.9. Robustness Check 
We explore the classification of each of the countries, as we are aware of, that all these 
countries are not equal. To avoid these problems, see table 6.9, we provide empirical result 
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without South Africa. Our hypothesis is that if the coefficients do not change significantly, 
then we take it to be evidence that these coefficients are “robust” 121(Lu and White, 2014). 
The detailed results, as presented in Table 6.9 shown no significant variation in the 
interaction effect and the real GDP per capita is significant just like in the preferred model. 
From the result, it is evidence that South Africa is an economic giant of the region, and 
absent of the country in the sample not affected the private sector investment in electricity 
market in the region. It shown that the true determinant of private sector in power sector in 
the region is the wealth of the people. 
In order to gain depth insight of the relative effect of different factors influencing the private 
sector investment in Africa, we estimated the interaction effect excluding South Africa. Thus 
dropping South Africa from the model, does not change anything. Therefore, South Africa do 
not constitute outlier in the model. 
                                                          
121 The word “robust” in this content should be confused with the concept of robustness in the statistics 
literature, which refers to the insensitivity to covariate selection, typically extreme in some way. What we 
refer to here is the degree of insensitivity of an estimator to adding or removing sample observation. 
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       Table 6.9: The estimation outcome without South Africa of the factors determining private sector investment in Africa 
 
Explanatory variables 
Institution and government 
commitment 
           
Market-oriented reform  
          
Macroeconomic stability and 
Control Variables 
           
        Unified Models 
           
Variables Name Parameters Eq.1 Eq.2 Eq.3 Eq.4 
Corrpt    𝒙𝟏 -0.012     (0.031)              -------------------- -------------------- -0.039       (0.035) 
Judindp 𝒙𝟐 -0.036     (0.026) -------------------- -------------------- -0.044       (0.029) 
Polst 𝒙𝟑 -0.019    (0.021) -------------------- -------------------- -0.019       (0.026) 
Rulaw 𝒙𝟒  0.001     (0.031) -------------------- --------------------  0.017       (0.034) 
Regul 𝒙𝟓 -------------------- -0.831   (0.457) -------------------- -435.346  (474.863) 
Privtz 𝒙𝟔 -------------------- -0.010   (0.064) -------------------- 0.376         (0.271) 
Compt 𝒙𝟕 -------------------- -0.149   (0.112) -------------------- 0.856**     (0.368) 
Unbund 𝒙𝟖 --------------------  0.264   (0.434) -------------------- (Omitted)
122 
Infatn 𝒙𝟗 -------------------- -------------------- -0.023        (0.016) -0.029*       (0.017) 
Asscap 𝒙𝟏𝟎 -------------------- -------------------- -0.013        (0.020)  0.024          (0.028) 
lnrgdpcap 𝒍𝒏𝒙𝟏𝟏 -------------------- --------------------  2.089         (1.349)  1.937          (1.499) 
lnenecons 𝒍𝒏𝒙𝟏𝟐 -------------------- -------------------- -1.837***  (0.630) -0.863          (0.840) 
Interaction effect models123      
Regvtz 𝒛𝟏 -------------------- -------------------- --------------------  44.029      (47.563) 
Regmpt 𝒛𝟐 -------------------- -------------------- --------------------  43.847      (47.783) 
Regund 𝒛𝟑 -------------------- -------------------- --------------------  4380.83    (474.998) 
Primpt 𝒛𝟒 -------------------- -------------------- --------------------  -0.003       (0.003) 
Priund 𝒛𝟓    -0.   153     (0.247) 
Comund 𝒛𝟔    -44.170      (47.783) 
Reprmt 𝒛𝟕    -0.444        (0.479) 
Reprnd 𝒛𝟖    -44.166      (47.557) 
Prmund 𝒛𝟗     0.443         (0.478) 
Recound 𝒛𝟏𝟎 -------------------- -------------------- -------------------- (Omitted)
124 
Repround 𝒛𝟏𝟏 -------------------- -------------------- --------------------  0.004        (0.007)  
R-squared  0.045 0.138 0.120 0.35 
constant  -2.197*** (0.561) -16.291   (11.142) -13.352**  (7.954) -95.859*** (36.006) 
Preferred Model  Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects 
Number of groups  27 27 27 27 
Number of observation  116 116 116 675 
                                                          
122 STATA drop Unbund due to collinearity. 
123 Interactions effect model is the interplay among explanatory variables that produces an effect on the outcome dependent variable (lnnetinvpul) which is the different from the sum of effects of the individual 
predictors. If two explanatory variables interact in determining a response variable when the partial effect of one depends on the value of the others (see appendix for detail) 
124 The interaction of regulation, competition and unbundling was dropped due to collinearity. 
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   6.10 Discussion and Conclusion 
The primary purpose of this study is to establish the factors influencing of private sector 
investment in power sector in Africa. As the countries across the region faced similar 
situation, but attract different outcomes in terms of volume of private investment inflow. 
Our result suggests that political institution matters, but not to our expectation especially 
when compare to the literatures. In principle, countries with low corruption rate, strong 
political institutions and haven adopted market-oriented reform are to enjoy significant 
increase inflow of private sector investment than other countries. Also, countries with a low 
inflation, flexible access to capital, high real GDP per capita and used more energy suggest to 
attract more of the private investment. This result is corresponded to earlier findings by 
number of studies such as (Habib and Zurawicki, 2002; and Mauro, 1995). Thus, our model 
only explained 31% variation of the key determinant of PPP-investment in the power sector, 
which shows low variation. However, due to lack of availability of data on sovereign credit 
rating, country risk and absence on financial instruments to mitigate the risk involved in 
power sector projects contributed to the low variation.  Our results shows that both foreign 
and domestic private investors favours to invest in countries with relative high income per 
capita, as there tend to focus more on returns to investment.  
Second, we may investigate if countries with abundant natural resources endowments in the 
region attract more private investment to justify such behaviours from private sectors.  
However, to improve this study we suggest using lagged dependent125 variables in dynamic 
panel data estimation. As the circumstance between fixed effects and random effects 
formulation has the implications for estimations that are of a different nature than those 
associated with static model.  Lastly, this chapter has set the objective of empirically 
investigating the determinant of PPP-investment in Africa region electricity market.  
We believe that our study contributed to existing literature, especially with regard to 
developing countries, in particular Africa region. 
                                                          
125 Thus if lagged dependent variables also appear as independent variables, then the strict exogeneity of the 
regresssors no longer holds. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion and policy recommendations for further research 
7.1 Conclusion 
In this study, we have made a conscious effort to assess and analyse the performance of the 
electricity market in the African region. Our objective is to develop an economic perspective 
on electricity market reform, with a specific emphasis on understanding the impact of market-
oriented reform (i.e. regulation, privatisation, competition and unbundling) on the 
performance of the power generation sector, to identify factors that promote efficiency in 
power distribution, and to examine factors influencing private sector investment in the 
electricity market. The backdrop of market-oriented reform has been adopted by many 
developing countries with the expectation for that the benefits will be visible to the customers 
(end users). This thesis contributes to existing literatures in analysing electricity market 
reforms in the African region with through an econometric approach based on cross-country 
analysis. 
The approach employed in this research to analyse the electricity market reform in 
developing economies by drawing upon three main methods used in analysing electricity 
reform as identified by Jamasb et al (2004): an econometric approach, efficiency and 
productivity analysis methods, and comparative case studies. The first method (the 
econometric approach) is best suited to an analysis and testing of hypotheses on electricity 
reform and performance in the power generation sector. The second approach (the efficiency 
and productivity method) is best used when measuring the effectiveness with which inputs 
are transformed into outputs, relative to best practice. The third method is for a single-country 
or cross-country study. Of these three methods, our study draws upon the first, second and an 
element of the third category.  
This chapter is arranged into five sections. First, we discuss whether we have answered the 
questions that gave rise to this research as stated in chapter one. The second connects to the 
policy consequence of results - either to a country that consider embarking on reform or to 
policy makers for such a country. The third section deals with the policy recommendations of 
our result, fourth section highlights the limitation of our research and lastly, what area(s) for 
further study are discussed in the final section. 
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7.2 Have the research questions been answered? 
This research were motivated by basically three main questions. The first question and 
objective seek to answer to what extent do market-oriented reform impact on the performance 
of a specific segment of the industry (power generation). Our research found that while there 
are few significant impacts of the reform variables on power generation performance when 
considered alone, they tend to be more effective when they co-exist or interact with other 
reform variables. So for countries to obtain first-best outcomes in electricity market reform, it 
is important to introduce more than one reform at a time in the reform process. Power sector 
reform in African countries are characterized with amended of electricity law to attract 
independent power producers (IPPs), corporatization of service provision, and the creation of 
new institutions such as regulatory authority to support reform activities. While there is no 
strong commitment to fully embark on privatisation, retail competition and unbundling, as the 
government prefers to engage in private sector participation and public-private partnership in 
power generation. This system promotes hybrid structure where the state-owned vertically 
integrated power companies still dominated as act as a single buyer. 
The second question and objective in the second empirical paper employed a stochastic input 
distance function using multiple inputs and outputs (which have been adjusted to account for 
the influence of exogenous factors such as peak load and customer density ) to evaluate the 
performance of the electricity distribution companies in the region. Moreover, we observe the 
behaviour of electricity distribution companies ‘when the number of outages/disruptions (a 
proxy for the quality of service) enters in the company’s production function as an 
undesirable input variable (i.e. an imperfect substitute for unscheduled maintenance 
activities, and planned interruptions)’. Our findings show an improvement in technical 
efficiency of EDISCOs when the quality of service is incorporated into the model. Thus, this 
allows us to identify the sources of technical inefficiency and the underlying trade-off faced 
by EDISCOs between the cost of improving the quality of service and other inputs. 
Lastly, the third question and objective examined what causes disparity in attracting private 
sector investment in the power sector of 28 African countries. Contrary to conventional 
expectation, results generated by our model imply that private investors do not place too 
much emphasis on the level of corruption perception of a country in their investment 
decision. Political stability, rule of law and judiciary independence are unlikely to influence 
private sector investors although there maintain appropriate signs. In fact, adopting market-
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oriented reform (i.e. regulation, privatisation, competition and unbundling) alone into power 
sector is necessary condition, but not a sufficient condition in terms of increasing the private 
sector investment, only when co-exist that the reform variables makes impacts. Our finding 
indicates that private investment is influenced by the high real GDP per capita of a country 
(i.e. countries with high marginal utility to income and wealth will attract more private 
investment in its power sector as there have the income to afford the services provided by the 
private sector). 
7.3 Policy consequences of our results 
In this section, we mention the policy consequences of our results, knowing fully well that 
the validity of our result may have been limited by some factors (as specified in 6.5). Our 
results have five policy implications. 
Power sector reforms in Africa have taken place within diverse political, economic, and 
structural contexts. Many of the reforms were initiated as a result of conditions to secure 
loans, aid, responds to economic crisis, and as part of a structural adjustment programme 
(SAP). Consequently, power sector reforms have taken a variety of forms and paths. It is 
perhaps not surprising that many African countries have encountered unexpected problems 
and some have only achieved to some extent limited results.  
Our findings in chapter four indicate that for improvement in terms of increase in total 
electricity generation, installed capacity and capacity utilisation, it suggests that a country 
should adopt at least three market-oriented reforms in the power sector. This implies a 
uniform pattern for all the countries. That is to say that similar reforms adopt by different 
countries work in the same way for different countries in the region. Thus, this is our first 
policy implication (i.e. reform prescription for a particular country may not work the same for 
another). Therefore, why is vital to initiate a reform or embark on the progress, it is essential 
to widen the reform agenda to include local conditions. 
The second empirical chapter tried to explain effect of exogenous factors (such as customer 
density and peak load) on the electricity distribution companies’ efficiency level; how do 
electricity distribution companies behave when the quality of service is incorporated to its 
production function. Based on the result obtained from the chapter, we form our second and 
third policy implications. The second policy implication of our results is that the amount of 
energy delivered to customers and the number of transformer has a significant influence on 
the technical efficiency level of electricity Distribution Company. Therefore, while designing 
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a power sector reform, it is important to plan the distance between distribution transformers, 
in order to avoid unnecessary power outages. 
The third policy implication implies that the electricity distribution companies always meet 
their quality of service targets as set by the regulatory body. Our result shown that 
incorporating the quality of service to the production function allows us to identify the 
sources of technical inefficiency and underlying trade-off faced by EDISCOs. That is to say 
that electricity distribution companies perform better under an incentive regulatory system.  
Our last empirical chapter examined factors that influencing the private sector investment in 
power sector using political institution/ government commitment indicators, market-oriented 
reforms and macroeconomic stability variables. In other words, strong political institution 
structure (such as a strong judicial system, a low corruption rate, political stability and 
adherence to the rule of law) promote increase in private sector investment; also, market-
oriented reform matters in attracting private sector investment in electricity market in the 
region and lastly macroeconomic stability (i.e. low inflation, access to capital) stimulates 
increase in private sector investment in African electricity market.  Based on the results from 
this chapter, we form the fourth and fifth policy implications.  
The fourth policy implication suggest countries with low corruption perception, freedom 
from political instability, independent of judiciary and rule of law attract more private 
sector investment. Our result revealed only corruption is significant. The fifth policy 
implication deals with the fact that market-oriented reform and strong macroeconomic 
stability variables influence private investment positively. Our findings indicate that these 
variables matter, but not sufficient to increase private sector investment. 
7.4 Policy recommendation 
In sum, discussion over the effects and impact of market-oriented reform on electricity 
market is heated, ongoing, and oftentimes uninformed, as some people believed that it has led 
to an increase in access, and improved quality of services, while on the other side, market-
oriented reform is criticised as a failure and an attempt for a few individuals to control a 
country’s essential service. It is no easy task to arrive at a definite ground of reforms—let 
alone offer a general acceptable policy recommendation. All of these issues cannot be 
addressed here; rather, our main purpose in this section is to shed light on the way forward 
for developing economies, especially the African region, while recognizing the inherent 
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limitations of these sources. Our policy recommendations to a country that wants to 
implement or redesign its reform programme in their power sector is to: 
(i). Bear in mind that not all market-oriented reforms in electricity market are successful (i.e. 
there are no one-size-fits-all reforms), also it is clear to state that electricity market reform is 
an evolving and changing process rather than a one-off event. Therefore, in the context of an 
environment characterized by unsustainable macroeconomic policies, inadequate political 
institutions and government commitments, the reform may fail. African countries should 
therefore avoid the pitfall of many developing countries by imitating developed countries 
structure and design in their power sector reform. It is critical to pay attention to local 
conditions. Reforms that are imported from outside and imposed on the people without 
considering local status may not be successful; rather it may weaken institutions that generate 
mechanisms of social identification and social protection. For instance, consider the 
composites of the country first and its history, as what works for Nigeria may unlike work for 
Egypt. 
 (ii). Market-oriented reforms in electricity market are not the end but a means. There are 
necessary, but not sufficient conditions for improving and achieving the first-best in power 
sector reform. Therefore, strong political institutions, government commitment and 
conductive environment are vital, also the right people to manage the sector are important in 
power sector reform success (see chapter six discussion). 
(iii). Electricity tariff reform should come first before overall power sector reform of the 
industry. The problem of cost recovery, under-pricing and subsidy pose serious challenges to 
the success of electricity market reform (Kessides, 2012b). Low cost recovery and subsides in 
the market limit private sector participation, as it lacks the incentive for private investors to 
make profit from their investment. Therefore, it is important for countries to first and 
foremost restructure its tariff structure and remove subsidy incentive from the system, before 
embarking on electricity market reform. As in many African countries, energy subsidies exist 
side by side with high power tariffs, making it difficult for full private sector participation 
and in such circumstance, it is difficult for the power utilities to recover cost. For instance, 
the Nigeria electricity market reform shows that power sector reform without first 
restructuring its electric tariff affect its success. In December, 2013, the country had achieved 
most of the power sector reform milestone, without fully restructure the tariff structure 
(Kojima et al.2014). 
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(iv) However, it is important that after reforming the tariff structure and cross-subsidies 
removes or reduced, that periodic review be implemented to confirm with the best practise in 
the sector. As one of the recent example, the Uganda electricity regulatory agency introduced 
tariff quarterly adjustment methodology in January, 2014. This review responds to changes in 
power generation mix, exchange rate, and inflations (ERA, 2014). 
(v). lastly, power sector in Africa countries should not just be discrete parts (i.e. there should 
be introduce retail competition in the supply segment to give customers options to choose 
from. Also, rural supply should be incorporated into the reforms, just as the urban supply, 
because private sector prefers to involve in cities and urban areas power supply than rural 
areas, because of return on investment(ROI) are higher in the former than later. Retail 
competition in the electricity market gives the consumers the opportunity to choose their own 
supplier as the case in Norway, Great Britain and European Union countries. It is the 
mainstream of the power sector reform in developed countries. 
 7.5 Limitation of the research 
In the course of this doctoral research, I have experienced frustration caused by wrong 
estimation, anticipated correct sign for a favourite variable turn to be the opposite. The 
disappointment one encounters when faced with an assumed straightforward estimation of a 
preferred model that turned out to be a wrong estimation could affect quality of a research. 
Due to the nature of our study, coupled with limited dataset tend to give rise to some potential 
limitations; 
Just like any other econometric analysis on market-oriented reform, the problem of 
endogeneity may occur in our analysis (i.e. when an explanatory variable is said to be 
correlated with the error term) these could be a result of measurement error or a loop of 
causality between the explanatory and explained variables. In other word, some independent 
variables in our model may have influence the dependent variable. One solution to this 
problem is to select good instrumental variables (IV)126. Thus, it was difficult to find a good 
instrumental variable, so we did not consider adopting this technique in our analysis, rather 
we used panel data which involved fixed effect. Therefore, by using country fixed effect we 
control the problem of endogeneity in our analysis. 
                                                          
126 There are two basic requirements for a good instrument; (i). Have to be correlated with the endogenous 
explanatory variables, based on the other covariates. (ii). the instrument must not be correlated with the 
explanatory variables. If these conditions are not met, then using instrumental variables is not valid. 
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Another source of shortcoming to our analysis is due to limited datasets. In our first, second 
and third empirical chapters, our samples size were 30, 16 and 28 countries respectively. 
Suppose in our regression estimation, as measured the impact of market-oriented reform on 
the performance of power generation performance in African countries. Our data have 
different results for different dependent variables than those without data availability. The 
consequence of this will be selection bias and misleading results. Therefore, in our analysis, 
we select only countries that have adopted reform and the period of observation are all the 
same across the dataset. 
Lastly, another problem common which is often ignored is the problem of outliers. In our 
estimation of factors that influences private sector investment in power sector. We adopted an 
aggregated data, our results shown the real GDP per capita was positive, and statistically 
significant. For clear understanding, we dropped South Africa in the sample, and regressed 
again (robustness check). In the second estimation, real GDP per capita was insignificant and 
negative, which signifies that South Africa was an outlier in the model. 
7.6 Some recommendations for further research 
This research has analysed the economics of electricity market reform focusing on African 
region. This analysis has provided in-depth understandings about the reason African countries 
are where there are in term of achieving reliable and efficient power supply. 
The approach employed by this research is to examine the extent of market-oriented reform 
impacts on the power generation performance, power distribution companies’ technical 
efficiency and the private sector investment in the sector. It is basically an econometric 
approach used, therefore, we could use case study approach with data envelopment analysis 
to analyse the efficiency and productivity of each of the country’s power generation and 
distribution firms’ performance in post and pre- reform and in measuring technical efficiency 
of each country distribution firm(s). As this will explore more hidden information. 
Besides, the approach could include using other relevant data, which was not available for all 
the countries in the sample at the time of writing to improve on the result. 
More economic analysis on factors influencing private sector investment in power sector is 
critical to evaluate the effect of natural resources endowments of a country on private sector 
investment. In addition, comparison study on electricity trading in the developed and 
developing regions might explain other factors that could influence private sector investment. 
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Based on our analysis, it appears that countries with high real GDP are able to attract more 
private sector investment. 
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